1. "PKK Kills 91 Soldiers from Jan. to July", Ninety-one Turkish soldiers have been killed in Kurdish rebel attacks across Turkey in the first seven months of 2006, the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced on Saturday.

2. "Mount Qandil: A Safe Haven for Kurdish Militants – Part 1", According to their own estimates, the number of PKK fighters in Qandil is around 3,000 [4]. The Turkish government estimates that there are up to 5,000 PKK members in the whole of northern Iraq [5].

3. "Turkey at the tipping point", After a Kurdish group claimed responsibility for a series of recent bombings in Turkey that killed three civilians and injured many others, the United States appointed a retired Air Force general and former NATO commander, Joseph Ralston, to work with Turkish authorities.

4. "Iraq calls for Turkey's assistance in soldiers training", Visiting Iraqi Defence Minister Abd al-Qadir Muhammad al-Ubaydi called here Friday for NATO member Turkey's assistance in soldiers training.

5. "Turks protest at funeral of soldier killed by Kurdish guerrillas", Angry women were seen shouting "Send Bilal to the military," in reference to Erdogan's son, who lives in the United States, television footage showed.

6. "'Bastard' pits Turkey against itself", Europe's governing body is watching which way Turkish courts will jump as author Elif Shafak is prosecuted for insulting her nation .

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1. - Cihan News Agency - "PKK Kills 91 Soldiers from Jan. to July":

10 September 2006

Ninety-one Turkish soldiers have been killed in Kurdish rebel attacks across Turkey in the first seven months of 2006, the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced on Saturday.

Twenty-five off the slain soldiers lost their lives in July when clashes between the security forces and the PKK in southeastern Turkey hit its peak.

Only six soldiers died in terrorist attacks in 2002, while the figures for 2003, 2004, and 2005 were 21, 73 and 97, respectively.

Seven Turkish soldiers have been killed and five others injured in southern Turkey in September alone, from clashes with the PKK or anti-tank mine explosions.

Rebel activities across Turkey experienced a resurgence following the ending of the unilateral cease-fire of the PKK two years ago. Two hundred twenty-three Turkish security force personnel have now been killed in PKK attacks since June 2004.

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2. - The Jamestown Foundation - "Mount Qandil: A Safe Haven for Kurdish Militants – Part 1":

8 September 2006 / by James Brandon

The following information and assessments are based upon the author's first-hand observations from his March 2006 visit to Kurdish camps on Mount Qandil.

In recent months, Turkey has renewed its threats to enter Iraqi Kurdistan to attack the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Any Turkish attack would focus on the PKK's main base, or series of camps, in the foothills of Mount Qandil (or Kandeel), a 3,500 meter mountain that straddles the Iranian border some 100 kilometers from the Turkish frontier. In August, Mount Qandil was the subject of Iranian artillery attacks as Tehran attempted to destroy camps belonging to both the PKK and its Iranian counterpart, the Party for Freedom and Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) (for an in-depth portrait of PJAK, see Terrorism Monitor, June 15). Any attempt by Turkey and Iran to attack the Kurds in northern Iraq will likely involve operations on this strategic mountain.

Geography

Mount Qandil is located on the Iranian border. The area controlled by the PKK is on the mountain's western and southern side where a series of winding valleys fan out toward Lake Dukan. The PKK controls an approximately 50 square kilometer area that also contains around a dozen Kurdish villages. The mountain's sprawling 3,500 meter high summit, a jumble of interlocking peaks and plateaus, is snow-covered for much of the year. The bulk of Mount Qandil itself is in Iranian territory. The southern slopes of Mount Qandil, within PKK-held territory, are largely occupied by PJAK. A four mile-wide sparsely wooded valley separates the PJAK camps from several small Iranian military bases sited on mountain-tops facing Qandil.

