1. "Kurds' Separatist Ambitions Pose Challenge To Iraq Unity", Iraqi Kurdistan's de facto independence from Baghdad -- and the popular desire in the three northern provinces to secede from Iraq -- could pose one of the thorniest problems over the coming year for the ethnic, religious, and political factions trying to craft a new Iraqi federal constitution.

2. "Winds of change in Kurdistan - End of the Law of Silence", Recently news was leaked by Kurdish media outlets regarding the plenary session of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) politburo. The leaked information acknowledged and highlighted that a serious debate took place, relating to the introduction of a wide range of socio-political and economic reforms culminating in a reshuffle of the posts in the PUK politburo.

3. "Kirkuk governor Survived Car Bombing", The Kurdish governor of Iraq's northern province of Kirkuk survived assassination when a car bomb exploded Thursday as his convoy passed by, police said.

4. "Erdogan and his gifts", Lucky prime minister enlarges his fleet with the latest gift of a Mercedes car from Airbus

5. "Athens calls Ankara to Cyprus talks", While Athens continues to support Turkey's EU membership bid, it also insists that Ankara should recognise EU-member Cyprus. Turkey, however, remains reluctant to do so.

6. "Kurds in Iran Cheer Iraqi Neighbors' Efforts for Greater Voice", Iran's six million Kurds are avidly following events across the border in Iraq, hoping that the Kurds there will blaze a trail to greater freedoms that can be duplicated in Iran.

7. "Terrorists will not be counted political criminals", The draft law preventing terrorist acts being considered as political crimes was approved at the committee level.

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1. Boston Globe / KurdistanObserver.com - Kurds' Separatist Ambitions Pose Challenge To Iraq Unity

SAID SADIQ / 14 November 2004 / by Thanassis Cambanis

SAID SADIQ, (Southern Kurdistan)-- Brigadier Rahim Mohammed Shakur's allegiance to the Iraqi Army is about as solid as the faxed sheet of paper he received two weeks ago, announcing that his Kurdish peshmerga fighters were now regular Iraqi soldiers, under Baghdad's command.

"I am a Kurd," Shakur, 42, said cheerfully last week, as his tank battalion trained with 100 Soviet tanks and armored personnel carriers that his fighters raided from Saddam Hussein's army in April 2003. "If we are ever attacked, I will stop being a regular Iraqi soldier and become a peshmerga again."

Iraqi Kurdistan's de facto independence from Baghdad -- and the popular desire in the three northern provinces to secede from Iraq -- could pose one of the thorniest problems over the coming year for the ethnic, religious, and political factions trying to craft a new Iraqi federal constitution.

The importance of the Kurds is not lost on US officials; on Monday, as American forces launched the attack on Fallujah, US Ambassador John Negroponte flew from Baghdad to Sulaymaniyah for a day to ask leaders from the PUK to commit to a smooth national election process.

As the sole oasis of stability and unwavering support for US policy in Iraq, the Kurds have made themselves an indispensable linchpin of Washington's hope to fashion a democratic Iraq. But the Kurds are wary allies, suspicious that the United States will barter Kurdish autonomy for the support of Iraq's Arab majority. And public opinion in the Kurdish provinces leans heavily toward declaring independence: about 1.7 million people signed a petition in April demanding a popular referendum on secession, and the independence movement has scheduled another conference for this week.

"I have no connection to Iraq," said Kharman Khasrow, 21, a history student at the University of Sulaymaniyah. She does not speak a word of Arabic.

"I've never been to Iraq. I wouldn't even want to go there," she said. When reminded that the Kurdish provinces are part of Iraq, she smiled and said: "I am in Kurdistan, not Iraq."

Separatist pushDepending on who is presenting the census figures, Kurds in Iraq number from 4 million to 7 million. Iraq's total population is about 25 million.

Kurds say 25 million to 40 million of their people live in territory divided between Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, with the lion's share, about half, in Turkey. The separatist movement in Iraqi Kurdistan provokes great anxiety in the neighboring countries, where well-armed Kurdish independence movements have smoldered for decades.

