20
April 2004
2. "The Case for Partitioning Iraq", The most commonly espoused partition plan calls for a three-way partition of the state formerly known as Iraq, a "Kurdistan" in the north, a "Shiastan" in the south, and a "Sunnistan" in between.
3. "What does France want?", Barnier on the one hand said that the EU shouldn’t turn its back to Turkey, but on the other hand stated that Turkey, under ‘today’s circumstances,’ can’t join the EU.
4. "Turkey, Cyprus: Army warns of ‘serious problems’", The Turkish army has refused to take sides on a UN peace plan to reunify Cyprus, but warned last week there might be “serious problems” in implementing such a peace deal.
5. "EU regrets Greek Cypriot media snub ahead of key vote on peace deal", The European Commission expressed regret Monday that two Greek Cypriot television stations had declined to let EU enlargement commissioner Guenter Verheugen appear ahead of crucial referendums this week.
6. "Veteran Cyprus warrior faces final fight", In the 1950s Rauf Denktash founded TMT - a Turkish Cypriot paramilitary organisation committed to partitioning Cyprus and consolidating ties with Turkey.
1. - KurdishMedia - "Kurds cast wary eye southward":
They watch the violence elsewhere in Iraq and debate its impact
on their lives.
Sulaimaniyah / 19 April 2004
The Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) - By Sarhang Hama Ali
The people of Kurdistan daily watch the burning vehicles, clouds
of smoke and attendant violence in Iraq as would people in Manchester
or New York - via television screens.
While Kut is under siege by radical cleric Muqtada Sadr’s militia
and Fallujah descends into a hellish battle zone, the residents of
Sulaimaniyah flock by the thousands to grassy green mountain slopes
to picnic and dance among spring wild flowers.
Along crowded city streets internet cafes are packed, while families
cruise glittering new supermarkets and stop off afterward at McDonald’s
for pizza.
Students clad in blue jeans hang out and smoke cigarettes between
classes on university campuses just like students anywhere else in
the world.
Free from Baathist loyalists and radical Shia clerics, this region’s
mostly pro-US Sunni Muslim Kurds watch events play out in central
and southern Iraq as passive observers.
Though distant onlookers, Kurds worry about the implications of the
violence for them and for their compatriots.
"Although we are Kurds, we are also Iraqis," said Hemin
Mustafa, 24, a policeman on the Sulaimaniyah University campus. "A
deteriorating security situation impacts every Iraqi."
A student on campus agrees. "I would like to see the same security
throughout the rest of Iraq as we have in Kurdistan," said Azad
Shukri, 23. "The worse the security situation, the longer it
will take the country to stabilise."
Some people would rather see the Kurds keep at arm’s length from
Arab Iraq. "Linking ourselves to the rest of Iraq will be bad
for us," said another student, Dashne Shamal, 24.
But others know they are unavoidably connected to the rest of the
country.
Businessmen, who often rely on obtaining products from outside of
Kurdistan, are concerned about the possible implications for their
businesses.
"As long as the security situation is bad in Iraq, the economy
will be affected negatively," said a cigarette seller who purchases
his products in Baghdad. He worries that he will not be able to continue
buying from the capital if conditions do not improve.
Some recognise the closer affinity between the Kurds and the US than
the Kurds and the rest of Iraq.
"The Kurds feel a stronger alliance with the United States than
with the Arabs of Iraq," said lecturer Soran Fawzi, 36.
Civil servant, Amanj Kareem, 26, agrees and goes a step further, "Every
time an American gets killed, I say I wish it was an Iraqi."
But Fawzi worries that the alliance with the US and the growing opposition
to the American presence could create resentment among Iraqi Arabs
toward the Kurds.
"The peaceful situation of Kurdistan could anger the Arabs in
the central and south," Fawzi said.
Sulaimanians either fear or hope the violence will prompt the US to
leave Iraq altogether.
Most think the American military is needed until the situation stabilises.
"A bad security situation could change the American plans for
Iraq, if things get out of control," observed Chunur Mohammed,
27, a worker at a publishing house, who wants the US to stay until
the country stabilises.
But a minority want the occupation to end and the Americans to go.
"The current situation is positive," said teacher Jamal
Marouf, 30. "Because it shows us the reality and how much Iraqis
are against American occupation."
