18 July 2003

1. "Turkey to change into a federal state in four years", the republic of Turkey is to change into a federal system in four years, reported the PUK Anba Kurdistan online Arabic news service.

2. "U.S./Turkey: Relations Still Racked By Mutual Distrust Despite Attempts To Mend Fences", U.S. and Turkish officials have expressed regret over the recent detention of Turkish soldiers by U.S. troops in northern Iraq. But neither side has officially apologized for the incident, and mutual distrust continues to simmer between the two NATO allies.

3. "Denktash threatens to take Varosha - Athens and Nicosia blast him", Athens and Nicosia were scathing in their criticism of Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash yesterday after he warned that he would open to Turkish Cypriots the town of Varosha that has been deserted since Turkey’s invasion of the island in 1974 if the Greek Cypriots did not accept his proposal for the reopening of Nicosia’s airport.

4. "Is CHP uneasy about the EU?", Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal drew applause from this column recently by announcing that he would give the government full support on the European Union issue.

5. "Turkey: Power struggle between government and army", the tensions between the elected Turkish government headed by Recep Tayip Erdogan of the moderate Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the leadership of the Turkish army have now developed into an open power struggle. The generals are being spurred on by the US to act against the elected government.

6. "Taoiseach, Turkish leader in Ankara talks", the Taoiseach has held talks with the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in Ankara. Mr Ahern insisted that Turkish membership of the EU and a settlement of the Cyprus issue, where the international community regards Turkey as being in illegal occupation of the North of the island, are linked as political issues.

1. - KurdishMedia - "Turkey to change into a federal state in four years":

London / 17 July 2003 / by Bryar Mariwani

The republic of Turkey is to change into a federal system in four years, reported the PUK Anba Kurdistan online Arabic news service.

Quoting from a press conference of the leader of Turkey’s Work Party, Mr Dogu Perincek., the PUK Anba online adds: In a secret agreement with the USA, Turkey will change into a federal country in four years. The implication is that North Kurdistan will be a federal state within Turkey, with a system similar to the South Kurdistan.

According to PUK Anba online, the agreement also includes the withdrawal of the Turkish forces in south Kurdistan within four months.

Turkey is also not allowed to carry out operations against the PKK in south Kurdistan without the American approval.

The Turkish opposition leader revealed that the agreement consists of nine articles which is signed by the Turkish Prime Minister, Receb Teyib Erdogan and the Turkish foreign Minister, Abdulla Gul, PUK Anba adds.

2. - Radio Free Europe - "U.S./Turkey: Relations Still Racked By Mutual Distrust Despite Attempts To Mend Fences":

U.S. and Turkish officials have expressed regret over the recent detention of Turkish soldiers by U.S. troops in northern Iraq. But neither side has officially apologized for the incident, and mutual distrust continues to simmer between the two NATO allies.

PRAGUE / 17 July 2003 / by Jean-Christophe Peuch

It has been nearly two weeks since U.S. forces in northern Iraq briefly detained a group of Turkish soldiers, setting off a flurry of accusations and diplomatic activity between Washington and Ankara. But despite efforts on both sides to mend fences, relations between the NATO allies remain chilly.

On 15 July, Turkey's General Staff issued what was presented as a joint statement expressing regret over both the dispute and the "treatment Turkish soldiers faced in detention." The statement was not released in full, but only partially quoted by local media.

Although the Turkish initiative was presented as an attempt to patch up strained bilateral ties, the U.S. State Department reacted coolly and blamed Ankara for breaching an earlier agreement that no joint statement would be made public without Washington's notice.

In a subsequent effort to downplay the incident, however, Washington said the early release was merely the result of "lack of coordination" and eventually endorsed the statement. U.S. State Department Richard Boucher yesterday read out the joint communique at a regular press briefing.

"The U.S. noted Turkish concerns about American treatment of Turkish military personnel during the unfortunate incident. The Turkish side noted U.S. concerns about reported activities of Turkish personnel in northern Iraq. Both sides expressed regret that this incident occurred," Boucher said.