Iraqi Kurdish leaders fear that separatists will provoke Turkey to send in troops, as it did in the 1990s when Iraqi Kurdish political parties started sheltering Kurdish guerrillas from Turkey.

Subjected to a genocidal campaign by Hussein's government, the three northernmost Kurdish provinces won independence after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when the US created a no-fly zone that kept the Iraqi Army away.

Now, many Kurds think any relation with a federal Iraqi government is too much, and are agitating for Kurdish leaders to annex, by politics or by force, a belt of cities historically considered part of Kurdistan -- including the flash point of Kirkuk; a series of smaller, Arab-majority cities running southward from Kirkuk to the Iranian border; and half of Mosul, Iraq's second largest city and a burgeoning resistance stronghold.

Tensions have flared over the issue before. The Kurdish parties threatened to withdraw from the new interim government in June because they felt Arab leaders did not respect Kurdish rights.

Such a move could prove disastrous, fragmenting the government along ethnic lines and provoking a fight over oil-rich Kirkuk, claimed by both Kurds and Arabs.

Kurdish politicians are eager to quell such concerns. "We won't occupy any place, and we won't oblige anyone to join Iraqi Kurdistan," said Nawshirwan Mustafa, a top official in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, or PUK, which controls the eastern half of the Kurdish provinces.

But, he said, Kurds insist that towns and cities be given free choice to join -- an expansion of the autonomous region that will exacerbate the concerns of Arab nationalists.

"We want our fair share," Mustafa said. "We want to create a new political tradition in Iraq, that Kurds are first class citizens."

North vs. south Sheik Sadoon Essa Yousif al-Qasimi, a Sunni Arab tribal leader from Salahuddin Province, which contains many towns claimed by the Kurds, thinks they are overrepresented in Baghdad. One of two vice presidents, the deputy prime minister, and the foreign minister are all Kurds.

"Kurds already control too much of the national government," he said.

Qasimi said he fears that Kurdish autonomy will prompt secession movements by Shi'ites in the south and Sunnis in central Iraq.

"We cannot allow such splits," he said. "We are one united Iraq."

But such debate in Baghdad ignores a reality obvious to anyone who travels to Iraqi Kurdistan, the official name for the three northernmost Kurdish provinces.

A de facto border, known as the Green Line, is guarded by peshmerga instead of Iraqi police or military. The US military presence, obvious throughout Iraq, vanishes northeast of the Green Line, where Kurdish forces have provided security since 1991.

Arabs who cross into Kurdistan must have permission letters or register with Kurdish security.

Most Kurds who went to school after 1991 never learned Arabic.

Instead of the Iraqi flag, most buildings fly a Kurdish flag, which replaces the three green stars representing Arab unity with a bright-yellow sun.

Until a few months ago, Kurdish phones shared England's international dial code -- a fluke of an underground phone system developed when Kurdistan was a rebel enclave in Hussein's Iraq.

US officials tiptoe around the issue, referring to the area as "the northern provinces." Even Hussein freely described the area as Kurdistan.

"People outside Iraq should know there's a huge difference between the north and south," said Omar Fattah, 52, prime minister of the PUK-controlled part of Kurdistan.

If violence forces a long postponement of national elections, Fattah said, the Kurdish provinces would consider holding their own vote for the Kurdistan Parliament, which was created in 1992.

"I am a Kurd, living within the frame of Iraq," Fattah said. "I live in Kurdistan. But the big Kurdistan was divided, and I'm in the part clinging to Iraq."

When Western powers redrew the Middle East's borders after World War I, territory inhabited by Kurds was split among Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Since then, Kurds have fought for autonomy and the idea of a united greater Kurdistan.

Turkey's bloody war with its Kurds, now in a state of cease-fire, has claimed about 40,000 lives over two decades. The Turkish government has vehemently opposed independence for Iraqi Kurds, fearful that formal secession would provoke more violence among Turkey's separatists.

Indeed, the fear of outside intervention by Turkey or even Iran puts the biggest damper on the Kurdish secession movement.

