21 October 2004

1. Security forces still resisting reforms in Turkey: UN envoy" - Security forces are still resisting full implementation of democracy reforms in Turkey and continue to treat human rights campaigners with suspicion, a UN envoy said here Wednesday.

2. "Prime Ministry HRC Chair: Minority Report Not Binding" - The Prime Ministry Human Rights Council (HRC) Chair Associate Professor Vahit Bicak announced that the report by the Minority and Cultural Rights Studies Group, approved in a Human Rights Advisory Council (IHDK) meeting, is not binding.

3. "Kretschmer: Turkey will have to look into the 'minority' issue" - Turkey's insistence that only non-Muslim religious communities be recognized as minorities here may not be in line with international conventions on the issue and Turkey will have to look into the matter, the European Commission's representative in Ankara said.

4. "Turkey EU entry as big as 'D-Day'" - German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has said Turkish entry to the European Union would be as important for Europe as the D-Day invasion 60 years ago.

5. "Turkish Military Projects To Wait For EU" - Turkey was expected to wait for a European Union decision for membership before proceeding with military procurement projects.

6. "Turkey Looks South, and Worries" -It fears that the gains made by Iraq's Kurdish minority could provoke an uprising at home. But for now, it knows that its hands are tied.

7. "Instead of just one Iraq, try three" - No less an authority on the breakup of failed states than Peter Galbraith, the former U.S. ambassador to Croatia, considers the possibility that Iraq will split up along ethnic and religious lines "more likely than a transition to a centralized democracy."

8. "Oil crisis in the land of oil" - The lack of oil in Kurdistan has entered its second week and the car cues are getting longer, proportional to public dismay.

1. - AFP - "Security forces still resisting reforms in Turkey: UN envoy"

ANKARA / 20 October 2004

Security forces are still resisting full implementation of democracy reforms in Turkey and continue to treat human rights campaigners with suspicion, a UN envoy said here Wednesday.

Hina Jilani, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's special representative on human rights defenders, praised Ankara's democratization efforts as "genuine steps towards change" at the end of a 10-day probe into the working conditions
of Turkish rights activists.

"But here are still some pockets of resistance to the changes," she told a press conference, singling out the country's security forces. More dialogue is needed between the government and civic groups "in order to eradicate suspicions from the security forces towards human rights defenders," she added.

Jilani also urged a "review" of a large number of pending trials against rights campaigners, including lawyers, journalists and doctors. Turkish rights groups often complain of harassment by authorities, especially regarding their work in the country's mainly Kurdish southeast.

Eager to boost its bid to join the European Union, Turkey has adopted a series of far-reaching democratization reforms since 2001. The European Commission said earlier this month that Turkey has fullfilled the EU's basic political criteria and recommended EU leaders to start membership talks with the country when they take up the issue in December.

Echoing a similar assessment by the commission, Jilani said that torture persisted in Turkey despite serious efforts by the government to stamp out the practice.

"The commitment of the government (on torture) is genuine but it may take some time in implementing the reforms," she said.

The UN envoy also called for easing restriction on the peaceful assembly of civic groups and for lesser police presence at public demonstrations.

"Police forces should also refrain from using disproportionate force" against demonstrators, she added.

Jilani is to write a report on her findings, to be submitted to the UN Human Rights Commissions next year.

During her mission, she met with officials and rights campaigners in Ankara, Istanbul, the western city of Izmir and the Kurdish cities of Diyarbakir and Bingol.

2. Zaman - "Prime Ministry HRC Chair: Minority Report Not Binding"

20 October / Ankara / Erdal Sen, Suleyman Kurt

The Prime Ministry Human Rights Council (HRC) Chair Associate Professor Vahit Bicak announced that the report by the Minority and Cultural Rights Studies Group, approved in a Human Rights Advisory Council (IHDK) meeting, is not binding.

The report caused a public outcry. Also criticizing the way the report was approved in the IHDK meeting, Bicak said yesterday, "This report is approved by only 24 members of 78 members of the Council. According to these numbers, I leave it to public opinion to evaluate whether or not the opinions of all the members are reflected in it."

