10 August 2004

1. "Two Turkish soldiers killed in mine, rebel Kurds blamed", Turkish military sources were quoted Monday as saying two of their men had been killed and a third wounded by a mine detonated by Kurdish militants in southeastern Turkey.

2. "A big chill: Israel pays the price for internal Turkish change", in May, when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan characterized Israel's incursions into the Rafah refugee camp in Gaza as the actions of a terrorist state, there was no mistaking that something had gone terribly awry in Turkish-Israeli relations.

3. "Patriarch: Freedom of Faith Still Restricted in Turkey", Fener Greek Patriarch, Bartholomeos, said yesterday that Turkey, who is campaigning for European Union (EU) membership, does not give the guarantee of faith; however, they were optimistic that the Heybeliada Seminary would be reopened.

4. "Turkey May Need $5 Bln From IMF Next Year to Fund Debt Payments", Turkey, which has said it will seek a new International Monetary Fund loan agreement when the current one ends in February, probably needs about $5 billion from the Fund next year to help finance debt payments.

5. "Palestinian betrayal of the Kurds", where do you stand on the occupation of Kurdistan and on the Kurdish demand for an independent state in their ancestral land of Kurdistan?

6. "Books: A Blizzard of Contradictions in Modern Turkey", from Orhan Pamuk's last novel,
"My Name is Red" .

1. - AFP - "Two Turkish soldiers killed in mine, rebel Kurds blamed":

ANKARA / 9 August 2004

Turkish military sources were quoted Monday as saying two of their men had been killed and a third wounded by a mine detonated by Kurdish militants in southeastern Turkey.

Anatolia news agency quoted the sources as saying the mine had been operated by remote control by Kurdish rebels as a military vehicle was passing on patrol 50 kilometres (30 miles) from Turkey's frontier with Iraq.

The military sources were quoted as saying the mine had been planted by members of the former Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) now re-named KONGRA-GEL.

Last June, the PKK ended a unilateral ceasefire against the Turkish state begun five years ago when its leader Abdullah Ocalan was arrested.

A Turkish court sentenced Ocalan to death for treason. The sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. Clashes between Turkish security personnel and Kurdish militants have become almost daily since the truce ended.

The PKK campaign in pursuit of an independent Kurdish state, and the retaliation of Turkish government forces, claimed a total of some 37,000 lives between 1984 and 1999.

The Kurdish people is scattered over four countries -- Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran -- and numbers from 25 to 35 million, according to varying estimates. They want their own homeland called Kurdistan.

As a large and distinct group with their own language and culture they are neither Arabs, Turks or Persians and are seen as a political threat by all four of the countries that they inhabit.

The largest number live in Turkey, where 13 to 19 million are settled. Following the Turkish defeat in World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman empire, Kurdish demands for an independent homeland were recognised under the Treaty of Sevres of 1920.

But promises receiv ed from Britain and France were never implemented. The Sevres treaty was re-negotiated at Lausanne in 1923 and the Kurdish demands were buried.

2. - The Daily Star (Lebanon) - "A big chill: Israel pays the price for internal Turkish change":

10 August 2004 / by Henri J. Barkey

In May, when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan characterized Israel's incursions into the Rafah refugee camp in Gaza as the actions of a terrorist state, there was no mistaking that something had gone terribly awry in Turkish-Israeli relations. Their correct but standoffish relationship began to blossom in 1996. So numerous were their military agreements and commercial deals that it appeared, certainly in the Arab world, that the two countries were then entering a strategic relationship.

Turkey's changed tone today doesn't signify the end of the relationship, but it augurs a time of greater differences ahead, as well as underlining Israel's increasing isolation. Th! e worsening situation in the Palestinian territories and the rise of the post-Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist threat have contributed to the falling-out. But the transformation in Turkish attitudes also stems from internal developments in Turkey.

The most important domestic change is the political ascent of Erdogan's Justice and Development Party. Yet despite its leaders' desire to be moderate and centrist, the party cannot escape its roots in Turkey's Islamist movement. To its credit, the party has charted a liberal and reformist agenda to facilitate Turkey's entry into the European Union. At the same time, Justice and Development has had to be careful not to rile Turkey's military establishment, which is anxious about Erdogan's growing power. For example, the party has backed down on such divisive religious issues as relaxing the ban on women wearing headscarves in government offices, schools and universities.

Erdogan's blast at Israel similarly gives his party some! political maneuvering room. First and foremost, it signals to his bed rock supporters that though the party at times makes concessions to the military, it can hold its own when it comes to Tel Aviv. On this the Turkish public is solidly behind the Justice and Development Party, because the Palestinian issue has always been important to Turks. Furthermore, limiting contacts with Israel puts the military on the defensive. Many Turks, especially Erdogan's rank and file, regard the Israeli-Turkish relationship as the creation of the military, which needed access to weaponry, and Israel's staunchest friend, Washington.

