4 August 2004

1. "Turkey poses high-stakes questions for EU", Europeans, it seems, are in the throes of a crisis of identity. And it will probably worsen in the next few months, as the 25-state union decides whether to begin the process of admitting Turkey, the only Muslim member of the NATO alliance, into its growing club.

2. "Turkey Commissions Tank Program Feasibility Study", Turkey’s procurement office has signed a contract with a team of local armored vehicle manufacturers to deliver a feasibility report that will shape the future of the country’s ambitious main battle tank program.

3. "Syrian opposition party says Kurd dies under torture in prison", a Kurd arrested in mid-July has died under torture in a Syrian prison, the country's banned opposition Kurdish party Yakiti said Tuesday.

4. "Women's education continuing problem", population study notes that 68.2 percent of Turkey is living in urban centers.

5. "Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq", A crisis of serious proportions is brewing in northern Iraq, and may soon explode into open violence. Since 1975, the former Iraqi government forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of Kurds, Turkomans, and Assyrians from their homes, and brought in Arab settlers to replace them, under a policy known as “Arabization.”

6. "Iraq's Kurds Are Not Collaborating with Israel", wherever Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi went during his tour of the Middle East in the past 10 days, he was asked by Arab journalists to comment on reports regarding alleged Israeli infiltration into northern Iraq, the specific purpose of which is to conduct operations against Iran and Syria and, in exchange, help the Kurds achieve their dream of an independent state.

1. - The Seattle Times - "Turkey poses high-stakes questions for EU":

LONDON / 4 August 2004 / by Rebecca Goldsmith

Three months ago the European Union pushed eastward to embrace 10 new countries, expanding to include 455 million people speaking 11 languages. As officials celebrated, former enemies agreed to work together, promising "unity through diversity."

That slogan fell flat in some quarters, however, and elections six weeks later exposed deep dissatisfaction with the very idea of a united Europe. Voters in established EU countries gave victories to opposition parties campaigning on anti-Europe platforms, and newly admitted countries had dismal voter turnout.

Europeans, it seems, are in the throes of a crisis of identity. And it will probably worsen in the next few months, as the 25-state union decides whether to begin the process of admitting Turkey, the only Muslim member of the NATO alliance, into its growing club.

The stakes are high. Admitting Turkey could help strengthen the political position and economic profile of the world's largest stable Muslim democracy, which has been a key Western ally in the Middle East. Rejection could undermine the government, isolate the country and empower extremist anti-Western factions within it.

Agricultural base

For opponents, the potential benefits do not outweigh the practical, cultural and economic dilemmas. Turkey is poorer and more populous than most of the member countries. It has an economy based on agriculture, and it borders the unstable nations of Iraq, Iran and Syria. Most of its 71 million people are Muslim.

The loudest cheerleaders for Turkey's candidacy — Americans, Britons and the Turks themselves — do not hold much sway with the European power brokers in Brussels. At the NATO summit in Istanbul in June, President Bush angered Europeans — especially French President Jacques Chirac — when he called for Europe to embrace Turkey.

Across continental Europe, few countries give Turkey's candidacy unwavering support.

Europe's leaders have vowed to take Turkey's recent political reforms into consideration.

The official debate will focus on whether Turkey is a constitutional state that guarantees the rule of law, human rights, freedom of religion and minority rights — the so-called Copenhagen criteria. Critics will scrutinize Turkey's role in the divided island nation of Cyprus, its treatment of the minority Kurdish community and its efforts to protect the religious practices of non-Muslims.

In October, the European Commission, the executive arm of the European Union, is due to issue its opinion on whether to open negotiations with Turkey. If that opinion is favorable, representatives from all 25 EU members will vote in mid-December on whether Turkey has made enough progress toward establishing a stable democracy to qualify.

Even if the December decision is unanimous, national parliaments in each country would have to ratify the decision a year or two later. After that, there would be a period of talks that could go on for a decade.

Despite the obstacles, longtime promoters of a broad European Union remain optimistic.

"It's not a matter of if Turkey will join the EU, but when," said Hans van den Broek, the former Dutch minister of foreign affairs. "What we have achieved in 50 years of European cooperation after the first half of the last century would never have been expected by the founders of the European community."