Bicak went on to say that they received several opposition faxes from the representatives of many institutional members of the Council. Organizing a press meeting, Vahit Bicak expressed that the IHDK services for consultancy provided for dialogue between the state and NGOs. Bicak also underlined that the Prime Ministry did not request a report into minority rights.

On the other side, IHDK member Society of Law Sovereign (HED) President lawyer A. Erdem Akyuz and a Societal Though Association President Fethi Bolayir announced that the Minority Rights Report is composed of the personal opinions of its authors.

3. - Turkish Daily News - "Kretschmer: Turkey will have to look into the 'minority' issue"

* 'It must be very clear that accession negotiations are not between the European Commission and Turkey but between Turkey and the 25 member states. It is an intergovernmental process, and Turkey will sit together with 25 countries around the table, all participating in the negotiations'
* 'We do not want to speculate what would happen if Turkey would somehow militarily intervene in Iraq in order to put things in Kirkuk right. If something like this happens before December 17, this would of course be a very important issue which would be in the minds of heads of state and government'
* 'We do not think that in the end we may turn negotiations to privileged partnership, which is the concept some in Germany are suggesting'

ANKARA / 20 October 2004 / Fatma Demirelli

Turkey's insistence that only non-Muslim religious communities be recognized as minorities here may not be in line with international conventions on the issue and Turkey will have to look into the matter, the European Commission's representative in Ankara said.

"It looks somehow not necessarily compatible with the existing international instruments that the only minorities which Turkey recognizes as minorities in Turkey would be non-Muslim religious minorities and that any other minority would by definition not exist in Turkey," Ambassador Hansjoerg Kretschmer told the Turkish Daily News in an interview.

But he also made it clear that terminology was not the core interest for the EU. "What is important here is that Turkey give to these people what they, with justification, claim," he said.

"I was also somehow surprised by statements that are made by representatives of Alawis and also of Kurds that they are not a minority," Kretschmer said.

The full text of the interview follows.

Negotiations for membership
TDN: Many people in Turkey were pleased that the European Commission eventually recommended opening accession talks on Oct. 6, but soon complaints were made that this recommendation came together with provisions that it would be an "open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed." To repeat one of the most frequently questions, why did the commission have to attach these strings?

KRETSCHMER: Of course negotiations, before they start, cannot be guaranteed a successful end. In this case, of course it depends on Turkey to be able to go through all this very difficult reform process in terms of legislation but especially in terms of implementation in all walks of life. Obviously, it is open-ended, it can never be guaranteed. Nor can there be a set date when negotiations will be concluded, something that is also sometimes asked: Why not a final date? That really depends on Turkey's speed and ability to do what is required.

TDN: Are the talks open-ended because of their "nature," or is this is a precautionary measure unique in the case of Turkey?

KRETSCHMER: No, by their very nature, they are always open-ended. It is a matter of fact that all negotiations in the past have ended with a positive result, except that Norway opted not to join for its own reasons. I hope very much that Turkey also will be successful in completing them. But on the other hand, Turkey as such a big country, will certainly have greater difficulties than those small countries with two or three million inhabitants, simply because the task is much bigger. Nothing else can be said. It is not opening the door for other solutions which are not membership. The commission has clearly said when President Romano Prodi and Commissioner Guenther Verheugen presented the report to the European Parliament, that these are negotiations for accession and will be conducted bona fide and nothing else. So we do not think, when the commission wrote this language, that in the end we may turn negotiations to privileged partnership, which is the concept some in Germany are suggesting.

TDN: Do you think the ongoing debate in the European public, particularly as regards the opposition to Turkey's membership, could complicate Turkey's accession process?

KRETSCHMER: No, I don't think it will complicate the process. When a decision on the opening of talks is taken -- the process is to a large extent a technical process -- there are only a number of issues which are really up for negotiation: the transition period, or the famous proposal on migration, which of course is not something with immediate relevance and will come further down the road when the more difficult chapters will be tackled. So, overall, this is essentially a technical process, and I do not see how this could be influenced by the public debate. This public debate, of course, shows us that a lot of work has to be done in order to change public opinion in EU states vis-a-vis Turkish membership. Therefore, the commission's proposal in the regular report for intense political and cultural dialogue is very important.