The statement was drafted after a joint military commission investigated the 4 July incident, in which U.S. troops arrested 11 members of Turkey's special forces in the northern Iraqi city of Al-Sulaymaniyah on suspicion of plotting to assassinate the Kurdish governor of Kirkuk. The detainees were brought to Baghdad for questioning and released after 60 hours.

This was at least the second such incident since the U.S.-led coalition launched its military campaign in Iraq. Three months ago (22 April), U.S. troops arrested a group of Turkish soldiers clad in civilian clothes who were escorting a cargo of weapons hidden in an aid convoy bound for Kirkuk. Both sides at the time agreed to hush up the incident.

Washington has provided no evidence to substantiate its claim that the 11 officers and noncommissioned officers arrested last week were plotting against the Kurdish administration of Kirkuk. Ankara has persistently denied the accusations.

Addressing lawmakers of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) on 15 July, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul described the detention of the Turkish soldiers as a "sad incident which should have never occurred between two allies."

"From our conclusions, it appears that a serious blunder was made," he said. "What has been debated [with the U.S. side] was a big mistake and, to prevent similar incidents from happening in the future, we've decided to set up some committees."

The Al-Sulaymaniyah incident triggered a firestorm in Turkey, with both the government and the opposition slamming the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush for his "unfriendly" treatment of a strategic regional ally.

Turkish media and politicians from both the left and right also criticized U.S. troops for handcuffing their prisoners and putting bags on their heads "as if they were Al-Qaeda terrorists." The heavy-handed treatment of Turkish soldiers was generally seen as humiliating in a country where the army is considered one of the pillars of society.

Following the release of the joint U.S.-Turkish statement, the leader of Turkey's opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) expressed regret that Washington had stopped short of formally apologizing for "wounding the honor of Turkey and its armed forces." Deniz Baykal also noted that neither side had offered any explanation for the detention and questioning of Turkish officers.

Pressed by reporters yesterday to comment on the absence of a U.S. apology, U.S. State Department spokesman Boucher was sparing in his response. "The joint statement expressed the joint conclusions, the joint sentiments, the joint feelings, the joint thoughts, and the joint appraisal of the situation, so I will stick exactly to that," he said. "That expresses everything there is to say about it at this point."

For Turkey and its powerful military, the incident is a bitter pill to swallow. In a bid to lessen the sting, Gul yesterday said U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had sent Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan a letter in which he reportedly expressed his respect for the Turkish military.

"It is, actually, an important letter," Gul said. "It expresses both the strategic importance of Turkish-U.S. relations and the respect felt for the Turkish armed forces. In addition, [Rumsfeld] expresses his regrets over the [4 July] incident."

Gul is due in Washington on 24 July to meet U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and other U.S. officials for talks on cooperation in Iraq.

Sources in both Ankara and Washington have said that the newly appointed head of U.S. Central Command, General John Abizaid, is tentatively scheduled to visit Turkey later this week ahead of a regional tour of the Persian Gulf area.

But beyond such conciliatory diplomacy, the war in Iraq has left a negative, and arguably durable, imprint on bilateral relations.

Ties between the two countries have been strained since early March, when the Turkish Grand National Assembly failed to approve a government motion authorizing the deployment of some 60,000 U.S. soldiers for military action against the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Denied access to Turkish territory, the Pentagon was forced to drop its plans to invade Iraq from the north, and instead redeployed its troops in Kuwait.

The end of the war has failed to alleviate the resentment between the two sides. The U.S. suspects Ankara of seeking to maintain influence in northern Iraq by using its small Turkic minority to stir up unrest in the predominantly Kurdish region. Turkey in turn fears the growing influence of Iraqi Kurds and that their privileged relationship with the U.S. might prompt its own Kurdish rebels to break a four-year-old cease-fire accord and resume their struggle for autonomy.

