13
August 2004
2. "2 blasts in Semdinli", while a military convoy was passing, 2 blasts happened in 2 different parts of Semdinli district of Hakkari without killing or wounding anyone.
3. "Clashes Will Not Affect Turkey's Progress", the Wall Street Journal, popular in the international financial community, has reported that the recent bombings in Istanbul and the clashes against Turkish soldiers in Southeastern Anatolia will not affect the date to start negotiations with the European Union (EU) in December or the economic growth in Turkey.
4. "Two Kurds die following torture in detention", Syrian security forces tortured and beat two Syrian Kurds, who later died from their injuries, Amnesty International and a Kurdish official claimed.
5. "The Natural Alliance of Kurdistan and Israel", the reporting of Israeli Mossad infiltration in southern Kurdistan provides a microcosm of the problem Kurds face in perception in the world -- as judged by the reaction to the news by the Israeli and Kurdish governments, the enemy states surrounding Kurdistan and global opinion.
6. "Beware of growing Kurdish displeasure", the era when Iraqi Kurdistan could be counted on as a beacon of stability for the United States and its coalition allies may be coming to an end.
1. - The News - "Kurdish group threatens more attacks":
ANKARA / 13 August 2004
A Kurdish group which claimed responsibility for this week’s deadly bombings at two Istanbul hotels on Thursday warned tourists and foreign businessmen to leave the country saying that further attacks were planned. "Taking account of the fact we shall particularly target the tourism sector, we call on all tourists to leave Turkey and those who are intending to come to change their plans," the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons said in a statement.
Tourism is Turkey’s top foreign currency earner. The group also said it would attack industrial targets and urged foreign and local entrepreneurs to suspend investments in Turkey. It said political and military officials were also "a primary target". The statement was made available to AFP by the Germany-based MHA news agency, a pro-Kurdish institution which often carries statements by Kurdish rebels.
An extremist organisation linked to the al-Qaeda network
also claimed the Istanbul blasts, but Turkish authorities have discounted
the claim and focused their investigation on Kurdish rebels. The Turkish
media has suggested the suspected bombers are linked to the former Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK), which took up arms for self-rule in mainly
Kurdish southeast Turkey 20 years ago on Sunday. The conflict has claimed
some 37,000 lives. 
2. - DIHA - "2 blasts in Semdinli":
HAKKARI / 13 July 2004
While a military convoy was passing, 2 blasts happened in 2 different parts of Semdinli district of Hakkari without killing or wounding anyone.
Last night 2 explosions happened on Þemdinli-Yüksekova motorway and Harmanlý village of the district. After the blasts motorway between Yüksekova- Þemdinli was closed for 2 hours.
2 surveillance
After police operations in Harmanli village following
the blast, M.Selim Camiye and 1 peasant whose name could not be learnt
were taken into custody. Operations still continue.
3. - Zaman - "Clashes Will Not Affect Turkey's Progress":
12 August 2004
The Wall Street Journal, popular in the international financial community, has reported that the recent bombings in Istanbul and the clashes against Turkish soldiers in Southeastern Anatolia will not affect the date to start negotiations with the European Union (EU) in December or the economic growth in Turkey.
The Wall Street Journal emphasized that these activities in Turkey will not affect the positive course of events in Turkey and noted that Turkey is seeing the lowest inflation rate in 30 years. It was disclosed that the economy program was to be carried out decisively and serious political reformations were staying their course.
The paper remarked that the clashes in Southeastern Anatolia
would not stop the innovative reforms taking place in Turkey.
4. - AP - "Two Kurds die following torture in detention":
BEIRUT / 12 August 2004
Syrian security forces tortured and beat two Syrian Kurds, who later died from their injuries, Amnesty International and a Kurdish official claimed.
The two men, identified as Ahmad Kenjo and Ahmad Hasan, died earlier this month, according to a statement sent by Amnesty to The Associated Press on Wednesday.
Abdul-Hamid Darwish, head of the Kurdish Progressive and Democratic Party in Syria, confirmed Kenjo's death through "Kurdish circles'' and said he had also heard unconfirmed reports of Hasan's death.
Darwish told The Associated Press on Thursday that the deaths were "regrettable'' and urged Syrian President Bashar Assad to intervene "to put an end to torture in prisons and to punish those responsible.''
No comment was available from Syrian officials, who routinely decline to comment on such sensitive reports.
Syrian Kurds have long complained they lack basic rights and says the government neglects areas of northern Syria where they live.
In March, 25 people were killed and more than 100 wounded in riots between Syrian Kurds and Arabs in northeastern Syria. Nearly 2,000 Kurds were rounded up by security forces, but many have since been released.
