18 June 2004

1. "EU not ready for Turkey", a senior EU official said Thursday that Turkey was doing well getting ready for EU membership but suggested the European Union may not be ready for Turkey.

2. "Battle of flags", the Kurds feel that the US has reneged on its promise to respect Kurdish rights, including the right to autonomy, which they have enjoyed since 1991.

3. "Iraqi Kurds Get U.S. Backing", Wolfowitz Urges Ethnic Minority to Help Unite Country.

4. "Turkey and the European Union: just another enlargement?", the implications of Turkey's accession to the EU for the Union itself.

5. "One Turkish soldier killed, two wounded in clashes with Kurdish rebels", armed Kurdish rebels shot dead a Turkish soldier and wounded two government-paid militiamen in clashes in the east and southeast of the country, local security sources said Thursday.

6. "EU steps up pressure on Ankara over customs union", the EU has stepped up calls on Turkey to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and sign Customs Union agreements with the island.

1. - Associated Press - "EU not ready for Turkey":

BRUSSELS / 18 June 2004

A senior EU official said Thursday that Turkey was doing well getting ready for EU membership but suggested the European Union may not be ready for Turkey.

Turkey's EU accession "is not for tomorrow," EU expansion affairs commissioner Guenter Verheugen told Turkish politicians and business leaders.

"Accession negotiations will take time and mark a fundamental change for Europe. I wonder if we can do it without a common foreign and security policy," Verheugen said, adding that once Turkey joins, the EU will border the volatile Middle East.

In the past decade, EU efforts to craft a joint foreign and security policy have met with very mixed results. The Iraq war, especially, bared great divisions within Europe over how to deal with security challenges outside the union, especially the Middle East.

EU leaders are to decide later this year if Turkey has met democratic and human rights standards that have been set as a condition for starting EU membership talks - a major policy goal of successive Turkish governments.

Verheugen praised constitutional reforms approved by the Turkish parliament in May.

These include the abolition of state security courts and other remnants of military rule, the removal of military members from boards making university appointments, opening up military spending to more public scrutiny, removing references to the death penalty in national laws and providing for gender equality.

Since then, the government in Ankara also has allowed television broadcasts in Kurdish and Kurdish language education.

The EU leaders' decision in December to begin entry talks with Turkey will hinge on an assessment report that Verheugen is currently drafting.

2. - Al-Ahram (Cairo / Egypt) - "Battle of flags":

Ibrahim Al-Marashi* travelled northern Iraq to assess its mood since attention shifted to Baghdad and the south

18 June 2004

Violent clashes in the southern cities of Falluja and Najaf have diverted attention from the situation in the north of Iraq. Ignoring the north further may have disastrous consequences for US-led occupation authorities. Southern Iraq was largely sidelined until Moqtada Al-Sadr stepped into the breach and launched his offensive against occupation forces. The same thing may well happen elsewhere soon.

I travelled to my native Iraq in the last weeks of March, my second visit since the end of the war. I entered the country from Turkey, where a line of empty oil trucks more than two miles long queued up on the Turkish side of the border. On entering, a sign welcomed us to the "Kurdistan of Iraq", a clear message to Iraq's northerly neighbour that the Kurds are not willing to give up the relative autonomy they have enjoyed since their "safe haven" was established after the 1991 Gulf war. A portrait of Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), hangs on the wall at the border post, a reminder that we are not just entering Iraq, but Barzani's domain as well. The Kurdish flag -- red, green and white stripes with a sun in the centre -- is flying alongside the yellow KDP flag. The Iraqi flag is conspicuously absent. Entering the town of Dohuk, 45 minutes from the Turkish border, I was greeted by another sign: "God bless the coalition." Dohuk is the only town in Iraq where American soldiers can walk around unarmed. In fact, they come here for rest and relaxation from other parts of Iraq. Coalition troops may be welcome for now, but how long will this situation last?