There are other reasons for Turkey's new ambivalence toward Israel. The Turkish government is more self-confident than at any time in recent history. Reflecting a palpable transformation in Europe's attitude toward it, Turkey's prospect for getting a date to begin accession negotiations with the EU is excellent. No longer is the country perceived as crisis-prone. Turkish views are well received, and Turkey's leaders enjoy great! er esteem. As a result, the Justice and Development Party doesn't need to curry favor with either Israel or its powerful supporters in Washington.

Second, the party wants to cash in Turkey's new respectability for a greater say in international institutions. It was no coincidence that Erdogan's criticism of Israel came soon after Ankara succeeded in landing the secretary-general office in the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

3. - Zaman - "Patriarch: Freedom of Faith Still Restricted in Turkey":

9 August 2004

Fener Greek Patriarch, Bartholomeos, said yesterday that Turkey, who is campaigning for European Union (EU) membership, does not give the guarantee of faith; however, they were optimistic that the Heybeliada Seminary would be reopened.

"We have the freedom to fulfill all religious services; however, we do not have the right to administer foundations, seminaries, cemeteries and schools belonging to the church."

Bartholomeos! claimed these institutions were in the scope of the state administrat ion and that they are abused. Claiming that the concept of the freedom of faith was restricted and superficial in Turkey, the Greek Patriarch said he believed that EU pressure would facilitate the seminary's reopening, which was closed in 1971.

Bartholomeos added that if the human rights and freedom of faith violations end in Turkey, the EU process would gain speed.

Indicating that he supported Turkey's EU membership, the Patriarch said that a European -- Muslim partnership was beneficial.

4. - Bloomberg - "Turkey May Need $5 Bln From IMF Next Year to Fund Debt Payments":

9 August 2004

Turkey, which has said it will seek a new International Monetary Fund loan agreement when the current one ends in February, probably needs about $5 billion from the Fund next year to help finance debt payments.

Turkey ``may require external financing of about $7 billion'' in 2005, said Hakan Aklar, an economist at Ak Yatirim. ``If it gets $5 billion f! rom the IMF it can finance the rest from international markets. The important thing is that there should be a strong agreement between the IMF and Turkey.''

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Friday that Turkey will seek new IMF loans when the current $19 billion plan ends. He didn't say how much Turkey aims to borrow. Ministers have said they may seek an accord with fewer restrictions on spending, while businesses and the central bank say monitoring of budget and legislative targets should remain tight to ensure the country can maintain payments on its $204 billion national debt.

Turkish and IMF officials agreed that the government will need as much as $15 billion of additional financing over the next three years, daily Sabah reported on Friday, without saying how it got the information.

More than $20 billion in debts to the Fund come due over the same period, meaning Turkey ``will end up paying about $3 billion to the IMF per year, which is mana! geable,'' said Tolga Ediz, an economist at Lehman Brothers in London, in an e-mailed note to investors.

Bonds Rally

Turkish bonds and the lira rose on optimism that a new IMF accord will maintain budget discipline. Yields on the benchmark security maturing in December 2005 fell about 0.8 percentage point to a three-month low of 25.4 percent as of 10:45 a.m. in Istanbul. The lira added 0.5 percent to 1,446,500 per dollar.

The Fund stepped up lending to Turkey as the economy suffered its worst recession for half a century in 2001, raising concern about the government's ability to repay debt. Fund-backed programs have required Turkey to post a budget surplus, excluding interest payments, equal to 6.5 percent of economic output for the past three years.

Many members of the governing Justice and Development Party oppose a new agreement with the IMF, Sabah said. By becoming a net repayer to the IMF the government can at least bring forward the date when it's no longer dependent on the Fund, said Ozgur Altug, an economist ! at Raymond James Securities in Istanbul.

``The government is trying to get rid of the IMF, so somehow they have to get rid of the obligation to the IMF,'' Altug said.

Borrowing Target

The Treasury may exceed its $5 billion target for borrowing from international capital markets this year, in order to hoard funds for debt repayments next year when borrowing conditions may be less favorable, Altug said.

Turkey has also pledged to sell state assets under the IMF program to help reduce the debt burden. The government probably won't count on revenue from such sources to close the financing gap because key asset sales have been held up by legal objections in the past, economists said.

The government has said it will announce details of its new three-year economic program later this year, and finalize the IMF arrangement next month. The new plan will have a ``stronger social dimension,'' Economy Minister Ali Babacan has said.

The Fund prob! ably will require ``serious measures to reduce the deficit in the soci al security system and make Turkish people pay their direct taxes'' as a condition for supporting the new program, said Baturalp Candemir, chief economist at HC Istanbul Securities.