TDN: This proposal for a cultural dialogue shows that the commission sees that there are issues regarding Turkey's membership which cannot simply be tackled through technical negotiations. Do you agree?

KRETSCHMER: Of course, because in the end, the accession of Turkey has to jump the hurdle of ratification by the national parliaments of member states. It is so important to work on public opinion.

TDN: There are also concerns that the method of negotiation recommended for Turkey by the commission is likely to complicate the talks. Would this really be the case?

KRETSCHMER: The commission recommended that the council set benchmarks for the opening and closure of negotiation chapters -- that Turkey will not only have to have shown an ability to legislate but also has to show a track record of implementation, which is somehow common sense, because Turkey will have to apply the EU acquis in all fields at the time of membership, except in some areas where transition periods may be agreed. Since we know that implementation is a very big problem, we have to be sure that this will happen. This has not been said in the same way to previous candidates, but we learned lessons out of this process. And of course Turkey is such a huge country; if the acquis would not be applied here, it would of course have serious consequences on the functioning of the EU. In order to make sure that Turkey will apply all the rules, the commission recommended to the Council that we look for implementation by Turkey before we close negotiations. Otherwise, you cannot be sure that the union with Turkey in it would function properly. Without the implementation clause, the negotiations would have been easier because legislation is relatively straightforward. So this is a big challenge, but membership is a big challenge.

Working out the 'minority' issue
TDN: One of the most controversial statements of the progress report was perhaps in those parts dealing with the minority issue, with the Turkish side revoking the terms of the Lausanne Treaty in defining who is a minority in Turkey. Is there a different understanding between Turkey and the EU on what the term minority refers to?

KRETSCHMER: I would suggest that this is a rather complicated issue, and one certainly has to refer back to international instruments which exist, which are the U.N. conventions mentioned in the report as well as the European conventions. On the U.N. conventions which have been signed by Turkey, Turkey put a number of reservations, whose details I don't want to go into now. But I think what is important here, like in all other fields, is that Turkey fulfill standards set in these conditions. The same applies to the issue of minority; what is a minority and what is not a minority. To me, it looks somehow not necessarily compatible with these international instruments that the only minorities which Turkey recognizes as minorities in Turkey would be non-Muslim religious minorities and that any other minority would by definition not exist in Turkey. So, clearly, Turkey will have to look into that and hopefully also to lift the existing reservations. I would grant that there is not necessarily an unequivocal reply to what is a minority and what is not; one would have to look into these instruments. I was also publicly somehow surprised by the statements which are made by representatives of Alawis and also of Kurds that they are not a minority, an example of which is the speech by Leyla Zana in the European Parliament contesting that Kurds are a minority. They want to be more than a minority, they want to be a part of the majority. Also several times, the term "constituent people" has been used. The term "constituent people" is something which has been used in other countries as well. And in these cases, it meant something very specific. Now whether minority, or constituent people, or part of the majority, that is more a terminological issue. What is important here is that Turkey give these people what they, with justification, claim. These claims and complaints have been set out in the regular report, and that is the substance for which we are looking, not so much the terminology.

TDN: So it is not about whether Kurds, Alawis and others are described as a "minority" or what, but whether they get their full rights.

KRETSCHMER: Exactly, that's the substance which comes.

TDN: What was your reaction when Leyla Zana and representatives of the Alawite foundation stood up and said they were not minorities?

KRETSCHMER: I was to a certain extent astonished. On the other hand, the comments which are made, for example, by Alawis that they are not a minority but part of the majority, they can also come from a more traditional Turkish perception of Turkey that there are no minorities in Turkey and that "We are all part of the Turkish population and there are only Turks, no others around." So even when you hear somebody saying that "We are not minority" you have to see who is saying that and why is the person saying that.