Despite Ankara's expectations, U.S. forces in Iraq have allowed Kurdish fighters to enter the oil-rich cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. Since then, Turkey's predominantly Kurdish southeast provinces have seen an upsurge of violence.

Only last week, members of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) killed four villagers near the southeastern city of Bingol. In a separate incident, PKK fighters ambushed a convoy carrying the governor of Tunceli Province and killed two Turkish soldiers.

War with the PKK -- which last year changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) -- has claimed an estimated 35,000 lives between 1984 and 1999. After being driven out of Turkey, PKK militants have spread across the region, settling in northern Iraq, Syria, and Iranian Kurdistan.

Turkey has traditionally maintained hundreds of troops in northern Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish separatists. Ankara now claims the U.S. has been in touch with the PKK since the lead-up to the war against Iraq and is now unwilling to crack down on the Marxist group although it officially considers it a terrorist organization.

Commenting on the 4 July arrest, Turkish Army Chief of Staff General Hilmi Ozkok said relations between his country and Washington were facing an unprecedented crisis. "From the very beginning, efforts have been made, both on the government and military levels -- especially between my American colleagues and myself -- to quickly resolve this incident. However, this event has, unfortunately, turned into the most serious crisis of confidence ever between Turkish and U.S. armed forces, and into a [real] crisis," he said.

But unlike Ozkok, most Turkish commentators believe the Al-Sulaymaniyah incident was simply the last straw and the natural result of U.S.-Turkish relations that had already turned sour as a result of the Iraq war.

"In the past, if a fight had broken out between [Iraqi] Kurds and Turkey, U.S. officials would have clearly stated their preference for Turkey. But now [these same officials] say it may no longer be the case," "Turkish Daily News" Editor in Chief Ilnur Cevik wrote yesterday.

Yet, if America's perception of Turkey has dramatically changed over the course of the war, the reverse is equally true. Graham Fuller, the former vice chairman of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's National Intelligence Council, wrote an opinion piece published in the 15 July "Los Angeles Times" stating Washington "is widely perceived in Turkey as a rogue actor with arrogant and hostile intentions toward basic Turkish national interests." He added that as a result, Ankara is in the process of reassessing the strategic importance of its ties with the United States.

3. - Kathimerini - "Denktash threatens to take Varosha - Athens and Nicosia blast him":

ATHENS / 17 July 2003

Athens and Nicosia were scathing in their criticism of Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash yesterday after he warned that he would open to Turkish Cypriots the town of Varosha that has been deserted since Turkey’s invasion of the island in 1974 if the Greek Cypriots did not accept his proposal for the reopening of Nicosia’s airport.

“Mr Denktash continues to be provocative and to act in an unacceptable manner,” Greek government spokesman Christos Protopappas said. “He continues these fruitless maneuvers which have no meaning and he drags simple Turkish-Cypriot citizens into his dead-end tactics, and he also imposes this tactic on the Turkish side,” he added. “This tactic of Denktash’s is dangerous for the true interests of the Turkish Cypriots and is dangerous for Turkey itself.”

The Cypriot government spokesman, Kypros Chrysostomides, declared that Denktash had displayed “boundless audacity.”

Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou said, “These are tactical moves and are not aimed at a real solution to the problem.”

Athens and Nicosia, as well as international mediators, are pushing Denktash to accept UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s proposals for a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. Denktash has refused to do so, proposing instead in a letter to Annan, which he made public last week, that Nicosia’s airport (also closed since 1974) and Varosha be opened.

Chrysostomides said the government would also like to see changes to Annan’s plan. “Accepting Annan’s plan as is reduces our side’s negotiating power,” he said. “We accept the Annan plan as the basis for negotiations and we see its improvement and amendment for the good of both communities,” he added. President Tassos Papadopoulos said on Tuesday that accepting the Annan plan as is would imply acceptance of the Turkish invasion and occupation, saying he would not be party to the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus.