The declaration "Thank God for our new constitution" greets visitors to Dohuk. The Kurds are content with the interim constitution passed in March 2004 because they won major concessions. Not only does it recognise Kurdish as Iraq's second language, the interim constitution also states that the permanent charter to be voted on in 2005 may be rejected if not approved by a majority of voters in three of Iraq's 18 provinces. The Kurds control three provinces in the north of Iraq, which gives a veto to an ethnic community that forms about 15 per cent of the population.

The Kurds in Dohuk are generally resentful of one man, Iraq's most prominent religious figure Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani. As a Shia, not only does he have little influence among the Sunni Kurds, but it was Al-Sistani who argued that the interim constitution, known as the Transitional Law was written by an unelected council under the occupation and thus does not reflect the views of the majority of the Iraqi people but rather that of the US-appointed Interim Governing Council. There is a sense that a new battle line has been drawn between Iraq's Shia and Kurdish leaders, whereas in the past the conflict was with the Kurds and the Sunni-dominated Baathist government.

In the eyes of the Kurds, the UN Security Council resolution passed on 8 June approving transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis is a demonstration of America's Shia sympathies, perhaps marking the first point of tension between the Kurds and the US. The Kurds feel that the US has reneged on its promise to respect Kurdish rights, including the right to autonomy, which they have enjoyed since 1991. Subsequently, Kurds have threatened to not take part in the post-30 June interim government and to boycott national elections in January 2005.

The interim government is dangerously similar to the government in Lebanon where government positions are awarded on the basis of a person's religion or sect. The most powerful post of the current Iraqi interim government, that of prime minister, is reserved for a Shia figure, Iyad Allawi; the post of president is reserved for a Sunni Muslim, Ghazi Al-Yawar. The Kurds control five of the 26 ministries, one of the two deputy president posts and the office of deputy prime minister. By controlling 15 of the 26 ministries and occupying the post of prime minister, argue the Kurds, the Shia will dominate the new government. The Lebanese civil war was a result of conflict over the division of government posts. The same thing could happen in Iraq.

Will the Kurds rebel if their demands are not met? The US has provided arms to the Kurds on the condition they are returned once the conflict has ended. However, this situation is reminiscent of the situation in Afghanistan where the US provided the Afghan mujahadin with weapons. They were never returned. Worse still, down the line they were turned against the country that gave them. There are currently 40,000 Kurdish armed militiamen -- the only unified armed force in Iraq. Some Kurdish leaders made veiled threats to secede from Iraq after the passage of the UN resolution. The Kurds are committed to a united Iraq, but only for the time being.

>From Dohuk I travelled to a town called Koya, where I was greeted by a portrait of Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Unionist Party (PUK), reminding me that I was now on his territory. In this part of Iraqi Kurdistan the Kurdish flag flies alongside the Iraqi flag, perhaps an indication of the PUK's "Iraqiness". Along the road to Sulaymaniyya, where the regional headquarters of the PUK are located, I could not help but notice the number of medical centres on the road specialising in prosthetic limbs, a reminder of the number of Kurdish victims maimed by mines planted by Saddam Hussein's regime in the north of the country.

The relative prosperity of the city is evident upon entering Sulaymaniyya; there are plenty of brand new shiny BMWs and Mercedes driving along the wide tree-lined avenues. The north of Iraq has had a twelve-year head start in rebuilding their region, unlike the south that suffered under a decade of sanctions. The youth of Sulaymaniyya hang out at the local "MaDonal" restaurant sporting necklaces in the shape of Kurdistan. It is interesting to note that many of these young people do not speak Arabic, perhaps an indication that a new generation of Kurdish Iraqis has little in common with their compatriots in the south.

>From Sulaymaniyya I drove to Kirkuk, a city divided among ethnic Kurds, Arabs and Turkoman, Sunnis, Shia and Christians. Some call it the Iraqi Jerusalem, and indeed Kirkuk has witnessed almost daily armed clashes. The Turkoman minority of Iraq, closely allied with Turkey and the Arabs residing in Kirkuk, accuse the US of turning a blind eye to what they term a Kurdish-led ethnic "ethnic cleansing" of the city. If the current trend continues, armed and bloody ethnic war could engulf the north of Iraq. Such a clash occurred between the US, Kurds, Turkey and Turkoman in July 2003.

Upon entering Kirkuk, I drove by a Turkoman social and cultural club ringed by armed guards. Why does a social club need so much protection? According to one of the guards, American forces surrounded the premises in July and seized Turkish soldiers there who were accused by the Kurds of attempting to assassinate the mayor of Kirkuk.

Arabs also form part of Kirkuk's population, a legacy to Saddam Hussein's attempts to "Arabise" the city. Many of the Shia here fly green and black flags emblazoned with the name of Imams Ali and Hussein, the fourth caliph and his son who are revered figures of all Muslims but especially Shia Muslims. Among those Shia residents, one can also find picture of Moqtada Al-Sadr, the young firebrand cleric whose anti-American message resonates widely.

Kirkuk sits on one of the largest oil fields in the Middle East, but looking at the pitiful state of the city, one would never guess the enormous wealth lying below the ground. The Americans promised to secure the oil fields and have established a military base and airfield literally right beside them. In return, the base comes under mortar attack on a daily basis.

Any past power-sharing agreement between the Kurds and the central authority in Baghdad has failed due to the issue of reallocation of Kirkuk oil revenues to the north of Iraq. Based on this past precedent, it seems likely that any agreement between the Kurds and a post-Saddam government will hinge on the issue of Kirkuk.

As I left Kirkuk on the road to Tikrit in the south, I could not help but feel pessimistic over the fate of this city, and the situation in the north in general. I wondered if this region would continue to enjoy a superficial peace and ignore the tensions emerging from within.

* The writer is an American researcher of Iraqi origin

3. - The Washington Post - "Iraqi Kurds Get U.S. Backing":

Wolfowitz Urges Ethnic Minority to Help Unite Country

18 June 2004 / Lake Dakan

Helicoptering across northern Iraq for high-profile visits to the region's top two Kurdish leaders, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz voiced strong support Thursday for protecting minority rights for ethnic Kurds in a new Iraqi political structure but also urged Kurds to resist secessionist notions and work for a united national government.

The separate meetings with Kurdish leaders Massoud Barzani and Jalai Talabani underscored U.S. interest in promoting accord among Iraq's Shiite Arab, Sunni Arab and Kurdish communities to ensure the emergence of a unified, democratic nation.

Earlier this month, Barzani and Talabani threatened to distance their Kurdish parties from the Iraqi state and possibly secede altogether. They were upset over the absence of any mention of Iraq's interim constitution in a U.N. resolution adopted June 8 that affirmed the planned transfer of Iraqi sovereignty June 30.

The interim constitution, hammered out in March, offered the Kurds some protection by essentially granting them a veto over ratification of a permanent constitution. It did this by stipulating that if two-thirds of voters in three of the country's 18 provinces rejected the constitution, it would not be adopted. There are three provinces with a Kurdish majority. Iraq's interim prime minister, Ayad Allawi, pledged last week that his government would adhere to the interim constitution until elections next year. But what happens after that remains in doubt, and tensions over the issue have highlighted the challenges ahead in crafting arrangements that will balance Iraq's main political, religious and ethnic groups.

"We Americans think it is very important that Kurds should be first-class citizens in their own country," Wolfowitz told reporters after a luncheon meeting with Barzani at a guest house outside the city of Irbil. "It's important because an Iraqi government that treats its Kurds as first-class citizens will treat all its people as first-class citizens."

Barzani welcomed Wolfowitz's visit, calling it reassuring and adding that it reflected the "importance and care" with which the United States has handled Kurdish issues.

Later, a dinner meeting between Wolfowitz and Talabani in this lake area in northeastern Iraq, yielded a renewed public commitment from the other Kurdish leader to pursue a unified national government.

In remarks to reporters afterward, Wolfowitz offered what he described as a new, more positive reason for opposing Kurdish secession than the traditional argument that a unified Iraq is important for regional stability.

"The unity of Iraq is important also because Kurds, with their general outlook and with their 12 years of experience of real self-government, have something enormously important to contribute to a free and democratic Iraq," he said.

The Kurds operated an autonomous region of northern Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, protected by U.S. and British air patrols. Now, the Kurds worry about losing the U.S. protection and falling subject to a government in Baghdad ruled by Iraq's Shiite majority.

Kurds are represented prominently in the interim government formed earlier this month, filling both a vice presidency and a deputy premiership, although Wolfowitz noted that Kurdish leaders had hoped to get one of the top two posts, prime minister or president.

Also, when the new Iraqi government and U.S. occupation authorities moved last week to declare all militia groups illegal, the two main Kurdish organizations -- the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan -- won special provisions. Many Kurdish fighters, known as pesh merga, will be allowed to form specialized units under the command of the Kurdish regional government that controls northern Iraq.

4. - EurActiv - "Turkey and the European Union: just another enlargement?":

The implications of Turkey's accession to the EU for the Union itself.

18 June 2004 / by Kirsty Hughes

Turkey was officially recognised as an EU candidate in December 1999, and in December 2002 the European Council announced that if Turkey met its political ‘Copenhagen’ criteria by the end of 2004 it would open negotiations without delay. Since 1999, and particularly since the election of the AKP government in November 2002, there has been radical and rapid political reform in Turkey. Major political reforms have promoted democratisation, and led to considerable steps forward in the area of human rights including minority rights and in the area of civilian control of the military. The EU goal has been a very important framework in underpinning these reforms and uniting disparate groups around reform.

At the same time, reforms are not complete and there are particular problems in many areas of implementation of reform including in the human rights area. Judicial reform remains inadequate. The European Commission has made clear its expectation of further progress in a number of key areas before it draws up its vital report on progress and its recommendation in the autumn to the EU’s leaders on whether to open negotiations. There is much agreement across different political groups and actors in Turkey, that opening EU negotiations is a vital step if the strong dynamic of political reform is to continue and become deeply rooted. There is also widespread pessimism in Turkey at the impact on political reform if the European Council does not decide to open negotiations in December.

Turkey in the EU - Economic Impacts

Turkey is a large country in population terms and a small one in economic terms. If Turkey joins the Union in 2015 it will have a population of 82.1 million, slightly smaller than that of Germany at 82.4 million, both accounting for just over 14% of EU28 population. By 2025 at 87 million people, Turkey will be the largest EU member state and account for 15.5% of the population. Looking forward to 2050, population is predicted to stabilise at 97 million – 17.7% of EU28 million (slightly less than Germany’s 18.1% share today of the EU25 population).

Today Turkey’s economy is just 1.9% of EU25 GDP. Assuming average annual growth of 5%, it would be 2.9% of GDP on accession in 2015. Turkey’s GDP per head (at purchasing power parity) is only 27% of the EU average. Turkey’s economy is also characterised by major regional inequality. Turkey’s macroeconomic situation is stabilising after the 2001 crisis – opening of negotiations is expected to impact strongly and positively on the sustainability of this recovery. But many further economic reforms are necessary. Labour market – and education – reforms are vital if Turkey is to use its economic potential. Both youth unemployment and the exceptionally low employment rate of women at 25.5% need to be tackled.

Given its small size, Turkish accession will have minimal impact on the EU economy. It might have a very small but positive impact on EU25 GDP of 0.1-0.3% of GDP, an impact which will increase if there are net migration flows from Turkey to the current EU members. The EU could benefit in particular from the different demographic profile of Turkey, with its much younger, growing population. If migration flows from Turkey are similar to those anticipated from the new EU member states from central and eastern Europe, then flows of around 225,000 a year would be anticipated, with a long run eventual stock of about 2.9 million migrants. This would be at a time when the EU is beginning to feel the negative impacts of its aging demographic profile.

Foreign direct investment in Turkey is exceptionally low. The prospect of EU membership together with increased political and economic stability at macro-level, and major reform of barriers at micro-economic level – including tackling corruption and problems in the judiciary – could results in FDI flows of €2-4 billion a year.

As a large poor country, Turkey will be eligible for significant budget transfers from the Union – though these will depend both on policy reforms in regional and agricultural policies in the EU in the next ten years, and on the actual negotiations. Both the EU’s common agricultural policy, and agriculture in Turkey will need further reform. Likely budget flows in the first 3 years of Turkish membership are estimated at a total of €45.5 billion ie around €15 billion a year. Turkey’s own contributions to the budget will mean the net figure could be €30-35 billion (and negotiations may reduce this further). In per capita terms, this is almost identical to the budget deal for the ten new member states.

Turkey in the EU – Political Impacts

The fact that Turkey will become the EU’s largest member state in population terms soon after accession is one of the biggest impacts of Turkish accession. Turkey’s strategic geographical location, and its large Muslim population also have implications for the EU. It is in the EU’s strategic interests that Turkey is democratic, stable and prosperous and a friendly ally. Turkish EU membership can – as with earlier enlargements – contribute to these strategic goals. The impact of Turkish accession – and of opening accession negotiations – in demonstrating that the EU is a secular, multicultural body not a ‘Christian club’ – will also have important geopolitical ramifications.

Institutionally, Turkey will have a large impact on the Council and the European Parliament but not on the European Commission. Assuming a double majority system of voting operates in the Council (of countries and population), in an EU of 28 both Turkey and Germany will have around 14.5% of the vote each. They will be strong players but unable to block proposals even together but they will be able to block proposals with a third large country. The large countries are not in a position to push through proposals on their own due to the need for a majority of countries as well as population. The largest 5 countries in an EU of 28 will account for 60.3% of the vote by population. This is only 3.4 percentage points higher than the share of the ‘big 4’ countries in an EU of 25 (where they have 56.9% of the vote). So Turkey will be an important powerful player and will add to the already complex set of alliances and blocking combinations that are possible. But in an EU of 28, despite its size, it does not add strongly to the dominance of the larger countries (assuming in any event that the large countries could and would agree). In terms of seats in the European Parliament, if seats are reallocated proportionately to take account of Turkish, as well as Bulgarian and Romanian accession, then Turkey – and Germany – would both have 82 seats – 11.2 % each of the total number.

Turkey will have an important impact on EU foreign policy interests given its borders with the Middle East, Caucasus and the Black Sea. This will shift the Union’s borders to the South-East and increase the Union’s range of interests in these difficult regions. Turkey will look to be a significant player in the development of EU foreign policy but it will not be as important a ‘bridge’ to the Middle East as some expect. Turkey will impact more widely on the already complex political dynamics among member states, including among the larger member states, but Turkey alone will not determine the future political evolution of the Union. And many issues around whether the enlarged Union can find strategic leadership and direction, and whether it will aim for further political integration, will become clear in the next decade before Turkey joins.

There is a risk that Turkey as a member state could resemble the UK and be a rather awkward player – but it is more likely than the UK to understand the political nature of the Union. It will also resemble in some ways the new member states of central and eastern Europe in some of its policy interests, and in other ways will have much in common with Mediterranean member states like Greece, Spain and Portugal.

Overall, the paper concludes that Turkey will have significant impacts on the Union but these impacts can be managed as those of previous enlargements have been. Consequently, Turkey’s candidacy should be judged on the same terms as that of other candidates – through adoption of the acquis and through meeting the Copenhagen criteria.

Source: Friends of Europe (Friends of Europe is a Brussels-based think tank without national or political bias that promotes discussion, research and new thinking of European policy issues.)