Amnesty said security forces beat Kenjo, a 37-year-old father of three, in March in northeastern Syria and while he was imprisoned incommunicado for two months. Kenjo sustained severe head injuries that caused him to suffer a brain hemorrhage that led to his death at home Aug. 3.
Amnesty said it is believed that Kenjo was never charged with any offense.
The human rights watchdog also said Ahmad Hasan, a father of four, died Aug. 1 or 2 while in custody at the Military Intelligence Branch in Hasaka province, northeastern Syria, following his July 13 arrest.
Amnesty claimed Hasan was never charged but was reportedly a sympathizer of a Kurdish party linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party.
His body was also buried without anyone being allowed to see it, Amnesty claimed.
"Amnesty International is seriously concerned to learn of the deaths of two Syrian Kurds in one week, both reportedly following torture and ill-treatment in detention by the security forces,'' the statement said.
"The deaths fit into a pattern of torture and ill-treatment of detainees in Syrian prisons and detention centers.''
Since coming to power in 2000, Assad has freed political prisoners and passed laws aimed at liberalizing the state-controlled economy. But he has also clamped down on political activists, jailing pro-democracy advocates and cracking down on government critics.
There are about 1.5 million Kurds in Syria, including
about 160,000 who are denied Syrian citizenship. Syria is a nation of
18.5 million people.
5. - Israel National News - "The Natural Alliance of Kurdistan and Israel":
12 August 2004 / by Karzan Akrei
The reporting of Israeli Mossad infiltration in southern Kurdistan provides a microcosm of the problem Kurds face in perception in the world -- as judged by the reaction to the news by the Israeli and Kurdish governments, the enemy states surrounding Kurdistan and global opinion.
The veteran American journalist Seymour Hirsch brought this information to light with the same aims he had upon his unearthing of the scandal at the infamous Abu Ghreib prison. News of Kurdish "collaboration" with the Israeli Mossad was meant to be a revelation of how the Bush adventure in the region was spiraling into instability, news that is pleasing to the ears of progressive Europe and the liberal elite in America.
The Turkish foreign ministry leaked the "secret" to Seymour Hirsch with at least two aims in mind: to embarrass the Israeli government, as relations between Israel and Turkey are going through a rough period; and to deceive the Americans into thinking how once more the interests of the Turks are ignored in Kurdistan.
While the reaction of the enemies of Kurdistan and the progressive global opinion is understandable, the purpose of the vehement denials of the existence of a relationship between Israel and Kurdistan by their own leaders is not clear. This attitude is detrimental to both Israel and Kurdistan.
The Israeli and Kurdish people have a great deal in common, from their determination to live in freedom, to having a mostly common enemy. These are good reasons for Israel to ally itself with Kurdistan. For Israel, a strong Kurdistan will be a major buffer against the Arab and Islamic world. For Kurdistan, a strong alliance with Israel should bring much needed military strength and critical access to the seat of power in Washington.
Of course, major differences separate Israel and Kurdistan. In the middle of the arc linking Israel and Kurdistan lies the evil little empire of Turkey, allied with Israel and doing everything possible against its own inevitable dismemberment. How ironic that Israel, born out of the ashes of the Holocaust, finds itself allied with a country carrying the burden of a genocide. In the modern age, despite the premium placed on the Turkish-Israeli alliance in Jerusalem and Washington, the facts on the ground indicate that Turks are as anti-Israel (as well as anti-American) as the people on the Arab street. By contrast, Kurds have a natural affinity for Israelis. But the Kurdish leadership has a lot of catching up to do to persuade the Israelis that Kurdistan would be a great friend of Israel, should Israel put its full weight behind the passion and struggle of Kurds for liberty and freedom.
Notwithstanding the fly in the ointment argument that Turkey poses to an Israeli-Kurdish alliance, it is unclear why this alliance has not taken root and why it has remained in the realm of secretive Mossad-Kurdish commando operations. As usual, much of the blame lies upon the failed leadership of the Kurds, especially the PUK. Cowering to the Arab street and not heeding the calls of the Kurdish people, the Kurdish leadership continues to bow down to the interests of the tyrannies in Baghdad, Damascus, Tehran and Ankara. While Palestinian terrorists negotiate with Israelis, Kurdish leaders consider it almost taboo to utter a good word about Israel, the natural ally-to-be of an independent Kurdistan. Even the maverick Mahmoud Othman, in a disappointing interview with an Egyptian newspaper, seemed to go out of his way to make a disingenuous attempt to portray the Kurds as anti-Israeli. This serves the interests of the enemy.
For their part, the Israelis share a good deal of the blame. They have not made the mental leap to realize that Kurdistan will be the strong ally they need. In a disgraceful manner, Israeli officials refer to the Kurds as Turkey's problem in the same breath as they refer to Palestinian terrorists. This is neither acceptable nor worthy of a country that respects freedom.
