15 June 2004

1. "Amnesty in return for disarmament", solution is obvious: Disarmament, amnesty and politics

2. "Kurdish rebels reject ceasefire with Turkey", a top Kurdish rebel leader has rejected calls for the restoration of a truce with Turkish forces and has called instead for an end to the prison isolation for former rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan, the pro-Kurdish Mesopotamia news agency reported Monday.

3. "One Kurdish rebel, one soldier killed in clashes in Turkey", a suspected Kurdish rebel and a Turkish soldier were killed in two seperate clashes, which also left two soldiers wounded, the Turkish army said on Tuesday. In a second clash late Monday near the southeastern town of Beytussebap near the border with Iraq, a paramilitary troop was killed and two others were wounded when they came under fire from KONGRAGEL rebels, it added.

4. "Turkey turns cold", at the same time, Ankara is said to have instituted a rollback of military and defense contacts with Jerusalem, including a freeze on Israeli participation in tenders for the purchase of helicopters, remote-piloted aircraft and tanks – all ostensibly as part of a new drive for domestic military manufacturing.

5. "Turkey cancels three multi-billion-dollar defence tenders", Turkey on Friday announced that it had called off three long-running multi-billion-dollar tenders for tanks, helicopters and unmanned aircraft, saying that it will seek to manufacture them at home.

6. "The Kurds have been betrayed once more", "The Kurds have no friends," is a bitter Kurdish proverb stemming from centuries of mistreatment at the hands of outside powers.

1. - Turkish Daily News - "Amnesty in return for disarmament":

15 June 2004 / opinion by Mehmet A. Birand

Have you noticed that after the start of broadcasts in Kurdish and in particular following the release of the former Democracy Party (DEP) deputies, all Kurdish groups have begun to make public statements. People are mumbling words. Replies are coming from representatives of the state (official/unofficial) and from some commentators who believe they have the authority answer for the state.

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK/Kongra-Gel) announces an end to its cease-fire, while the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP), in a clever policy decision most probably based on the demands of the people, is calling for its continuation.

Everybody is confused.

The public has failed to grasp what is happening and the meaning of what people are saying.

For those interested, I would like to summarize, in simple terms, what's going on.

Both DEHAP and the PKK are stressing these points:

A general amnesty should be called that will facilitate the return of the militants in the mountains. Those in jail should be freed. This will put an end to armed clashes.
The right of expression for Kurdish citizens should be expanded. Allow them, including the armed militants, to engage in politics and enter Parliament.
The real problem lies with the division within the PKK. Some PKK leaders are aware that it is becoming harder to keep militants in the mountains, with nothing for them to do. Morale within the organization is low. They have no idea what will happen next. The fate of PKK forces based in northern Iraq depends on the good graces of U.S. troops. Even though the United States seems to be saying that the 5,000-strong PKK force in northern Iraq cannot be eliminated through the use of arms, nothing is certain. Everything may change, and they might find themselves faced with the full force of U.S. power.

Another part of the PKK leadership along with other Kurdish groups argue that nothing would be achieved if the attacks were to commence. They realize that at a time when the entire world is united against terrorism, they would be the ones to lose. If armed conflict resumes, they are aware that a joint Turkish-U.S. military operation would eliminate their bases in the Kandil Mountains in northern Iraq.

A person who is assessing developments from a more realistic perspective and is moderating the sides is jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. If he had not adopted such a stance, would he have been allowed to rule the PKK from Imrali Island, which is under the direct control of the Office of the Chief of General Staff?

In summary, part of the PKK leadership knows that their threat of "resuming their armed struggle to punish the Republic of Turkey and its people" is wearing thin. They are seeking a way out. Another part of the leadership believes that if a general amnesty were called, they could stop their armed attacks and the matter could be resolved in the political arena, where it truly belongs.

Does Turkey know what to do?
Turkey is confused, too.

The stance of the military is different. No one can claim they are united. Some argue for an aggressive armed reaction and an all-out effort to wipe out the militants, while others believe the normalization of relations would be better.

The National Intelligence Organization's (MIT) opinion is rational as usual. The agency believes there can be no turning back, arguing for the gradual adaptation of these militants to the community.

The government believes politics should be broadened, but they also don't want to lose their 15 percent advantage vis-a-vis the election threshold.