But the political case for Turkey's candidacy may be overshadowed by cultural differences. The resistance includes — but is not limited to — reactionary, xenophobic elements. In newspapers and universities, prominent intellectuals are also raising questions about the wisdom of admitting Turkey.

A big part of the debate over Turkey is whether Europe is merely a geographic demarcation or a community of shared Judeo-Christian values and ideas.

"There is always the question, 'Where will it end?' Next time we'll have the Moroccans in? Should Australia be in? What is it that binds us together? Many people say Turkey is not really European," said Wendy Asbeek Brusse, who researched the role of religion in the Turkey debate for a Dutch government think tank, the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy. "Is a country like Turkey really going to fit in, or is it a sort of Trojan horse of fundamentalism?"

Blend of fears

Many anti-Turkey arguments combine a muddled blend of fears of immigration, terrorism and Islam — what Brusse calls a "messy cocktail of unease."

Arguments against Turkey's candidacy also reflect changing demographics in Europe. Muslim immigrants in some member states have been slow to integrate, and second-generation Muslims have been more assertive than their parents.

In Germany, which has a large Turkish immigrant population, opposition to admitting Turkey is firmly in the political mainstream, with the country's Christian Democrats campaigning on anti-Turkey platforms. Within a decade, Turkey's population is projected to top Germany's, which would give it greater say in EU affairs.

Discomfort widespread

In light of the widespread discomfort with Turkey's candidacy, wary politicians may heed their constituencies' desires this fall. In his first address to the European Parliament, the new EU president, Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, warned his colleagues last week to treat Turkey fairly.

"The decision must be arrived at honestly," he said, through "strict application of the criteria laid down, but without inventing any new criteria. We must not allow ourselves to be guided by fear. ... Raising barriers to any particular religion does not fit in with Europe's shared values."

No matter what happens, the decision on Turkey will be a watershed moment. The European Union granted Turkey status as a candidate five years ago and created ground rules for its admission two years ago. Turkey first started talking to the union about membership in 1963.

"There's a lot at stake," Brusse said. "Politicians in Europe realize, given the 40-year history that they have with Turkey, this issue is not going to go away."

2. - DefensNews - "Turkey Commissions Tank Program Feasibility Study":

ANKARA / by Burak Eke Bekdil

Turkey’s procurement office has signed a contract with a team of local armored vehicle manufacturers to deliver a feasibility report that will shape the future of the country’s ambitious main battle tank program.

Under the deal, the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, or Savunma Sanayi Mustesarligi (SSM) in Turkish, has commissioned FNSS, here; Otokar, Arifiye; and BMC, Manisa, to produce a report on development of a third-generation tank. The duration of the project is six to eight months.

“During that time, we will have intensive contacts with foreign tank manufacturers as well as possible Turkish sub-contractors and military plants where the new model can be manufactured,” a senior company official involved with the deal said Aug. 3.

Both the companies involved and SSM officials declined to discuss the contract's value.

An SSM official said the deal marks the beginning of a renewed contract for third-generation tanks. “The final report will be the basic guideline for the tank program,” he said.

SSM Undersecretary Murad Bayar told reporters July 28 the program is an effort to meet Turkey’s need for third-generation battle tanks after 2010.

In May, Turkey’s top defense panel, the Defense Industry Executive Committee, canceled bidding on a $3 billion co-production deal for an initial batch of 250 main battle tanks.

3. - AFP - "Syrian opposition party says Kurd dies under torture in prison":

BEIRUT / 3 August 2004

A Kurd arrested in mid-July has died under torture in a Syrian prison, the country's banned opposition Kurdish party Yakiti said Tuesday.

"Ahmed Hussein Hussein, from Hasakah (on the border with Syria), has been killed under torture by the military security services ... who pretended he died of a blood clot," said a statement signed by Fuad Aaliko, a party central committee member.

"His body was returned on Monday night to his family and the authorities refused to provide a medical report on what caused his death and put pressure (on the family) so he was buried quickly under tight security," it added.

The statement said Ahmed Hussein, a Syrian national who was accused of belonging to the recently-formed Democratic Union party of Turkish Kurd separatists, was arrested on July 17. Syria's Kurdish parties, which cover 11 banned groups includin Yakiti, said last April that two other Kurds had died after being "tortured in a savage manner".