What both Israel and Kurdistan need to do is enact and declare an open and full political and military relationship. In the short term, this radical move will agitate the region. But this relationship is coming, just as is the independence of Kurdistan. The sooner we see it, the better.
[This article originally appeared as an editorial on
Kurdistan Observer.com in July, 2004.]
6. - The Daily Star (Lebanon) - "Beware of growing
Kurdish displeasure":
13 August 2004 / by Ali Ezzatyar and Dariush Zahedi*
The era when Iraqi Kurdistan could be counted on as a beacon of stability
for the United States and its coalition allies may be coming to an end.
Following the official transfer of sovereignty back to the Iraqis last June, the word on the streets of Northern Iraq is that the Kurds have been had once again. The disparity between people's wishes in the region and Iraq's actual political direction continues to widen as letdowns materialize. Resentment on the streets is mounting and the Kurdish Peshmerga forces could undergo an internal shakeup in the months to come, with devastating domestic and regional consequences.
With an Arab-dominated interim government now in power, many Kurds feel there is no going back to the position of near independence they once enjoyed - ironically under Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In an almost nightmarish scenario, Kurdish politicians have found themselves short of bargaining chips (apart from their 60,000 strong Peshmerga paramilitary force) to bring to the table in their attempt to secure longstanding requests for federalism and control of key areas.
Reports in early June that street signs in Kirkuk had been changed from Kurdish to Arabic infuriated and frightened Kurds across northern Iraq, who now feel genuinely betrayed by the US and by President George W. Bush in particular. Significantly, this disappointment has already begun to exert a negative impact on the Kurdish leadership, which is being blamed by Iraqi Kurds for selling out to the Americans to maintain their stranglehold on political and economic power.
The dearth of Kurds in significant positions of power in the new government, and the lack of assurances given to the Kurds by the former Governing Council are glaring. Desperately trying to salvage legitimacy, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) of Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani issued a joint threat to withdraw from Baghdad's central authority if their requests were not considered, though they left their exact meaning vague.
A casual conversation in an Irbil cafe or a glance at Kurdish-language news sites reveal feelings of anger and resentment at the road taken by unelected party leaders during the war and post-war periods. The leaders are hearing widespread calls to either step down or hold elections to establish a new direction.
The reality is that the vast majority of Kurds lack any attachment to the notion of a united Iraq. The Kurdish parties, all the while in ongoing and uneasy competition with one another, have tiptoed around this issue for too long.
Widespread Kurdish celebration accompanied the entry of Peshmerga forces into Kirkuk last year, the first time they had done so since Saddam's ethnic cleansing program began in the late 1980s. Today, however, popular sentiment couldn't be more different. At the request of the Kurdish leadership, the Peshmerga ceded much of their control of Kirkuk and have anxiously waited for something good to emerge from the post-war political process. Anxiety has turned to outright antagonism, with large portions of the population, and the Peshmerga forces from which they are drawn, considering new options vis-a-vis the Iraqi rehabilitation process.
During the Iraq war, Talabani and Barzani largely placated the Kurdish population with the promise of new freedom and prosperity. As incompetent sons and relatives of leading Kurdish officials occupied cushy diplomatic posts in Washington, Kurdish forces were directed into a conflict that was supposed to result in autonomy within the confines of a federated Iraq.
But it now appears that the best offer the interim Iraqi government can provide to the Kurdish leadership in a constitutional convention is likely to be less than what the Kurdish population will find minimally acceptable. If the reputation of Kurdish party bosses is further undermined, it will take only a modicum of revolutionary initiative by mid-level party officials or the Peshmerga themselves to send northern Iraq into a tailspin. A leadership more willing to reflect Kurdish popular wishes could take power at the expense of Talabani and Barzani. Indeed, ample precedent exists for rivalries within the KDP and PUK.
The Kurdish question will be pivotal with respect to both regional and internal Iraqi stability in the coming months. When the time of reckoning comes, Kurds will need to feel that their interests are being preserved. Otherwise, many are liable to turn not only against Iraq's central government, but also against their own ruling elite. The implications of this for Iraq's future will be immense if the country's most formidable militia force, the Peshmerga, enter the fray, perhaps in opposition to a united Iraq, or even to the US and the coalition.
Iraq's neighbors for the moment wait uneasily, realizing that the Kurdish nationalist bubble may soon expand beyond control. If and when that happens, however, these neighbors, particularly Turkey, are likely to put a quick end to their "wait and see" posture.
* Ali Ezzatyar is a doctoral candidate in law, and
Dariush Zahedi is a lecturer in political science, both at the University
of California, Berkeley. They wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR