16 December 2003

1. "Turkey's Muslim identity attracts Mideast spotlight", in the aftermath of November's terrorist bombings in Istanbul, Turkey's search for a modern national identity has attained high-stakes urgency.

2. "Turkish Cypriot vote muddies EU entry", ELECTION DEADLOCK: Pro-EU opposition parties fell just short of the majority needed to win government, casting doubt on full EU entry for the divided island

3. "Turkish Cypriot elections resolve nothing", opposition scores huge gains but legislature will be squarely divided.

4. "Road to Turkey's EU membership clear, says Gul", Turkey has never been in a better position to become an EU member, says FM Gul, adding that no matter who won the KKTC elections, they could not move independently of Turkey.

5. "Kurdish intelligence may have played a role", Lieutenant-General Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of US forces in Iraq, on Sunday refused to be drawn on whether he would be paying a reward for the information that led to the capture of Saddam Hussein.

6. "IHD reacts to Kurdish poster ban", the Turkish Human Rights Association (IHD) reacted angrily against state officials banning their Kurdish posters in Hakkari, Van, Bursa, Mardin and Siirt in a written statement. Assistant Chairman of IHD Reyhan Yalcindag said that the theme of the Human Rights Week is peace.

7. "Will Turkey Meet The Strategic challance In Georgia", many Turkish critics are chastising Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for Turkey’s tentative outreach to the reformists who succeeded Shevardnadze on November 23. Turkey’s focus was elsewhere.

8. "Turkey chafes at European 'snub'", Turkey is not yet part of the EU family.

1. - BPNews - "Turkey's Muslim identity attracts Mideast spotlight":

ISTANBUL / 15 December 2003 / by Erich Bridges

In the aftermath of November's terrorist bombings in Istanbul, Turkey's search for a modern national identity has attained high-stakes urgency.

Most eyes remain on Iraq, just to the south, where, despite Saddam Hussein's capture Dec. 13, the battle for control continues. But where Turkey goes, much of the Muslim world might one day follow -- politically and spiritually.

As in recent Al Qaeda-related attacks in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, the Istanbul bombers struck at "soft targets" connected in some way to the United States, its military allies or Israel. In this case, they hit two Jewish synagogues, a British-owned bank and the British Consulate. Also, as in the other attacks, many of the victims left dead or bleeding on the streets of Istanbul were local Muslim bystanders. Such indiscriminate brutality has caused widespread public anger and revulsion.

How Turks respond is crucial, because another target of the bombings appears to be modern Turkey itself.

The ancient cultural crossroads of Europe and Asia, Turkey was the heart of the Ottoman Empire, crown of Islam's golden age of conquest. Istanbul was its capital. The empire lasted more than six centuries, and at its zenith stretched from the gates of Vienna to the southern tip of Arabia.

Turkey remains overwhelmingly Muslim, but its government and military have been solidly secular for generations. Its politics and economy are increasingly democratic and Western-oriented. It is a member of NATO and has been seeking entry into the European Union for years. More than 60 percent of its 71 million people are under the age of 30 -- and more interested in making a good living than returning to the ways of traditional Islam.

Those factors -- and the government's reluctant support for the U.S.-led Iraq invasion, despite opposition from the Turkish public -- have incurred the wrath of Islamic extremists. Post-bombing investigation and arrests by Turkish authorities so far indicate the bombers were Turks tied to or inspired by Al Qaeda and its tentacles in the region.

"Obviously someone is mad at Turkey and is trying to hurt them because of Turkey's importance as a hub for East and West," says a Christian observer who lives in Istanbul. Muslim militants "don't want a moderate voice that is pro-democracy and pro-Western, yet Islamic. They don't want Turkey there as model of how it could work. So several things are converging on that real estate, which happens to be the same real estate where [the Apostle] Paul did his ministry."

If turning Turkey away from the West is the goal of the terrorists, their methods seem to be backfiring -- at least so far.

"The militants know Turkey's strategic importance, so they're trying to use the tactic of fear," reports another Christian observer in Turkey. "But for the most part it's causing disgust versus fear. It's causing people to question their imams as they try to discover what the Koran teaches. It's another nail in the coffin of disillusionment with what is true Islam. They're asking, 'Is this what we want to adhere to?' A lot of local papers are saying, 'This is not Islam. This is not who we are.' They're running toward secularism and materialism here in Turkey."