Hundreds of Kurds were arrested after clashes in mid-March between Kurds and Arab tribes and security forces in northern Syria. The Kurds said 40 people died in the clashes, while Syria put the death toll at 25.

Dozens of Kurds have since been freed in several waves, although the Kurdish parties says hundreds are still being held. More than one million Kurds live in Syria, mainly in the north near the Turkish and Iranian frontiers.

4. - Turkish Daily News - "Women's education continuing problem":

Population study notes that 68.2 percent of Turkey is living in urban centers

ANKARA / 4 August 2004

In a poll conducted by the Hacettepe Population Study Institute, it was found that 21.8 percent of all women either never went to school or failed to complete their primary school education.

The study "Population and Health Study" is conducted every five years on Turkey's population and age composition, utilization of health services, women and children's health and child death rates. According to the 2003 preliminary report, lack of education for women is a continuing problem.

The report says that 68.2 percent of Turkey's population live in cities, while the rest live in rural communities.

Western Turkey is the most populous region with 38 percent of Turkish people living there. Only 7 percent live in the north of the country, making it the least populous region. 17 percent of Turkey lives in Istanbul and 10 percent live in the southeast.

While 53.7 percent of all Turkish women were able to complete their primary school education, only 17 percent finished high-school or universities.

One of the most interesting sections in the report notes the changes in the rate of increase in population depending on regions. While the number of children born every year is decreasing, in the east the average number of child births per woman is 3.65 and in the southeast it is 4.19. This figure is 1.83 in Istanbul.

5. - Human Rigths Watch - "Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq":

3 August 2004

A crisis of serious proportions is brewing in northern Iraq, and may soon explode into open violence. Since 1975, the former Iraqi government forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of Kurds, Turkomans, and Assyrians from their homes, and brought in Arab settlers to replace them, under a policy known as “Arabization.” With the overthrow of that government in April 2003, the Kurds and other non-Arabs began returning to their former homes and farms. Ethnic tensions between returning Kurds and others and the Arab settlers escalated rapidly and have continued to do so, along with tensions between the different returning communities—particularly between Kurds and Turkomans—over control of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. In the absence of a speedy implementation of plans to address the conflicting land and property claims and the needs of the different communities, ownership disputes may soon be settled through force.

In the context of negotiations over the political future of Iraq and the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) by the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on June 28, 2004, the Kurdish leadership pressed for a number of demands that would consolidate the gains they have made in areas under their control since 1991 as well as realize some of their other long-standing political aspirations. Some of these demands have direct bearing on the future of the hundreds of thousands of victims of Arabization, and are in line with what the Kurdish leadership sees as a historic opportunity to reverse the consequences of what was, in effect, an ethnic cleansing campaign conducted by successive Iraqi governments over several decades. They include a determination of the future status of the city of Kirkuk, which is linked to a return to pre-Arabization administrative boundaries in the relevant governorates; the right of all internally displaced persons to reclaim, and return to, their original homes; and the removal of all Arabs brought from other parts of the country for the purpose of altering the demographic makeup of the northern region. Some of these demands are shared by other ethnic communities that also suffered Arabization - the Turkomans and to a lesser extent the Assyrians – but are at variance on crucial points.

What does unite all the parties concerned is the wish to see past injustices redressed, particularly through a fair mechanism for the settlement of property disputes which lie at the heart of the problem. Resolving these disputes in a timely, fair, and effective manner involves a highly complex operation, which may take years to complete, but on which hinges the ability to diffuse ethnic tensions which are close to a breaking point. The Iraq Property Claims Commission, which was established by law in January 2004, more than eight months after the cessation of major hostilities, has yet to become operational. Moreover, the law fails to address the burning issue of what is to become of the so-called Arabization Arabs, in particular whether they will have the right to choose their place of residence following the resolution of property disputes. They, in a real sense, have become the latest victims of internal displacement.

Since at least the 1930s, successive Iraqi administrations have attempted to change the ethnic make-up of northern Iraq by expelling Kurds, Turkomans, and Assyrians from their homes and repopulating the areas with Arabs moved from central and southern Iraq. Arabization first occurred on a massive scale in the second half of the 1970s, following the creation by the Iraqi government of an autonomous zone in parts of Iraqi Kurdistan. During that period, some 250,000 Kurds and other non-Arabs were expelled from a huge swath of northern Iraq, ranging from Khanaqin on the Iranian border all the way to Sinjar on the Syrian-Turkish border were forcibly displaced. These comprised entire families, including women and children. Simultaneously, the Iraqi government brought in landless Arabs and their families from the nearby al-Jazeera desert to farm the former Kurdish lands. The land titles of the Kurds and other non-Arabs were invalidated. The land was declared government land, but was leased on annual contracts only to the new Arab farmers. However, they did not receive freehold title to the lands.