TDN: One argument is that the EU wants to see Turkey transformed into a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic country, and some in Turkey are concerned because this seems opposed to its firmly established unitary nature. Do you agree?

KRETSCHMER: What we want to see is a Turkey which complies with European standards and with relevant international conventions. We have of course in the European Union a very diverse culture, and we have different peoples who have together, minorities, regions and all different sub-divisions of the union. So, a multi-cultural, multi-religious country would just add to that "wealth" and big diversity which make Europe so interesting. And it is just one of the formidable achievements in Europe that this multitude of cultures, traditions, systems have come together and created this successful project.

TDN: Does Turkey seem fit now to contribute to that European wealth?

KRETSCHMER: Turkey is on its way to complying with European standards. Of course, from our perspective, this is perhaps one of the most difficult areas for Turkey. We are still unhappy with the situation of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey; we are still of the view that not enough has been done in respect of the Kurdish population in Turkey. The Kurdish issue, especially as concerns Kurds in the Southeast and not those Kurds who are well integrated into society in the big cities of Turkey. But in the Southeast, the Kurdish issue is still considered primarily a security issue, and not enough has been done for social and economic development. Recently, I visited a small village in the region where return has begun, but people there were living in absolutely dismal conditions. So I think Turkey has to develop a strategy on how to tackle this economic and social situation. We are ready to help Turkey, we have our financial cooperation with Turkey and have earmarked a big part of our current and future assistance for this activity. Turkey has started on this long road by drafting a national development plan. It is envisaged that regional development agencies are built in different regions, and so in the end I think we will make good progress. But as it stands, it is one of the most difficult and deficient areas.

EU and Iraq: Conflicting agendas?

TDN: The regular report mentions the role of the military in the formulation of security strategy and says civilian authorities should "fully exercise their supervisory functions as regards the formulation of the national security strategy and its implementation, especially concerning relations with neighboring countries." And also the EU is engaged in efforts to formulate a common foreign and security policy. Would the EU expect Turkey to toe its line while formulating foreign policy, such as concerning Iraq?

KRETSCHMER: In fact, we do not want to speculate what would happen if Turkey would somehow militarily intervene in Iraq in order to put things in Kirkuk right. It is very difficult to say what the reaction of the European Council would be. If something like this happens before December 17, this would of course be a very important issue which would be in the minds of heads of state and government. But again, I would be unable to tell what the reaction could possibly be. Whether it is foreign policy or internal policy, the rule must be the same; it must be the civilian authority which decides. I do not expect Turkey would intervene in northern Iraq. I understand the concerns of Turkey, which have been made very clear by the government, but I do not believe that a Turkish action in northern Iraq is imminent or even foreseeable.

TDN: Does the EU Commission look into whether and how a candidate country implements the European common foreign and security policy?

KRETSCHMER: Of course, one of the Copenhagen criteria is that a candidate country must share the objectives of the political union, and therefore Turkey would have to be fully committed also to developing common foreign and security policy further. But I don't see any reason why this should not be the case.

'Cyprus' hurdle
TDN: The report notes that the European Council of June 2004 "invited Turkey to conclude negotiations with the Commission on behalf of the Community and its 25 member states on the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement to take account of the accession of the new member states" and says that the commission subsequently transmitted to the Turkish side a draft protocol required for the adaptation of that agreement and now expects a positive reply from Ankara to that. Can you elaborate on what that means practically?

KRETSCHMER: The Ankara Agreement needs to be adapted to the fact that now the EU has ten more members. Traditionally, this is done by way of a protocol. This was the case in relation to the Europe agreements of Bulgaria and Romania, where both parties signed a protocol which took note of the enlarged membership of the EU, and we are suggesting the same to Turkey in relation to the Association Agreement.

TDN: But the problematic part lies in implications, as this inevitably comes down to the question of Turkish recognition of the "Republic of Cyprus."

KRETSCHMER: That is something I don't want to comment on at present, but simply I would underline that we are taking exactly the same approach as for other agreements, and that's just the normal way of handling it.

TDN: Does that mean practically that Turkey will have to recognize the Greek Cypriot administration so that it will be able to open accession negotiations with the EU?