Seemingly aware of his unpopular position, he hastens to add that
he is not siding with the Islamists, but just opposes any foreign
military presence in the country.
Sarhang Hama Ali is the editor-in-chief of the youth-oriented newspaper,
Liberal Education, in Sulaimaniyah. 
2.
- Tech Central Station - "The Case for Partitioning Iraq":
By Carroll Andrew Morse / 20 April 2004
Partitioning Iraq after June 30 deserves serious consideration. Usually,
the argument in favor of partition is very pragmatic. Many of the
worst cases of recent, organized violence -- Rwanda, Serbia, Chechnya,
etc. -- had their roots in different ethnic populations forced to
live together within a single state. The argument that we can head
off some future campaign of ethnic cleansing by not forcing the Sunnis,
the Shiites and the Kurds of Iraq to live together in the first place
should not be lightly dismissed. There are other arguments supporting
partition, however, that must be considered by a world that claims
to take ideas like freedom and democracy seriously.
The most commonly espoused partition plan calls for a three-way partition of the state formerly known as Iraq, a "Kurdistan" in the north, a "Shiastan" in the south, and a "Sunnistan" in between. This article proposes something different. Neither the American-led coalition, nor even the larger international community should determine the borders of a set of Iraqi successor states. The people of Iraq should be the ones to decide where partition lines are drawn. The people of Iraq should be the ones to decide if partition lines need to be drawn at all.
Here is the plan. Sovereignty will not come to Iraq all at once. On June 30, Iraq will be divided into provinces, or occupation zones -- at different times and different places, both labels will be appropriate. There will be more than three zones, there will be at least 25, maybe as many as 100. Each zone will evolve towards civil government at its own rate. Some zones will need to be overseen using the rules of outright military occupation of a hostile nation. Other zones will be able to quickly establish full home rule, complete civil government in all matters except foreign policy and military affairs. Over six months, let's see how many zones can produce a local government that can rule without slaughtering a significant percentage of its own population, or stoning women for committing adultery, or burning the foreign nationals providing electricity and water.
Zones demonstrating the ability to live peacefully will be migrated
towards full home rule. When enough provinces reach complete home
rule, they will have important decisions to make. If enough zones
decided to band together, they can form a state of their own. (There
will have to be a few basic rules about a minimum number of provinces,
or a minimum total population, and/or territorial contiguousness required
to form a state.) They are free to welcome into their state other
provinces that reach full home rule at a future time. Multi-province
successor states may even reserve the right to join with other multi-province
successor states. Under this plan, the Iraqi people ultimately decide
the shape of post-Hussein Iraq.
Partition by Popular Sovereignty
This plan -- partition by popular sovereignty -- corrects the American-led coalition's error of trying to impose democracy from the top down. Democracy is more than just an institutional and procedural framework -- the framework is a means to an end. People band themselves together into states to do things they cannot do alone. They agree to make individual sacrifices so that the group, as a whole, will be better off. Democracy helps insure that the actions undertaken in the name of the group do not abuse the individual too much. Are the people of post-Hussein Iraq ready and willing to band themselves together in this manner? Is an Iraqi Kurd willing to sacrifice some of his or her autonomy to help an Iraqi Sunni build reasonable civil structures? If an outside threat were to come from the direction of Iran, will an Iraqi Shiite defend the life and liberty of fellow Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis, or join the cause of the Iranian invaders?
I do not know the answer to these questions, and I do not think that anyone really does. I do know that fast-forwarding to the assumption of one-state-at-any-price has stifled addressing these questions, both inside and outside of Iraq. If the would-be leaders of Iraq -- Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd -- are not making a convincing case about what the average Iraqi gets from a single state, other than the argument of "that's the way it's been for the last eighty years", then who is anyone outside of Iraq to demand that they be forced to live together? If Ayatollah Sistani cannot make a convincing case why the Shiite regions of Iraq should be linked to the Sunni and Kurdish regions -- what all sides get from the deal -- then why should they be linked? And if the Iraqi people of a place like Fallujah would rather kill Americans than work on building civil government, need anyone take their demands for control of civil government seriously? But why should their actions hold up the Kurds from governing themselves if they show themselves ready to run a civil, stable state?
