25 April 2006

1. "Dozens of Kurdish youngsters risk jail over riots in Turkey", at least 80 minors aged between 12 and 18 will stand trial in connection with deadly Kurdish riots that rattled this southeastern Turkish city last month, risking jail terms of up to 24 years, judicial officials said Monday.

2. "Turkish cities suffering wave of bombings", as Turkey dreams of joining the wealthy European Union, and gears up for the summer tourist influx that feeds its economy, it is suffering a wave of bombings by an old adversary - Kurdish rebels.

3. "Anti-Terror Bill Restrictive, Unnecessary", rights activist and lawyer Yildirim evaluates Ankara's new Anti-Terror bill, says it's against fundamental rights and freedoms. "Defendants are to be categorized as 'terrorists' until they can prove their own innocence... Turkey does not need such a law."

4. "Turkey expects 'operational' support from US against Kurdish rebels", Turkey called on the United States Monday for "operational" support against Turkish Kurd rebels based in neighboring northern Iraq, saying that intelligence sharing alone cannot be effective against "terrorism."

5. "Greek, Kurd issues await Rice in Turkey", threats of more carnage by restive Kurds and a growing feud over the role of Islam will greet Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on her one-day visit to Turkey on Wednesday.

6. "Divide And Heal", despite the imminent formation of a government of national unity, Iraq is splintering into its three historic provinces. The break-up can be managed, but it cannot be avoided. The western powers and Iraqi nationalists must now accept that radical federalism is the only alternative to civil war.

1. - AFP - "Dozens of Kurdish youngsters risk jail over riots in Turkey":

DIYARBAKIR / 24 April 2006

At least 80 minors aged between 12 and 18 will stand trial in connection with deadly Kurdish riots that rattled this southeastern Turkish city last month, risking jail terms of up to 24 years, judicial officials said Monday.

The prosecution charged the suspects with offenses including membership in an armed organization, a reference to the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), accused of orchestrating the riots; damaging public property; preventing public servants from carrying out their duties and breaching the law on meetings and demonstrations, the sources said.

If convicted, the suspects risk jail terms of between nine-and-a-half and 24 years in jail.

Most of the suspects remain in jail in Diyarbakir, the central city of the mainly Kurdish southeast.

No details were available as to what age groups the suspects belong, but Baris Yavuz, a lawyer for several defendants, explained that children younger than 12 cannot be tried under Turkish law, which considers people under 18 as minors.

The suspects will be tried at a special juvenile court, inaugurated last year as part of reforms Turkey has undertaken to align with European Union norms.

The unrest erupted in Diyarbakir on March 28 after youths demanding vengeance attacked the police following the funerals of PKK rebels killed in fighting with the army and spread quickly to other towns in the region.

A total of 16 people, including three small boys, were killed when the security forces opened fire and used tear gas to disperse the crowds, which attacked the police with Molotov cocktails, torched banks and vandalized public buildings and shops.

Among the victims were also three women who were crushed to death in Istanbul when Kurdish rioters set a city bus ablaze with a petrol bomb.

Prosecutors in Diyarbakir have indicted 36 other minors in connection with the unrest, but a court in Ankara will decide whether their trial will go ahead after the charge sheet was rejected by the local court.

The unrest, followed by clashes between the army and the PKK in the countryside and several bomb blasts blamed on the PKK, came at an awkward time for Turkey as it seeks to prove its democratic credentials in membership talks with the EU that opened in October.

The Kurdish conflict has claimed more than 37,000 lives since 1984 when the PKK took up arms for self-rule in the southeast.

2. - AP - "Turkish cities suffering wave of bombings":

DIYARBAKIR / 24 April 2006 / by Selcan Hacaoglu

As Turkey dreams of joining the wealthy European Union, and gears up for the summer tourist influx that feeds its economy, it is suffering a wave of bombings by an old adversary - Kurdish rebels.

This time the violence that used to be confined to outlying areas is hitting Istanbul, the largest city, and tourist resorts.

The eight bombings of the past three months, which left two dead and 47 injured, have been claimed by a group calling itself the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons. It is urging Turkish Kurds to bring "fear and chaos" to the country of 70 million and has posted bombing-making instructions on its Web site alongside praise for suicide bombers.

It claimed at least two bomb attacks at tourist resorts last year and is warning tourists to stay away.

The Falcons' emergence could signify a new phase in the decades-long war between Turkish troops and autonomy-seeking guerrillas who claim the 15 to 20 percent Kurdish minority has second-class status. That struggle was highlighted recently by the killing of 40 guerrillas and of 12 demonstrators in subsequent riots in the overwhelmingly Kurdish southeast.

"Come to duty now with the motto: 'revenge, revenge, revenge,'" the group's Web site told Kurdish youth.

"We will not recognize any rule. Everything and everywhere are targets for us," the Falcons added in warning off tourists. "From now on, our attacks will continue and become more violent."

The Falcons are a splinter group of the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, the main militant group in southeastern Turkey. The PKK suffered a string of battle defeats and the 1999 capture of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, apparently left his lieutenants divided over whether to keep fighting or pursue a political agenda.

The PKK called a unilateral cease-fire after Ocalan's arrest, but resumed fighting in 2004 because Turkey still rejected it as a terrorist organization and refused to talk to it. T

The Falcons, formed the same year, accuse the PKK of weakness and claim to be attracting disaffected PKK guerrillas to their ranks. Unlike the PKK, which has its base of support in southeastern Turkey, the Falcons appear to draw core support from Kurds who fled the 1990s fighting and took refuge in slums ringing Turkish cities.