KRETSCHMER: Again, this is something I wouldn't like to speculate about because this is in the end the decision of the European Council, if and what additional conditions would be put for Turkey at the December summit. So, therefore, this is really a matter for the member states to look at. On the other hand, it must be very clear that accession negotiations are not between the European Commission and Turkey but between Turkey and the 25 member states, and not even only the council. It is an intergovernmental process, and Turkey will sit together with 25 countries around the table, all participating in the negotiations.

4. BBC - "Turkey EU entry as big as 'D-Day'"

21 October 2004

German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has said Turkish entry to the European Union would be as important for Europe as the D-Day invasion 60 years ago.

Mr Fischer told the BBC that Europe needs to bring in Turkey and use its influence to make the country secular.

Turkish membership was a key way to liberate Europe from the threat of insecurity from the Middle East and "terrorist ideas", the minister added.

There is significant public opposition to Turkey's accession in Germany.

But Mr Fischer indicated the state's entry would be strategic in the long-term.

"To modernise an Islamic country based on the shared values of Europe would be almost a D-Day for Europe in the war against terror," he said.

"It would be the greatest positive challenge for these totalitarian and terrorist ideas."

'Big question'

The new European Commission has recommended that Turkey is now ready to begin full negotiations on joining the EU.

At a summit in December, the EU leaders will use the report as the basis for deciding whether or not to open negotiations on the Turkish bid.

"Turkey is heavyweight and will be the biggest country in the future," the minister told Radio 4's Today programme.

"The big question will be is Europe ready to digest such a big member state?"

Mr Fischer said that before the 11 September 2001 attacks he had been sceptical about the EU bordering Syria, Iraq and Iran.

He suggested it was now strategically important.

"Our security will be defined for at least five decades in this region... whether we like it or not."

Germany has been more forthright in its views on the EU's relationship with Turkey than France, which is deeply divided on the issue and has promised a referendum.

In the wide-ranging interview, the minister also said that his country supports efforts to re-build Iraq, but will not send troops to the country.

Mr Fischer also described the UN as "indispensable", but urged reform.

"It is weak and we must reform that," he said.

5. Middle East Newsline - "Turkish Military Projects To Wait For EU"

ANKARA / 20 October 2004

Turkey was expected to wait for a European Union decision for membership before proceeding with military procurement projects.

Turkish government sources and analysts said Ankara would delay major procurement until the EU clarifies its plans regarding membership for Turkey in December 2004. They said procurement would also depend on the revision of military requirements in the aftermath of the U.S.-led war in Iraq.

As a result, the sources said, Turkey's Defense Ministry could delay a decision on major procurement for at least another year. In the meantime, the government of Prime Minister Recep Erdogan has been wooing European defense contractors to bid on a range of proposed tenders in an effort to expand the lobby for Turkey's accession to the EU.

"Erdogan and his government will oppose any major military contract that does not give Turkey added benefit and that means capabilities for the defense industry or political credits with the EU," a government source said. "There is quiet agreement for this position within the military's General Staff."

6. Los Angeles Times - "Turkey Looks South, and Worries"

* It fears that the gains made by Iraq's Kurdish minority could provoke an uprising at home. But for now, it knows that its hands are tied.

Ankara / 21 October 2004 / Tracy Wilkinson

Turkish officials are watching with alarm, and rattling a few sabers, as ethnic Kurds gain strength in northern Iraq — but their ability to react militarily is limited, analysts say.

Turkey worries that if Kurds in its southern neighbor become powerful enough, they will declare an independent state. In light of the history of troubled relations with its own Kurdish minority, official Turkey fears that independence for Kurds in Iraq would inspire Kurds in Turkey to seek the same.

Kurds in Iraq already enjoy a certain amount of political autonomy, and Kurdish officials there are working to settle Kurds back into oil-rich Kirkuk — the north's crown jewel — and other cities and towns in the region. Tens of thousands of Kurds were driven out years ago by Saddam Hussein's regime in a plan to "Arabize" the north, resulting now in the displacement of many Arabs.

