5 February 2004

1. "United States and Turkey Strive to Deepen Relations", following a US visit by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that has been hailed for repairing a frayed bilateral relationship, Washington and Ankara appear set to establish a “softer strategic relationship.” The soft partnership will focus on maintaining existing military-strategic links, while deepening political and economic cooperation.

2. "Islamic group claims responsibility for Iraq suicide blasts", a little known Islamic group with alleged links to the terrorist network Al Qaeda has claimed responsibility for the twin suicide attacks in the Iraqi Kurdish city of Arbil on Sunday.

3. "Iraq draft interim constitution sparks critical debate", a draft interim constitution scheduled to go into effect this month has sparked a political debate on issues critical to Iraq's future -- Kurdish autonomy and the role of Islam.

4. "Annans Provisions and Success in the Cyprus Question", UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan offered four provisions to start the negotiations on Cyprus: The first is that both parties should display a good will.

5. "Cypriots feel the squeeze as Turkey takes initiative", a major peace initiative from Turkey has left Greek Cypriots facing unaccustomed pressure for concessions on Cypriot reunification, but analysts say neither side has yet met UN conditions for resumed talks.

6. "Baku-Ceyhan Pipline Projekt Loses Popularity", documents on financing of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline were signed in Baku. Only Azerbaijan was represented by the President. Turkey and Georgia sent only ministers. Kazakhstan, whose oil can fill this pipeline, did not send anyone.

1. - EurasiaNet - "United States and Turkey Strive to Deepen Relations":

4 February 2004 / by Mevlut Katik*

Following a US visit by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that has been hailed for repairing a frayed bilateral relationship, Washington and Ankara appear set to establish a “softer strategic relationship.” The soft partnership will focus on maintaining existing military-strategic links, while deepening political and economic cooperation.

Erdogan spent five days in late January trip wooing US business and political leaders. US officials indicated that their anger with Ankara -- stirred by the Turkish parliament’s decision almost a year ago not to grant US troops temporary basing rights -- had largely dissipated. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Of late, Washington has come to view Turkey as a potentially valuable ally in helping to contain Islamic radicalism in the Middle East and in Central Asia. As such, the Bush administration is now expressing an interest in deepening ties, building what Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz has characterized as a “very different kind of strategic partnership.”

“In the old days it [US-Turkish relations] was very much dominated by the military threat from the Soviet Union, and our cooperation as military allies,” Wolfowitz said during a January 29 interview broadcast by CNN Turk television.

“In this era, the softer one, if you want to call it that, the philosophical side, the common values, the common beliefs in secular democracy, is much more important than the concrete military things,” Wolfowitz added.

He went on to stress, however, that military cooperation would remain an important component of the partnership. In a sign that the strategic partnership is once again fully functional, Washington is using the Incirlik military base in Turkey to rotate US forces into and out of Iraq. Roughly 100,000 US troops will pass through Incirlik during the rotation.

Erdogan’s visit provided crucial momentum to efforts to forge a deepened US-Turkish partnership. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said the trip fulfilled most of Ankara’s expectations. “We observed that there has been a common vision between Turkey and the United States on all important issues such as the Middle East, Iraq and Cyprus,” Gul was quoted as saying by the Anatolia News Agency on January 31. ”The US administration appreciated our initiative to add human rights and democratization dimension to the strategic relations.''

Though the Incirlik decision generated complaints in Turkish opposition circles, political analysts in Istanbul and Ankara generally agreed with the government assessment of the visit. “Tension in relations seen in 2003, and stemming from Iraqi issue, has been overcome to a great extent,” Yasemin Congar, Washington correspondent of daily Milliyet wrote February 2. “A new era started in relations.”

The primary benefit of Erdogan’s visit, from Ankara’s view point, concerned US policy on Iraq’s reconstruction. Turkey stressed that it opposed any effort by Kurds in northern Iraq to gain autonomous powers. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. US officials remained non-committal on Iraq’s future political structure. However, Washington pledged to address the issue of Kurdish radical activity in northern Iraq, especially the presence of Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) militants in the region.