Debates with state institutions are continuing. The decision will most probably be made after the December 2004 European Union summit. Their decision will be based on whether Turkey receives a date to start membership negotiations or not. If Turkey is given a date, the process will accelerate. If not, everyone will reasses their attitude.

Solution is obvious: Disarmament, amnesty and politics

While no one is making any public announcements yet, the policy, discussed in secret and overseas, is ready.

The PKK accepts disarmament and the dispersal of all its forces, and the Turkish state passes a very broad amnesty and opens the way for participatory politics.

You might remember this policy. Almost everyone has heard about it.

The agreement signed between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was very similar. Political integration proceeded as disarmament continued, but when the guns started going off, the process was slowed down.

Actually, Turkey is moving towards this road; however, sides are so suspicious of each other that they seem to be calling for an intermediary. They have no idea who would mediate.

I believe a Turkey that has received a date to start EU membership negotiations will implement the policy discussed above.

2. - The International News - "Kurdish rebels reject ceasefire with Turkey":

ANKARA / 15 June 2004

A top Kurdish rebel leader has rejected calls for the restoration of a truce with Turkish forces and has called instead for an end to the prison isolation for former rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan, the pro-Kurdish Mesopotamia news agency reported Monday.

"It is not possible to completely abandon our defence policies. It is not on our agenda to completely change our decision on the ceasefire," Murat Karayilan, the head of the armed wing of KONGRA-GEL, was quoted by Mesopotamia as telling the Europe-based Kurdish television channel, Roj TV.

KONGRA-GEL, the successor of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), said late last month it was ending its five-year-old unilateral ceasefire as of June 1.

Turkey’s main Kurdish-party DEHAP and former Kurdish MP Leyla Zana — released last week after more than a decade in jail for collaborating with the rebels — had called this weekend on KONGRA-GEL to restore the truce.

But Karayilan said Ankara must take a number of steps before his group could agree, the first being an end to Ocalan’s solitary confinement.

Ocalan has been the sole inmate at the prison island of Imrali in northwestern Turkey since he was captured in 1999 and sentenced to death. The sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment after Ankara abolished capital punishment.

Karayilan said that Turkey must also stop attacking the rebels and should observe a ceasefire.

"Even though we unilaterally observed the ceasefire for five years with much sacrifice on our part, (Turkish security) operations have increased in recent months. There were 700 operations in the last five years," Karayilan said.

3. - AFP - "One Kurdish rebel, one soldier killed in clashes in Turkey":

ANKARA / 15 June 2004

A suspected Kurdish rebel and a Turkish soldier were killed in two seperate clashes, which also left two soldiers wounded, the Turkish army said on Tuesday.

Turkish troops shot dead a militant of the KONGRA-GEL rebel group in an operation late Monday in the village of Kacarlar in the eastern province of Tunceli, an army statement said.

In a second clash late Monday near the southeastern town of Beytussebap near the border with Iraq, a paramilitary troop was killed and two others were wounded when they came under fire from KONGRAGEL rebels, it added.

KONGRA-GEL is the successor of the PKK which led a 15-year armed campaign against Turkey for self-rule in the country's mainly-Kurdish southeast. Following the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, the rebels declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew from Turkey. But KONGRA-GEL said last month it was ending its five-year-old unilateral ceasefire as of June 1.

On Monday evening, army chief of staff Hilmi Ozkok said in a statement "the Turkish armed forces are as determined as ever to pursue its fight against the separatist terrorist organisation."

4. - The Jerusalem Post - "Turkey turns cold":

15 June 2004 / by Ilan Berman*

The Sharon government is currently embroiled in a heated internal debate over the merits of disengagement from the Gaza Strip. But another, equally far-reaching crisis may be on the horizon.

Since their start in the early 1990s, the military and defense ties between Ankara and Jerusalem have evolved into one of the Middle East's most important geopolitical alliances. But now, that strategic partnership has begun showing signs of serious strain. Angered by Israel's recent offensive against the Hamas terrorist organization, eager to boost ties with Europe and new regional allies, and responding to the demands of its core Islamist constituency, the government of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan appears to have begun a unilateral rollback of strategic cooperation with Jerusalem.

Just months after its conclusion, the future of a long-awaited accord to bring Turkish water to Israel is in question. Disputes over the projected route of the pipeline have created friction between the two countries, and rumors now abound that Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has canceled the arrangement outright – dealing a major blow to Israel's already-strained hydrological resources, which would have received 15 million cubic meters of water annually from Turkey's Manavgat River.