The relationship between the PKK and the Falcons is not clear. Analysts note that the PKK in the past has been quick to suppress rival groups, and the Falcon's Web site pledges loyalty to Ocalan, the jailed PKK leader.

The Falcons have a few hundred militants operating in small cells in western cities, said an anti-terrorism police officer, speaking on condition of anonymity. Turkish officials are not permitted to speak on the record without prior permission.

Besides detailed instructions on making bombs with fertilizer, clocks and radios, the Web site says: "Everywhere in Turkey, the bombs will explode, the assassinations and sabotage actions will take place."

The bombings come as the European Union presses Turkey to give the Kurds greater cultural rights as one of the criteria for admitting the country to the bloc. Turkey has recently allowed limited broadcasts in the once banned Kurdish language as well as private Kurdish language courses. But the militants dismiss the reforms as insufficient.

3. - Bianet - "Anti-Terror Bill Restrictive, Unnecessary":

Rights activist and lawyer Yildirim evaluates Ankara's new Anti-Terror bill, says it's against fundamental rights and freedoms. "Defendants are to be categorized as 'terrorists' until they can prove their own innocence... Turkey does not need such a law."

ANKARA / 24 April 2006

Association for Human Rights and Solidarity with the Oppressed (MAZLUMDER) executive board member lawyer Nesip Yildirim has said Turkey's new draft amendment to the Anti-Terror Law (TMY) contains so many excessive restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms that it is crammed with articles that are in themselves "violations".

Yildirim believes there was no need for such a law in the first place due to current legislation in Turkey and that there is genuine ground to be concerned if it is passed by Parliament to replace that very legislation which is already subject to criticism and debate.

The lawyer and human rights activist evaluated the draft bill to Bianet with emphasis on the balance between freedom and security, in light of whether a requirement for such a law existed.

Excessive authority

"It is of course the duty of the state, which already has the authority to use legitimate violence, to ensure the security of citizens in the struggle against terror" Yilmaz said.

He added, "But if serious legal limitations are not imposed on this immense power, then this authority could itself turn into a monster that creates violations. At this point, officials should be able to say 'how can I establish the freedom of the citizens and protect them' instead of saying 'I should have even more authority, I should act freely'".

Yilmaz pointed out that "the extrajudicial practices and serious violations in Turkey and specifically in the Southeast committed under the auspices of the struggle against terrorism" had even been identified by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and said "the violations of all fundamental freedoms including the right to life are of the nature that confirms concerns that the excessive authority granted under the TMY draft will be misused."

"It is our concern that in combating terrorism there is the possibility that people who have nothing to do with the incidents will be greatly harmed" he said.

Non-violent activities in scope of terrorism

"While terror organisations have illegal goals and they use various serious unjust and outlawed means such as violence and the violation of the right to life for their goals, they also could have activities that do not contain violence based on demands for legitimate rights that are not being met or have not been met by the legal system" he continued.

"According to the law, a civilian citizen expressing the same demand or acts the same way will be accepted as having committed a terror offence and being a terrorist individual on grounds that the act they commit is 'in line with the targets of the organisation'.

"You yourself can decide how many measures, how many difficulties and how many grievances, including being placed under arrest, they will have to go through until an individual can prove he or she is not a terrorist.
Because of this, it would be fairer, on part of protecting freedoms, if the offence is included in the law clearly for acts of illegal violence and using violence."

"The European Council regards 'violence' as a provision for an act of terror to be committed. In its verdicts, the ECHR observes activities that 'neither incite violence, nor armed resistance, nor uprising, nor enmity' within the scope of freedom of opinion and expression and regards anything adverse to these as a 'violation' of rights.

The ECHR also requires for the penalty and punishment type to be proportional to the offence, where it meets the target sought, as well as the fundamental limits that need to exist in a democratic society.

"Our current draft includes acts other than violence in the scope of offence, ignores the fundamental criteria in the ECHR decision, brings heavy prison terms and fines to the press and contains serious violations".

Glorifying offenders

Yilmaz also noted that "articles related to publicly inciting an offence within the framework of a terror organisation, to glorify an offence or offences that have been committed, publications that contain content in the form of propaganda for a terrorist organisation, hanging placards, opening flags, shouting slogans etc. will very suddenly eliminate all the advantages that have been achieved in freedoms of opinion and expression and take us back to the same point as we were before the EU period."

"For instance, why was article 8 of the TMY related to 'propaganda against the indivisible sovereignty' abolished in 2003? " he asked.
"With this and similar articles being abolished, the day where every individual could freely express their opinions, where they could speak what they could not, came to being. Of course to invite for violence, to commit violence should be a crime but even if we do not like an opinion, what harm would it do if it is expressed by someone and does not incite violence? How can a competent state be harmed just with speech?"

The need for law

Voicing concern over a violence for violence reasoning, Yilmaz said the following:

"What will harsh measures particularly in relation to the recent activities of violence, solve? For example which act of violence in Diyarbakir province was prevented with the measures put into force? Abroad, for instance in Britain where we take the TMY as example, even though it enforced heavy measures against foreigners and not its own citizens for a year, did this prevent bombing activities in their own country? Is the law still in force? No.