Turkish officials were also cheered by indicators that US-Turkish economic dealings may pick up. During his visit, Erdogan sought to assure potential investors that the Turkish economic recovery was on firm ground. “Our businessmen held a series of meetings with US businessmen. ... I believe that these talks will yield positive results soon,” Erdogan said in an Anatolia news agency report published February 2. Officials in Ankara also indicated that Turkish participation in Iraq reconstruction projects could increase.

Not all the economic news was good during Erdogan’s trip, though. Ankara failed to convince Washington to modify existing conditions attached to an $8.5 billion credit offer. The most onerous condition, in Ankara’s view, is a requirement that precludes possible Turkish military intervention in northern Iraq. Unidentified Turkish officials were quoted by the mass-circulation daily Hurriyet as saying that Turkey may opt not to tap into the credit, so as not to limit its future security options. Some observers believe Erdogan’s government will continue to press the Bush administration to ease the credit conditions.

The Bush administration advocated Turkish membership in the European Union. At the same time, US officials rebuffed a Turkish feeler to on securing Washington’s mediation in ongoing efforts to promote the reunification of Cyprus. The United States reportedly insisted that future reunification negotiations should be conducted under UN auspices. At the same time, US officials indicated that Washington would strive to play a constructive role in the process.

* Editor’s Note: Mevlut Katik is a London-Based journalist and analyst. He is a former BBC correspondent and also worked for The Economist group.

2. - AFP - "Islamic group claims responsibility for Iraq suicide blasts":

5 February 2004

A little known Islamic group with alleged links to the terrorist network Al Qaeda has claimed responsibility for the twin suicide attacks in the Iraqi Kurdish city of Arbil on Sunday.

Ansar Al Sunna took responsibility in a statement published on an Islamic website, but verification of the claim has not been possible.

Kurdish groups have blamed the bombings on Ansar Al Islam, which is suspected of links to the Al Qaeda network.

Kurdish TV says the death toll from the suicide attacks has risen to 105.

3. - Associated Press - "Iraq draft interim constitution sparks critical debate":

BAGHDAD / 5 February 2004

A draft interim constitution scheduled to go into effect this month has sparked a political debate on issues critical to Iraq's future -- Kurdish autonomy and the role of Islam.

The debate is pitting Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish politicians against one another at a time when the US political blueprint for Iraq is already on hold due to differences with the Shiite clergy over early elections.

A committee set up by Iraq's Governing Council has completed drafting the document, which is scheduled to take effect on Feb. 28, until a permanent constitution is adopted next year. But the council was not expected to start debating the document in its entirety until Sunday or Monday, according to sources close to the process and familiar with the draft.

Under an agreement reached on Nov. 15 between the council and the U.S.-led coalition, adopting the interim constitution is a first step in a two-year political blueprint that will have a transitional legislature in place by the end of May, an unelected but sovereign government a month later and allow Iraqis to vote in a general election by the end of 2005.

Governing Council member Adnan Pachachi, a Sunni Muslim politician who heads the committee that drafted the document, has said he expects the document to be adopted by the council by mid-February, allowing Iraqis a two-week period to familiarize themselves with its details.

"There will be an intensive public debate and views expressed in those discussions will be considered before the final version is adopted," said Pachachi, who held the council's one-month, rotating presidency in January.

However, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani, an influential Shiite cleric demanding an early vote, has said that an elected legislature must ratify the document before it goes into effect.

His demand, together with the time needed for the UN experts to investigate the feasibility of an early vote and present their findings, could mean that the Feb. 28 deadline may be put back by a week or two, according to the sources, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Part of the basic law deals with the mechanisms involved in forming the proposed 250-seat legislature and the provisional government to take office by July 1 -- the primary focus of the UN experts and the subject of the impasse between the coalition and al-Sistani.