The people of post-Hussein Iraq should be given maximum flexibility to ask these questions, and to make the best arrangements they can after they hear the answers. Without knowing how much of the Iraqi population is really willing to place loyalty to all of the people of Iraq above ethnic, tribal, or clan loyalty, neither the American-led coalition nor the wider international community should force individuals into a dangerously unstable governmental arrangement.
The dialogue, unfortunately, does not seem to be happening. The ironclad guarantee that there will be a single Iraq makes violent obstructionism an effective alternative to dialogue, hampering this necessary debate. Those with limited ability to persuade but great will to harm believe they can violently rout their opponents and prevail. In the one-state-at-any-price scenario, they may be correct. In the one-state-at-any-price scenario, they do not need to win, they just need to be the strongest faction standing amidst the chaos they create. To thwart the Machiavellian efficiency of this strategy, the outside world must make it clear that there will be no winner by default. If there is no broad agreement on how to form a single Iraqi state, there will be no single Iraqi state.
Partition via popular sovereignty provides the peaceful, silent majority
an option for responding to violent and radical factions who do not
want to see an Iraq governed for the benefit of all Iraqis. The short-term
benefits that come from the local establishment of civil order are
efficiently leveraged into a long-term advantage. Peaceful Iraqis
can band together to protect themselves against radical militias and
then freely, openly, and legitimately seek allies outside of Iraq
who will help them grow. They can erect their own formal defenses
against areas dominated by leaders who seek control rather than compromise.
Leaders of the future Iraq -- or its successor states -- who cannot
count on having a state handed to them must work towards persuasive
unification as least as hard as they work towards violent domination.
Covering Popular Sovereignty
Now, perhaps the above description places too much blame on the contemporary Iraqi leadership. Perhaps the voices of Iraqi leaders who honestly seek to unify are drowned out by the violence of the extremists. One advantage of partition by popular sovereignty is its ability to amplify the voices of the unifiers.
To date, the American level of international civic and media engagement has not been up to the task of garnering relevant information about whether viable democratic leaders are emerging in Iraq. The American public has experienced the international version of basing decisions about municipal government solely on the reports of four-alarm fires and muggings and shootings that are reported during the local eleven o'clock news. In local politics, however, we have direct contact with the good that the city does, even if the news reports only the bad.
With respect to Iraq, remote in space, with primary information in a language that most Americans do not understand, there is very limited contact with the good. The public is almost entirely dependent on either major media or government reports, and both of these sources have failed to provide the American public with a coherent narrative. The American public, ultimately in control of the American military, ultimately charged with making some weighty decisions about whether to stay or go, is unable to get reliable information about whether there is reasonable hope for a peaceful future.
Announcing a plan of partition by popular sovereignty would immediately change this. The story of Iraq would no longer be one of strange foreigners living in chaos punctuated by mass outbreaks of violence. The story of Iraq would become a horse race story -- a narrative structure ideally suited to American media coverage.
On the nightly news and during State Department and Pentagon briefings, presenters would show a big colored map of Iraq, showing provinces with full home rule in blue, provinces mired in military occupation in red, and a few pastels for the provinces in between. Questions now nebulous would become more concrete. Is progress towards civil democracy being made? Compare the map now to the map a year ago. Are more regions moving towards full home rule? We must be doing some good in those regions. Are the regions in full home rule -- or conversely, the regions stuck in military occupation -- all in one particular region? Maybe those regions need to be broken away. Ultimately, the American public gets a better information structure to help its decision-making.
The "sophisticated" international community will, of course, howl at the suggestion of partition by popular sovereignty. The international community prefers that international borders stay static, regardless of the consequences. Perhaps the "sophisticated" international community prefers the one-state-at-any-price option because it allows potential future conflicts -- conflicts all too tragically foreseeable -- to be defined as internal matters. As the "sophisticated" international community has shown time and time again, even the most brutal organized violence can be ignored, so long as it is an internal matter. Ten years after Rwanda, the international community should be "sophisticated" enough to offer the people of Iraq something more than a promise that they will not be victims of ethnic violence unless it is violence perpetrated by legal residents of their home state.
Unless they freely choose to do so, people with wildly different
visions of ideal governance should not be forced to work together
because of eighty-year old map lines hastily drawn by colonial interlopers.
