13 February 2004

1. "Amnesty calls for Turkish reform", Human rights defenders in Turkey have been harassed despite Ankara's efforts to adhere to EU entry demands, the head of Amnesty International said yesterday.

2. "Turkey EU membership not likely until 2015", Turkey will probably not become a member of the European Union for at least another 10 years because it must resolve tensions over Cyprus as well as pass key reforms, according to a Reuters poll.

3. "U.N. Cyprus talks: One last try", a third day of talks between Turkish and Greek Cypriot delegations aimed at seeking to reunite the divided island of Cyprus have ended without a solution but are set to resume later.

4. "After the Annan plan", a four-power summit will be held with the participation of Turkey and Greece about the issues on which a consensus couldn’t have been reached at the end of technical works to be done until March 26.

5. "Remaking the Middle East: A European perspective", is the “axis of evil" starting to crumble?

6. "French authorities closed Medya TV", a new channel, “Roj TV”, will begin broadcasting on the first of the month.

1. - The Guardian - "Amnesty calls for Turkish reform":

ATHENS / 13 February 2004 / by Helena Smith

Human rights defenders in Turkey have been harassed despite Ankara's efforts to adhere to EU entry demands, the head of Amnesty International said yesterday.

Tayyip Erdogan, Turkeys' prime minister, was urged to end human rights violations by ensuring the police, judiciary and state employees enforced reforms.

But Amnesty's secretary general, Irene Khan, said: "Unless there is far reaching institutional reform, legal reforms will not be effective or sustainable."

Presenting Mr Erdogan with a memorandum, during the first meeting between the group and a Turkish leader, Ms Khan outlined her concern over growing human rights abuses by law enforcers. Violence against women, not least "crimes of honour", and continuing restrictions on freedom of expression, were especially worrying.

Ms Khan claimed that violations had surged as Turkey implemented reforms dictated by the EU. "As old laws have been abolished new ways have been found to obstruct the activities of human rights defenders. There is a risk that the government's efforts will be sabotaged if legal reform is not accompanied by a strong agenda for institutional reform."

The ruling Islamists, the first government to control a clear majority in parliament for 15 years, have been credited with forging ahead with historic human rights legislation over the past 14 months.

Turkey's desire to join the EU had created "a unique momentum" for improving human rights, Ms Khan acknowledged, but she said while the Islamists had announced a policy of "zero tolerance of torture", those who expressed dissenting views were still apt to suffer widespread abuse.

Human rights defenders, in particular, faced a "pattern of pressure" which had appeared to evolve concurrently with reforms in Turkey. In the past three years "huge numbers" of investigations and trials had been opened against such activists under new laws.

"Reform is not reform until it has been fully incorporated in day-to-day practice and behaviour," said Ms Khan. "It is not enough for the authorities in Turkey to change the laws, they must make sure the police and judiciary act on it."

2. - Reuters - "Turkey EU membership not likely until 2015":

LONDON / 13 February 2004

Turkey will probably not become a member of the European Union for at least another 10 years because it must resolve tensions over Cyprus as well as pass key reforms, according to a Reuters poll.

The mid-range of 34 forecasts in the February 9 to 11 poll showed a 30 percent chance of the EU agreeing to open accession talks with Turkey in late 2004 or early 2005, unchanged from the last poll in November.

Analysts said Turkey would join the EU in 2015, compared with 2014 in the previous survey. Forecasts ranged from 2010 to 2025.

"Turkey has already made significant progress and on top of that there seems to be some momentum underway to resolve the Cyprus issue," said Mehmet Simsek at Merrill Lynch in London.

"If (that) is resolved...then the EU will very likely begin accession negotiations in 2005 and it could take a decade."

Turkey, a largely Muslim nation of about 70 million people, is not currently negotiating its entry to the wealthy EU bloc because it failed to meet the basic political criteria for membership.

The divided island of Cyprus, which will join the EU in May along with nine other states, remains a key focus for Turkey's bid for membership.

Cyprus has been divided since Turkey intervened the north of the island in 1974 after a brief Greek Cypriot coup backed by the military regime then ruling Greece.

Need solution

The EU hopes to see the island reunited before Cyprus joins the bloc and talks on reaching a deal have been taking place at the United Nations this week.

Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash handed a new proposal to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan on Wednesday to break the deadlock in the talks, which included a pledge to hold a referendum on a final agreement on April 21.

The Greek Cypriots must now say whether they accept his plan.

If a solution is not reached on Cyprus, the EU will admit only the Greek Cypriot part of the island, a move that threatens to harm Ankara's own bid to start entry talks.

"The decision on whether to open up formal memberships talks with Turkey would appear to rest largely on progress made on resolving the Cyprus issue in the coming months," said James Ker-Lindsay at Civilitas Research in Nicosia.

"It would be difficult to see how the EU could refuse talks if Turkey did ensure a Cyprus settlement."

Still, even if a solution on Cyprus was reached, Turkey must implement a reform package, which includes bringing the country's human rights and freedom of speech into line with those of the EU.

"It is likely that the EU will make a proposal to start accession talks with Turkey at the end of 2004," said Dagmar Alpen at Oppenheim Research in Cologne.

"But...I don't think accession talks would start much before 2007, after which about five more years would be needed as Turkey still has a lot of reforms to put in place before it can join the EU."

Tim Ash at Bear Stearns in London, who does not see Turkey joining the EU before 2020, says it is being judged by different standards to other countries due to religion and race issues.

"This is ridiculous, arguably racist and very short-sighted, but that is the reality of Europe...where immigration is now a major political issue," he said.

"Turkey brings big advantages to the Union, in particular the ability to demonstrate that Islam can live together with the West."

3. - CNN - "U.N. Cyprus talks: One last try":

UNITED NATIONS / 13 February 2004

A third day of talks between Turkish and Greek Cypriot delegations aimed at seeking to reunite the divided island of Cyprus have ended without a solution but are set to resume later.

The delegates were awaiting a proposal from U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan Friday that is expected to suggest possible ways of moving the talks forward and what role the European Union might take.

Cyprus has been divided into a Greek Cypriot south and a Turkish-held north since a 1974 Turkish invasion sparked by a short-lived coup by supporters of union with Greece.

Turkey maintains about 40,000 troops in a northern Turkish Cypriot breakaway state, which is only recognized by Ankara.

A peace deal was vital for Turkey's ambitions to join the EU. The Greek Cypriot side of the island will join the 15-nation bloc with or without the a peace agreement in May.

Talks collapsed last March after the Turkish Cypriot side, led by Rauf Denktash, insisted that their state win full recognition, while Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos demanded refuges who left the north about 30 years ago should have the right to return home.

Papadopoulos and Denktash signaled they were unhappy with a power-sharing plan that would involve land exchanges and population movements.

Denktash believed the plan would create refugees and throw many Turkish Cypriots out of their homes on an island where two-thirds of the population are Greek Cypriots.

Greek Cypriots opposed the plan because it committed them to sharing power with a minority and restricted the number of Greek Cypriots who would be able to return to their former homes.

4. - Milliyet - "After the Annan plan":

13 February 2004 / by Derya Sazak

A four-power summit will be held with the participation of Turkey and Greece about the issues on which a consensus couldn’t have been reached at the end of technical works to be done until March 26. If there are still disagreements, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan will fill the gaps in the draft agreement to be presented to referendum. The four-power summit means the ‘registration of political equality,’ requested by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The current situation is considered the result of the policy of ‘going one step ahead,’ started by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan returns from Cyprus after taking the step towards the solution. At this point, Ankara’s pressure is unquestionable.

There is a plan of game in Cyprus and the parties are playing their own roles. If there weren’t the target of May 1 and the EU membership, the Cyprus problem would continue 40 years more with this bargaining. Denktas doesn’t want the current situation to be considered a ‘victory.’
Considering Denktas, one of the key names in the delegation says, ‘If I had been in his place, I would have resigned immediately.’ However, Denktas is a very severe negotiator. Will the current situation unlock the lack of solution in the Cyprus problem? Actually two doors will be unlocked. Besides Greek Cypriot administration, Turkey’s EU membership seems possible. The solution before May 1 will make it easier to receive a date of negotiation at the end of 2004.

5. - Media Monitors Network - "Remaking the Middle East: A European perspective":

13 February 2004 / by Alain Dieckhoff

"...the fact that the US is today a direct regional player has had a moderating effect on “rogue states”. But it will only be a lasting one under two conditions: a successful stabilization of Iraq, both politically and on security matters (and here uncertainties remain); and a reasonable American policy looking for incremental improvements rather than brutal breaks, because a forceful strategy is a recipe for major trouble in a Middle East based on complex internal dynamics."

Is the “axis of evil" starting to crumble? The question has to be raised after the successive announcements of last December: Syrian readiness to resume peace negotiations with Israel, Libya’s renouncing of its WMD program, Iran’s commitment to sign the additional protocol to the NPT (which allows IAEA inspections at very short notice). It is tempting to lump these three events together and to see these positive developments as a direct result of the war in Iraq and as the first steps of a global transformation of the Middle East. But is that assumption fully warranted?

Let us start with the obvious: the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime is clearly a proof of United States determination to go to war in order to change a geopolitical situation deemed unbearable for American vital interests in the aftermath of 9/11. The message could not be ignored by Middle Eastern so-called rogue states, all the more as there is today a huge American military force in Iraq, a reality that has deeply changed the regional equation.

Thus, for instance, the fact that Iran is squeezed between two countries where American troops are stationed is necessarily in the minds of decision-makers in Teheran. The overthrow of Saddam had a deterrent effect on both the Iranian leadership and Libya's Muammar Qadhafi and led them to opt for a realist path rather than to adopt a risky confrontational line. And Syrian President Bashar Asad’s relative openness also has something to do with a desire to show goodwill towards Washington—although the gesture is a minimal one and does not mean in any way that Syria is ready to depart from its traditional demand for return of full sovereignty over the Golan Heights.

If the new geopolitical situation has favored these evolutions, it would nevertheless be a mistake to think that they have vindicated the neo-conservative perception that only an assertive policy is able to make things move in the Middle East. The Iranian decision was the result of a combination of the demonstrative effect of force and the vital role of diplomacy. Without an American armada along its borders, the Islamic Republic would have certainly been reluctant to sign the additional protocol, but without a diplomatic horizon (the joint British-German-French initiative, last October), Tehran would also not have been as cooperative.

Indeed if, for a regime, the only option left is its demise, it is doubtful its leaders will be in a hurry to comply with the demands of the international community. Things may change if the same leaders are convinced that if they show more accountability, their regime will be spared. The new regional equation could thus have positive effects on the “rogue states” when their compliance to legitimate concerns on security matters (on WMD or support for terrorist groups) is followed by a progressive normalization of their international status (for instance lifting of sanctions such as embargos and freezing of financial assets).

Although realists in Washington would be satisfied with such an outcome, “idealist neo-conservatives” will surely not be content with mere accountability. They look for more: a general transformation of the Middle East and the disappearance of all regimes that do not totally fit with US strategic interests. The objective is not just to work towards more accountable behavior, but towards a substantial change of the nature of those regimes, meaning their overthrow (more softly called “roll back”). Such a perspective does not necessarily require a military intervention, as in Iraq; it can also be reached through a combination of sanctions, propaganda and support for opposition groups (in exile or within the country).

Thus, if despite having taken positive steps that have improved regional security (such as control of WMD), states like Iran or Libya continue to be pointed to as dangerous and non-reliable, two consequences can be expected. The first is domestic: conservative forces that stick to uncompromising positions will be vindicated, while reformists will be challenged and undermined (the parliamentary elections in Iran will be an interesting test-case). Thus, at least in the short run, rather then being weakened, the regime may well tighten its grip over society.

The second consequence is regional: these regimes will try to find allies in other neighboring states that are also concerned with the destabilizing effects of a reframed Middle East. The rapprochement between Syria and Turkey, symbolized by Asad’s recent visit to Ankara and linked with a common concern over the emergence of a quasi-independent Kurdish entity in northern Iraq, is an indication of possible unexpected realignments.

To conclude, the fact that the US is today a direct regional player has had a moderating effect on “rogue states”. But it will only be a lasting one under two conditions: a successful stabilization of Iraq, both politically and on security matters (and here uncertainties remain); and a reasonable American policy looking for incremental improvements rather than brutal breaks, because a forceful strategy is a recipe for major trouble in a Middle East based on complex internal dynamics.

6. - KurdishMedia.com - "French authorities closed Medya TV":

LONDON / 13 February 2004

French authorities have closed the Kurdish satellite television station Medya TV. At 1:30 PM, the channel ran an announcement in Kurdish, Turkish, and France stating, “In accordance with an administrative decision, Medya TV has ceased broadcasting. A new channel, “Roj TV”, will begin broadcasting on the first of the month. (Source: amude.com)