The Nov. 15 agreement provides for the legislature to be selected from regional caucuses. Al-Sistani wants the legislature to be elected in a direct vote.

It also provides guidelines for the interim constitution, including guarantees for the freedom of speech, equality of all Iraqis, federalism, independence of the judiciary and civilian control over the army.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced Tuesday that he will soon dispatch a team of UN experts to Iraq to assess whether an early vote is possible. Washington believes lengthy preparations are needed before a fair and credible election can be held, but asked Annan for the UN to help because it doesn't want to alienate the Shiite majority.

Pachachi, who leads Sunni opposition to an early vote, has said he hoped that 25 percent, and maybe as many as 40 percent, of the proposed 250-seat transitional legislature would be set aside for women and spoke vaguely of a three-member presidency chosen by the assembly.

The presidency, presumably comprising a Shiite, a Sunni and a Kurd, will name a Cabinet whose members must be confirmed by the legislators before taking office, he said.

The draft states that Islam is the official religion of Iraq and cites Islamic Sharia laws as a primary source of legislation. This already has been contested by council members affiliated with religious parties and who want Sharia to be the "sole" basis of laws.

The dispute over the role of Islam cuts to the heart of politics in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq where Shiite clerics and, to a much lesser extent, their Sunni counterparts play a key role. Al-Sistani's demands, for example, already has forced Washington to drop one political plan for Iraq. His demand for early elections looks set to force Washington's hand again.

The draft constitution replaced one presented in December by the five Kurdish members of the 25-seat Governing Council.

It was later abandoned in favor of a draft put forward by Pachachi's aides. The sources said the earlier draft contained what others on the council saw as excessive guarantees to protect Kurdish autonomy.

Kurdish council members argue that leaving the question of autonomy, which has been in force under US protection since 1991, to be settled in the permanent constitution is an evasive tactic designed to undermine the de facto independence they have enjoyed for close to 13 years.

"I say `yes' to federalism, but only on geographical basis," said Sunni council member Samir Shakir Mahmoud. "Federalism based on ethnicity takes us down a slippery road."

4. - Radikal - "Annans Provisions and Success in the Cyprus Question":

5 February 2004 / by Tarhan Erdem

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan offered four provisions to start the negotiations on Cyprus: The first is that both parties should display a good will. Secondly, they should accept the calendar for negotiations. Thirdly, parties should accept that Annan would fill in the blanks on issues where no agreement is reached at the end of the negotiations. Fourthly, parties should go for a referendum on accepting or rejecting the plan formed by this process.

Some find the government's political will and statements on negotiations and agreements as wrong and some claim that Turkey's recent movement endangers its future. This move by Turkey turned the parties towards the negotiation table. Now it's difficult for the parties to say 'I don't accept Annan's provisions and wont negotiate.' Some also claim that Annan's provisions would make it difficult to negotiate. I think that the provisions would make the solution easier for both sides.
The reason is that the provisions by Annan facilitate agreement instead of disagreement. Annan's provisions make negotiations more fruitful and encourage compromise.

If the provisions are accepted and parties sit on the negotiation table, they will know how much time they will have: The negotiations should begin in mid February and last until the end of March; parties will have 45 days to reach a solution. At the end of these 45 days, issues on which agreement is reached will be added to the plan and issues on which no agreement is reached will be filled by Annan. Parties could guess what Annan will add to fill in the blanks but they won't prefer estimation and would strive for a negotiation to prevent any gaps in the plan. Thus, the issue will become definite by their will. Parties won't risk further demands and will reach an agreement. Annan's provisions say that parties should either agree within a certain period or accept what Annan adds to the plan. Thus, we can expect that parties would agree on more issues in 45 days than they did within 45 years.

Today, what could be a success in Cyprus? I think success would be a referendum resulting in a positive way after Annan's recent initiative.'

5. - AFP - "Cypriots feel the squeeze as Turkey takes initiative":

NICOSIA / 5 February 2004 / by Charlie Charalambous

A major peace initiative from Turkey has left Greek Cypriots facing unaccustomed pressure for concessions on Cypriot reunification, but analysts say neither side has yet met UN conditions for resumed talks.

Turkey's call for renewed talks on UN chief Kofi Annan's 2002 peace plan has marked a major step forward, but the analysts warned that it was still far from clear that the powerful Turkish military is fully on board.

And the Greek Cypriot leadership is maintaining its refusal to agree to an April referendum on the blueprint, regardless of the outcome of any renewed talks.

"I think there is pressure exerted on both sides," one diplomat said. "The UN secretary general's conditions are crystal clear, and nobody is meeting them yet."

In Brussels last week, Annan said any talks must aim at a deal by the end of March, so referendums can be conducted in April and allow a reunited Cyprus to join the EU on May 1.

He said he needs to see the "necessary political will" from all parties before re-engaging in the search for a settlement.

Cyprus has been divided since 1974 when Turkey invaded and occupied the northern third of the island in response to a Greek Cypriot coup aimed at uniting it with Greece.

Annan was "encouraged" by what he heard from Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a tumultuous week of diplomatic activity to get chances for a settlement back on track.

In a breakthrough 10 months after Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash rejected Annan's plan with presumed approval from Ankara, Erdogan asked the UN chief to revive peace negotiations. That turned the tables on Papadopoulos, who had managed until then to avoid any real pressure from outside.

"Turkey was seen to be taking the initiative because it was a significant step forward from its previous position, but people are not 100 per cent sure what Turkey is saying," said the diplomat.

The EU had warned Turkey that its own European aspirations would be seriously dented if it did not help broker a peace deal.

In the eyes of many observers, Ankara got itself off the hook with its initiative, while the Greek Cypriots are floundering.

Although Papadopoulos asked Annan on Tuesday to give Cyprus talks "another chance," he has come under heavy fire for being too negative in the face of Turkey's apparent change of heart. Moreover, the Greek side signalled it did not endorse Annan's terms of committing to a referendum on his plan before negotiations re-start.

"Our side have been stupid in projecting a negative face while Turkey was winning the public relations exercise," seasoned Greek Cypriot political commentator Sofronis Sofroniou said.

Even so, while saying "we have been negative and indecisive," Sofroniou added that "Turkey is no better; it has offered no substance or clear endorsement of the Annan plan."

The analyst points to the recent statement by Turkey's influential National Security Council of political and military leaders supporting the Annan plan only as a "reference point".

"There is a long way from accepting the core of the Annan plan as a basis of negotiation as the Greek Cypriots have and saying it is a reference point," said Sofroniou.

Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders also refer to the "realities of Cyprus", interpreted as meaning two separate states. This scenario is not envisaged in the UN's federalist plan and is considered a "nightmare" by the internationally recognized Greek Cypriot government.

A divided island joining the bloc could raise tension between Ankara and Brussels as, technically, 30,000 Turkish troops would be occupying part of the European Union. Turkish Cypriots would also be frozen out of the EU.

Denktash has warned that the calendar may be too tight to conclude a settlement to the three-decade conflict.

The arch-nationalist says he is ready to return to the table and negotiate on the same plan he rejected last March, an irony not lost on his opposite number.

Papadopoulos believes no solution is possible if Denktash is given carte blanche.

So Annan has the tricky task of navigating the apparent brinkmanship and overcoming mutual suspicion to judge if the time is ripe to give Cyprus another chance.

"Signs are encouraging but we are not there yet," commented a diplomatic source.

6. - Russian Oil & Gas Report - "Baku-Ceyhan Pipline Projekt Loses Popularity":

4 February 2004

Documents on financing of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline were signed in Baku. Only Azerbaijan was represented by the President. Turkey and Georgia sent only ministers. Kazakhstan, whose oil can fill this pipeline, did not send anyone.

IFC and EBRD allocate $500 million ($250 million each). The pipeline syndicate will allocate $1.2billion. British Petroleum is ready to issue a $500-million credit and Statoil is prepared to allocate $170 million. A part of the credit is issued through the export and import agencies connected with governments of the US, UK, Japan and Germany, which represent so-called bound credits for purchase of equipment from these countries.

According to experts, Baku-Ceyhan is the most expensive of all projects for transportation of Caspian oil. The main advantage of this pipeline is a possibility to export Caspian oil bypassing Bosporus, where tankers usually wait in jams, through the deep-water port of Ceyhan in the Mediterranean Sea.
The Odessa-Brody pipeline remaining idle is considered an alternative route for transportation of Azerbaijani oil. In This case from Baku Azerbaijani oil will go not to Turkey but to the Georgian port of Supsa, from where it will be delivered by tankers through the Black Sea to Odessa and later through the territories of Ukraine and Poland directly to the oil pipeline system of Western Europe.

The main drawback of both projects is that there may not be oil reserves sufficient for normal functioning of the pipeline in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea.

Representatives of Kazakhstan did not arrive to the ceremony of signing of the document very important for the fate of the pipeline. Representatives of Kazakh company KazMunayGaz confirmed this. It was believed that Kazakh oil would help Azerbaijani oil to fill the pipeline to Ceyhan.

Low status of participants of the ceremony is interesting. President participated in it only on the part of Azerbaijan. Turkey sent the Energy Ministry who attempted to sooth down the effect from his appearance by the proposal to name the final oil terminal in Ceyhan in favor of diseased Azerbaijani President Geidar Aliev. Georgia was represented on the minister's level too. The PR service of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili reported that Saakashvili was not even going to visit Azerbaijan.

There are also other signs indicating that serious treatment of Azerbaijani oil and its transportation after the death of Geidar Aliev stopped. The most illustrative example is British Petroleum. It has the biggest stake in the project and through its Azerbaijani subsidiary it is operator of the part of the pipeline that goes to Supsa. Simultaneously, through its TNK-BP subsidiary British Petroleum is lobbying the reverse of the Odessa-Brody pipeline in Ukraine, which closes the possibility of oil transportation to Europe through this route.

Moreover, British Petroleum states that Russia and not Azerbaijan will be the main resource base of the company in the near future.

LUKoil dealt another blow on the project when it expressed its intention to sell its stake in the project for development of the Shah Deniz field, which had been considered one of the most promising projects in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea.

This action hardly testifies in favor of bright future of the future Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.

Back in 1999, The Financial Times wrote that oil projects sponsored by the US may subject their relations with Moscow to serious ordeal. "The matter is primarily about signing of the agreement by Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia, which outlines the terms of investments in construction of the oil pipeline from Baku to the Turkish pot of Ceyhan. American sponsorship pursues primarily geopolitical goals of involving of Caucasian and Caspian countries into the orbit of the West and global economy. Washington also counts on isolation of Iran, diversification of sources of energy resources and reduction of dependence on the Middle Eastern oil."

Now, when the US retains control over Iraq, its strategic interest in Azerbaijan and in the Baku-Ceyhan project sharply decreased.

Project participants are British petroleum (30.1%), SOCAR (25%), Unocal (8.9%), Statoil (8.71%), TPAO (6.53%), ENI (5%), Itochu (3.4%), ConocoPhillips (2.5%), INPEX (2.5%), Total (5%) and Amerada Hess (2.36%). The pipeline is 1,767 kilometers long including 443 kilometers in Azerbaijan, 248 kilometers in Georgia and 1,076 kilometers in Turkey.

Construction of the pipeline started in April 2003 and would be completed in the fourth quarter of 2004. The Azerbaijani part of the pipeline will be built by September 2004, the Georgian part by October 2004 and the Turkish part by the end of 2004. Beginning of export of Azerbaijani oil from Ceyhan is scheduled for the second quarter of 2005.