The main PKK camp is approached up a winding, well-maintained asphalt road that passes over steep valleys. There are at least two simple PKK checkpoints on this road before the road crosses two passes and reaches the PKK base camp. A mud track then leads up to the main PKK bases. PJAK's camps are reached by a separate mud track. Cows and sheep grazing along the roads leading to both camps indicate that the area is not mined and the few barbed wire fences on the mountain are to stop livestock rather than troops. Where the road switchbacks up steep inclines, however, there are indications that the cliff-side is rigged with explosives so that rockfalls can be remotely triggered. Where the hillsides are steep the terrain is rocky, but in the valley there are fields and fruit trees. Further up the mountain there are deciduous forests.

Facilities, Weapons and Communications

Most PKK buildings on Qandil are traditional Kurdish mud and stone houses. Some larger buildings are built of pre-fabricated steel or concrete blocks. There is also a PKK cemetery with approximately 30 graves. The PKK has several petrol-powered generators; electricity consumption, however, is very low. Buildings and tents are often lit by oil-lamps and heated in winter by oil-stoves. There is one simple hospital at the PKK base camp, partially staffed by Kurds educated in Western Europe. The hospital, which is composed of two long, low huts made of concrete breeze blocks, offers only the most basic medical facilities.

Communication within the camp is by a mix of shortwave radio and Thuraya satellite phone, neither of which appears entirely reliable. As PJAK and the PKK are separated by the high mountain ridges, radio communication between the two is patchy. On parts of the mountain it is possible to receive a weak signal on Korek, the main Kurdish cell phone operator. The PKK also have internet access on several computers through satellite uplinks. Travel within the camp is mainly by foot. Donkeys and mules are also used to transport food and provisions up and down the mountain. The PKK also have some 4x4 jeeps that are mainly used for traveling outside the base. Food is brought in from the nearby town of Raniya.

The PKK's weapons are mainly basic. The standard weapon is the AK-47 assault rifle. There is little visible evidence of any more high-tech equipment. PKK publicity photographs, however, show Soviet-era anti-aircraft guns, RPGs and heavy machine guns. PKK members are often un-armed in camp and it is unclear if there are enough AK-47s to go around. There was no obvious sign of high-end guerrilla equipment such as sniper rifles or night-vision goggles. There are some guard dogs kept at outlying PKK encampments on Mount Qandil.

History of the Camp

The precise history of Kurdish militant activity on Mount Qandil is unclear but the presence of old, traditional Kurdish villages within PKK territory suggests that Mount Qandil mostly escaped Saddam Hussein's campaign against the Kurds. In 1988, Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) had their main guerrilla headquarters nearby which may have encompassed Qandil [1]. Turkish Kurdish militants were active in Iraq from the mid-1980s, but the PKK first came to the region in substantial numbers in 1991. During the 1980s, the PKK were mainly funded by Syria and based in Lebanon's Bekaa valley. The PKK first moved to Qandil after PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan declared a cease-fire after his arrest in 1999 and then in a second wave when Syrian sponsorship of the PKK formally ended in 2000. Mount Qandil was from its inception a PKK retreat rather than part of an offensive strategy.

The PKK's decision to settle in Qandil may have been inspired by the actions of the Kurdish Islamic groups Komala and Jund al-Islam, which by the mid-1990s were starting to coalesce around Halabja where—with Iranian help—they gradually established a shifting zone of control in a dozen villages. Like Mount Qandil, these areas were also mountainous, inaccessible and nestled tightly against the porous Iranian border. The presence of these Kurdish Islamist camps (eventually ruled by Ansar al-Islam) meant that a rigid ideological separation developed among non-Iraqi Kurds; the religious went to Halabja and the secular moved to Qandil [2].

In summer 2003, the U.S. Army surrounded Mount Qandil and established checkpoints on the roads leading to the mountain [3]. The Coalition Provisional Authority refurbished small Saddam-era forts on some of the mountain's approach roads that are now manned by small PUK peshmerga detachments. These men do not interfere with the operations of the PKK or PJAK and their main aim appears to be to prevent non-Kurds from reaching the camps.