Another significant public shift may have occurred after the synagogue bombings: The Jewish victims were embraced and mourned as native Turks, not as outsiders or "foreigners" in Turkey.

"The Turkish media really picked up on the fact that these are Turks who embraced Judaism, not minority groups," the observer notes. "They put Turkish flags on these Jewish coffins. That is a huge change in terms of identity: You can be a Turk and you can be something else. They are saying this [terrorism] is against Turks, whether you choose to believe Christianity or you choose to believe Islam or anything else. A Turk is a Turk."

The consequences of such a shift, if it lasts, are potentially enormous for the small but growing body of Turkish Christians. They live in a culture that has long taken for granted that "to be a Turk is to be Muslim." It's easier for Muslims to decide to follow Christ in urban Turkey than in some other parts of the Muslim world, but "easier" is a relative term. Conversion often brings rejection by family members, educational and employment discrimination, harassment and threats.

Still, the number of evangelical Turkish believers has grown to about 3,000 -- up from a little more than 2,000 last year. The number of small groups gathering to worship also is expanding. "Something's happening spiritually," the observer says.

Another Christian, who walked by the British Consulate in Istanbul only a few days before it was bombed Nov. 20, admitted it would "be easy to become paralyzed by fear of what might happen -- what cost or pain or suffering we might bear -- if we continue to proclaim Good News here."

But he sees the growth in believers and worship groups pointing "toward a time when the church will begin to spontaneously expand here ... catapulted forward by the indisputable witness of the transformed lives of new disciples of Jesus and new churches."

2. - AP - "Turkish Cypriot vote muddies EU entry":

ELECTION DEADLOCK: Pro-EU opposition parties fell just short of the majority needed to win government, casting doubt on full EU entry for the divided island

NICOSIA / 16 December 2003

Turkish Cypriot opposition parties that favor a UN-backed plan for reunifying the island made huge gains on Sunday in crucial balloting on the future of the island, but failed to win a majority of the seats in parliament.

Elections ended in a deadlock with the pro-EU opposition and pro-government parties splitting the 50 parliamentary seats.

The opposition, which had only 11 seats in the outgoing parliament, has been growing in strength as a May date for Cyprus to enter the EU -- divided or unified -- approaches. If Cyprus is not unified by May, EU laws and benefits will only apply to the Greek Cypriot south.

But the opposition failed to capture a majority in parliament, which left critics of the UN-backed reunification plan celebrating.

"Long live the status quo," supporters of the National Unity Party, the largest of the governing parties chanted after the election.

With all of the 554 ballot boxes counted early yesterday morning, the pro-EU Republican Turkish Party and the Peace and Democracy Movement together had 48 percent of the vote and took 25 seats in parliament. The two parties have vowed to form an alliance if they win.

Meanwhile, the National Unity Party and the Democrat Party had 46 percent of the vote in the elections, according to the High Elections Board. Both parties oppose a UN-sponsored reunification plan and are currently serving in a co-alition government. They also had 25 seats.

"It is of course disappointing that we don't have a clear majority," said Serdil Sabit Soyer, general secretary of the Republican Turkish Party.

Opposition parties support a UN-backed plan to reunify the island. The governing parties argue that the plan would lead to domination by the richer Greek Cypriot south of the island.

With Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and the Turkish military both opposing the UN talks, the opposition is believed to have needed a strong mandate for change.

"The people seem to be divided into camps," said Serdar Denktash, son of the Turkish Cypriot leader and head of the Democrat Party.

The next step will be for Rauf Denktash to name a party leader to form a new government. Denktash has already said that he would not nominate the opposition unless they won an outright majority.

If no party can form a coalition, new elections will have to be held in 60 days.

Parliament seats are divided according to a complicated formula that takes into account the population of the district casting the votes.

The future of Cyprus is key for Turkey's own EU bid. EU members have said that Turkey must help reunite the island before it can realize its own membership aspirations.

With some 40,000 troops deployed in the north, Turkey could technically be considered to occupy EU soil after Cyprus enters the bloc, EU members have warned.

Vedat Oktunc said he feared Greek Cypriot domination and voted for the National Unity Party of Dervis Eroglu, who serves as prime minister.

"A win [by pro-Denktash parties] will provide protection," he said.

Some 140,000 people were eligible to vote. About half of the 200,000 people on the Turkish Cypriot side of the island are Turkish settlers who moved to Cyprus after the island's division in 1974. They are expected to largely oppose reunification.

The opposition has pledged to axe Denktash as head negotiator in peace talks with Greek Cypriots.