"It's only the threat of invasion by the neighboring countries that makes us willing to accept being part of a federal Iraq," said Karzan Karem, 21, another student at the University of Sulaymaniyah who supports independence.

A risky futureBasit Hama Gharib, a leader of the Kurdistan Referendum Movement, said the petition with its 1.7 million signatures would be presented to American, British, and United Nations officials within the next month at UN headquarters in New York.

"After the fall of Saddam, the people of Kurdistan became part of Iraq without being asked," Gharib said.

He acknowledged that a referendum almost certainly would provoke a political crisis and very likely a war.

"Without a doubt, it is risky," he said. "But you cannot tear the root of independence from the heart of the people where it is anchored."

At the base of the new Iraqi Army's First Mechanized Infantry, Shakur proudly presented his troops; they still consider themselves peshmerga, a Kurdish word that means "he who faces death."

His division actually captured their Russian-made tanks and armored personnel carriers from Hussein's retreating Army in April 2003.

In his office at the tank base, Shakur has hung two of the most popular images, visible in virtually every home or office in this part of Kurdistan. One shows PUK leader Jalal Talabani, standing before the Iraqi Governing Council last spring, brandishing an Ottoman-era map that shows the areas of Iraq that were historically part of Kurdistan, including Kirkuk.

The other is a modern-day map of greater Kurdistan, the nightmare of Ankara, Damascus, and Tehran: It stretches to include vast swaths of territory populated by Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq.

"We are 40 million, but we have no country," Shakur said. "Iraqi Kurdistan is small. We want a big country. This is just the beginning, God willing."

Globe correspondent Sa'ad al-Izzi contributed to this report from Baghdad. Thanassis Cambanis can be reached at tcambanis@globe.com.

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2. - KurdishMedia.com - Winds of change in Kurdistan - End of the Law of Silence

14 November 2004 / By Ayoub Barzani

Recently news was leaked by Kurdish media outlets regarding the plenary session of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) politburo. The leaked information acknowledged and highlighted that a serious debate took place, relating to the introduction of a wide range of socio-political and economic reforms culminating in a reshuffle of the posts in the PUK politburo. This was reported to include the limitation of the party-leaders’ seemingly unlimited power and unrestricted financial control. The discussions focused on the abnormality of the PUK management and the faced challenges, with the focus on turning the PUK into a more democratic organization that is collective in the decision-making process and has a greater respect in the principle of accountability.

The doors of debate relating to the Kurdish fate and affairs are closed and as such the Kurdish public does not know the exact details of this unusual event. In the current climate, no transparency is allowed by the political parties and vital events are often leaked rather than told. The enigmatic manner by which these events are made public, provide clues about the dark and secretive nature of closed-party workings. Perhaps, opening these doors should be in the frontier of these aforementioned reforms, which admittedly are rare in Kurdish political life as well as in the entire region of the Middle East. The reported event is very significant, and may have positive consequences on Kurdish political life that is commonly characterized with stagnation and hypocrisy.

Kurdish political parties, especially the two ruling parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the PUK, do not take into consideration the right of their people to information. These parties have many fundamental shortcomings, which hitherto is mainly spared from being exposed to criticism and accountability. These shortcomings are a great threat to the normal functioning and development of the Kurdish civil society towards democracy. More alarming is the long silence observed by the intellectuals, the political elites, writers and the Kurdish masses, leading to an era where the dominant law is the “Law of Silence”.

Why changes are slow?

The weakness of the intellectuals in Kurdish society is derived in great part from their own incapacity to unite and form a third political force. Their lack of kinetic energy has pushed them into a state of introversion, working in isolation and fearful of the PUK, KDP or ex-PKK critics. To domesticate intellectuals who disagree with the party line, Kurdish parties pursue a policy of harassment and financial incentives. It can be argued to a certain degree that this policy is successful and ironically explains why Saddam Hussein was successful in applying this method. In addition, the policies of the occupying governments pay special preference to dealing with the classical and tribally oriented parties, rather than allowing the emergence of modern and democratic organizations.