At the same time, Ankara is said to have instituted a rollback of military and defense contacts with Jerusalem, including a freeze on Israeli participation in tenders for the purchase of helicopters, remote-piloted aircraft and tanks – all ostensibly as part of a new drive for domestic military manufacturing.

These moves have been mirrored on the diplomatic front. In late May, in yet another indication of the new tenor of ties between the two countries, the Turkish government temporarily recalled its ambassador for consultations (he's since returned).

Prime Minister Erdogan, meanwhile, has publicly snubbed Israel, rejecting a formal invitation to visit the Jewish state in recent meetings with National Infrastructure Minister Yosef Paritzky, and even going so far as to label Israel's actions in Rafah "state terrorism."

THIS ABRUPT chill is indicative of a larger reorientation underway in Ankara. Since coming to power in late 2002, the Islamist AKP has put a premium on charting an independent foreign policy course. In practice, this has brought Ankara closer to historic regional rivals like Syria and Iran while cooling its relationships with both Jerusalem and Washington. At the same time, Turkish officials have begun concerted efforts to more closely align their country's foreign policy with Europe.

What's more, Turkish policymakers are now hard at work trying to cement these policy shifts. In recent weeks, the AKP launched a frontal assault on its chief domestic rival – the country's powerful military. As part of constitutional reforms intended to harmonize the country's legal system with European standards, Turkey's parliament on May 7 overwhelmingly approved a raft of laws substantially trimming the military's power. They include the removal of military officials from national broadcasting and education oversight committees, the elimination of state security courts previously used to try political crimes, and stripping the military of its budgetary autonomy, making its previously-independent national security planning subject to parliamentary oversight and review.

And, in a critical development, the post of general secretary within Turkey's influential national security council (the Milli Guvenlik Kurulu, or MGK), can from now on be occupied by a civilian, paving the way for a greater governmental hand in the composition of the country's military leadership.

The AKP has been quick to bill the move as an effort to strengthen democracy ahead of the European Union's December meeting – at which European capitals will decide whether to open accession talks with Ankara. But the Turkish military has justifiably expressed worries over the AKP's power grab, and its implications for the direction of Turkish foreign policy.

The effects of this erosion of power are already being felt. Turkey's military establishment, the traditional guardian of Mustafa Kemal Attaturk's secularist legacy, has long been the main proponent of strategic ties with Jerusalem. Its progressive loss of control over the country's security policy has therefore called into question the durability of Israel's most important regional alliance.

Israeli policymakers, dazed by the rapid turnaround in the strategic partnership, are now scrambling to mend fences. But the Israeli government's ability to alter this trend is limited; the health of Israeli-Turkish ties remains largely dependent on the political priorities and foreign policy trajectory of the AKP itself.

And, at least for now, their future is uncertain, as Turkey continues to drift away from its traditional role of an independent, pro-Western partner in the Middle East.

* The writer is vice president for policy at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.

5. - Defence Talk - "Turkey cancels three multi-billion-dollar defence tenders":

ANKARA / 14 June 2004

Turkey on Friday announced that it had called off three long-running multi-billion-dollar tenders for tanks, helicopters and unmanned aircraft, saying that it will seek to manufacture them at home.

No reason was given for the cancellation taken at a meeting of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Defence Minister Vecdi Gonul, army chief Hilmi Ozkok and defence industry officials.

"It has been decided to meet the needs of the Turkish armed forces with new models based on domestic production and original designs and by making maximum use of national resources," said a statement issued after the meeting and carried by the Anatolia news agency.

It added that it would encourage domestic firms as well as partnerships between Turkish and foreign firms to take an interest in the projects.

The statement gave no further details, but Anatolia said the cancelled tenders amounted to nearly 11 billion dollars.

One of the tenders, worth some five billion dollars, was for the manufacture of 1,000 tanks, with four countries -- Germany, France, the United States and Ukraine -- vying for it.

The second tender was for the purchase of 145 attack helicopters, a project also worth five billion dollars.

In July 2000, Turkey shortlisted Bell Helicopter Textron of the United States and a consortium between Kamov of Russia and the Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI).

The third tender, worth nearly one billion dollars, involved the joint production of nine unmanned aircraft in Turkey.

