12 January 2004

1. "Iraqi Kurds scorn US autonomy offer", Kurds in Iraq have rejected a US-backed plan for very limited autonomy in the north of the country, which has enjoyed a status close to independence for more than a decade. "It gave us even less than Saddam Hussein offered us in the past," a Kurdish leader said yesterday.

2. "Kurds' Soft Sell for a Hard-Won Autonomy", U.S. officials are reluctantly accepting a long-oppressed minority's right to self-rule.

3. "Kurds go on trial at Syrian state court", seven Kurds charged with attempting to unite part of Syrian territory with a third state went on trial at a state security court here on Sunday amid allegations the accused had been tortured.

4. "War of Ideas", by Thomas L. Friedman

5. "Turkish Cypriot rivals cut deal", two Turkish Cypriot parties say they have agreed to form a coalition government, despite holding differing views on reuniting the island.

6. "Assad's visit to Turkey: an attempt to garner allies amid US pressure", Bashar al-Assad's historic visit to Turkey was the latest in a series of diplomatic overtures by the Syrian president to overcome increasing US pressure and seek new allies for his isolated country, analysts say.

1. - Independent - "Iraqi Kurds scorn US autonomy offer":

BAGHDAD / 11 January 2004 / by Patrick Cockburn

Kurds in Iraq have rejected a US-backed plan for very limited autonomy in the north of the country, which has enjoyed a status close to independence for more than a decade. "It gave us even less than Saddam Hussein offered us in the past," a Kurdish leader said yesterday.

The Kurds, who have fought against control by Baghdad for most of the last 80 years, restated their determination to keep substantial control of their own affairs to Iraqi Arab political leaders during two days of talks last week in the Kurdish mountain headquarters at Salahudin in northern Iraq.

The US and senior Arab members of the interim Iraqi Governing Council have been pressing the Kurds to accept integration into a post-Saddam Iraq, with only local powers for the Kurdish authorities. Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, the top Kurdish leaders, told seven or eight council members, all former members of the Iraqi opposition, that this was wholly unrealistic.

The Kurds have said they are willing to turn over control of foreign policy, defence, fiscal policy and natural resources to a central government. But in practice they will retain most of the powers they won a dozen years ago when Saddam Hussein withdrew his armies from Kurdistan.

The Kurdish leaders are conscious that they are in a very strong position. They lead the third-largest Iraqi community, smaller in numbers than the Shia and the Sunni Arabs but well organised and armed. They are also the only Iraqi community which supports a long-term American occupation, and Iraqi Kurdistan is the only part of the country where US forces can move in relative safety.

Mr Barzani and Mr Talabani reminded the Arab parties and individuals opposed to Saddam Hussein that they had been committed since 1992 to a federal Iraq in which the Kurdish region would rule itself. The Kurds will not declare independence because they know that this would precipitate an invasion by Turkey and also be fiercely opposed by Iran and Syria.

The result of the meeting at Salahudin has been portrayed by some Kurdish leaders as a compromise, but in fact shows that they need to concede very little to the US or Iraqi Arab leaders. Since the dissolution of the Iraqi army by the US in May the Kurdish peshmerga have been the only significant Iraqi armed force.

A Kurdish leader said that the Kurds were prepared to negotiate over the future of Kirkuk, the oil province of the north, recaptured by the Kurds during the war last year. It is unlikely that they would ever give up Kirkuk, from which many of them were driven by Saddam Hussein.

The Kurds want their autonomy to be enshrined in Iraqi law as swiftly as possible, rather than being dependent on the outcome of future Iraqi elections.

2. - The Los Angeles Times - "Kurds' Soft Sell for a Hard-Won Autonomy":

U.S. officials are reluctantly accepting a long-oppressed minority's right to self-rule.

11 January 2004 / by Brendan O'Leary*

It is a maxim of politics that territorial autonomy is begrudgingly conceded by central authorities and ungratefully received by those to whom it is granted. That's one way to understand what is happening in Kurdistan, or what some still call northern Iraq. The Kurds of Kurdistan would like to be independent but will accept autonomy in a binational federation with Arab Iraq. Washington, Arab Iraqis and regional powers begrudgingly concede this emergent reality.

The Kurds are the largest nation without their own state in the Middle East. Greater Kurdistan was partitioned among Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq after World War I, even though it had a better self-determination case than most of the new states created by Woodrow Wilson and his allies. British colonial authorities in Iraq promised local Kurds autonomy in compensation but broke their word to appease Turkey and serve their petroleum interests. In independent Iraq, Kurds experienced coercive assimilation, expulsion and genocide at the hands of successive Sunni Arab-dominated regimes, most recently Saddam Hussein's. This history explains why they aspire to an independent Kurdistan.