Turkey's social security system posted a deficit of $7.4 billion in 2002 as spending on health care and pensions exceeded contributions. The government has already pledged measures to close the gap.

Widespread evasion of income tax has forced Turkey to increase indirect taxes on items such as gasoline, cigarettes and mobile phone calls when it needs more revenue.

5. - The Jerusalem Post - "Palestinian betrayal of the Kurds":

10 August 2004 / by Alan Dershowitz*

I have a testing question for those who single out Israel for condemnation because of its occupation and who champion the establishment of a Palestinian state: Where do you stand on the occupation of Kurdistan and on the Kurdish demand for an independent state in their ancestral land of Kurdistan?

I can tell you where the Palestinians themselves stand. Their leadership is adamantly opposed to the Kurdish efforts to end their occupation and establish their state. The Palestinians support the occupiers, namely Syria, Turkey and Iraq, and they always have.

This should not surprise anyone, since Yasser Arafat was the first to congratulate the Chinese government "on behalf of the Palestinian people" for its brutality in putting down the demonstration and killing the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989.

Moreover, Arafat has presided over a regime that punishes dissent by murder. Forget about due process. The Palestinian leadership does not support human rights, only the rights of those Palestinians who blindly support the destructive Arafat agenda.

But where is the United Nations, the Presbyterian church, the anti-Zionist hard Left, the European community, Nelson Mandela, Ralph Nader and the others who shed crocodile tears only for the oppressed Palestinians?

Their silence with regard to the Kurds is deafening.

Is it possible that some of these groups and leaders are focused less on the oppressed and more on their alleged oppressors?

They pretend to care about the Palestinians only because it is Israel that is accused of oppressing them. They don’t give a collective darn about the Kurds, because they are being oppressed by Arab and Muslim nations, just as they don’t seem to care about the Tibetans, who are being occupied and oppressed by China, or the Chechens, who are being abused by the Russians. Nor did they care about the Palestinians during all the years the West Bank was occupied by Jordan and the Gaza Strip by Egypt.

THE CASE for ending the occupation of Kurdistan and establishing an independent Kurdish state is at least as strong, and in many ways stronger, than the case for ending the occupation of the West Bank and establishing a Palestinian state. (The occupation of Gaza will soon be ended.) There already is one state with a Palestinian majority – Jordan – whereas the Kurds are not a majority in any nation, despite the fact that there are many more Kurds than Palestinians.

The Kurds have suffered far more than the Palestinians, as many as 100,000 of them being gassed by Saddam Hussein while the world stood idly by.

The Kurds have been promised a state since the end of World War I, when Woodrow Wilson made such a commitment and the treaty of Sevres said they could have a state if a majority of Kurds supported statehood.

The Palestinians, on the other hand, have repeatedly rejected offers of statehood, first in 1937, then in 1947 and, most recently, in 2001-2004 at Camp David and Taba. Most Palestinians, according to recent poll, would not be satisfied with a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. They want to see the destruction of the Jewish state of Israel.

The Kurds, on the other hand, are not seeking the destruction of any existing state, only their own independence on their own land.

I support the end of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and the establishment of a peaceful, prosperous, democratic, Palestinian state in those areas (with some minor territorial adjustments consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 242). Most Israelis support the two-state resolution, so long as their security can be assured.

Why, then, do all Arab nations, the Palestinian leadership and many supporters of Palestinian statehood so vehemently oppose the legitimate claims of the Kurdish people?

Is it because the Kurds have not resorted to large-scale international terrorism despite the long-term occupation of their lands and the oppression of their people? Is it because those who occupy and oppress the Kurds have access to oil and Israel does not? Or is it because the occupiers and oppressors of the Kurds are Arabs and Muslims, whereas Israel is a Jewish state?

Whatever the answers to these questions, one point is clear: There is no legitimate basis for opposing the end of the occupation of Kurdistan and the establishment of a Kurdish democracy, while supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state.

The burden of justification is on those who claim to base their decisions on high moral grounds to distinguish the two cases. If they cannot, then they stand accused of applying a double standard to the Jewish nation.

All people who favor a single standard of human rights are waiting for an answer.

Don’t hold your breath.

* The writer is a professor of law at Harvard University.

6. - The New York Times - "Books: A Blizzard of Contradictions in Modern Turkey":

10 August 2004 / by Richard Eder

In his last novel, "My Name is Red," the great and almost irresistibly beguiling Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk devised a breathtaking image for the schism in his country's soul between Westernization and the traditional values of Islam.