This prompted a protest by Nikos Anastasiadis, president of Democratic Rally. “I am truly surprised,” he said. “And I am trying to follow... the line followed by the current government on this national problem.”

4. - Turkish Daily News - "Is CHP uneasy about the EU?":

18 July 2003 / by Mehmet Ali Birand

Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal drew applause from this column recently by announcing that he would give the government full support on the European Union issue.

However, more recent reports -- seen in the light of certain statements Baykal and his staff have made to the media -- have created an odd picture.

Since this is the party I voted for in the last election I cannot help but wonder. Is the party founded by Ataturk, is undergoing a change? Or are we getting an entirely wrong impression?

The CHP is the party that boasts about carrying Turkey forward, about being the party that has carried Ataturk's legacy from one generation to another. The CHP is the party "that has been charged with the task of elevating this country to the level of contemporary civilization." That is what we have been told, generation after generation. We saw Baykal in this light. What is happening now?

Baykal keeps complaining, saying, What is this? One harmonization with the EU bills package after another is being presented. The sixth package was more than enough. Where has the seventh package come from?

Baykal is one of the persons who would know best what changes Turkey must make exactly to achieve harmonization with the EU. Now that he adopts this stance does that mean that he considers the harmonization bills to be concessions being made to the EU -- just as Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), even Democratic Left Party (DSP), once did? I do not think so.

Then has he taken this particular stance merely to voice his opposition to the Justice and Development Party (AK Party)? Are CHP criticizing this drive for the sake of "doing politics"?

The Baykal we know is not a leader that confuses the country's long-term interests with the day-to-day games of domestic politics.

Baykal says that the harmonization packages have stemmed from "external pressures", that the balances in the country have been disrupted. He repeats these often, both behind closed doors and in public, using different words. Why have you not asked the military?

The last time he had a talk with Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul -- according to what is being said in Ankara's political circles -- he expressed his uneasiness about the planned changes in the composition of the National Security Council (MGK) especially. He reportedly said, referring to the proposed provisions that would limit the powers of that institution, "Why has the opinion of the military was not obtained?" His posing that question raises question marks indeed.

Yet, the government had announced that it had relayed the draft seventh package to the General Staff and that Gul was going to have a talk with Chief of Staff Gen. Ozkok.

I do not want to believe that the CHP can be upset by the EU project.

If the CHP is the party of the youth as it claims, a party that would carry our youngsters into the Turkey they hope for, then it cannot obstruct the EU project for the sake of "doing politics". On the contrary, it should grab the EU standard from the hands of the AK Party, become the standard-bearer itself.

A mistake has been done somewhere down the line. I cannot pinpoint where exactly.

It would not do to conduct an EU policy via the military

The seventh package would introduce extremely important chages concerning the MGK. To put it more correctly, the package would trim to a significant extent the powers with which the MGK general secretariat has been equipped in a extremely exaggerated manner, powers some of which never get used in practice anyway.
Naturally, this step has great symbolic significance.
The military are obviously upset by this. On the other hand they see that it is impossible for the MGK to be preserved in its present form. They view the developments a little emotionally and, at the same time, realistically.

The main problem stems from the civilians that roam among us, those civilians who adopt a harder line than do the military, that is, retired security figures such as retired soldiers, policemen, prosecutors and judges. They are trying to create the impression that:

Turkey can fall into the hands of Islamist fundamentalists any minute, can be split up by Kurdish nationalists. The military are the only guarantee. If we now trim the powers of the military we will be playing into the hands of these enemies of the homeland.

To create extra tension they spread lies. In the latest instance it was said that initially it was planned to leave the force commanders outside the MGK so that the chief of staff would be the only military official attending MGK meetings, but that, due to the objections raised by the military, the government dropped the plan (!) I have looked into this matter. It turns out that no one had even thought about leaving the force commanders outside the MGK.

The changes to be made regarding the MGK general secreteriat are not based on a reckoning between the AK Party and the military. It is time we destroyed the taboos in our minds. Rather than focusing on how not to change we should focus on how best we can change.