In 1988, the Iraqi government launched the Anfal campaign against the Kurds, killing some 100,000 Kurds and destroying many of their villages, which left hundreds of thousands of Kurds homeless. Although the aims of the Anfal campaign was not Arabization—the aim was genocide—in its aftermath Kurds were not allowed to return to their destroyed villages. Their property rights, too, were invalidated, and Arabs were brought to settle and farm some of their lands.

The policy of Arabization continued right up to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government in April 2003. Kurds and other non-Arabs in Kirkuk faced constant harassment, and were forced to choose between immediate expulsion or joining the Ba`th Party, changing their ethnic identity (commonly referred to as “nationality correction”) to Arab, and “volunteering” for paramilitary forces such as the Jerusalem Army (Jaysh al-Quds). Families who refused to comply were issued expulsion orders requiring them to leave their homes and were then expelled to the Kurdish-controlled areas. The government of Iraq expelled approximately 120,000 persons from Kirkuk and other areas under Iraqi government control during the 1990s in furtherance of its Arabization policies. Arabs were encouraged to settle in the north through financial incentives and subsidized home prices.

The impact of three decades of forced displacement and Arabization has been immense. U.N.-Habitat counted a total of 805,505 displaced persons living in the Kurdish governorates of Arbil, Duhok, and Sulaimaniyya in 2001. Arabization, as a policy of forced transfer of populations, constituted a crime against humanity, and the victims of that policy have a right to return to their homes or be compensated. However, the rights of the victims of Arabization must be implemented in a manner that does not cause additional human rights abuses against the ethnic Arab populations who settled in the north. Fair and impartial procedures are needed to determine the status of claims and the rights of individuals. Special efforts may be necessary in order to guarantee that returning women, including but not limited to heads of households, are able to exercise their property and inheritance rights. It will also be important to ensure that property restitution rights not be restricted to owners of housing or other property but also address the rights of tenants, cooperative residents, and other tenure groups.

The situation in northern Iraq changed drastically during the 2003 conflict. A large number of Arab settlers and their families left their homes well in advance of the arrival of Kurdish and U.S. forces, leaving many of the Arabized villages empty. For the Arab settler families, the war was a devastating blow, leaving them homeless often after living for decades in the Arabized villages. For the moment, many of these villages remain empty. The judicial mechanism to determine claims to properties has not yet become operational, and many Kurds displaced from their villages through Arabization are simply too poor to rebuild their homes or even pay for the trip to their villages without assistance.

In most cities like Kirkuk and Mosul, as well as towns such as Khanaqin and Sinjar, many Arab settlers chose to remain, explaining they had property deeds to their homes. Tensions in these urban areas run high, as returning Kurds and other non-Arabs attempt to reclaim their property. In some places, particularly in Kirkuk and Khanaqin, some Kurdish officials have attempted to expel Arab residents through threats and intimidation and seize their homes for redistribution among Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and the families of slain fighters.1

In light of the tremendous pressures Kurdish leaders face from their displaced and victimized constituents who are demanding redress, the Kurdish leadership has shown a clear commitment to preventing mass retaliation. In contrast to similar conflicts where formerly victimized populations seize control—the situation of Kosovar Albanians following the NATO war is a close analogy—few acts of retaliation and no massacres were committed by Kurdish forces. At the same time, Kurdish leaders remain committed to their declared policy that Arabization must be reversed completely and that Arabs who came north during the Arabization period must leave, thereby setting themselves up for a major confrontation in the future.

The lack of widespread retaliation killings and other serious human rights abuses by Kurdish forces should not obscure the underlying reality of a dramatic change in power relations in northern Iraq. Arab families are almost completely powerless in the face of Kurdish forces, which were among the few militias in Iraq to have been allowed by U.S. and coalition forces to retain their arms. Serious intimidation of Arab families by Kurdish officials has taken place in areas where Peshmerga forces of both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) began deploying following the fall of the former Iraqi government.

The U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) failed to address the rising tensions in northern Iraq, and to implement a strategy to resolve the claims and needs of the different communities in northern Iraq. When the CPA was formally dissolved on June 28, 2004, more than a year after the fall of the government of Iraq, the mechanism to resolve competing property claims had yet to become operational. The necessary legislation was initially promulgated in January 2004, but only finalized on June 24, 2004, just days before the handover of formal governing authority to the IIG, and the humanitarian needs of displaced persons—Kurds as well as Arabs, women and children as well as men—meanwhile went largely unmet.

Equally dismal has been the failure of the Kurdish leadership to put in place a coordinated and unified policy for dealing with the expected influx of displaced Kurdish and other families into Kirkuk and other areas, particularly with regard to their humanitarian needs. There were reports of Kurds being compelled to return to the Kirkuk area against their will. Hundreds of thousands of others are waiting to return to their homes and farms, and their patience is quickly running out. A large number of Arab families were forced to flee their homes during the 2003 conflict. At present, these internally displaced Arabs have no recourse to determine their rights.

Significantly, many of the Arab settlers interviewed by Human Rights Watch in the months following the fall of the former government indicated that they recognized the Kurdish claims to their properties. Many told Human Rights Watch that they were willing to give up their homes in Arabized villages in return for humanitarian assistance in finding new homes and livelihoods for their families. The willingness of the Arab settlers to seek compromise perhaps offered great hope of peacefully resolving the crisis in northern Iraq.

Over time, with no tangible steps having been taken to resolve property disputes, and with mounting tensions and deteriorating security conditions in Kirkuk and its environs, attitudes on all sides have hardened considerably. More than one year on, it has become doubly difficult to find a just and peaceful resolution to the many competing claims. Both coalition and Kurdish officials alike must be held responsible for the lack of both pre-war and immediate post-war planning. As one CPA official told Human Rights Watch, “We missed an opportunity to put something in place that would inspire confidence.”

The crisis of displacement and conflicting property claims in northern Iraq is potentially one of massive proportions, and can only be resolved through resolute action by the international community. As of July 2004, it is far from clear that the Iraq Property Claims Commission will provide the resolution mechanism needed to adjudicate property disputes in a manner that is expedient, accessible, fair, and impartial. The success of any property resolution process will also require a massive humanitarian response to meet the housing and living needs of these newly displaced families as well as the equally needy Kurds and others in northern Iraq who are attempting to return to their homes.

6. - The Daily Star (Lebanon) - "Iraq's Kurds Are Not Collaborating with Israel":

24 August 2004 / by Kamran Karadaghi

Wherever Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi went during his tour of the Middle East in the past 10 days, he was asked by Arab journalists to comment on reports regarding alleged Israeli infiltration into northern Iraq, the specific purpose of which is to conduct operations against Iran and Syria and, in exchange, help the Kurds achieve their dream of an independent state.

A week ago a Palestinian newspaper, Al-Manar, quoted unidentified sources as saying that Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, had secretly visited Israel, where he met with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and other senior Israeli officials and discussed with them steps to declare an independent Kurdish state.

Even some Arab officials seem to believe the allegations. Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq al-Sharaa proposed at the last meeting of foreign ministers of countries neighboring Iraq to include in the final communique a clause expressing concern about Israeli penetration into northern Iraq. Iraq's delegate at the meeting objected, saying that his government had no evidence of such penetration. However, despite the denials and the failure of the accusers to produce any evidence, many in the Arab press continue to treat the alleged Israeli presence in Iraqi Kurdistan as a foregone conclusion.

One significant reason for this is that the story was told last June by none other that the famous American investigative journalist, Seymour Hersh, in an article published in the New Yorker magazine.

In his article Hersh quoted numerous sources - Americans, Turks, Israelis, Europeans, unidentified former officials and others, who confirmed that a strategic decision had been taken by Sharon to support an independent Kurdish state that would serve Israel's regional interests. Hersh reported that the Israelis were training Kurdish commandos and supplying them with advanced military equipment. In their turn, the Israelis seek to use Iraqi Kurdistan as a platform to spy on Syria and Iran, and, in particular, monitor Iran's nuclear facilities.