Numbers of Fighters and the Role of the Camp

According to their own estimates, the number of PKK fighters in Qandil is around 3,000 [4]. The Turkish government estimates that there are up to 5,000 PKK members in the whole of northern Iraq [5]. The constant migration of people from Qandil makes an exact figure impossible and there is some overlap between PJAK and PKK fighters. Many of the camp's long-term residents are Syrian Kurds who are unable to return to their homeland [6]. The quality of PKK recruits on Qandil compares unfavorably to those of PJAK, the PKK's more urbanized Iranian equivalent. While PJAK's members are young, motivated and highly educated, PKK members on Mount Qandil are largely older, less educated and often from very rural backgrounds.

The PKK operates Mount Qandil more as a mini-state rather than a simple "training camp." While weapons training does take place and forms an important part of training for new recruits, the PKK puts great emphasis on ideological training [7]. Education in Kurdish history, culture and politics aims to create dedication to the Kurdish cause with loyalty to Abdullah Ocalan. At the same time, many PKK members are middle-aged and have been in the camp since 1999, or even earlier. The camp is purposely situated far from the frontlines and its primary role is to act as a safe haven for Turkish Kurds. The sense of lethargy that pervades the camp comes from the fact that the PKK's leader is still Abdullah Ocalan who, despite being in prison, aims to micro-manage the movement. "The PKK are lost; they are on their mountain and they don't have a clue about where their movement is going," said Peshwaz Faizulla, editor of Hawlati, the largest independent newspaper in Iraqi Kurdistan.

* Part Two of this article will discuss the internal politics of the Kurds on Mount Qandil, in addition to the future of the camps.

Notes

1. Human Rights Watch, "The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds," (New York, 1993), http://hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ANFAL3.htm.
2. Author interviews with members of Komala and the Islamic Union of Kurdistan, March 2006.
3. Author interview with Akif Zagros, member of PJAK leadership council, PJAK Camp, Mount Qandil, Iraqi Kurdistan, March 21.
4. Interviews with PKK members, March 20-22, 2006, Mount Qandil.
5. See for example: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/Terrorism/PKK_KONGRA_GEL.htm
6. Interviews with PKK members, March 20-22, 2006, Mount Qandil.
7. Author interview with Assad Abdul Rahman Chaderchi, member of PKK leadership council, PKK base camp, Mount Qandil, Iraqi Kurdistan, March 22.
8. Author interviews, March 2006, Sulaimaniya.

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3. - The New York Times - "Turkey at the tipping point":

10 September 2006

After a Kurdish group claimed responsibility for a series of recent bombings in Turkey that killed three civilians and injured many others, the United States appointed a retired Air Force general and former NATO commander, Joseph Ralston, to work with Turkish authorities. Ralston will be responsible for coordinating American antiterrorist efforts with Iraq and Turkey, both of which have sizable Kurdish minorities - and minorities within those minorities who have resorted to terror.

The Turkish foreign ministry hailed the appointment as a "new opportunity" for cooperation between the United States and Turkey.

The United States would be wise to create many more and varied opportunities to engage with Turkey, a longtime ally, and a uniquely important one. Turkey is a predominantly Muslim, secular democracy, situated between Europe and the Middle East. After years of trying to make amends for having suppressed its Kurdish population, often brutally, Turkey has seen violence resume of late. The United States needs to frankly acknowledge that instability in Iraq, on Turkey's southeast border, has fomented instability in Turkey. That morally obligates the United States to help with corrective action.

Equally important, a renewed focus on Turkey is in the United States' self interest. Last week, the nonprofit German Marshall Fund of the United States released the results of its annual survey of public opinion in the United States and 12 countries in Europe, including Turkey. The survey's most striking finding is the degree to which Turks now question their ties to the United States and Europe, and have warmed to Iran, their neighbor to the east.

The discontent appears anchored in Turks' overwhelming disapproval of President George W. Bush's handling of international affairs and growing disapproval of European Union leadership. Both are manifest in waning Turkish support for the institutions that have bound Turkey to the West. Though Turkey has been a staunch NATO member since 1952, only 44 percent of Turks in this year's survey agreed that NATO was essential for Turkey's security, versus 52 percent in 2005. Even though Turkey opened official membership talks with the European Union last year - after strenuous efforts to meet the Union's criteria - only 54 percent of Turks now view membership as a good thing, versus 73 percent in 2004.

As Turks see it, their support over decades for the West and for democracy has been rewarded with severe regional tension brought on by the United States, and by a cold shoulder, particularly from France and Austria, ever since Turkey qualified for European Union accession talks.

The appointment of Ralston may help the United States to re-engage with Turkey, though ending Kurdish violence and tensions requires mainly political solutions. The United States can also help to keep Turkey's aspiration to join the European Union on track, by advocating more openly for resolution of the division of Cyprus between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

The United States must not ever take Turkey for granted.

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4. - Xinhua - "Iraq calls for Turkey's assistance in soldiers training":

8 September 2006

Visiting Iraqi Defence Minister Abd al-Qadir Muhammad al-Ubaydi called here Friday for NATO member Turkey's assistance in soldiers training.

Speaking to reporters prior to his meeting with his Turkish counterpart Vecdi Gonul, al-Ubaydi said that "military training in Turkey is excellent. Thus, we want to send Iraqi soldiers to Turkey for their training."

He said that "I am in Turkey to further develop relations between our two countries. We are aware about Turkey's concerns arising from the north of Iraq and Iraq in general. The Iraqi government will do all it can to eradicate matters of serious concern of Turkish authorities."

For his part, Gonul said that Turkey and Iraq are neighbors with deep historical and cultural ties.

"I am confident that Iraq will reach bright days with its richness in culture, intellectualism and natural resources. Turkey and Iraq have excellent relations," he said.

The Turkish official indicated that Baghdad has taken some steps against Turkey's outlawed Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) based in the north of Iraq and will continue to work on the issue.

"We will inform al-Ubaydi about Turkey's expectations and the steps that must be taken by the Iraqi government against PKK," he added.

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5. - AP - "Turks protest at funeral of soldier killed by Kurdish guerrillas":

ANKARA / 8 September 2006

More than 2,000 angry Turks protested on Friday at the funeral of a Turkish soldier slain by Kurdish guerrillas, calling on the prime minister to send his own son to fight the guerrillas.

The mourners in the western town of Bergama, near the Aegean port city of Izmir, were angry at comments by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who said recently: "Military service isn't the place to lay down and unwind," he said. "Military service has risks. It's not a holiday."

"He didn't lay down," said a huge banner carried by mourners in reference to 20-year-old Ali Balikci, who was killed by the guerrillas in a raid on a military outpost in the southeastern town of Eruh in Siirt province on Thursday.

Angry women were seen shouting "Send Bilal to the military," in reference to Erdogan's son, who lives in the United States, television footage showed.

The premier's remarks have caused outrage, especially because they were made at a time when Kurdish guerrillas are stepping up attacks on troops and when the prime minister was pushing to send Turkish peacekeepers to Lebanon.

The Turkish public is increasingly frustrated with the government's efforts to control the rise in attacks by the rebels, who have killed dozens of soldiers and police officers in recent attacks while setting off bombs in tourist resorts, killing three and wounding dozens of others, including 10 Britons.

The bloody fight between autonomy-seeking guerrillas of the The Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, and Turkish troops has claimed the lives of more than 37,000 people since 1984.

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6. - AP - "'Bastard' pits Turkey against itself":

ISTANBUL / 7 September 2006

For best-selling Turkish author Elif Shafak, this month promises to be one of joy and tribulation.

Nine months pregnant, the University of Arizona literature professor is set to give birth to her first child. Another important date looms: the start of her trial on charges of "insulting Turkishness" in her novel that deals with the waning years of the Ottoman Empire.