Autonomy is the very least the Kurds will accept, and they have had it since the 1991 Persian Gulf War. They have the only functioning government and parliament in Iraq. The Kurds were the sole locally organized group to contribute significantly to the recent U.S. war effort. They joined Arab opponents of Hussein to insist that any new Iraq should be federal, with their entity as one of its regions — with emphasis on the word "one."

In accepting last week that Kurdistan must continue to exist, intact, throughout the post-June 30 transitional period, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and the Coalition Provisional Authority's L. Paul Bremer III were recognizing their debt of honor. Yet, they accepted Kurdistan's reality without warmth or enthusiasm.

Kurds will tell you that one doesn't hear the Bush administration condemning Israel and Turkey as ethnic states, but the air last week was thick with proclamations that Kurdistan is — or will be — such an entity. Kurds observe that U.S. officials in part defend Israel's right to exist because of genocide against European Jewry, but in the same breath deny the right of Kurdistan to exist because it would reputedly be an ethnic state. That the Kurds of Kurdistan treat their minorities — Turkmens, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Jews and Christians — better than the Israelis treat their minorities is ignored. That they proclaim Kurdistan to be for all its citizens, Kurd and non-Kurd, is forgotten.

Kurds also say the same Turkish politicians who condemn Kurdistan as an ethnic entity can be heard insisting — as vehemently — that the Turks of Northern Cyprus should have maximum feasible territorial autonomy in a two-unit federation on Cyprus. They are often the same politicians who call for coercive assimilation of minorities into a Turkish ethos and ethnos. That the Kurds of Kurdistan treat their ethnic Turks much better than Turkey treats its Kurds is denied, but it is true.

So, why is Washington's recognition of Kurdistan begrudging?

Coalition authorities in Baghdad want to placate Arab opinion, both among their collaborators and those who resist the U.S. occupation. Arab liberals promote a federation for Iraq based on Hussein's 18 "governorates." It would have the effect of dividing Kurdish-dominated areas among four units. This vision wishfully implies that Kurds would settle for less than what they won by arms from Hussein in the Iraq war. (The regions of Mosul and Kirkuk, historically predominantly Kurdish cities, were mainly liberated by the peshmergas of Kurdistan.)

This vision died last week, and we are watching its funeral. The idea implied that Iraq could become like the United States when it cannot. America was a settler state, which displaced (and expelled) and swamped its minorities, building almost every one of the 50 states of its federation around a white (usually Protestant), English-speaking local majority. America has no historic indigenous people that comprises between one-fifth and one-third of the total federation, with its distinct language and dialects, customs, norms — and territory.

Arabs and Americans preaching a nonethnic federation to the Kurds of Iraq are whistling in the wind. The Kurds rightly interpret calls for "a nonethnic Iraq" as disguised code for the restoration of an Arab Iraq. They tell the Americans and their prospective Arab negotiating partners to look to Canada, rather than the U.S., for a more appropriate federal vision for Iraq — a binational federation, a partnership of two peoples, Kurds and Arabs.

The other reason why Washington begrudges Kurdistan's right to exist is because it doesn't want to provoke the regional powers, Turkey above all. The U.S. interest in avoiding a war over the breakup of Iraq is clear, but it is not obvious why the Bush administration should oppose Kurdistan's existence within a federal Iraq, or indeed its expansion to include Kirkuk district and city.

After all, the Kurds' two major parties are committed to a democratic, binational, multiethnic, and religiously tolerant Iraq. They are both secular. Given that Kurdistan is by far the most stable and best-developed region in Iraq, it should be the building block for those in the U.S. and the United Nations intent on aiding democratic reconstruction. Washington should note that because Saddam Hussein used Palestinians in his repression of Kurds, popular Kurdish sentiment is not sharply anti-Israel in the way that Arab Iraq is. Turkey's politicians know that a full invasion of Iraq by their army would terminate their prospects of entry into the European Union. That binds their hands.

The Bush administration knows it cannot break up Kurdistan as the Arab liberals want — and as Turkey, Syria and Iran would prefer. To do so would create chaos. The U.S. is, however, leaving Kirkuk — and the details of a federation — to the peoples of Iraq to negotiate — having abandoned the Pentagon's preposterous plan for an American to write the constitution of Iraq.

No one knows how the negotiations will play out. With many Arabs preferring an 18-unit Iraq, and with Kurds preferring a two-unit entity, a compromise might be reached somewhere — say with five regions, Kurdistan as one entity, Baghdad as another, and three other Arab-dominated regions in the northwest and the south. Kirkuk might be a special power-sharing unit within Kurdistan, while Mosul might be a special power-sharing unit within an Arab-dominated region.