"In our country where even with the TMY law not being approved, the use of excessive force that led to 11 citizens being killed, hundreds of wounded, hundreds of detained and a peak point being reached in mistreatment and torture claims makes it evident what the results of extreme authority and using violence to repress leads to.

"If even more serious things were done, which of those doing them were taken from duty or arrested? In any event, the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) law on the execution of criminal and security measures and the criminal procedures laws already have serious articles against terror crimes and criminals.
"On top of these, our Anti-Terror law that discriminately makes the conditions even more serious is already in force. In the past years, illegal organisations in Turkey involved in very effective armed struggle have been put on trial under these laws and have been forced into a period of being purged. The reality that the state is the 'strongest structure' also imposes upon the state the duty of 'combating terror' without limiting fundamental rights and freedoms".

Is current legislation enough ?

Yilmaz explains that the current legislation is already rather tough on organisational offences in a rather discriminatory way and lists some of the areas that are now being addressed by the new TMY:

"* Where members of an illegal organisation commit serious organisational offences such as killing someone etc. they can already be sentenced to heavier terms of life time imprisonment (TCK 302, 309)

* Organisation founders and leaders who have not been involved in serious acts can be sentenced from 10 to 15 years imprisonment.

* Organisation members can be sentenced to 5 years heavy prison terms (TCK 314)

Other than these, the current TMY, which is being regarded as insufficient, already increases the sentences here by half, in a discriminatory way. (TMY 5)

* Those abetting and assisting an organisation can, according to the TCK, be punished more severely than before.

* The Criminal Procedures Law (CMK) allows for 72 hours detention for organisational offences while normally the detention period is 24 hours. (CMK 91)

* Those who commit organisational crimes spend more time serving the sentence they have received than ordinary criminals. Those who receive heavy life time imprisonment spend 36 years in prison instead of 30, those who receive life time imprisonment serve 30 years instead of 24 and in other conditions they have to serve 3/4 of their jail term instead of 3/5th. (CGTIK 107- E-4)

* Those who commit organisation crimes serve their prison terms in high security prisons confined to 1-3 person cells, with limited prisoner rights and subjected to a heavy execution of their punishments. (CGTIK articles)

* Heavy terms are already imposed on those involved in illegal meetings and demonstration rallies, carrying the emblem or signs of illegal organisations and groups, attending meetings and demonstrations by hiding their faces partially or totally, carrying posters, placards, pictures, signs, instruments and material deemed illegal by the law or shouting slogans to this effect. (Law number 2911 Article 23)"

Arbitrary increases in penalties

The rights activist adds, "under the justification of combating terrorism, to allow for a breach of the maximum term described under the Turkish Penal Code allows for the legal arbitrary increase of penalties while it is not in the law itself. Arbitrary punishment will deepen the inequality in the current law, allowing for practices contravening to the law becoming a convention."

NGOs and peaceful activities

Yilmaz also warns that "With this draft, the peaceful activities and legitimate criticism of non government organisations and civilian initiatives can be silenced under the excuse of activities of armed groups and the very right for civil willpower to exist, may be blocked."

Authority to shoot

According to Yilmaz, the authority granted to security forces to directly and without hesitation open fire on their target where an attempt has been made to use arms in violation of a "surrender" order is against the Constitutional Court 06.01.1999 dated E: 1996/68, K: 1999/1.

"In this decision the same provision under 3713 TMY Annex Article: 2 was overruled. The decision to abolish this article that was re-worded was explained as '...it may be possible in some incidents to make ineffective the offenders through methods that less risk life and according to the nature of incident, not to use such methods and directly and without hesitation use fire arms can lead to the right to life being damaged. Because of these reasons, the Constitutional Court had found the relevant provision in violation of article 17 of the Constitution.'

To ignore this decision is an excessive authority granted to security forces and will open the way for extrajudicial killings to escalate and continue" he said.

Discrimination for officials and parents

Yilmaz noted that the new law would allow security force officials who have committed crimes in the combat against terrorism to have better protection from prosecution while in holding parents responsible for the behaviour of their children, the principle of "individuality of crime" was being violated.
Amendments in the law propose prison terms up to five years for parents whose children have been allowed to participate in activities against the state, believed to have been stimulated by the recent wave of violence in the Southeast where some sources said 80 percent of the demonstrators throwing stones and fire bombs against security forces were minors.

Defense rights limited

Yilmaz also said the new law limited defence rights. He explained that there was an attempt to prevent suspects placed under custody from informing any relative of this detention and warned this would be "preparing the conditions for practices such as disappearances under detention and torture which have been on the country's agenda for so many years."

He said the law also excessively limited the defence rights between defendant/suspect and his or her attorney, disallowing any contact with a lawyer for the first 24 hours of detention, then preventing relatives from learning of the detention, asking a lawyer to defend a suspect without even seeing the case file and allowing security personnel to be present during attorney and client meetings. "The law" he warned, "will bring provisions which will partially or totally abolish defendant rights and the right to defence".

Yilmaz explained that under the section on protecting rights and freedoms, the draft referred to "monitoring by the judge" but said experiences from current procedures showed this would not be very effective and that the court would only receive very generalised information and not be able to confirm the authenticity of the intelligence it received.
Violations

According to Yilmaz, the new law allows authorities from the head of security forces to governor level to impose security measures without needing a warrant from the prosecutor's office and in practice this would amount to those officials restricting the rights of individuals on grounds that 'they might commit an offence in the future' or 'their existence might constitute a threat for the country in the future.'