5. - World Socialist Website - "Turkey: Power struggle between government and army":

18 July 2003 / by Justus Leicht and Sinan Inkinci

The tensions between the elected Turkish government headed by Recep Tayip Erdogan of the moderate Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the leadership of the Turkish army have now developed into an open power struggle. The generals are being spurred on by the US to act against the elected government.

The AKP, which gained an overwhelming majority in the Turkish parliament in elections last November, had already openly been snubbed on April 23, the day of “national sovereignty.” The state president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, and the complete leadership of the army boycotted the traditional reception. The reason they gave was that Bülent Arinc of the AKP, the president of the Turkish parliament, was bringing his wife who would be wearing a headscarf at the event. The wearing of a headscarf at a state ceremony is regarded as a political symbol of Islamic fundamentalism.

One week later, a meeting of the National Security Council, which is dominated by the military, passed a resolution calling for “the highest possible awareness to protect the secular state.” The situation recalled the notorious one on February 28, 1997, when the military presented former prime minister Necemettin Erbakan with a similar ultimatum. A few months later, Erbakan was brought down in a “bloodless coup d’état.”

Only a few weeks after these incidents, US deputy secretary of defence Paul Wolfowitz came to Ankara, where he openly incited the army to act against the country’s elected representatives and demanded an apology from the Turkish parliament. On March 1, the parliament had decided that no American troops taking part in the Iraq war were to be stationed in Turkey. Wolfowitz declared: “For one reason or another they have not played the leading role on this issue that we would have expected of them.” He then went one step further: “In my opinion, it is especially appropriate with regard to their system when the military says it is in Turkish interests to support the US in its efforts.” The Turkish military has carried out a total of four putsches against the government over the last 40 years.

Under such extreme pressure, the AKP has continuously stressed that it is collaborating with the army in “complete harmony,” while at the same time attempting to restrict the powerful position held by the generals, which is laid down in the constitution established by the military regime in 1982. In this conflict, the AKP is counting on the European Union (EU), with which Turkey is currently negotiating membership. The government also knows it is backed by the majority of Turkish employers and especially the employers’ federation TÜSIAD. The EU has declared that a limitation of the “inappropriately large power” of the army is a prerequisite for negotiations over membership.

Similar to the former regime of Suharto in Indonesia, the Turkish military has implanted itself into Turkish society in the manner of an enormous parasite. The Security Institution for Members of the Military and the Foundation for the Strengthening of the Turkish Security Forces (TSKGV) are both declared to be “beneficial to the public” and are exempted from taxation. In reality, however, both have become large concerns with many branches, holding shares in many European and American companies including Goodyear, Mobil, Shell, Renault and Turkish Telecom. The army itself decides how high its budget should be while the minister of defence merely puts his initials to the army decision. Regarding most other important political spheres, the army has a formal right to participate in decisions, which in practice amounts to a right of veto.

The established media also support the government. The liberal newspaper Radikal, which is neither radical nor pro-Islamic, called on the AKP to carry on with reforms and disregard pressure coming from the military. Radikal, which belongs to the influential media company Dogan, recently also published a sensational interview, which was unambiguously directed against the military. A Kurd, who was quoted as being non-political, described how he was thrown into jail without reason following the military putsch in 1980. He then described the sadistic torture he had witnessed of his fellow prisoners.

He reported that most of those tortured, who had at first been non-political, later joined the Kurdish national guerrilla movement PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) after their release. The fact that this interview appeared in a respectable bourgeois newspaper amounts to an admission that the army’s brutality was at least partially responsible for the civil war in the Kurdish regions. During the last 15 years, about 35,000 people have been killed in this war. The article shows how intense the conflicts within the Turkish establishment itself have become.

Now a number of new laws and constitutional changes intend to limit the power of the army. The “6th EU-harmonisation package” has already been passed. And not only that, it was not presented to the National Security Council to be checked beforehand.

