15 November 2006

1. "The Cypriots and the Kurds", Turkey complains vociferously about the European Union's unfair treatment of the politically and economically isolated Turkish Cypriots. Why then shouldn't Turkey grant a big chunk of its own citizens - the Kurds - the same rights it demands for people who are not even Turkish nationals?

2. "The New York Times Appeasement of Turkey", the New York Times editorial fails to state that the Turkish government and military have from 1984 through 1998 resorted to massive state terror against its 15 million Kurdish minority which has been characterized as genocide by many observers including the late respected Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island. During that time the Turkish military killed 35,000 Kurds, 30,000 of whom were innocent civilians and 5,000 were PKK rebels.

3. "Former MP Bucak Sentenced to Jail", former MP Sedat Edip Bucak involved in the 1996 car crash that uncovered the so-called Susurluk Conspiracy has been sentenced to 1 year 15 days imprisonment for conspiring to commit an offence.

4. "Turkish soldier killed in clash with Kurdish rebels", a Turkish soldier was killed Tuesday in fighting with armed Kurdish rebels in the eastern province of Van, official sources said.

5. "US questions EU deadline on Turkey", the United States today intervened in the row over Turkey's EU membership negotiations by questioning a key European demand.

6. "Turkey says Iraq must not be split up", Ankara, a NATO ally of the United States, is especially worried about the possible emergence of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq that could stoke separatism among its own large Kurdish population in southeast Turkey.

1. - International Herald Tribune - "The Cypriots and the Kurds":

14 November 2006 / by Kirsty Hughes

Turkey complains vociferously about the European Union's unfair treatment of the politically and economically isolated Turkish Cypriots. Why then shouldn't Turkey grant a big chunk of its own citizens - the Kurds - the same rights it demands for people who are not even Turkish nationals?

There are many similarities between Northern Cyprus and the Turkish southeast, where many of Turkey's estimated 15 to 20 million Kurds live. They are geographically similar and are located in sensitive areas - the one off Syria's coast, the other bordering Iran, Iraq and Syria.

Both are relatively isolated and poor, though the Kurds are a lot poorer than the Turkish Cypriots. In both cases, poverty is linked to the unresolved political and security issues around their identity and political status.

But it's the differences that are more striking. Turkey is loudly championing the rights of Turkish Cypriots in the EU. But anyone who champions Kurdish rights in Turkey risks being accused of separatism and even terrorism.

While Turkey expects international support for its Cyprus solution, based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality between the two communities, it argues the precise opposite for its own Kurdish citizens.

For many Turks, any Kurdish request for national recognition - whether to be called Kurdish citizens of Turkey rather than Turks, or for a federation, or to use the Kurdish language in schools or in the media - is perceived as an attack on the Turkish nation and its territory.

While many Kurds are ready to remain within a unitary Turkish state so long as they can have full cultural rights, for most Turks the idea of Turkish Cypriots accepting simply minority status in a Greek-Cypriot dominated Republic of Cyprus is anathema.

The Turkish habit of stamping slogans onto mountainsides is evident both in Northern Cyprus and in southeastern Turkey. But on Cyprus, the slogans declaring the north to be the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus are directed at the Greek Cypriots across the Green Line, while in the desolate mountains of southeast Turkey, the slogans assert "one state, one flag, one language."

Many Turks will argue that the Cyprus problem and the Kurdish problem are not the same due to the violence of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). But why should violence by a so called minority of Kurds mean curtailing the rights of the majority of Kurds?

How can there be any hope of a political solution in either place without respect for the rights of both minority groups?

Where are the political leaders? Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is struggling on many fronts, not least to win re-election next year in the face of a nationalist and secularist onslaught, and also to keep Turkey's EU process on track despite negative signals from Europe and waning public enthusiasm in Turkey. Thus Erdogan may not be capable of making a deal on Cyprus, nor of making any progress on the southeast in the face of growing hostility both to him and to the Kurds.

And yet while some hardline Turkish nationalists may want an independent Northern Cyprus, and some radical Kurds may dream of an independent Kurdistan, the fact is that neither Turkey's southeast, nor Northern Cyprus has a realistic future as independent state.

In both cases the best hopes for an acceptable solution lie with a continuation of Turkey's EU negotiations.