The intellectuals themselves are under threat. To prevent themselves from becoming marginalized and defamed, their functions need to side with one of the main political parties. Again reminding us of the strategy of the Baathist regime against independent intellectuals. The doors of media outlets are closed to them and only a political party identification is sufficient to enter the world of intelligentia and mass media. In this society, a political party owns the state, the media, the armed forces, the educational systems, financial and economic sources, and just about every important aspect of life. For those who lack the confidence to confront conventions it would be difficult to stay as intellectual outside of the main political parties.

Certain intellectuals have found the party system ideal in keeping a high profile by utlising media outlets and other party organs. The fact prevails that the Kurdish society, as it is stated by many political observers, is a society that has no effective intellectuals and writers. Despite the monopoly of power exercised by the political parties, an elite group of intellectuals and writers could take a firm stand against corruption, nepotism and despotism. However, this can only be achieved with a degree of sacrifice and potentially also result in a life in exile as political refugees.

Where changes come from?

With this current scenario, the question is how to change and abolish the “Law of Silence” imposed by authoritarian deeds and who would form the entities that would work as catalysts for this change.
Changes may come from different sources: from within, from the top to the base or vice-versa. The changes, which have been brought by the elites, have different consequences than changes brought by the masses. When a people revolt, they may destroy all the symbols of the authority and bring about profound political, socio-economic changes and thus build a new society. This is synonymous with the Kurdish uprising of spring 1991 against Saddam Hussein’s government. Conversely, changes which are introduced by the elite, can be gradual and spare wide destruction of the deposed regime’s apparatus. In a final scenario, changes may come by mutual co-operation between the masses and the elite in society.

Presently, there are frequent cases of foreign intervention to accelerate change. The U.S. and Europe have started imposing changes through military means, most recently in Afghanistan. Another prime example is the forcible regime change in Iraq by the U.S. and Great Britain. In other cases, economic and diplomatic pressures are used for changing or influencing regimes in the Middle East. Foreign intervention becomes necessary when the concerned nations are crippled from within and lose the capacity, courage and desire to fight back their national despots. However, it must not be forgotten that in most cases change by foreign powers are also responsible for creating corrupt powers around the world, particularly in the Middle East.

Why hints of change in the PUK?

The inevitable question one would ask is why the demand for change has manifested itself within the PUK, which control Sulaimani? And subsequently why these attempted changes have not started within the KDP, which controls the Badinan province?

The answer may lay in the different historical developments of the Sulaimani and Badinan provinces. Historically, Sulemani is the effective cultural centre of South Kurdistan and was the capital of the Baban principality. During the first half of the 19th century, Sulaimani was the centre of the two main Sufi orders; Quaderi and Naqshibendi, before it became the centre of Kurdish nationalism where the first “Independent Kurdistan Kingdom” was proclaimed. The creation of an “Independent Kurdistan” was the main demand of Sheikh Mahmoud Berzinji and not autonomy or federalism. He lead several revolts, in his battle for liberation and was later injured and taken prisoner by the British occupiers.

The intellectuals from the cities, including those from Kirkuk and Hewler, were active in introducing new ideas and in the promotion Kurdish nationalism. Mulla Mustafa himself, the first President of the KDP, recieved most of his nationalist education from Sulaimani during the years of exile in 1933-1943. The city’s cultural elite, to a great degree, were free from tribal culture and modern in their political outlook. The Arab culture could not penetrate the same way it did elsewhere in other parts of Kurdistan. Currently, the city has its Kurdish schools, colleges and university, where Kurdish has been the dominant language of education for many decades. All the inhabitants of the towns and agglomerations surroundings Sulemani consider the city as their cultural and commercial capital. This is enforced by the strong economic exchange between the city and its rural population.

The upheaval of 1991 did start in Betwata but the population of Sulemani joined it quickly and only then did the revolt spread northwest reaching Badinan. In another example, the current "Referendum movement" for self-determination via a plebiscite started two years ago from Sulemani, and similarly it only spread afterwards to all parts of Southern Kurdistan.

Why changes are slower in the KDP?

Meanwhile, historical developments for the population of Badinan, representing nearly 30% of the inhabitants of Southern Kurdistan, took a different shape. Nearly a decade after World War I, the region of Badinan was cut off from its normal northern cultural sources, namely Botan, Amed (Diyarbekir) and Riha (Urfa). The dispute on the fate of Mosul Wilayet was settled between Britain and Turkey in 1925 and as a result, a number of local tribal chiefs made a decision on behalf of the whole population of Badinan. In the ensuing period, the Arabic language was chosen as the language of education and from the 1930s to 1991, the Arabic language was used in schools in Badinan as in the rest of Iraq.

Moreover, the city of Mosul – which formed the backbone of the disposed Baathist regime and still remains the fanatic centre for Arab nationalism, became the centre for economic activities in Badinan. As a result, large quantities of fruits, vegetables, cereals, tobacco, dairy product, honey and great amounts of various animal meats found its way to the Mosul merchants and a mutual economic interest between Mosel and the Aghas in Badinan developed rapidly. As a result of this, Arab culture found its way to Badinan. However, this does not mean that the whole intellectual community in Badinan accepted this cultural concession. Some like the poet Nalbend, Mela Taha Mayi, Mishekhti (Mela Khali) and Sadik Bahadin Amedi wrote in Kurmanci and had a popular following.

It is only recently that the children of Badinan have access to education in their mother tongue. During a visit to Kurdistan in the summer of 1993 by Dr. Ismet Sherif Vanly, a reunion in Duhok was arranged and attended by an important number of intellectuals. In this meeting the question of introducing Kurmanci as a language of education was strongly advocated. This was affirmed by Dr Vanly in loud rhetoric: “How can you abandon the language of Mele Cizire and of Ahmede Xani? It is time to press for this fundamental right.”

Tribal chiefs in Badinan have been protected, by the successive governments in Baghdad and the KDP leadership. The latter considers Badinan as its bastion. Currently the ancient mercenaries and those with such backgrounds are integrated into the KDP leadership - rank and file. The hybridized KDP makes changes towards democracy difficult and extremely slow. Indeed, Saddam’s regime encouraged family rule in Kurdistan from his defeat in Kuwait to the collapse of his regime in 2003. The KDP leadership and Saddam’s regime were prominent for keeping the status quo. Fortunately, George W. Bush put an end to this “entente cordiale” in 2003.

The strong mutual interest developed between the KDP leadership and Saddam’s regime (1992-2003) needed maintenance and protection from both sides. Hence, there was a necessity to “curb” Badinan and Hewler populations from fashioning their national sentiments. The city of Hewler, the capital of the Kurdistan Provisional Government, was occupied by Saddam’s army in 1996 after the overthrow of the PUK rule in the district, and subsequently handed over to the KDP leadership.

This is in contrast to the PUK, where the promotion of family from within is recent and timid, as the social milieu is detribalized and mostly rejects hereditary process of power transfer. Meanwhile, the propaganda machine of the KDP is openly enhancing family rule, putting it into the centre of their strategy by seemingly altering history and memory by erasing any trace of a dissenting historical parallel with the party as one. In order to exert this absolute control on collective memory, it was forbidden to remember and commemorate anything other than this official memory and thus resulting in the “Law of Silence”. In Sulaimani, just the leader is promoted, but in Badinan the leader and his kin are promoted. In the PUK-area the leader is prominent, but in KDP-areas it is the dynasty, which is portrayed in the pictures of the three of party leaders that are hung in every single party and government office. It is disappointing and alarming to see that oppressed Kurds depict their oppressor’s method - Saddam’s former regime. The party leaders must have the ability to see the tomorrow and not only today. They must ask themselves, "Where are the billions of pictures of Saddam, which were on walls just over a year ago?" In turn they should also ask themselves, "Where is Saddam’s dynasty?"

The KDP Politburo members have been mostly nominated to their posts through kinship, nepotism and favouritism. Hence the total absence of courage since no one dares questioning the family rule. Therefore, there is no possibility of political change from within. One of the present politburo members told me frankly, “the KDP is the party of Aghas, including mercenaries, but if I oppose this policy, either I am dead or I have to leave Kurdistan definitely.”

Changes are inevitable

The 1991 upheaval was highly contagious; it spread soon to all parts of South Kurdistan. In a similar vain to this, let us hope that the looming and widely anticipated changes within the PUK will also precipitate change within the KDP politburo. However, if changes do occur, we have to also be careful that we are not be fooled by the application of cosmetic changes.

No doubt, the population of Hewler and Badinan are longing for democratic changes, a civilized administration and a real parliament. We hope that the KDP leadership will have the wisdom and courage for real radical changes, before it is too late. They must understand that aesthetic changes are no substitute for letting the civil society breath normally and liberally.

The PUK and the KDP cannot isolate themselves from the advocated positive changes in the region and around the world, which includes the promotion of multinational democracies, local democracy, civil society, respect for human rights, freedom of expression and the independence of the media, transparency, political accountability and pluralism.

The concept of the "Vanguard party", which was promoted in Iraq by the Arab Baath Socialist Party and was a depiction of the former socialist bloc, has been embodied in both the PUK and KDP. One manifestation is that both parties have governments and no one is prepared to take the challenge of an election and accept defeat if it comes their way. Both sides would simply have too much too lose and potentially not much to gain in such an electoral maneuver.

The changes are inevitable, but it would be more productive if the party members work within their organizations for long-due changes. The Kurdish society is certainly weary of current political structure. The daily gossip and talk are all about party corruptions, thefts and nepotism. Expecting a rebellion within the public is not a far-fetched reality. However, such a rebellion would harm the Kurdish cause, and may result in offering a golden occasion for regional military interferences and re-imposing of rule from Baghdad once again.

There are fundamental problems in the party and government structure that the PUK and KDP leaderships must not trivialize. These proposals are the prelude to the beginning of the end of an era. They must not be reduced down to aesthetic amendments, as the changes in the PUK would influence the KDP.

The historical test is for the people of Kurdistan. After much sacrifice and enormous suffering, the people will no longer accept that party leaders sign agreements with Baghdad without their consultation. The people shall not tolerate a despotic rule fuelled by corruption and manipulation.

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3. - Xinhuanet / KurdistanObserver.com - Kirkuk governor Survived Car Bombing

BAGHDAD / 11 November 2004

The Kurdish governor of Iraq's northern province of Kirkuk survived assassination when a car bomb exploded Thursday as his convoy passed by, police said.

The attack took place at about 8:30 a.m. (0530 GMT) in the center of the oil rich city of Kirkuk, close to the headquarters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), a leading Kurdish party, the police said.

Kirkuk Governor Abdel-Rahman Mostafa was not hurt in the attack, while one pedestrian was killed and four others wounded at the Al-Tabaqchali overpass, some 100 meters from the PUK building, according to witnesses and hospital officials.

Kirkuk, some 250 km north of Baghdad, is inhabited with different ethnic and sectarian groups.

The city has been repeatedly hit by assassinations and attacks on senior police and political leaders.

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4. - Turkish Daily News - Erdogan and his gifts

Lucky prime minister enlarges his fleet with the latest gift of a Mercedes car from Airbus

ANKARA / 15 November 2004

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is one of the luckiest ones in recent memory. Despite the public uproar it has generated, Erdogan keeps receiving gifts from foreign companies whenever he goes overseas.

When Erdogan visited South Korea earlier this year, Hyundai's CEO, Jung Monkoo, gave him two limousines. Monkoo accompanied Erdogan during his tour of the Hyundai factory in Busan, and asked him which car he had liked. Erdogan said he liked the limousine, after which the CEO said two of these cars, worth $ 100,000, would be presented to Erdogan back in Turkey. Reports say that one of the cars is currently being used by the prime minister's wife, Emine Erdogan.

Meanwhile Toyota announced that they would be giving a six cylinder, 230 horsepower, 4X4 jeep to Erdogan as a new years present. Top officials in Toyota said that they had met with Erdogan and told him about the gift and that the prime minister had told them the he would accept it if the jeep was registered to the Prime Ministry. While some claim that the jeep's value is around TL 200 billion, Prime Ministry officials say that the jeep costs "no more than TL 60 or 70 billion."

It was really the fault of these car manufacturers that Erdogan got into the habit of getting presents every time he visited a factory or met with company executives. When he attended the opening ceremony of the MAN bus factory in Ankara, he was given a small model of a bus. He joked: "I thought you were going to give me a real one." As a result, he was given a luxury MAN bus that is said to cost Euro 240,000. One can never know when one needs a bus.

The most public incident happened when Erdogan went to Berlin to sign an agreement to purchase 36 planes from Airbus for the Turkish Airlines and asked for a VIP jet plane as a gift. He was told that a jet plane as a gift was impossible, because Turkish officials were receiving the planes at bargain prices and that such a gift would cause their costs to pass the price charged. They instead promissed to present a luxury Mercedes model Maybuch 62, of which only 1,000 were manufactured a year, that costs around TL 1.5 trillion.

The opposition did not look too kindly on Erdogan's attempts to increase his fleet of cars. Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal said Erdogan's tradesman mentality had got out of hand, calling on the prime minister to never ask for another gift again. He said, "He doesn't have the right to embarrass the proud Turkish people."

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5. - EurActiv.com - Athens calls Ankara to Cyprus talks

15 November 2004

While Athens continues to support Turkey's EU membership bid, it also insists that Ankara should recognise EU-member Cyprus. Turkey, however, remains reluctant to do so.

The leader of Greece believes that Turkey must recognise the Cypriot government if it wants to secure a date for its EU accession talks. "Turkey's European course depends above all other things on itself," Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis has told the Cypriot parliament. Karamanlis said that he has extended an invitation to the government of Turkey for talks on the unresolved Cyprus issue.

In Ankara, the Foreign Ministry indicated that the proposal was not to be taken seriously and said that the government had no plans to issue an official response. The Commission likewise preferred to remain tight-lipped.

Earlier, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said that his country had no obligation to recognise the Greek-Cypriot administration.

In Nicosia, the Turkish Cypriot community's leader, Rauf Denktash, said that the Greek proposals were part of an "arrogant move" to use Turkey's EU bid to corner Ankara. ''The EU should now decide that there are two separate peoples in Cyprus and nobody has the authority to make one of these peoples government of the other. And the EU should behave in line with this decision. Otherwise, there will be no agreement in Cyprus,'' said Denktash.

In a referendum in April 2004, the Greek community of Cyprus voted down a UN-sponsored plan to resolve the Mediterranean island's 30-year-long division, while the Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly endorsed it. As a result, Greek Cypriots alone joined the EU.

On 17 December, the leaders of the EU member states are scheduled to decide on Turkey's EU accession bid. Both Greece and Cyprus have a veto right over the issue.

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6. - New York Times - Kurds in Iran Cheer Iraqi Neighbors' Efforts for Greater Voice

TEHRA / 13 November 2004 / By NAZILA FATHI

Iran's six million Kurds are avidly following events across the border in Iraq, hoping that the Kurds there will blaze a trail to greater freedoms that can be duplicated in Iran.

But lately, the Iranian Kurds are discouraged.

Their hope was that in Iraq, Kurds would build on the autonomy they had established for all practical purposes since 1991, when routine British and American flights over Iraq kept Saddam Hussein from ruling, and mistreating, the Kurdish region.

Iranian Kurds were jubilant when their brethren across the border won rights in the interim Iraqi constitution recognizing the autonomy of the Kurdish region and granting the Kurds extraordinary powers to protect it.

But now they fear that those powers will be ignored, as the interim Iraqi leaders talk of that constitution applying only until national elections are held. Further, the appointment of non-Kurdish Iraqis as prime minister and president raised fears that Kurds would once again become marginalized.