Although limited, it allows for the introduction of the Kurdish language in the media and states that in future no representatives of the military are to be sent into the media supervisory authority (RTÜK). The notorious eighth paragraph, which calls for “propaganda against national unity” to be punished with up to three years imprisonment, is to be abolished. The military leadership immediately registered a sharp protest. At the end of May, the chief of the general staff, Hilmi Özkök, pointedly refused to rule out the possibility of another military putsch similar to that of 1997. In the meantime, state president Sezer has used his right of veto against the abolition of paragraph 8, but he can be outvoted by a renewed vote in parliament. The reason given by Sezer was similar to that of the generals. He claimed that the existence of the Turkish state itself was in danger.

Another reform package to limit the power of the army even further is imminent. It includes a reform of the National Security Council, the military’s centre of political power. In future, the president and representatives of the government will have representation on the body, while the military will only be represented by the chief of the general staff and not, as before, by the heads of all the armed services. Furthermore, the secretary of the council is to be a civilian. The defence budget is to be put under the control of the government and the so-called State Security Courts are to be dismantled. It is not surprising that on June 26, during the last meeting of the National Security Council, the government and the generals could reach no agreement.

Parallel to the rapprochement with the EU, the AKP government is also attempting to improve its relations with the US. It was for this reason that the undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, Ugur Ziyal, travelled to Washington in the middle of June. There he supported the threats made by the US against Iran. A few days later, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül announced that all Turkish ports and airports would be available for “humanitarian relief actions.” According to Gül, this could also include foreign troops.

However, it has become apparent that all attempts to curry favour with the military are of little use. On June 30, the Turkish Daily News reported that the Bush administration had sent a note directly to the Turkish general staff. In this note, the US government “praised the contribution made by the Turkish military during the Iraq war” and “pointed out the significance of the Turkish armed forces.” At the same time, economic pressure was put on the AKP to translate the “structural reforms” demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) into action and attack the working population.

At the end of June, referring to “sources in the Bush administration,” the television news channel NTV-MSNBC reported that the AKP government was “deviating from the demands made in the IMF programme.” According to these sources, “the populist policies of the AKP” were also a reason for US concern, and resemble “a violation of the strict fiscal demands made by the IMF programme.”

On July 4, Turkish-American relations reached a new low. In a surprise attack, American troops rushed into Suleymania, a town in northern Iraq. There they occupied an office of the Turkish army, taking 11 Turkish officers and all domestic personnel prisoner and then wrecking the office equipment. Those arrested were accused of planning the assassination of a high Kurdish representative in Kirkuk, a town about 100 kilometres away. The Turkish government rejected the accusations, calling them absurd and demanded the immediate release of the prisoners as well as an apology by the US. As a countermeasure, it closed the border crossing point in Harbur where US-troops in northern Iraq are being supplied with fuel and other equipment.

In its conflict with the AKP government, the military has the support of the trade union bureaucracy of Türk Is (trade union umbrella organisation) and of parts of the Turkish “left.” Türk Is called on workers to regard themselves as “unarmed troops.”

In this context, one must recall that on February 28, 1997, Türk Is went along with the military and supported the intervention by the army that led to the removal of the government headed by the Islamic Refah (Party of Prosperity). Now the trade union leadership is going one step further and is offering its support in advance—before the military has even made an appeal to the “unarmed troops.” Shamelessly they discuss openly whether a “transitional regime” or even a military putsch is necessary in Turkey.

Türk Is has demonstrated its loyalty to the military in the cheapest manner. For years it has evaded the questions of privatisation and wages, but during the demonstrations against the new labour law on May 17, it utilised these questions to gain more influence among workers. This is seen as necessary to mobilise them to support the military. By making appeals to nationalist sentiments among the workers—with such slogans as “save the nation”—Türk Is is attempting to align them alongside the pro-American wing of the bourgeoisie against the government. Yildirim Koc, a mentor of Türk Is, provocatively demanded that all parties remove their flags and banners during the demonstrations. “We do not want to see any banners and flags except the Turkish national flag,” he shouted.