In a quiet cafe in the backstreets of Istanbul's historic Beyoglu district, where Turks, Armenians and Jews once lived in harmony, Shafak reflected on the peculiarities of a case in which it is nothing she said herself that is being put on trial, but words she gave to a fictitious Armenian character.

"I think my case is very bizarre, because for the first time they are trying fictional characters," said Shafak, a striking woman with unruly locks of blond hair.

If convicted Shafak, who divides her time between Tucson, Arizona, and Istanbul, could face three years in prison. Turkey has refused her request to delay the Sept. 21 trial because of her pregnancy.

The case will be closely watched by the EU, which has repeatedly insisted that Turkey abolish laws that limit freedom of expression if it is to fulfill its dream of joining the elite club of nations -- which sees itself both as an economic bloc and a beacon of liberal, democratic values.

Shafak said the law on insulting Turkishness "has been used as a weapon to silence many people. ... My case is perhaps just another step in this long chain."

That chain includes Turkey's best known novelist Orhan Pamuk -- a perennial candidate for the Nobel Prize in literature -- and dozens of other writers and intellectuals forced to defend themselves against charges of "insulting Turkishness."

Shafak says he has received hate mail from nationalists calling her a "pawn of the enemies of Turkey."

Although most of the cases have been dropped for technical reasons -- such as the case involving Pamuk -- and no one has ended up in prison, the trials have raised serious questions about whether Turkey is ready to embrace European values.

To Shafak, the trials, brought forward by a coalition of ultranationalist lawyers, are an attempt to resist EU-inspired changes toward a more democratic and pluralistic Turkey that some see as a threat to the powerful central state, which has strong ties to the military.

Yet Shafak sees reason for hope: The surge in nationalism, she says, is a clear sign that Turkey is truly undergoing a momentous transformation.

"This ultranationalist movement is taking place not because nothing is changing in Turkey, but just the opposite, because things are changing," Shafak said. "The bigger the transformation, the bigger their panic."

Shafak's novel, The Bastard of Istanbul, touches upon the massacres of Armenians during the final years of the Ottoman Empire, telling the tale of a Turkish and an American-Armenian family whose lives become intertwined.

The book also deals with other taboos -- domestic violence and incestuous rape -- which are rarely discussed in this conservative, predominantly Muslim country.

But it was fictional Armenian-American characters in the book who sent Shafak to court. In one passage, a character is deeply concerned about the prospect of his niece being brought up by a Turkish stepfather.

"What will that innocent lamb tell her friends when she grows up?" the man asks. "[That] I am the grandchild of genocide survivors who lost all their relatives to the hands of Turkish butchers in 1915, but I myself have been brainwashed to deny the genocide because I was raised by some Turk named Mustapha!"

Later, a radical Armenian-American blogger who goes by the name of Lady Peacock/Siramark writes: "Do you think [the Turks] are going to say: Oh yeah, we are sorry we massacred and deported you guys, and then contentedly denied it all."

Turkey insists that the mass evacuation and deaths of up to 1.5 million Armenians during World War I was not a planned genocide. Labeling it as such can be considered a criminal offense.

The book has sold 60,000 copies since it was published -- considered a big hit in Turkey, where readership is low.

The daughter of a female diplomat who raised Shafak alone -- her father left when she was young -- the novelist said that she first became aware of the Armenian issue after Armenian militants killed dozens of Turkish diplomats across the 1970s and 1980s.

"My very first acquaintance with the word `Armenian' was so negative, it just meant someone who wanted to kill my mother," Shafak said. "I then started to ask questions, `why so much hatred against Turkish diplomats? What is behind this?'"

She does not take sides on the genocide debate, but criticizes Turkey for what she calls a "collective amnesia" of the atrocities.

"Turks and Armenians are not speaking the same language," she explained. "For the Turks all the past is gone, erased from our memories. That's the way we Westernized: by being future-oriented... The grandchildren of the 1915 survivors tend to be very, very past-oriented."

The English version of The Bastard of Istanbul is to be published next year.