The American coalition and the wider international community should
give the people of Iraq an opportunity to build civil societies under
the conditions where there is a fighting chance for success. A single
state solution is not necessary for a peaceful and prosperous future
for the people of post-Hussein Iraq. Democratic processes provide
no guarantee that the people of Iraq will avoid bad choices, but they
can be structured so that the poor choices of some do not scar the
futures of all.
3. - Miliyet - "What does France want?":
by Sami Kohen / 20 April
Every fresh news report or statement from France is confusing. What is France’s view on Turkey’s European Union membership now? Is there any change in Paris’ support? The statement of new French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier made France’s official stance clearer, but failed to dispel doubts. Barnier on the one hand said that the EU shouldn’t turn its back to Turkey, but on the other hand stated that Turkey, under ‘today’s circumstances,’ can’t join the EU.
We have to consider the following elements in evaluating France’s
current stance: Giving Ankara a date for EU accession talks and Turkey’s
EU membership are two different issues. French officials, including
Barnier, haven’t said anything against giving a date for Turkey’s
accession talks.
They specify that they will decide together with other members in
light of this fall’s European Commission report. French President
Jacques Chirac, who prefers not to talk about the issue due to domestic
political concerns, will decide in December, most probably after conferring
with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. And if the report is positive,
the decision will be in favor of giving Ankara a date for accession
talks…
Turning to the issue of membership, Barnier and many other French officials don’t expect Turkey’s EU membership ‘under today’s conditions’ or are against such a decision. However, the process beginning with the accession talks with an eye to membership will be quite long (this process was 10 years for Spain and Portugal and seven for Greece). Why does Barnier then insist on saying that Turkey can’t become an EU member ‘under today’s circumstances’? There are domestic political concerns at this point. The ‘Turkish question’ is on the agenda of this June’s European Parliament elections. Extreme left- and right-wing parties are against Turkey’s EU membership. There are various reasons for this: Some are anxious about the membership of a ‘Muslim country’ like Turkey, and some are worried about Turkey’s ‘huge population’ shaking Europe’s stability… Consequently, the right wing in France doesn’t favor Turkey’s EU membership and is pressuring the government, which is center-right. But Chirac prefers to shy from these disputes and not to talk before the June elections…
Turkey should take a nuanced policy at this point. France is an important
country both for its position in the EU and its relations with Ankara.
Bilateral relations are going well. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
is set to visit Chirac in Paris this July. Being skeptical about France
or acting in a way that would put Chirac in a difficult position would
be counterproductive. French authorities should be given time to take
a more
positive stance…”
4. - Monday Morning (Lebanon, weekly) - "Turkey, Cyprus: Army warns of ‘serious problems’":
19 April 2004
The Turkish army has refused to take sides on a UN peace plan to
reunify Cyprus, but warned last week there might be “serious
problems” in implementing such a peace deal.
“If we look at the whole plan, we can say that beside positive
aspects, it does not meet some of our demands and there is the possibility
of serious problems emerging during its implementation”, the
chief of staff, General Hilmi Ozkok, told a rare press conference.
His remarks were the first official reaction from the military --
which wields significant influence in Turkish politics -- to the UN
blueprint aimed at ending the island’s 30 year division before
it joins the European Union on May 1.
But Ozkok refused to take a stand on the plan, which will be voted
on in separate but simultaneous referenda in both the Turkish and
Greek Cypriot sectors of the island on April 24. “We cannot say
yes or no to the plan. It would not be an appropriate answer”,
he said.
Speaking about the disadvantages of the plan, the general pointed
to the risk that the European Union might fail to permanently guarantee
some of the provisions of the settlement scheme -- a key demand of
Turkey and Turkish Cypriots.
“We believe these must be secured, otherwise there could be great
difficulties for the continuation of the Turkish [Cypriot] presence
and, as a result, great stability and security problems could emerge
in the region”, he cautioned.
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots want permanent exemptions from EU
principles on the free movement of people and capital, fearing that
otherwise the populous and prosperous Greek Cypriots could one day
swamp the Turkish Cypriot minority, both politically and economically.
The UN plan limits the ability of Greek Cypriots to settle, invest
and buy property in the Turkish North, but EU officials have said
those measures can only be temporarily exempted from basic EU law.