5. - AFP - "One Turkish soldier killed, two wounded in clashes with Kurdish rebels":

DIYARBAKIR / 17 June 2004

Armed Kurdish rebels shot dead a Turkish soldier and wounded two government-paid militiamen in clashes in the east and southeast of the country, local security sources said Thursday.

The soldier was killed late Wednesday in the southeastern province of Sirnak, which borders Syria and Iraq, when rebels opened fire, the province’s governor Osman Gunes said.

In a separate operation in a rural area in the eastern province of Mus, two village guards -- local men armed and paid by the government to combat Kurdish rebels -- were wounded when fighting erupted with militants from the KONGRA-GEL rebel group.

KONGRA-GEL is the successor of the outlawed PKK which led a 15-year bloody campaign for self-rule in Turkey’s mainly Kurdish southeast until 1999 when the rebel group declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew from Turkey.

But KONGRA-GEL announced last month that it was ending the truce as of June1.

Turkish security forces have since stepped up their operation against the group both on rural ground and urban centers where Kurdish rebels have carried out bombing attacks in the past.

Police in the southern city of Adana have detained eight suspected KONGRA-GEL militants, including two women, on suspicion of preparing bomb attacks in the city, the Anatolia news agency reported Thursday.
Officers seized 10 kilos (22 pounds) of plastic explosives, detonators and documents on bomb-making when they made the arrests Wednesday, the agency said.

Four other members of the former PKK were arrested earlier this month in Adana on suspicion of planning attacks.

6. - Cyprus Mail - "EU steps up pressure on Ankara over customs union":

18 June 2004 / by Simon Bahceli

THE EU has stepped up calls on Turkey to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and sign Customs Union agreements with the island.

Turkey has already signed Customs Union agreements with all other nine new EU members, but refuses to do so with Cyprus because of its refusal to recognised the Turkish Cypriot breakaway state in the north.

But an EU diplomat told the Mail yesterday there had been a “ratcheting up of the language” used to apply pressure on Turkey to recognise Cyprus and implement the Customs Union agreement with it.

The diplomat said he believed the Union would be able to apply effective leverage on Turkey in the light of its keenness to get a date for the start of its own EU accession negotiations, adding: “If Turkey wants to join the club it has to abide by the rules and cannot formulate the rules to suit itself”.

He added that although recognising the Cyprus Republic was not one of the criteria Turkey had to fulfil in order to get a date for the start of accession processes, the issue was “part of the EU acquis, which includes the fact that there are 10 new member states and that those new member states should be part of any agreements to which the Union is presently party”.

“Whatever the Turkish wish may be, it would be very foolish of Turkey to attempt to tell the community what community law should be,” the EU diplomat added.

Earlier this week, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul sent a letter to current EU President Bertie Ahern proposing ways in which Turkey could give limited recognition to the Republic without compromising its own political sensitivities.

Gul’s letter also raised objections to what it called Cyprus’ flouting of the Customs Union agreement by blocking exports from Turkey through northern Cyprus.

The EU, however, has indicated that it wants full compliance from Turkey on the issue and described Gul’s proposals as being “far from what is expected”.

One EU Commission official said yesterday, “Turkey has no alternative but to recognise the Republic and must prepare itself to do so”.

The official added that in order to begin accession negotiations with the EU immediately after the bloc’s December summit, it must fulfil all of the Copenhagen criteria.

He highlighted a number of issues that the EU was keen to see more progress on, including the establishment of an independent judiciary, the expansion of basic freedoms and cultural rights, adjustments in the balance of power between the military and civilian government and action to alleviate ethnic conflict in the southeast of the country.

Responding to the draft conclusion published ahead of the EU summit in Brussels, President Tassos Papadopoulos said: “The document, as it was changed, is satisfactory. It calls on Turkey to extend the agreement to all 10 countries. I believe there is no way for Turkey to avoid extending the agreement towards Cyprus.”