In meetings with U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, his British counterpart, Jack Straw, and numerous other world leaders, Turkey has repeatedly warned against what it calls the Kurds' destabilizing actions.

"Kirkuk is a city that belongs to all Iraqis, and all of Iraq's natural resources also belong to all the Iraqi people," Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul told reporters this month, in what some saw as a veiled threat. "If harm comes to these [principles], then harm will come to peace in all Iraq…. There should be no provocative acts aiming to maximize [the Kurds'] status or strengthen their position."

Turkey is also protesting the continued presence of Kurdish guerrillas in northern Iraq and southern Turkey, where violence has begun to resurge after a long lull. The government has asked the United States to make good on what the Turks see as a promise to eradicate fighters of the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, which Washington and Ankara consider a terrorist group.

The U.S. has made it clear, however, that with its hands full with major offensives, ambushes and firefights in Iraq, going after the PKK is not a top priority.

In the past, Turkey might have moved militarily to quell signs of a Kurdish uprising. But the government, led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has less maneuvering room than at any time in recent history.

One reason is that Turkey is pursuing membership in the European Union, a years-long process in which the country must show significant improvement in its human rights record, economy and political stability. A unilateral, armed operation in Iraq would jeopardize Turkey's EU application, diplomats said.

The Turkish military believes that the PKK, in its current form, remains sufficiently well-supplied with explosives and missiles to pose a threat, even if the group is beset by internal battles, the loss of key leaders and the depletion of its forces. Still, its level of activity has not crossed the line that would force the army to respond.

As for the political gains of the Iraqi Kurds around Kirkuk and elsewhere, Turkish officials, despite their protests, realize the enormous complexity of the situation in Iraq. They are reluctant to send their own troops into the morass, analysts said, a move that would meet with a fair amount of domestic opposition.

"Everyone here sees Iraq as an unmitigated disaster — why get involved?" said a European diplomat in Ankara, the capital. "You'll hear the usual rhetoric, but Turkey has accepted the semi-federation of Iraq. Not with great joy, but that's the reality on the ground."

Turks are further constrained by their diminishing influence on Washington. Many Bush administration and other U.S. officials have not forgiven Turkey for its refusal in a March 1, 2003, parliamentary vote to allow the U.S. to launch its invasion of Iraq from Turkish soil.

These officials argue that if Turkey had cooperated, the U.S. could have deployed larger numbers of troops and been better able to battle the insurgency that spread after Hussein's fall.

"Had they taken a different route on March 1, the situation would be different," a Western diplomat in Ankara said. "Turkey would have a seat at the table. Turkey would have a major role."

Instead, Turkey does not seem to have Washington's full attention when it complains about Kurds, the PKK or other issues.

Military analyst Faruk Demir said Turkey was aware that its hands were tied and was willing, for now, to stand down. But Turkish officials could eventually lose patience with what they see as U.S. inertia, especially if Kurdish rebels stage a major attack in urban centers or Iraqi Kurds go too far in changing the demographics of Kirkuk.

What exactly the trigger might be is a matter of conjecture.

"Turkey won't want to do anything unilaterally and would always prefer to have the Americans on board," Demir said. "At some point, though, they won't be able to stand by and watch."

7. The Berkshire Eagle - "Instead of just one Iraq, try three"

20 October 2004

No less an authority on the breakup of failed states than Peter Galbraith, the former U.S. ambassador to Croatia, considers the possibility that Iraq will split up along ethnic and religious lines "more likely than a transition to a centralized democracy."

(Mr. Galbraith, by the way, will speak Friday, 7:30 p.m., to the Windham World Affairs Council of Vermont in the Rotch Center located on the World Learning campus here in Brattleboro; his talk is entitled, "How to Get Out of Iraq.")

The United States, he writes in the New York Review of Books, "faces a near-impossible dilemma in Iraq." If it withdraws now, it will leave a weak central government incapable of controlling the chaos that provides such fertile ground for terrorists. But by staying, it undermines the legitimacy of that government.