Set in the 16th century, "Red" presents the schism as the incursion of Renaissance painting - representational, three-dimensional and with an individualist vision - into the sultan's court. There the flat, stylized and impersonal grace of the traditional miniaturists is upheld as a matter of religion; and Western perspective is abhorred, since, for instance, it could make a nearby dog bigger than a far-off mosque.

The implications go way beyond art. In Mr. Pamuk's pyrotechnics of mystery, murders, eroticism and glittering colors, art is war and civil war among humanity's embattled religious and historical values.

"Snow," translated from Turkish by Maureen Freely, deals with the same schism but its setting is political. It is a novel of lesser scope than its grand and magical predecessor and more narrowly focused, although it is enriched by the author's same mesmerizing mixes: cruelty and farce, poetry and violence, and a voice whose timbres range from a storyteller's playfulness to the dark torment of an explorer, lost. All this finds voices through characters whose tactile immediacy fades imperceptibly into a fog of ambiguousness and contradiction.

Often we don't know where we are, only to realize that this is exactly where we are: in Mr. Pamuk's vision of a Turkey unable to know itself. The fight has gone on too long and run too deep: a schism not of two distinct sides but of two sides existing within a single consciousness, one that is both the nation's and the author's. Educated abroad, trained in Western literature and culture, he is caught in the entwined roots of tradition and modernity, each choking the other.

Culturally and politically Mr. Pamuk is a Westerner, but he is shattered to see his beliefs embodied in the methods used by the heirs of Kemal Ataturk who, grown dictatorial and often corrupt, have tried to force their secular code upon a vast Islam-bred rural and urban underclass (no turbans, fezzes or head scarves). In an epigraph he quotes Dostoyevsky's sardonic rendering of Russia's own modernizers: "Well, then, eliminate the people, curtail them, force them to be silent. Because the European enlightenment is more important than people."

Ka, the protagonist of "Snow," could not bear the consequences if the popular will turned out to be fundamentalist. He is not so much the author's alter ego as his emissary to the wilder, zanier shores of a dilemma that by now is more than his own and Turkey's. It shows itself these days in a number of countries, including the one where the United States has engaged itself so chaotically. Trying to democratize, that is, yet most likely unwilling to accept the likely failure that would follow an unlikely success.

A blocked poet and onetime radical, Ka returns from Germany after 12 years' exile to get back in touch with his country. A newspaper assignment takes him to a town near the Georgian border to investigate a rumor, mostly exaggerated, about a wave of schoolgirls who killed themselves when ordered to remove their head scarves.

In his picaresque wanderings through the streets, symbolically blurred and isolated under a weeklong blizzard, he goes from one encounter to the next. Some are sinister, some alluring, some surreal. A dog, a charcoal-colored match for the German overcoat Ka proudly wears, persists in following him around as if to mock his Westernizing vanity. Each meeting is a dissonance, a clue to a puzzle he can't make out.

He finds a vicious paramilitary killer who claims to be upholding Ka's own civilized values against the prospect of a Turkish Iran. There is an old Communist who tolerates a daughter's head scarf as a rebellion against the establishment, and a newspaper editor who publishes as past events those that are still to take place. And - partly a magical-realist touch and partly an acid satire on the press - publication seems to make them take place.

Ka is moved to anguish by Necip, a young fundamentalist of surpassing sweetness who is afraid he will lose his faith (though he's killed before he can). He is chilled and infuriated by Blue, a lethal yet childlike underground activist.

Most extravagantly, and it is the novel's garish, extended climax, he becomes involved with Sunay, a theater impresario and former leftist who now seems to work on behalf of the military ultras pledged to the secular Ataturk tradition. Sunay organizes a crude anti-Islamic vaudeville that incites a near-riot. This provides the excuse for the local army garrison to mount a minicoup and arrest, torture or kill Islamists and Kurds. Controlling it all, the impresario glories in having achieved a supreme work of art, one whose dramatic culmination will be his own death onstage.

Art, its vanities and its detachment from consequences, is one of the author's targets. But what marks Mr. Pamuk and his targets is that he stands alongside them to receive his own lethal arrows. And he does it with odd gaiety and compassion.

Ka wanders through the town's murderous chaos receiving tidy inspiration and producing 19 poems of exactly 36 lines each. He is a fool of time, but his creator is tender and funny with his fools. Ka is doomed finally to betray, and so is the marvelous woman he has a besotted and arousingly depicted affair with; each in a different way is an innocent.

Even the symbols get affectionate treatment. Cutting off the town, the blizzard may stand for the isolation from any universal truth or value; one that history seemingly requires by history while it conducts its contorted affairs. The snow, though, is of surpassing beauty and hauntingly rendered. For Mr. Pamuk beauty does not redeem the tragic horrors begotten by human passions and obstinate memory. Neither do the horrors diminish it.