Mahmoud Othman, a veteran Kurdish leader and a prominent independent politician, admits that Hersh's article had a negative impact on the Kurds, as it came soon after another article in which the journalist exposed the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. However, Othman pointed to serious flaws in Hersh's scenario. For example, he ridiculed the idea that Israel could monitor Iran's nuclear facilities from 2000 kilometers away. In an interview with me in mid-July, Othman expressed belief that Turkish circles were the main source for Hersh's story (an allegation that was also made in the Turkish press). Othman says he is not alone among Kurdish politicians in thinking that Ankara is trying to alienate the Kurds from Iran, Syria and the Arabs in general, in order to force them to be dependent solely on Turkey.

The history of Kurdish-Israeli contacts is well documented. It was Israel's Middle East man, the former Mossad official David Kimche, who established direct contacts with the Kurdish leadership back in the mid-1960s. In 1997, the London-based Al-Hayat published my interview with Kimche in which he explained that, when the contacts were made, Israel's then Prime Minister Levi Eshkol had taken a "strategic decision" to establish relations with ethnic minorities in the Arab world. Kimche met with then Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani, and shortly afterwards Israel began delivering aid to the Kurds.

Othman, who was at the time Barzani's trusted liaison with the outside world, confirmed Kimche's account. He pointed out, however, that Barzani was hoping that the contacts with Israel would help him establish relations with the United States. Barzani believed that the US was the only power that could help the Kurds achieve their national rights. According to Othman, Barzani personally asked Kimche to help him establish contacts with the Americans.

In later years Othman accompanied Barzani in secret visits to Israel, where the Kurdish leader again asked his hosts to help him with the US. Israeli aid to the Kurds resumed after the breakout of hostilities with Baghdad in 1974. Barzani again attempted to contact the Americans. The whole affair ended in disaster for the Kurds when the shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, signed the 1975 Algiers agreement with former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, who though not yet president of Iraq, was the country's strongman.

According to Othman, Hersh was working on his latest article at least since the start of 2004. He raised the subject with Othman in January when both participated at a conference on Iraq in Dubai. Hersh told Othman about his story, but the Kurdish politician denied the allegations about the Israelis. However, he explained to Hersh the background to Kurdish-Israeli relations and pointed out that the Kurds had not gained from them in the 1960-70s and would not gain from them now, since such relations were bound to create powerful enemies for the Kurds in the shape of Iran, the Arabs and many others in the Muslim world.

Hersh promised Othman to double-check his information. Then last May I received a phone call from Hersh. He told me the gist of the article based on his assertions about Sharon's strategic decision to support the Kurds, to train Kurdish commandos, to establish military camps, etc. Could I share with him any additional information I might have? I didn't have any and didn't think his information was credible. Hersh didn't agree and said he was sure that his facts were "absolutely correct" and would go ahead and publish the article.

Are there Israelis in Kurdistan? The answer is yes. Most of them are visitors who describe themselves as Kurdish Jews. They, or more likely their parents, lived in northern Iraq until they emigrated to Israel in the early 1950s. Some still have relatives in Iraq; others go there to see the land where their ancestors lived for almost 2000 years. Some Kurds and their Jewish visitors have become friends, inducing the Kurds to travel to Israel. Whether the Arab world likes it or not, the fact is that most Kurds consider having Israeli friends and visiting Israel as something normal. Kurds are not "allergic" to the Israelis.

Othman says that he explained to Hersh during their January meeting that there most likely were Israelis working in Kurdistan with some Western, particularly American companies. Many of them may have dual nationality. Some may also be soldiers in the US Army. Are Israeli intelligence agents among them? The answer is, again, yes. The same goes for Iran, the US, the UK and Syria. Turkey for example, "officially" has agents in major Kurdish cities.

Apart from the denial by Talabani of a visit to Israel, Kurdish leaders didn't officially comment on Hersh's allegations. Most likely they didn't see any point in doing so. They are used to such accusations and convinced that this is not the last time they will be accused of collaborating with Israel. However, Othman says he is still puzzled by Hersh's article and can't understand why the journalist allowed himself to be used by all those unidentified sources and did not bother to visit Iraqi Kurdistan to verify his allegations before publishing them.

* Kamran Karadaghi is an Iraqi political commentator based in London. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.