He explained that the restrictions could include entry and exit bans to certain areas within determined time and date limits, limitations on an individuals decision to allow his residence or work place to be used by someone, limitations on travel, confiscation of ID cards including passports, collecting photograph, finger print or DNA samples to identify an individual where he or she are facing criminal proceedings, banning the use of certain materials that might be handy for offences, banning services or the use of some facilities for an individual, limiting a profession or art, limiting regional communication so far as it is proportional and limited to where an offence can be committed, banning an individual from being at a certain location or area provided this is within a time limit, regional or local; requiring individuals to inform local authorities of their plans and movements.

Yilmaz said the TMY draft amounted to a number of violations that would open the way for arbitrary violation of rights and freedoms. He said the principles of "respect for human rights", "right to innocence", "right to fair trial", "right for individual freedom and security", "right to request respect to private life", "right to defence attorney", "right to defence", "property right", "right to travel"' and various other rights included in the constitution itself would be violated.

4. - AFP - "Turkey expects 'operational' support from US against Kurdish rebels":

ANKARA / 24 April 2006

Turkey called on the United States Monday for "operational" support against Turkish Kurd rebels based in neighboring northern Iraq, saying that intelligence sharing alone cannot be effective against "terrorism."

The appeal came ahead of a visit by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who will hold talks with Turkish leaders in Ankara on Wednesday.

"We have had very sincere and fruitful cooperation (against the PKK) in the past. Today, this cooperation needs to be taken further," Justice Minister Cemil Cicek, who is also the government's spokesman, said after a cabinet meeting.

"Operational cooperation is required in the fight against terrorism and other types of organized crime," Cicek said. "Turkey wishes to have not only intelligence sharing (with the US) but also cooperation that goes beyond that."

Thousands of armed militants from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), considered a terrorist group by both Ankara and Washington, have taken refuge in the mountains of northern Iraq, from where they infiltrate into adjoining southeast Turkey.

Ankara has repeatedly urged the United States to crack down on PKK bases in the Kurdish-held region, but Washington says its troops are swamped by violence in other parts of conflict-torn Iraq.

The issue has become of increasing importance for Turkey in recent weeks, which saw escalating clashes between the PKK and the army in the southeast and a series of bomb attacks in urban centers blamed on the group.

Despite Ankara's frustration with US reluctance over military action against the PKK, Turkish diplomats say intelligence sharing between the two countries is improving and Washington is supplying information on PKK infiltrations into Turkey.

They say US efforts to cut PKK's financing channels are also under way.

The Turkish army has recently reinforced its troops in areas bordering Iraq and Iran, preparing to intensify operations against the rebels, whose infiltrations usually increase with the arrival of spring as snow melts and passage through the mountains becomes easier.

Most PKK militants, whose numbers are estimated at about 5,000, retreated to northern Iraq in 1999 after the group declared a unilateral ceasefire following the capture of its leader Abdullah Ocalan. The truce was called off in June 2004.

Prior to the US-led occupation of Iraq in 2003, the Turkish army carried out incursions into northern Iraq to pursue the PKK.

The Kurdish conflict in Turkey has claimed more than 37,000 lives since the PKK took up arms for self-rule in the southeast in 1984.

5. - The Washington Times - "Greek, Kurd issues await Rice in Turkey":

NICOSIA / 24 April 2006 / by Andrew Borowiec

Threats of more carnage by restive Kurds and a growing feud over the role of Islam will greet Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on her one-day visit to Turkey on Wednesday.

Veteran diplomats said that regardless of the agenda established in Washington, Miss Rice will be unable to avoid discussions on longtime Greek-Turkish problems, which have not changed significantly in years.

From Greece -- where Miss Rice will stop Thursday -- come warnings about the slow pace of reforms required before Turkey can join the European Union and of demonstrations against U.S. policies in the area.

Western diplomats stressed the delicate nature of Miss Rice's mission, pointing to rising tension between Greece and Turkey, Turkey's growing ethnic and religious crises, and its difficulties with the EU accession process.

"There is a general view in the EU that Turkey is experiencing a 'reforms fatigue,'?" said Giorgos Koumoutsakos, a spokesman for the Greek Foreign Ministry.

Greek officials said they were not concerned about threats of anti-U.S. demonstrations during Miss Rice's stay in Athens. "Greek people are hospitable," said Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis. "We have traditionally good relations with the United States. I am not afraid of anything."

Foremost among Greek fears is a concern that a worldwide Islamic revival is gaining ground in Turkey. Greece also worries about Turkey's refusal to compromise in efforts to establish a viable bicommunal state on Cyprus.

"It must be seriously examined whether Turkey's EU course is feeding a dangerous instability in that country," wrote the Athens conservative daily Kathimerini.

The newspaper referred to EU criticism of a proposed Turkish anti-terrorism law, described by European specialists and some Turkish media as encompassing too many crimes and prone to abuse.

The planned law largely was prompted by mounting Kurdish unrest and threats by radicals to create "a climate of fear and chaos" in cities and resort areas popular with foreign tourists.

Turkish political tensions have been aggravated by a debate pitting Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan against President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, in which the secular president said the governing party was leading Turkey toward Islamic fundamentalism.

Miss Rice is scheduled to see both Turkish leaders in what Turkish officials describe as a review of relations between the two countries, with particular stress on problems with Iran and Iraq.

Turkey is particularly anxious to obtain a U.S. commitment to prevent arms and guerrillas from crossing into the country from northern Iraq.

6. - Prospect Magazine - "Divide And Heal":

Issue 122, May 2006

Despite the imminent formation of a government of national unity, Iraq is splintering into its three historic provinces. The break-up can be managed, but it cannot be avoided. The western powers and Iraqi nationalists must now accept that radical federalism is the only alternative to civil war.

Gareth Stansfield is reader in middle east politics at the University of Exeter and associate fellow of the middle east programme at Chatham House.

Sometime in the next few days or weeks, a government of national unity will finally be formed in Iraq. This rare piece of good news will briefly rekindle some of the optimism about the political future of a unified Iraq that followed last December's election. But the reality on the ground is that Iraq is breaking up. The Kurdish north is largely independent and Basra, capital of the Shia south, is increasingly falling out of Baghdad's orbit. Moreover, there is anecdotal evidence of significant population movement—with Shias leaving Sunni areas, Sunnis leaving Shia areas, and Kurds (and many professionals of all identities) moving north to the relative sanctuary of Kurdistan.

The partitioning, or rather radical decentralisation, of Iraq is under way. This should not necessarily be seen as a problem. Historical Iraq was a place of three semi-independent parts—Kurdish north, Sunni centre and Shia south—within the loose framework of the Ottoman empire. It is the centralised Iraq—starting with Britain's creation of the modern state in 1921-23 and reaching its nadir in nearly three decades of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship—that has failed and should be allowed to die.

There are, however, powerful forces refusing to contemplate partition or "hard federalism." The radical Shia movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr, emerging as one of the most powerful groups in Iraq, rejects federalism as a divide-and-rule tactic and defends Iraqi identity in traditional nationalist terms. Opposition among the Arab Sunnis who have traditionally dominated the state is even stronger. Whether radical Islamists, ex-Ba'athists or secularists, Arab Sunnis see federalism as undermining everything they have stood for in nearly a century of Iraqi history.

The coalition—especially the British—is also opposed to further decentralisation. On his recent visit to Baghdad Jack Straw refused to discuss with Kurdish officials the distribution of power between regions and the centre—and the British insist on talking about Kurdish areas rather than a distinct Kurdistan region of Iraq. US officials too are committed to the status quo, but a debate is starting in Washington about how to respond to the new realities. Peter Galbraith, former US ambassador to Croatia, recently said that "a break-up has already taken place," and hoped that the constitution's federal provisions would be effective enough to avoid a "Bosnia-type" war.

Even if an Iraq dominated by its regions does come to be seen as part of the solution rather than the problem, there are many obstacles in its path. Turkey is nervous about an even more independent Kurdish north, and Iran might come to dominate the Shia south. Partition would also change the geopolitical balance of the middle east in unpredictable ways and would be seen in many parts of the world as an egregiously colonial parting act: what imperialists can assemble they can also disassemble. Inside Iraq there is the question of whether extensive population movement would be necessary—especially in flashpoints like Kirkuk and Baghdad itself. There is also the question of whether the two areas that have oil—the Kurdish north and the Shia south—would distribute any proceeds to the Sunni centre. And would there still be a place for a national army in a semi-partitioned Iraq? If so, what authority would it be answerable to? If not, would that increase the possibility of conflict between the three new entities?

Before considering how the logic of radical decentralisation arises from Iraq's own history, and examining various scenarios for the country's constitutional future, an illusion must be dispelled: the idea that Iraq already has a functioning federal constitution. Iraq has great democratic achievements under its belt since 2003, but the truth is that there is no agreement in the constitution over the powers of the regions, the distribution of oil revenues, the deployment of military forces, the control of borders or the role of Islam, to name a few issues. Some optimists argue that the delay in the formation of a new government is evidence that Iraqis are forging a deal on these matters to last for generations. There is, alas, little evidence for this. It would be truer to say that the different ethnopolitical groupings are stockpiling arms and building alliances, in case they have to fight for their interests.

Iraq as a powerful central state has already been shattered. Whether as a result of Saddam's attacks on the rebelling Kurds and Shias after the first Gulf war, the quasi-independence of the north since 1991, the rise of political Shi'ism in the south, or the mistakes of the coalition since the 2003 invasion and its almost-total dependence on ethnic and religiously based groups to govern the country—there can be no going back. Kurdistan is already operating as if it were an independent country in all but name. The Kurdistan regional government (KRG) recently concluded deals with DNO, a Norwegian oil company, to investigate oil reserves near Dohuk, with the implication that the KRG, rather than the Iraqi government, would legally own any resources. There is also an attempt to break linguistically with Iraq—English is now being promoted as the second language in Kurdish schools and colleges, replacing Arabic. But more striking, perhaps, are the murmurings of secession in the south. Some leading Shias have begun to consider Basra as the capital of a southern region that would include Iraq's southern oilfields. One of the most prominent is Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the pro-Iranian Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq party (SCIRI). His views put him sharply at odds with his fellow Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr who has an Iraqi nationalist's deep suspicion of Iran.

The british invented Iraq as a modern state in the 1920s, but it had long existed as a decentralised federal entity within the Ottoman empire, known in Europe by its historic name Mesopotamia (and locally as al-Iraq). The three Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra developed in distinct but connected ways. Life in these provinces was focused upon their major towns (of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra) and each of them existed within separate geo-economic spheres. Mosul was linked with Anatolia, Baghdad looked west to Arab lands, and Basra had a "Gulf-centric" identity with connections to India. The past three years have seen the re-emergence of these regional identities: Kurdistan is the old Mosul province, the old Baghdad and Basra provinces are now nicknamed "Sunnistan" and "Shiastan" respectively.

In the aftermath of the first world war, the imposition in Iraq of a European-style centralised state clashed with local habits, as elsewhere in the former Ottoman empire. The empire is often seen as having fostered cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic societies. This is true, in the main, although Sunni-Shia tensions certainly existed in the old Iraq and Kurds remained isolated in their mountains. But the sociopolitical conditions that underlay the foundation of most European nation states could not be found in Ottoman Iraq—there was no dominant nation that came together to form a state. Meanwhile, the structure that the British imposed—a constitutional monarchy in their own image, based on strong control from the capital and negligible power to the provinces—was a radical change from a system that had worked well under the Ottomans. The idea that the British created Iraq is widely repeated, but inaccurate. They did, however, reinvent its internal structure.

The logic behind Iraq's new centralised structure made sense only from the perspective of the British. Chairing the Cairo conference in March 1921, Winston Churchill headed a "who's who" gathering including TE Lawrence, Percy Cox, Gertrude Bell and the Emir Faisal, son of the Sharif of Mecca and leader of the Arab revolt against the Turks. Churchill's main concern was to secure Mesopotamia from any threat from Turkey or Russia. For Bell, Cox and Lawrence, the objective was to ensure the accession of Faisal, their wartime ally. These priorities helped to implant the two main pathologies of the modern Iraqi state. The Cairo conference saw to it that the non-Arab Mosul province (Kurdistan) remained within the newly named and centralised state of Iraq because of its oil, because its inhabitants were Sunnis (from the British perspective, more trustworthy than Shias), and because its mountainous terrain provided the new state with natural defences. The conference also nominated Faisal as king, thus ensuring that Sunni Arabs continued to dominate the predominately Shia population, as they had in Ottoman times. Iraq was therefore constructed with a non-Arab minority, the Kurds, who objected to their inclusion in Iraq and to the failure to grant them their own state, and a majority Shia population that remained unimpressed with their Arab Sunni monarch and his British backers.

It was this dominance of the institutions of the state by one group that allowed the Ba'athist junta of 1968 and then Saddam Hussein to turn Iraq from an authoritarian state into a totalitarian one. Under Saddam, differences between and within communities were exploited as a means to divide and rule. Saddam's Arab Sunni clique committed acts of sectarian and ethnic aggression against the Shias and the Kurds, and inevitably inflamed the country's enduring sectarian and ethnic identities, as was seen in the aftermath of Saddam's defeat in the first Gulf war in 1991. With the government seemingly on the verge of collapse, a regional rebellion broke out in the Shia south and a Kurdish one followed in the north. Although both rebellions were quashed by Saddam's Republican Guard, the blueprint for the current surge of political Shiism and Kurdish nationalism had been written. The violence and the centrifugal forces we are witnessing in today's Iraq are the reckoning for the 30 years of war that the Sunni-dominated regime waged against the Shias and the Kurds.

Because modern Iraq was the creation of British imperialism, it has become a cliché to describe it as an "artificial state." But one should recall that under the Ottomans the three parts of Iraq had a long association. Moreover, all states are to some extent artificial constructs and nearly a century of existence has endowed Arab Iraq with some sense of national identity. Outside of Kurdistan, Iraqis today are almost unanimously loyal to such symbols of nationalism as their flag and their rather successful football team. Many historians claim that a regional identity existed before the state was formed, and that Iraqi nationalism grew and prospered during the 20th century—at least in the Arab communities, among whom anti-Iranian feeling also acted as a glue, especially during and after the Iran-Iraq war. For promoters of this secular vision of Iraqi nationalism, there has never been a sectarian problem in Iraq between Sunnis and Shias, and the ethnic problem with Kurds was the result of imperial meddling.

This appealing vision appears to have coloured the view of the US administration as it geared up to remove Saddam; it seemed genuinely to believe that an overriding sense of Iraqi unity would emerge following the dictator's demise. Perhaps a primary error made by both the US government and many western academics in the run-up to the war was the implicit belief that most people in the world are post-ethnic individualists, like Americans believe themselves to be. The continuing hold of ethnic and sectarian allegiances was underestimated. (Within academic circles, the focus upon ethnicity as a politically mobilising force has become unfashionable, often attracting the accusation of Orientalism or essentialism.) But the vision of a unified, secular Iraq existed mainly among the middle classes. Cosmopolitan Iraq could indeed be found in the urban spaces of Baghdad and other major cities, but beyond these narrow confines Iraqi identities remained conditioned by local colourings of ethnicity and confessional background.

The evidence for this emerged after Saddam's removal in 2003. Sectarian-inspired violence spread quickly, while the Kurds consolidated their autonomy. The exponents of the "one Iraq" thesis blamed coalition mismanagement for these developments. The occupiers may not have helped, but the reason for the drumbeat of civil war could be found in the particularist way that Iraqis began to identify themselves in the absence of a strong centre.

Federalist thinking in modern Iraq was pioneered by the Kurds. By the end of the 1990s, the freedom and independence of the Kurdish north meant that they could impose their federal agenda on most of the Iraqi opposition movements. But the fall of Saddam ushered in a wider debate about different federal models, in which Shia notions of administrative federalism clashed with the more ethnic definition of the Kurds.

Which of the many possible federal models does the Iraqi constitution mandate? The imprecise nature of the document—adopted by referendum in October 2005—makes it hard to say. It describes Iraq as being democratic, federal and representative. But it is difficult to pin down exactly how these ideals will be achieved. Kurdistan was "approbated" in the constitution and recognised as existing within the boundaries of the 1991 entity—which did not include any of the disputed territories, including Kirkuk. In addition, provision is made in section 5 of the constitution for new regions to establish themselves. The regional governments are held responsible for all domestic affairs that lie outside those assigned to the federal government, including the organisation of internal security forces, and regional guards (known as militias, or peshmerga in Kurdistan). The ownership of oil and gas reserves is vague, but the emphasis of article 109 upon the federal government's management of oil and gas from "current fields" has encouraged both the Kurds and Shias to believe that new fields would be the property of the region rather than the centre. Furthermore, the fact that article 117 places regional law above federal law (at least for those matters not designated as exclusively federal) again emphasises the extent of possible decentralisation. However, all of these federal provisions remain in question, and the constitution is flanked by several supplementary deals, such as the famous "Kurd veto," which remain shrouded in mystery and ambiguity.

If, however, those favouring a stronger national centre—above all Muqtada's Shias and the Sunnis—were to prevail in the constitutional debate, an attempt could be made to rein in the most independent regions—by disbanding their regional guards, for example. Such a development would antagonise the Kurds and the SCIRI-supporting Shias in the south and could encourage them to take matters into their own hands. The Kurds suspect that the current prime minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, does want to pursue a recentralisation strategy, with the support of Muqtada al-Sadr and the Arab Sunnis. But in its present state, the Iraqi army could not occupy Kurdistan —many of its most effective units are actually taken from the Kurdish peshmerga. Similarly, the well-organised and well-funded Iranian-backed Badr army of SCIRI is itching for an excuse to attack the more Iraqi nationalist forces of Muqtada al-Sadr and settle scores with other Shia militias. Even if al-Jaafari remains prime minister, it is unlikely that the Iraqi government will risk antagonising the two most powerful military forces in the country.

At the other end of the federal spectrum, and a novelty for the middle east, is the idea of Iraq as a confederal state with a weak central authority. Rather than Baghdad being the undisputed centre of what is seen by many Arab Sunnis as the heart of Arab nationalism, it would be the reduced administrative centre of a state in which the regions, and primarily Kurdistan and Shiastan, would be the real powers. Under these circumstances, no Iraqi military forces could be based in Kurdistan without consent from the Kurdistan national assembly; the boundaries with Turkey and Iran would be policed by Kurds answering to Erbil rather than Baghdad, and Kurdistan's new oil resources would be controlled by the KRG. (Whether Kurdistan's existing oil reserves would remain under the control of a weakened Baghdad would remain to be seen.)

A similar pattern could develop in the south, with SCIRI probably becoming the leading political force and its military wing, the Badr army, becoming regional guard. Control over the oilfields of the south would be a source of dispute between Baghdad and Basra, but it is unlikely that force could be exerted on such a strong region, with a committed political leadership and capable military, from a weakened centre.

Political leaders in both the north and the south realise that they must tread carefully to reach their decentralising goals, and they also realise that there are some advantages to a residual central Iraqi state—a large single market, more clout on the international stage and so on. Nonetheless, the radical decentralisation scenario is the more likely of the two, if only because one of the confederal entities, Kurdistan, already exists. The momentum behind the formation of a Shia entity in the south remains strong, although it may, at least temporarily, have been slowed by falling electoral support for the pro-Iranian, pro-decentralisation SCIRI party. SCIRI is thought to have won around 20 per cent of the votes in the December election for the main Shia coalition, the United Iraqi Aliance, considerably less than the 35 per cent for the parties backing Muqtada al-Sadr. SCIRI, however, remains a force, and it still controls nine out of 11 councils in the south. This pattern of support and influence helps to explain why SCIRI is keen to build up power at the regional level while Muqtada is happy to consolidate the centre.

The push for a strong federalism, as with attempts at recentralisation, could trigger serious conflict. The stand-off over the premiership of Ibrahim al-Jaafari suggests that this is a real possibility. If the Kurds and SCIRI succeed in ousting him from power as a first step towards a looser Iraq, this could galvanise those opposed to federalism into an Arab nationalist bloc willing to take up arms in order to prevent what would be perceived as an existential threat to Iraq. In this eventuality, different Shia militias would turn on each other, particularly in Basra and Baghdad, with Arab Sunni insurgents also heavily involved.

The Kurdish parties, meanwhile, would seize the opportunity to secure their hold on Kirkuk, where they would face a challenge from Shia Turkmen and Arab Shia followers of Muqtada al-Sadr. And if the Kurdish leaders were to go as far as claiming all the disputed territories—a broad arc that runs from Syria to the Iranian border, including Sinjar, Makhmour, parts of Mosul, Tuz, Kirkuk, Khanaquin and Mandali—then serious fighting would break out between local communities and Kurdish liberators/ occupiers. Many of these areas contain significant non-Kurdish populations, who, especially in the area of Mosul, would react violently towards any threat to Iraq's integrity. A similar pattern could be expected in the south of the country, except that there would also be a strong possibility of internal Shia conflict in addition to conflict between Sunnis and Shias.