The uncertainty over EU derogations has been raised by both the hawkish
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash -- who rejects the UN plan --
and Turkey’s National Security Council, a top policy-making body
which brings together the country’s civilian and military leadership.
The Turkish government has also admitted there is a risk of not getting
EU guarantees, but it has nonetheless backed the peace plan.
Ozkok, meanwhile welcomed the UN blueprint for allowing Turkey to
have a permanent military presence on the island, which he said played
a “strategic role” in the country’s security.
Turkey keeps some 30,000 soldiers in Northern Cyprus since it invaded
and occupied the island’s northern third in 1974 in response
to an Athens-engineered coup aimed at uniting Cyprus with Greece.
Under the UN peace plan, two guarantor states for the island, Turkey
and Greece, will keep 650 and 950 soldiers respectively.
Nonetheless, the general noted that the final decision on the plan
lay with the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Parliament, which will
approve the result of the April 24 referendum.
“The referendum train has left the station and is moving fast...What
is important is to prepare the atmosphere for the Turkish Cypriots
to take the best decision on their own free will and without any pressure”,
he said. If Cyprus -- split along ethnic lines since 1974 -- is not
reunified by May 1, only the internationally-recognized Greek Cypriot
South of the island will join the European Union while the breakaway
Turkish Cypriots will be left out.
5. - AFP - "EU regrets Greek Cypriot media snub ahead of key vote on peace deal":
19 April 2004
The European Commission expressed regret Monday that two Greek Cypriot television stations had declined to let EU enlargement commissioner Guenter Verheugen appear ahead of crucial referendums this week.
The EU executive arm called the decisions "odd", saying that Brussels simply wanted to explain its position ahead of the April 24 votes among Greek and Turkish Cypriots on a UN plan to reunify the divided Mediterranean island.
"We are told that this is an interference in the public debate in Cyprus," said Verheugen's spokesman Jean-Christophe Filori, but "our intention is not all to influence in any way, or to campaign. Our intention is to explain.
"We were told that this is not possible, so we found it quite odd. Of course (this is a) situation that we regret."
The EU commission did not name the two offending broadcasters but Greek Cypriot officials identified them as the state-controlled Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CyBC) and Greek-owned private broadcaster Antenna.
Both denied the commission's charge that they had deliberately snubbed Verheugen.
"There was never an official proposal to CyBC for such an interview," the state broadcaster said.
"We always carry Verheugen statements in full. On this occasion we were not informed in a timely enough fashion to rearrange programmes," said a statement from Antenna.
It was the second time that a foreign official had been excluded from the air waves amid growing resentment among Greek Cypriots at the huge international pressure for them to say "yes" to the UN peace plan.
On Friday, UN Cyprus envoy Alvaro de Soto was reportedly told by the state broadcaster that he was no longer welcome to take part in a discussion programme to be aired this week.
Government spokesman Kypros Chrysostomides distanced the Greek Cypriot leadership from that decision, saying any move to exclude foreign dignitaries from speaking out in the run-up to Saturday's vote was a matter for the CyBC board.
Monday's statement from the state broadcaster made no explicit reference to air time for overseas officials, saying only that it would "give absolute priority to informing the public on the basic issues related to the referendum."
US Secretary of State Colin Powell did appear on two Greek Cypriot channels -- Antenna and private rival MEGA -- to urge a "yes" vote over the weekend.
Opinion polls have suggested that the UN plan may well be rejected by Greek Cypriots -- although one recent survey showed opposition falling from 71 percent to 54 percent -- after President Tassos Papadopoulos came out against it.
The EU is watching the referendums closely. If either community rejects the peace plan brokered by UN chief Kofi Annan, the internationally recognized Greek Cypriot side alone will be admitted to the European Union on May 1.
The commission spokesman stressed that the EU did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of Cyprus, but added that that did not mean EU or UN officials should not be heard.
"It is clear that the Cyprus voters will be the only ones to vote. But there are implications for others here," Filori said.
"The possibility should be left maybe also to the representatives of the EU and the UN to explain the implications of the Annan plan."
The government-appointed EU harmonisation coordinator, Takis Hadjidemetriou, resigned Monday, slamming the Greek Cypriot leadership's opposition to the blueprint.
Cyprus has been divided since 1974 when Turkey occupied its northern
third in response to a Greek Cypriot coup aimed at uniting the island
with Greece.
6. - BBC - "Veteran Cyprus warrior faces final fight":
Nicosia / 20 April 2004 / By Tabitha Morgan
Rauf Denktash may be about to see his lifelong ambition fulfilled.
The octogenarian Turkish Cypriot leader has devoted his political
career to creating a separate state for his people in Northern Cyprus.
The irony is that the new state would be delivered courtesy of the
Greek Cypriots.
And in the process Mr Denktash's own leadership could come to an end.
On 24 April, Greek and Turkish Cypriots will vote on whether or not
to accept the UN's latest plan for the reunification of their island.
The indications are that the Greek Cypriots will vote against it,
thus consolidating the island's partition.
Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, seem likely to ignore the advice
of Mr Denktash and vote in favour of a deal.
If that happens, Mr Denktash has said he will resign.
It would be the end of a career in politics that has spanned no less
than seven decades.
Back in 1948, when Cyprus was a British colony, the young Rauf Denktash
- a newly-qualified barrister from Lincoln's Inn in London - was a
member of the island's short-lived Consultative Council.
Since then he has never been out of the public eye.
During the 1950s, when Greek Cypriots took up arms against the British
in the Eoka campaign for independence, Mr Denktash was a prominent
prosecution lawyer.
Paramilitary leader
His courtroom adversary - more often than not - was Glafcos Clerides,
later to become president of the Cyprus Republic.
The two men have known each other since childhood. They went on to
re-enact their courtroom sparring across successive negotiating tables
during lengthy but fruitless discussions on re-uniting Cyprus.
As a young boy, one of Rauf Denktash's ambitions was to become a vet,
or failing that, a pilot.
In the event he followed his father's path into law, and then into
politics.
In the 1950s, when the Eoka campaign was at its height, Mr Denktash
founded TMT - a Turkish Cypriot paramilitary organisation committed
to partitioning Cyprus and consolidating ties with Turkey.
In the process he established strong personal links with the Turkish
"motherland" which were to underpin his entire political
career.
Since the political upheaval of the early 1960s, when violence broke
out between the island's two communities, Rauf Denktash has been a
permanent fixture of Turkish Cypriot public life.
Stubborn
His political stature amongst the Turkish Cypriot community was enhanced
in 1974, when Turkish troops invaded the North of the island in response
to a Greek-backed military coup.
The island was effectively partitioned. In 1983, Mr Denktash unilaterally
announced the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
Until recently, many Turkish Cypriots who feared a return to inter-communal
violence found his presence reassuring.
His stubbornness and indifference to international criticism, combined
with his substantial rotund physique to create a popular image of
an avuncular father of the people.
But increasing numbers of Turkish Cypriots believe he is out of step
with the times - particularly those born after 1974, with no memory
of the inter-communal clashes of the 50s and 60s.
"He was around when my mother was a child, and when I was a child,"
said one unification supporter.
"The other day, my daughter who is now 16, asked if he will still
be president when her children are born. It seems as if he will never
go away."
But more damaging to Mr Denktash's political future is that he now
finds himself publicly at odds with the Turkish leadership, which
is keen to see Cyprus reunited in order to advance its own bid for
EU membership.
Generals cautious
The veteran politician continues to enjoy considerable popular support
in Turkey, particularly in Anatolia.
But his enduring alliance with the powerful Turkish military, which
until now has been crucial to his continuing political survival, is
less secure.
For the moment, at least the balance of power on Turkey's secretive
National Security Council appears to favour those generals who cautiously
support Turkey's progress towards EU membership.
While the army's public support for Mr Denktash remains undiminished,
its emerging pro-European policy is clearly at odds with his nationalist
stance and his refusal to accept the UN's plan for re-unification.
If, as seems likely, Greek Cypriots vote against the UN deal and Turkish
Cypriots vote in favour, Mr Denktash may yet see his unrecognised
state gradually accepted by the international community.
But if his own implacable opposition to reunification costs him both
popular support and the backing of the Turkish state, the veteran
leader could well find that his political career is finally at an
end.