Türk Is is not the only organisation with such a position. The nationalist-Stalinist “left” declared in its weekly paper Aydinlik that the workers and Turkish armed forces stand together. The reputed left-wing Kemalite newspaper Cumhurriyet also supports the army.

For its part, the AKP government is not capable of making an appeal to the broader masses to resist the pressure put on them by the military. It is busy with the implementation of a neo-liberal programme consisting of the opening up of the Turkish market for international capital, as demanded by both the IMF and the EU.

The state-owned refinery company Tupras, the monopoly holding company for tobacco and spirits Tekel, and the petrochemical group Petkim Petrokimya Holding SA are to be privatised, as well as 19 of the 33 power supply networks. A general law now provides foreign investors with the same fundamental rights and freedoms as Turkish investors. It also lifts restrictions regarding the acquisition of land by foreign investors and companies. The government plans no pay increases in the public sector and wants to cut 100,000 jobs.

This programme is extremely unpopular. The government is as fearful of a popular mobilisation as it is of the military. The population could raise social questions and a movement could develop that could easily go out of control.

This is the background to Erdogan’s about-turn concerning Cyprus, although this is an important issue regarding Turkey’s application for EU membership.

Initially, Erdogan’s government had signalled that it supported UN plans aimed at creating a unified state, including autonomy for both the Greek and Turkish halves, as well as limiting the military presence on the island. The overwhelming majority of the Turkish-Cypriot population, which showed its support for a reunification of the island in mass demonstrations, supports this plan. On the other side, these plans are being rejected by the military and the right-wing nationalist followers of Rauf Denktasch, who, with the aid of the Turkish army, has controlled the north of Cyprus for over 30 years. In the meantime, Erdogan’s government has begun to back Denktasch and has pointed out the role the army plays as a “guarantor of power.”

Confronted with a putative danger for the establishment, Erdogan is using traditional methods of repression in Turkey itself. The government is also actively pursuing the persecution of the nationalist Young Party (GP) led by Cem Uzan, which, according to opinion polls, is the biggest rival of the AKP. The persecution of the GP makes a mockery of all talk about democratisation.

Uzan is a multimillionaire who, because of his shady business methods and ruthless use of his Star media group for political means, is often described as the “Turkish Berlusconi.” He is attempting to exploit the social crisis for his own purposes. He has blamed the IMF and the EU for the devastating social conditions in Turkey and, among other promises, has pledged tax reductions, the distribution of land to the poor and the building of hundreds of new universities. As a result, the government took away two of his power companies and a bank, and threatened to expropriate his family. Erdogan has accused him of slander and Uzan’s TV stations were taken off the air for one month.

6. - Radio Telefis Eireann - "Taoiseach, Turkish leader in Ankara talks":

17 July 2003

The Taoiseach has held talks with the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in Ankara.
Mr Ahern insisted that Turkish membership of the EU and a settlement of the Cyprus issue, where the international community regards Turkey as being in illegal occupation of the North of the island, are linked as political issues.

Mr Ahern was speaking after a first visit by a Taoiseach to Turkey.

Turkey wants to open talks with a view to joining the EU next year, but the issue of Cyprus has dogged those negotiations.

In an interview with RTÉ, the country's Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, said the terms for opening talks with the EU had already been agreed and settlement of the Cyrpus issue could not now be added as a condition.

However, Mr Ahern maintained that it was the passionate wish of all European countries to see a united Cyprus and that the issue of the island's future and Turkish aspirations for EU membership had to be linked.

Earlier, speaking in advance of the talks, Mr Ahern said 2004 presented an historic opportunity for Turkey and for the future of Europe.

He said it remained possible that two hugely significant objectives could be achieved next year: the accession to the EU of a united Cyprus on 1 May and a decision by the European Council in December to open accession negotiations with Turkey.

The Taoiseach said both developments would require imagination and dedication on all sides.