A civil war may come whether American troops withdraw or not. The horrific torture-murder of five Shiite truck drivers in Fallujah this past June may prove the flash point for a confrontation between Iraq's Shiite Muslim majority and the Sunni minority. The descriptions of the pictures of their mutilated bodies make the snapshots from Abu Ghraib pale by comparison. They are making the rounds of Shiite mosques in southern Iraq, and so great is the anger in the Shia heartland that the American troops now besieging Fallujah may be the only thing that prevents the Mahdi Army from sacking it.

Meanwhile, the Kurds in the north, who already had a quasi-independent state under American protection, are disenchanted with the blunders of the occupation and annoyed that their leaders were frozen out of top spots in the new government. Their militia is the second most numerous, best trained and equipped fighting force in Iraq, and they are openly talking of secession and of refusing to let the new Iraqi army enter their territory. In the south, Shiite political parties and religious institutions form a defacto government, independent of Baghdad's authority.

President Bush, before the invasion, promised to respect the territorial integrity of Iraq, which was formed by the British from the Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. Religious and ethnic violence has been a fact of life in Mesopotamia for thousands of years; it has been suggested before that only a monster like Saddam Hussein could have hoped to rule it as one country. Civil war would be intolerable -- it would benefit the terrorists, it would threaten the already precarious stability of world oil markets, and it would put American troops in an even more untenable position.

The Turks kept those provinces separate for a reason. A "loose federation," Mr. Galbraith suggests, would allow the people of Iraq to rule themselves, and take America off the hook. Perhaps a unified Iraq is a promise Mr. Bush, or Mr. Kerry should consider breaking.

8. KurdishMedia.com - "Oil crisis in the land of oil"

21 October 2004

The lack of oil in Kurdistan has entered its second week and the car cues are getting longer, proportional to public dismay.

Kirkuk/South Kurdistan (KurdishMedia.com) - The official explanation is that the terrorist attacks on the oil pipelines and later on the tankers transporting the oil has been the main cause of this latest crisis.

Ironically, the earlier Iraqi governments had constructed the oil pipe lines from Kerkuk fields to the Beiji refinery southwest of it then all the way up on the west side of the Tigris river to avoid the Kurdish region until reaching the Turkish frontier for export. This current arrangement makes the oil pipeline go through the Sunni lands, which is the main area of attack.

The new Iraqi government unable to protect its pipelines resorted to agreements with neighbouring countries for supply of oil. Turkey takes by tankers the crude oil from Iraq and returns part of it refined for Iraqi consumption. This refined oil is sold and subsidized by the Iraqi government at a fixed price of 53 dinars per litre, about 3 cents of a dollar. The Turkish tanker drivers after unloading the refined oil in Iraq used to buy the same oil they brought at the price of 3 cents, almost 30 times cheaper than the Turkish market prices to resell it in Turkey.

According to the manager of Hewler Petrol station, located 15 km outside of the capital on the main road leading to the tourist resort of Salahadin, the problem comes from Turkey. Because rebuying the oil at the subsidized price was draining the Iraqi economy and fatal business for the Kurdish region where the oil was destined.

On that base, the Kurdish administration restricted Turkish drivers from buying the oil destined to Iraq to a maximum of 500 litres. Turkish drivers reacted by a strike in the frontier reaching over 20 km long. This was further aggravated by Turkish pressure when they reduced the amount of oil transported to Kurdistan. The Petrol station manager used to receive 5 tankers and now only receives one tanker per day, forcing him to work only two hours per day until the oil runs out while paying full wages to his employees.

One citizen waiting in the petrol station asked why the authorities didn’t construct oil pipelines going through the safe Kurdish region just like the tankers, which currently pass through Kurdistan, after all, the oil is from the Kerkuk fields. Solving that way the security problems as well as the congestion of 1500 tankers crossing the Khabur frontier on a daily basis.

For an immediate solution there seems to be negotiations to get refined oil, gas and other combustibles from Iran. The question is, will the oil rich Kurds have to pass another winter without kerosene for heating, cooking and other basic necessities.