Three things are certain. Kurds will remain unified behind the idea of one Kurdistan, with the right to decentralize power within their region if they so wish. Kurdish parties want to include Kirkuk district and city in their region — to redress, fairly, Hussein's ethnic cleansing and settler policies — and to have appropriate power-sharing arrangements with the Turkmen and Arab populations. Finally, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan will negotiate jointly, seeking a binational, democratic, multi-ethnic and religiously tolerant federal Iraq, knowing that their own supporters would prefer to have an independent state. Washington, Turkey and the Arab Iraqis should be grateful to have such an accommodating Kurdish leadership, but they won't be caught saying so.

No one has the power and the will to remove Kurdistan's hard-won autonomy. Whether begrudging recognition can be succeeded by something more harmonious is not known, but a period of gracious silence from Washington on its constitutional preferences would be prudent.

* Brendan O'Leary is Lauder Professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, where he directs its Solomon Asch Center for the study of ethnic conflict. He also will be a constitutional.

3. - AFP - "Kurds go on trial at Syrian state court":

DAMASCUS / 11 January 2004

Seven Kurds charged with attempting to unite part of Syrian territory with a third state went on trial at a state security court here on Sunday amid allegations the accused had been tortured.

The seven, arrested in June during a demonstration in Damascus where they demanded to be given Syrian nationality, have denied the charges against them, which also include membership of a secret organisation, the Syrian Committee for the Defence of Human Rights said.

"They reject the tribunal’s accusations against them and say they were tortured and threatened during their interrogation," the committee said in a statement, calling for the immediate release of the seven.

"(The trial) reflects the depth of the human rights crisis in Syria and the lack of will to stop flagrant violations of citizens’ rights," the committee statement said.

It said about 300 people had gathered outside the state security court, whose rulings cannot be appealed.

More than a million Kurds live in Syria, mainly in the north on the border with Iraq. Some refused to be counted in the 1962
census to avoid military service, resulting in them and their descendants being denied Syrian citizenship.

4. - The New York Times - "War of Ideas":

12 January 2004 / by Thomas L. Friedman

While visiting Istanbul the other day, I took a long walk along the Bosporus near Topkapi Palace. There is nothing like standing at this stunning intersection of Europe and Asia to think about the clash of civilizations — and how we might avoid it. Make no mistake: we are living at a remarkable hinge of history and it's not clear how it's going to swing.

What is clear is that Osama bin Laden achieved his aim: 9/11 sparked real tensions between the Judeo-Christian West and the Muslim East. Preachers on both sides now openly denounce each other's faith. Whether these tensions explode into a real clash of civilizations will depend a great deal on whether we build bridges or dig ditches between the West and Islam in three key places — Turkey, Iraq and Israel-Palestine.

Let's start with Turkey — the only Muslim, free-market democracy in Europe. I happened to be in Istanbul when the street outside one of the two synagogues that were suicide-bombed on Nov. 15 was reopened. Three things struck me: First, the chief rabbi of Turkey appeared at the ceremony, hand in hand with the top Muslim cleric of Istanbul and the local mayor, while crowds in the street threw red carnations on them. Second, the Turkish leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who comes from an Islamist party, paid a visit to the chief rabbi — the first time a Turkish prime minister had ever called on the chief rabbi. Third, and most revealing, was the statement made by the father of one of the Turkish suicide bombers who hit the synagogues.

"We are a respectful family who love our nation, flag and the Koran," the grieving father, Sefik Elaltuntas, told the Zaman newspaper. "But we cannot understand why this child had done the thing he had done . . . First, let us meet with the chief rabbi of our Jewish brothers. Let me hug him. Let me kiss his hands and flowing robe. Let me apologize in the name of my son and offer my condolences for the deaths. . . . We will be damned if we do not reconcile with them."

The same newspaper also carried a quote from Cemil Cicek, the Turkish government spokesman, who said: "The Islamic world should take stringent measures against terrorism without any `buts' or `howevers.' "

There is a message here: Context matters. Turkish politicians are not intimidated by religious fundamentalists, because — unlike too many Arab politicians — they have their own legitimacy that comes from being democratically elected. At the same time, the Turkish parents of suicide bombers don't all celebrate their children's suicide. They are not afraid to denounce this barbarism, because they live in a free society where such things are considered shameful and alien to the moderate Turkish brand of Islam — which has always embraced religious pluralism and which most Turks feel is the "real" Islam.

For all these reasons, if we want to help moderates win the war of ideas within the Muslim world, we must help strengthen Turkey as a model of democracy, modernism, moderation and Islam all working together. Nothing would do that more than having Turkey be made a member of the European Union — which the E.U. will basically decide this year. Turkey has undertaken a huge number of reforms to get itself ready for E.U. membership. If, after all it has done, the E.U. shuts the door on Turkey, extremists all over the Muslim world will say to the moderates: "See, we told you so — it's a Christian club and we're never going to be let in. So why bother adapting to their rules?"

I think Turkey's membership in the E.U. is so important that the U.S. should consider subsidizing the E.U. to make it easier for Turkey to be admitted. If that fails, we should offer to bring Turkey into Nafta, even though it would be very complicated.

"If the E.U. creates some pretext and says `no' to Turkey, after we have done all this, I am sure the E.U. will lose and the world will lose," Turkey's foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, told me in Ankara. "If Turkey is admitted, the E.U. is going to win and world peace is going to win. This would be a gift to the Muslim world. . . . When I travel to other Muslim countries — Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia — they are proud of what we are doing. They are proud of our process [of political and economic reform to join the E.U.]. They mention this to me. They ask, `How is this going?' "

Yes, everyone is watching, which is why the E.U. would be making a huge mistake — a hinge of history mistake — if it digs a ditch around Turkey instead of building a bridge.

5. - BBC News - "Turkish Cypriot rivals cut deal":

12 January 2004

Two Turkish Cypriot parties say they have agreed to form a coalition government, despite holding differing views on reuniting the island.

One of the parties favours a UN-backed deal with the internationally-recognised Greek Cypriot government.

But the other is led by the son of the current Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, who is cool towards the plan.

There is pressure on Turkish Cypriots to reach a deal with the Greek south before Cyprus joins the EU this year.

Correspondents say failure to reach a deal in time could affect Turkey's own chances of joining the EU in the near future.

Uneasy coalition

Elections in December split the parliament equally between parties supporting a UN plan for reunification of the island and others opposing it.

Mehmet Ali Talat of the pro-EU Republican Turkish Party was asked to form a government after narrowly winning the largest number of seats.

Serdar Denktash, who leads the smaller of two nationalist groups, the Democrat Party (DP), had said he would join a coalition government if major changes were made to the plan.

Mr Denktash and Mr Talat said they would consult their parties before officially forming the government, in which they will control four and six ministries respectively.

The DP will receive the foreign affairs portfolio, giving it a key role in future negotiations with the Greek Cypriots.

The BBC's Tabitha Morgan in Nicosia says the result is a rather uneasy coalition.

While the pro-Europeans now share power, she says, they certainly do not have the majority they were hoping for to press swiftly ahead with re-unification.

But correspondents say it may be that the younger Mr Denktash represents the last hope for those who support the UN plan.

His father rejected it last March and still refuses to accept it as a basis for negotiation.

6. - AFP - "Assad's visit to Turkey: an attempt to garner allies amid US pressure":

BEIRUT / 9 January 2004

Bashar al-Assad's historic visit to Turkey was the latest in a series of diplomatic overtures by the Syrian president to overcome increasing US pressure and seek new allies for his isolated country, analysts say.

In a marked departure from the rigid policies of the ruling Baathist party, Assad has embarked on almost back-to-back high-profile visits to Greece and Turkey after concluding in mid-December a strategic partnership accord with the European Union.

And in an interview with the New York Times last month, Assad called on the United States to support renewed negotiations with Israel in order to normalize ties between the neighbours. "The fall of Baghdad last spring and the presence of thousands of US soldiers on Syria's eastern border (Iraq) have forced Bashar al-Assad to review his policies," a Western diplomat based in Beirut told AFP.

"Assad's visit to Turkey, an ally of Israel and member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, should be measured by this," the diplomat added. Assad's later father and predecessor Hafez al-Assad who ruled Syria with an iron fist for three decades, had initiated the rapprochement with Turkey but it is the young Bashar who was the first Syrian head of state to set foot in Ankara this week.

"Today the situation is very different. Bashar al-Assad is far from being as powerful as his father and fears, more than anything else, distabilisation in his country," the diplomat said. "Time is no longer in Syria's favour because the Americans are waiting for it around the corner and Israel is counting on its weakness to force Damascus into making concessions," the diplomat added.

Assad's visit to Turkey helped strengthen the Syrian-Turkish agreement signed in December to fight against terrorism and ensure the "neutrality" of Syria's powerful northern neighbour, which has military ties with Israel, he said. In 1998 Syria and Turkey were on the brink of war because of Syria's support for Turkish Kurdish separatists outlawed by Ankara.

But with his visit to Ankara, Assad has managed to secure new allies who share his concern over the future of the territorial integrity of post-war Iraq. Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara told Arab journalists who were covering the visit that this was the start of "coordination between Syria, Turkey and Iran concerning Iraq aimed at preserving the unity of that country".

British analyst Patrick Seale, an expert on Syria, also noted the "geostrategic importance of the visit because it was carried out in coordination with Iran, an ally of Syria".

A few days before Assad flew to Ankara he received in Damascus Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi, who used the opportunity to criticize the United States for pressuring Syria into eliminating its weapons of mass destruction while Israel holds onto its own arsenal.

"Effective international pressure should be brought to bear on Israel so that this entity renounces" its weapons of mass destruction, Kharazi told a press conference after meeting Assad.