Much of the solution lies in Turkey's hands. If Turkey's government and public stand up consistently for democracy and human rights - whether in support of Turkish Cypriots or Turkey's Kurds - and against the undemocratic political pronouncements of Turkey's military and nationalists, then it will be hard for democratic European politicians to give in to their nationalists and to suspend membership negotiations with Turkey.

2. - HNA - "The New York Times Appeasement of Turkey":

WASHINGTON / 14 November 2006 / by Gene Rossides

The New York Times editorial of September 10, 2006, reprinted in the National Herald in its September 16, 2006 issue, is a prime example of the New York Times appeasement of Turkey for decades to the detriment of U.S. interests and to the detriment of Greece and Cyprus.

The editorial contains misstatements of fact, misleading statements and serious omissions of facts and issues.

The editorial commends the U.S. for appointing retired Air Force General and former NATO Commander Joseph Ralston “to work with Turkish authorities. General Ralston will be responsible for coordinating American antiterrorist efforts with Iraq and Turkey, both of which have sizable Kurdish minorities and minorities within those minorities who have resorted to terror.”

The New York Times editorial fails to state that the Turkish government and military have from 1984 through 1998 resorted to massive state terror against its 15 million Kurdish minority which has been characterized as genocide by many observers including the late respected Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island. During that time the Turkish military killed 35,000 Kurds, 30,000 of whom were innocent civilians and 5,000 were PKK rebels.

During that time the Turkish military burned and destroyed 3,000 Kurdish villages creating three million Kurdish refugees in their own country.

During that time the Turkish paramilitary under the direction of the Turkish military assassinated 17,500 Kurds as stated by Eric Rouleau, former French Ambassador to Turkey in his article “Turkey?s Dream of Democracy” in Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, pp. 100 to 114 at 112.

Instead the New York Times editorial refers to the Turkish Foreign Ministry?s hailing “the appointment as a ?new opportunity? for cooperation between the United States and Turkey”…and says the U.S. “would be wise to create many more and varied opportunities to engage with Turkey, a longtime ally, and a uniquely important one.”

I strongly disagree that Turkey is “a longtime ally and a uniquely important one.” Let?s look at the record for the 20th century and the opening years of the 21st century.

The record clearly shows that in the 20th century Turkey fought against the U.S. in World War I; that in World War II Turkey broke its treaty with Britain and France to enter the war; stated its neutrality; profited from both sides; and actually aided Nazi Germany by providing Hitler with chromium, a vital resource to Nazi Germany?s armaments industry and war effort. (See F. Weber, The Evasive Neutral 44 (1979).

Hitler?s armaments chief, Albert Speer, provided Hitler a memorandum in November 1943 on “Alloys in Armaments Productions and the Importance of Chromium Imports from the Balkans and Turkey,” which stated that the loss of chromium supplies from Turkey would end the war in about 10 months. A. Speer, Inside the Third Reich 316-17, 405, 550 n. 10 (1970).

The allies finally halted chromium exports to Nazi Germany. However the net effect of Turkey supplying Hitler with chromium was that Turkey prolonged WW II in Europe by seven months.

Let?s look at the record since 1947 when the U.S. started ait to Turkey at the beginning of the Cold War. How many readers are aware that since that date, and while being a NATO member since 1952, there are several instances where Turkey actively aided the Soviet military to the detriment of the U.S. and NATO! The facts are well known yet the New York Times editorial board simply ignores them and calls Turkey “a staunch NATO member since 1952.” As long ago as 1974, Edward Luttwak, the noted strategic analyst, discussed Turkey?s cooperation with the Soviet military during the Cold War. He wrote the following:

“No longer presenting a direct threat to the integrity of Turkish national territory, and no longer demanding formal revision of the Straits navigation regime, the Soviet Union has nevertheless successfully exercised armed suasion over Turkey, even while maintaining a fairly benevolent stance, which includes significant aid flows. Faced with a sharp relative increase in Russian strategic and naval power, and eager to normalize relations with their formidable neighbor, the Turks have chosen to conciliate the Russians, and have been able to do so at little or no direct cost to themselves. It is only in respect to strategic transit that Turkey is of primary importance to the Soviet Union, and this is the area where the concessions have been made. Examples of such deflection, where the Russians are conciliated at the expense of western rather than specifically Turkish interests, include the overland traffic agreement (unimpeded Russian transit to Iraq and Syria by road), the generous Turkish interpretation of the Montreux Convention, which regulates ship movements in the Straits, and above all, the overflight permissions accorded to Russian civilian and military aircraft across Turkish air space. The alliance relationship in NATO and with the United States no doubt retains a measure of validity in Turkish eyes, but it is apparent that its supportive effect is not enough to counteract Russian suasion, especially since the coercion is latent and packaged in a benevolent, diplomatic stance.” (Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power, Johns Hopkins Press, 1974, pp. 60-61.)

Examples of Turkey?s disloyalty and unreliability over the past decades as a NATO ally for U.S. strategic purposes include:

1. During the 1973 Mid-East War, predating the Turkish invasion of Cyprus by one year, Turkey refused the United States military overflight rights to resupply Israel and granted the U.S.S.R. overland military convoy rights to resupply Syria and Iraq, and military overflight permission to resupply Egypt. (See Karaosmanoglu, “Turkey?s Security and the Middle East,” 52 Foreign Affairs 157, 163, Fall 1983.)

2. In the 1977-78 conflict in Ethiopia, Turkey granted the Soviets military overflight rights to support the pro-Soviet minority of Ethiopian communist insurgents, led by Colonel Mengistu, who eventually prevailed and established a Marxist dictatorship directly dependent upon the Soviet Union. (C. Meyer, Facing Reality- From World Federalism to the CIA 276-80, 1980.)

3. Over NATO objections, Turkey allowed three Soviet aircraft carriers, the Kiev on July 18, 1976, the Minsk on February 25, 1979 and the Novorosiisk on May 16, 1983, passage rights through the Bosphorous and Dardanelles Straits into the Mediterranean in violation of the Montreux Convention of 1936. The Soviet ships posed a formidable threat to the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

4. In 1979 Turkey refused to allow the U.S. to send 69 U.S. marines and six helicopters to American military facilities at Incirlik in Turkey for possible use in evacuating Americans from Iran and protecting the U.S. embassy in Tehran.

5. Again in 1979 Turkey refused the U.S. request to allow U-2 intelligence flights (for Salt II verification) over Turkish airspace “unless Moscow agreed.” (N.Y. Times, May 15, 1979, at A1, col. 3.) This position was voiced over a period of months by Turkish officials, the opposition party and the military Chief of Staff, General Kenan Evren, (See, Washington Post and New York Times, April—September 1979).

6. In January of 1981, President Carter tried to obtain a commitment from Turkey for the use of Turkish territory for operations in cases of conflict in the Middle East. The January 20, 1981, New York Times reported that Turkey was not in favor of “the United States using Turkish bases for conflicts not affecting Turkey.” In the spring, 1983, issue of Foreign Policy magazine, Harry Shaw pointed out that Turkey is unlikely to become involved in, or allow U.S. forces to use Turkish territory in a Middle East war that does not threaten her territory directly.

7. As an example of the above, in 1980, Turkey refused to permit the U.S. to use the NATO base at Diyarbakir in eastern Turkey as a transit point for the purpose of conducting a rescue mission into Tehran, Iran, to free the American hostages held in that city. The distance from Diyarbakir to Tehran is 450 miles as opposed to the actual route taken, which was over 900 miles.

8. In May, 1989, Turkey rejected an American request to inspect an advanced MIG-29 Soviet fighter plane, flown by a Soviet defector to Turkey. (New York Times, May 28, 1989, at A12, col.1.)

9. The Turkish government refused repeated American requests for the installation of antennas in Turkey concerning eleven transmitters whose broadcasts would have been directed primarily at the Soviet Union and its eastern European satellites. (Newsweek, July 22, 1983)

10. Turkey further damaged NATO by vetoing NATO?s effort to put military bases on various Greek islands in the Aegean for defensive purposes against the Soviet navy.

Most readers are aware of the latest failure of Turkey as an “ally” to assist the U.S., namely, the Turkish Parliament?s refusal on March 1, 2003 to allow U.S. troops to use bases in Turkey to open a northern front against Saddam Hussein?s dictatorship when it counted most.

The reason for the refusal was Turkey?s efforts to get more money. Prime Minister Erdogan stated that he wanted $6 billion more for Turkey?s cooperation over the $26 billion irresponsibly offered by the then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz! A U.S. negotiator called it “extortion in the name of alliance.”

The Times states erroneously that Turkey is a “secular democracy situated between Europe and the Middle East.” Freedom House points out that Turkey is a “partial democracy” because, among other things, the military is not under civilian control and there is a lack of freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of religion. Further Turkey is 95% in the Middle East and 5% is Europe.

The public opinion surveys in Turkey referred to by the Times editorial can and should be cited to demonstrate that Turkey, a 99% Muslim nation, cannot be relied upon by the U.S., NATO and the West.

The Times editorial?s serious omissions of issues and facts are three-fold: Cyprus, the Aegean and Armenia. How could an editorial on Turkey not include a discussion of Turkey?s invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and its occupation of 37.3% of northern Cyprus since 1974 with 35,000 illegal occupation troops, and 120,000 illegal colonists/settlers in violation of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Turkish barbed wire fence across the face of Cyprus?

How could it not refer to the report of the UN Commission of Human Rights condemning Turkey for the killings and rapes of innocent civilians and looting by its army in 1974 and thereafter?

How could it not refer to the Turkish Air Forces illegal flights in the Aegean in violation of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) rules?

How could such an editorial not discuss the illegal economic blockade of Armenia which prevents U.S. humanitarian supplies to Armenia?

Frankly, the editorial should have asked:

What is the U.S. State Department doing to advance full human and political rights for Turkey?s Kurds?

When is the State Department going to apply the Bush doctrine of democracy to Turkey?

What is the State Department doing to remove the Turkish occupation troops and settlers from Cyprus and getting rid of the Turkish barbed wire fence?

What is the State Department doing to halt the illegal Turkish Air Force flights in the Aegean in violation of ICAO rules? General Ralston should have been appointed to halt Turkey?s illegal Air Force flights in the Aegean.

What is the State Department doing to lift Turkey?s economic blockade of Armenia?

I urge my readers to write and call the New York Times to protest its appeasement of Turkey. Your letters and calls can definitely help.

3. - Bianet - "Former MP Bucak Sentenced to Jail":

Former MP Sedat Edip Bucak involved in the 1996 car crash that uncovered the so-called Susurluk Conspiracy has been sentenced to 1 year 15 days imprisonment for conspiring to commit an offence.

ISTANBUL / 14 November 2006

True Path Party (DYP) former Sanliurfa MP Sedat Edip Bucak has been found guilty of conspiracy to commit an offence and sentenced to 1 year 15 days imprisonment for his involvement in a criminal network ranging into the state, which was uncovered through a November 3, 1996 traffic accident in Susurluk.

Bucak, who was injured in the accident involving a Mercedes car and a truck colliding, was traveling together with Istanbul Police School chief Huseyin Kocadag, Abdullah Catli who was carrying a false identification in the name of Mehmet Ozbay and Gonca Us.

Neither he nor current DYP chairman Mehmet Agar who was named during the investigation into the Susurluk conspiracy gang could be tried for a time due to parliamentary immunity.

While Agar's immunity still continues, Bucak was charged in 2002 after losing his immunity for "setting up a gang in order to commit offences and possession of deadly weapons".

Bucak was originally pardoned for two of the offences he was charged with and acquitted on the conspiracy charges but the acquittal was overturned by the Court of Appeals leading to this retrial.

The court had decided that during the trial key witnesses including former Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, Mehmet Agar, Tansu Ciller, Gen. Dogan Gures and Hasan Kundakci could submit their statements through fax without making any court appearances.

4. - AFP - "Turkish soldier killed in clash with Kurdish rebels":

DIYARBAKIR / 14 November 2006

A Turkish soldier was killed Tuesday in fighting with armed Kurdish rebels in the eastern province of Van, official sources said.

Fighting with members of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) broke out near the town of Baskale, about 50 kilometers (31 miles) from the Iranian border, the sources said.

The PKK, which has been battling the Turkish army since 1984, ordered a unilateral ceasefire from October 1, saying it hoped this would pave the way for talks to resolve the conflict.

But the truce, like previous ones called by the rebels, was rejected by Turkey.

Fighting has nonetheless decreased markedly since then.

More than 37,000 people have died since the PKK took up arms for self-rule in the mainly Kurdish southeast of the country.

5. - The Guardian - "US questions EU deadline on Turkey":

BRUSSELS / 14 November 2006 / by Nicholas Watt

The United States today intervened in the row over Turkey's EU membership negotiations by questioning a key European demand.

Weeks ahead of an expected showdown between Turkey and the EU, Washington cast doubt on the EU's call for Ankara to open up its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels by the end of this year.

European leaders are expected next month to suspend parts of Turkey's EU membership negotiations if Ankara refuses to live up to its commitment to extend its EU customs union to Cyprus. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish prime minister, is refusing to act until the EU lifts its trade embargo of Turkish occupied northern Cyprus.

Washington, Turkey's staunchest ally which has long supported its EU membership bid, today offered some support for Ankara by questioning whether the EU had imposed a deadline. Matthew Bryza, the US deputy assistant secretary of state for Europe, said that the EU has been clear in demanding that Turkey act on Cyprus, but he insisted that no clear deadline was ever set.

"It is a factual observation, not an analytical one, that the language of October 3 [2005, the day Turkey's membership talks were formally launched] was not specific about deadlines. The language is ambiguous and intentionally ambiguous so that the political process can take place [and] member states can take whatever decision they want."

Mr Bryza's remarks set him at odds with all sides in the EU, including allies of Turkey, who agree that some form of punishment will have to be imposed - possibly at next month's EU summit - if Turkey refuses to act on Cyprus. This is on the basis that the EU pledged to review the implementation of the Ankara protocol, Turkey's customs union with all 25 EU members, by the end of this year.

Britain, Turkey's biggest supporter in the EU, is hoping to limit the punishment by suspending a small number of the 35 "chapters" in the membership negotiations which are specifically related to Cyprus and the customs union. These could cover transport and the free movement of goods.

Mr Bryza called for the EU to agree on an even lighter touch. He would like the EU to continue negotiations on the 34 chapters still under discussion, but to refuse to conclude them until Turkey moves. "Maybe one option would be not closing rather than not opening [chapters]," he said.

Mr Bryza insisted that he was not intervening directly in the negotiations which are a matter entirely for the EU and Turkey. "We are willing to offer any assistance or we are willing to do nothing at all ... This is the EU stadium, we are not in the stadium. Maybe we can buy a ticket for the match."

He said it would be wrong for Washington to repeat its 2004 intervention - in the run up to the EU's announcement of a start date for the negotiations - when George Bush telephoned Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder to say why it was important to anchor Turkey in the west.

But Mr Bryza's carefully calibrated remarks will be seen as an important signal of support for Turkey at a delicate moment.

France, which is emerging as the key player in the negotiations, yesterday made clear that its patience is running out. Catherine Colonna, France's Europe minister, said that the European Commission should publish its recommendations for how Turkey should be punished soon. "We can't wait until the last moment to consider the conclusions," she said.

Paris, which is growing increasingly sceptical of Turkey's EU membership bid, is likely to act as a broker between Britain, which will want a limited punishment, and Cyprus which may call for the entire negotiations to be suspended.

6. - Reuters - "Turkey says Iraq must not be split up":

ANKARA / 14 November 2006

Turkey on Tuesday condemned suggestions that dividing its eastern neighbour Iraq into three separate states could bring peace, saying such a move would instead plunge the whole region into chaos.

"God forbid, if Iraq breaks up, an unbelievably dark new period will begin," Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said, using unusually strong language.

"In such an event, Iraq's neighbours will not have the same attitude as today, of course. The world should know this," he told parliament's budget committee, signalling that Turkey and other neighbours would not stay quietly on the sidelines.

Ankara, a NATO ally of the United States, is especially worried about the possible emergence of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq that could stoke separatism among its own large Kurdish population in southeast Turkey.

Iran and Syria also oppose the creation of a Kurdish state.

Some U.S. politicians including Senator Joseph Biden, a Democrat who is expected to head the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, have suggested creating three largely automous regions for Iraq's Shi'ites in the south, Sunni Arabs in the centre and Kurds in the north.

"This kind of simplistic approach would definitely drag the country into chaos and can never be an alternative," said Gul, evoking the bloody breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Gul also urged Kurds, Arabs and Turkish-speaking Turkmen to forge a compromise over the fate of Kirkuk and its oil reserves in northern Iraq. Ankara fears the region's dominant Kurds aim to turn Kirkuk into the capital of a new state.