History may suggest that a loose confederation of three semi-autonomous statelets is the best long-term solution for Iraq. If the three main groups cannot even agree on a mild form of federalism then the status quo will not hold for long. But if they cannot agree on a modest federalism they are unlikely to agree on a more radical untangling and, as we have seen, recentralisation is also not a realistic option. The best hope for a resolution is to convince some of the main opponents of a looser federation, in particular Muqtada al-Sadr, that it is in their interests. This is not impossible in the case of Muqtada. He has said that he is not against federalism in principle, but as an Iraqi nationalist he is suspicious of too much Iranian influence in the south. If, however, Muqtada's party started to eclipse SCIRI in the south, his interest in federalism might increase.

But even if the coalition and a big figure like Muqtada are converted to federalism, there are still some large obstacles to overcome. Opponents of decentralisation often point out that nearly all of Iraq's urban centres have heterogeneous populations. Hard federalism could speed up the ethnic-sectarian population movement that is already under way, creating flashpoints where populations are most mixed, including in Kirkuk, Mosul and Baghdad, in addition to the scores of smaller towns and settlements across the centre of the country. Since the fall of Saddam, Baghdad's dominant Sunni identity has been increasingly challenged by the Shias of Sadr City. And a similar potential confrontation awaits in Kirkuk. Should Baghdad and Kirkuk be given some sort of special status within a federal structure? It is an attractive idea but will not be popular with the dominant groups in those cities.

The oil issue, by comparison, looks less serious. Some Kurdish and Shia politicians view federalism as a means to seize control of their local oilfields and make up for the decades during which the Sunnis benefited disproportionately from the oil revenues. However, looking around the world it is unusual for regions to hang on to oil revenues when they are part of states, even decentralised ones. The compromise that seems to be emerging is that revenues from old oil will remain nationally distributed, but revenues from new oil will stay in the region where it is found.

Another consideration is the reaction of Iraq's neighbours. The main concern of Turkey, Iran and the Arab states is instability in Iraq. If they are persuaded that radical federalism will reduce violence and disorder then they will be less hostile. For Iran, the loosening of Iraq has much to be said for it. It not only removes a threat to Iran's western border, but also presents an opportunity for Iran to reassert its influence in the spiritual centre of Shi'ism—much to the irritation of the US. It is not just in Shiastan that one would expect to see strong Iranian influence. Already in Kurdistan, Iranian companies are investing heavily along the border, especially in Suleimaniyah, and the ethnically-based link between Kurds and Persians is openly spoken about in both places with pride.

Turkey is, of course, hostile to any independence for the Kurdistan region. However, Turkish companies have already invested $1bn there and its military and intelligence services work closely with those of the Kurdistan Democratic party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. And given Turkey's desire to secure EU membership, it will be hard for it to oppose a people demanding self-determination. Turkey's opposition to Kurdistan will not be enough on its own to stop it.

The belief that Saddam's regime was the glue that held together the fragmented mosaic of Iraq has proved to be true. It is now too late to resurrect a strong centre. New political forces have emerged with strong localised support and the ability to project power far more effectively than the nascent institutions of the new Iraqi state. These forces also have very different ideas as to how Iraq should be constructed and what it will mean to be an Iraqi in the future. For the Kurds, the problem is the legitimacy of the state itself. For the Shia, it is the nature of the state. In an ideal world, the Kurds would secede, with or without Kirkuk, and even without oil if it meant establishing their own state. Kurdish politicians are caught between satisfying a realist position in Baghdad and representing an increasingly noisy secessionist voice in the north. This Kurdish disenchantment with Iraq has not gone unnoticed among the two main Arab groups and it is increasingly common to hear the refrain, "let them leave if they wish to, but not with Kirkuk." Until an Arab-dominated Iraqi army is in a position to attempt to bring the Kurds back into Iraq, there will be little fighting in the north. For that reason, a Quebec-like asymmetrical decentralisation—in which the Kurdish region opts out of the Arab Iraqi state for most purposes—is likely to be officially recognised at some point soon.

The nature of the dispute between Sunnis and Shias is much more complex, as it is about who controls the narrative of the Iraqi state—what it means to be an Iraqi. For most of the 20th century, the narrative was one of Arab Sunni nationalism. Now, the Shia are struggling to win it back. The real struggle is in Baghdad and it is imbued with the symbolism of ancient religious disputes from the formative years of Islam itself. The struggle is further complicated by the fact that whereas Shiastan has resources, a relatively homogeneous population and a political leadership with some legitimacy, none of this can be said of Sunnistan—the most unstable part of Iraq.

The re-emergence of ethno-sectarian identities in Iraq should not have taken policymakers or academics by surprise. The Soviet collapse, for example, led to the intensification of ethnic conflict in several successor states, including Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan, and changes in the ethnic balance of power in Yugoslavia quickly heralded that state's demise. Iraq is mirroring this pattern closely.

America and Britain still have some influence over events. We need to consider the most realistic and appropriate options still available. The return to a looser form of the Iraq state is a difficult process that requires careful management. If it can be achieved with little bloodshed and disruption, it will be a great prize. The alternative seems to be break-up by a long, low-level civil war—which would be a stain on the western conscience for decades to come.