"The population of Kurds is much smaller than the Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq," said Tofiq Rafiee, the editor of Sirvan, a leading Kurdish journal. "Without the right to veto, Kurds can never make any changes to improve the situation for themselves," he said, referring to the Kurdish veto right that is part of the current constitution.

Sirvan reported in September that the current arrangement, in which Kurds serve as vice president and deputy prime minister, was similar to what Mr. Hussein granted Kurds 20 years ago and was not what the Kurds were expecting today.

Iran's Kurds, who reside mostly in the northwestern parts of the country, near Iran's borders with Iraq and Turkey, were hoping for a spillover effect if the Iraqi Kurds gained greater powers.

Although the Iranian Constitution recognizes the Kurds as a minority, the government has long treated them as second-class citizens. Unlike the majority of Iranians, who are Shiite Muslims, most of the Kurds are Sunnis.

They have been barred from teaching the Kurdish language at schools or publishing their literature freely. They complain that they face discrimination in employment and university admissions. Kurdish provinces are among the least developed regions in the country, and the Kurds have been discouraged from forming their own political parties.

After 1991, Iranian and Iraqi Kurds increased their contacts. They exchanged political and cultural journals, and professors from Iran taught at the four universities in Kurdish areas in Iraq.

"The situation in the two regions affects one another," said Jalal Jalalizadeh, a Kurd who is a former member of Parliament. "Iranians compare themselves with the Kurds of Iraq. When their situation improves they also struggle for more rights."

Mr. Jalalizadeh said that when Iranian Kurds learned about the rights granted to Iraqi Kurds in the interim constitution they demanded a more active political role. "They want to be able to have their own independent TV, teach the Kurdish language at schools and have representation in the government," he said.

Kurds on the two sides of the border speak the same language and share the same faith. Marriage between Iranian and Iraqi Kurds is common, and a Kurdish satellite television channel has increased communication between them.

Iranian Kurds celebrated for several days in March after the Iraqi interim constitution granted Kurds the right to form a government. However, the Iranian government put down the celebrations and arrested nearly 100 people when the events turned into riots. In a sign of solidarity, the Iranians held mourning ceremonies when several Kurdish officials were killed in a bombing in Erbil, Iraq, in February, Sirvan reported.

Iranian Kurds have not sought full independence since the 1979 Islamic revolution, which was followed by a period of fighting with the government, but they have demanded greater autonomy, democracy and freedom.

They refer to their historical and cultural ties with Persian Iranians and say their Iranian identity is as important as their Kurdish identity. The Kurdish language is close to Farsi, the main language spoken in Iran, and Kurds say they were the founders of the civilization where Iran is today.

They took part in the political process along with other Iranians, and voted overwhelmingly for President Mohammad Khatami, a reformist, in 1997 in the hope of achieving more democracy.

Reformist Kurdish members of Parliament, who were elected after the brief period of political openness after Mr. Khatami's election, formed a Kurdish bloc in Parliament and managed to win a fivefold increase in the budget for their part of the country. One member spoke in the Kurdish language for the first time in Parliament, and the language will be taught for the first time at universities in Kurdish areas this year.

However, the Iranian Kurds feel marginalized again, after Kurdish candidates, along with other reformists, were removed by a hard-line watchdog council before the last parliamentary elections. With many reformers prevented from running and voters angry that the pro-reform Parliament was able to achieve so little, hard-liners recaptured Parliament again this year.

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7. - NTV - Terrorists will not be counted political criminals

ANKARA / 12 November 2004

The draft law preventing terrorist acts being considered as political crimes was approved at the committee level.

Turkey’s Foreign Relations parliamentary committee on Thursday approved an amendment to European Convention on prevention of the terrorism.

Under the draft legislation, which still has to be ratified by the parliament, terrorism will no longer be considered a political crime.

The new law, as approved by the committee, will also facilitate the extradition of terrorists wanted by other countries from Turkey.