6. - The Daily Star (Lebanon) - "The Kurds have been betrayed once more":

15 June 2004 / by Bernard Sabella

"The Kurds have no friends," is a bitter Kurdish proverb stemming from centuries of mistreatment at the hands of outside powers. In the Iraqi settlement agreement, pushed through the United Nations Security Council by the United States, the Bush administration has again proven the truth of this proverb. Only this time, the American mistake may begin the long-feared Iraqi civil war.

The UN settlement agreement, Resolution 1546 (2004), endorses the timetable for the political transition leading to a constitutionally elected government by Dec. 31, 2005, as well as the convening of a national conference. However, the resolution makes no mention of Kurdish independence or even autonomy, thus cheating the Kurds out of the homeland for which they have longed for centuries.

It further tells the Kurds that they will never be able to be selected as President or Prime Minister of the country. In the interim government Kurds were indeed represented, but the highest echelons of power eluded them. The best they could do was vice-president (Roj Nuri Shawis), deputy prime minister for national security (Barham Saleh) and perhaps most important, foreign minister (Hoshyar Zebari). Barham Saleh in particular will be under a great deal of pressure from his own community as a result of the UN resolution, since he has been heavily backed by the United States.

This is not the first time the Kurds have been sacrificed to expediency. Articles 62 to 65 of the Treaty of Svres, signed Aug. 10, 1920, between Ottoman Empire and the Allied powers (including the United States), provided for the formation of an autonomous Kurdish administration out of the southeast provinces of Turkey. The Kurds of northern Iraq in the province of Mosul were to be free to join this autonomous area if they so desired. This new state was then snatched away by the infamous Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, because of opposition from Kamal Attaturk and his new Turkish government. The British representative, Lord Curzon, at first fought the new Turkish government to maintain an independent Kurdistan, but the Turks were equally obdurate.

Eventually, Great Britain capitulated, giving the bulk of Kurdistan back to Turkey by abandoning the Kurdish provinces in Turkey and splitting the Ottoman province of Mosul. The southern half of the province was attached to Iraq, and the northern half given to Turkey.

This partition of Kurdistan was widely seen as an expedient move to try and settle unrest in the region. The British had already suffered a revolt in Iraq in 1920, and further conflict with Turkey over the Kurdish question was creating instability in the government of Lloyd George in London.

Zooming forward to 2004, we see Kurdistan again as an incipient nation with a tacit promise from Allied powers that it will become independent or autonomous. The United States, this time, has primary responsibility for shaping the national borders. The Kurds helped the United States in ousting Saddam Hussein. They were loyal to America, and were the only place where US leaders could receive a reliable welcome.

The Bush administration is facing increasing unrest in Iraq, increasing instability and discontent at home, and a looming presidential election in November. The dominant forces in the region - the Shiites in the south and the Turks over the Iraqi northern border, both are threatening to take drastic action if Kurdistan remains autonomous.

The Shiites feel that leadership of Iraq is their birthright, and as the majority population there, they fully expect to rule in the future.

Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani objected strenuously to an earlier draft constitution that gave "minorities" in Iraq veto power over government actions. Of course this was a device to give the Kurds and Sunnis more power in government, and deprive the Shiites of what they felt was their right to rule.

The Turks fear that an independent or autonomous Kurdistan will spell trouble in the future. The British may have split the province of Mosul in 1923, but the Kurds never saw it that way. They continue to see themselves as a unified people, and it is inevitable that some Kurdish autonomous region in Iraq will be a locus for attacks against Turkey.

At present Turkey's only serious social problem is the Kurds, and this will only make things worse.

What more expedient course to take than to appease those who threaten to make the most trouble? By selling out the Kurds once again, the United States thus repeats the British colonialist history of 100 years ago.

Cynical Kurds are not surprised. They fully expect such treatment from Western powers. Only, this time, the Kurds are not likely to remain quiet. Having established an island of peace and growing prosperity in northern Iraq, the Kurds have proved themselves to be capable of governing their own affairs. Their success has been shamelessly exploited by the Bush administration, which has undeservedly taken credit for their success. Now the Kurds will fight back. The peshmerga (literally, in front of death) troops are ready and willing to fight, and their skills in battle are legendary.

Unless something is done very soon, we will see growing Kurdish anger begin to spill over into the rest of Iraq, thus proving: The Kurds have no friends.