Denktash will not be standing for re-election until 2005.

The island has been split between a Greek Cypriot south and a Turkish Cypriot north since Turkish troops invaded in 1974 amid intercommunal fighting that left some 3,000 dead and a short-lived coup by supporters of union with Greece.

A strong vote for the opposition would make it easier for Turkish leaders to press to reunite the island.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke of the need to solve the Cyprus problem after coming to power last year.

The powerful military, however, considers Cyprus to be of strategic importance and favors Denktash.

3. - The Daily Star - "Turkish Cypriot elections resolve nothing":

Opposition scores huge gains but legislature will be squarely divided

NICOSIA / 16 December 2003 / Nicholas Birch

Turkish Cypriot hopes of joining the European Union with their Greek neighbors next year looked slim Monday as results from Sunday’s parliamentary elections showed a dead heat between supporters and opponents of a UN-led plan to reunite the two communities.

Both sides won 25 seats in the 50-seat Parliament. Superficially, this was a triumph for chief opposition leader Mehmet Ali Talat, whose Republican Turkish Party topped the polls with almost three times the votes gained in 1998. Speaking at his party headquarters with 80 percent of the votes counted, Talat described the results as a victory “for peace, a solution and the EU,” and promised that “we will change the status quo.”

But if this was a victory, it was a Pyrrhic one. Without the clear majority he had hoped for, Talat will be hard-pressed to fulfil his pledge to take over from Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktash as chief negotiator of the UN’s reunification plan.

A hard-line nationalist, Denktash broke off talks with the Greek Cypriots earlier this year, claiming that the plan for a federal Cyprus would end in the destruction of the island’s Turkish minority. He insists that the world join Turkey in recognizing the 200,000-strong statelet that he proclaimed in 1983.

In an apparent softening of tone, Denktash Monday joined the US and the EU in describing the results as proof that Turkish Cypriots want into Europe.

“With luck, this is a sign that he has understood the need for a less uncompromising position on the Annan Plan,” says Mete Hatay, Turkish Cypriot member of a Norwegian organization that monitored the elections.

Other observers are more skeptical. With a cross-party coalition necessary to avoid a hung Parliament, they believe Denktash could use his position as kingmaker to obstruct opposition demands for dialogue.

“There is a possibility the opposition could join with the smaller of the two status quo parties to form a majority,” says Erdal Guven, Cyprus analyst for Turkish daily Radikal. “Denktash would only give his blessing to such a coalition if assured that he will remain chief negotiator.”

That, he adds, is likely to condemn the Turkish Cypriots to further isolation, as well as seriously undermining Turkey’s own hopes of getting a date for European accession next year.

There is a glimmer of hope, though. While hard-liners in the Turkish military and bureaucracy are unlikely to alter their traditional support of Denktash, the Turkish government has in the past expressed support for a solution on Cyprus.

“The time has come for Turkey’s civilian leaders to lend the Cypriot opposition a hand,” says Istanbul-based foreign policy expert Mensur Akgun. “These elections have been described as a referendum on Europe. Pro-Europeans won that referendum. It is in the Turkish government’s interest to respect the will of the majority.”

Observers also fear the electoral results could deepen divisions between Turkish Cypriots and the estimated 70,000 settlers brought in by Denktash since 1974 to replace emigrating locals. More attached to their motherland than most Turkish Cypriots, Turkish settlers have traditionally opted for parties that support the continuation of a divided island.

On Sunday, settler-heavy rural districts voted overwhelmingly against the Annan Plan. Omnipresent at status quo party meetings, Turkish flags were all but absent at the headquarters of the two main opposition parties yesterday evening.

The election seemed fair, though many question the lack of voting facilities for a 100,000-strong diaspora. But with evidence mounting that several thousand settlers have been granted shotgun citizenship in the past year alone, it is not difficult to find Cypriots ready to blame the settlers for the electoral impasse.

4. - Anatolian News Agency - "Road to Turkey's EU membership clear, says Gul":

Turkey has never been in a better position to become an EU member, says FM Gul, adding that no matter who won the KKTC elections, they could not move independently of Turkey

ANKARA / 16 December 2003

Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said late Sunday that in the latest summit in Brussels, Turkey had come closest than ever before to becoming an EU member, adding that the road to Turkey's membership had been cleared for the first time.

Speaking on the "Teke Tek" TV program on Kanal D, Gul said that steps taken by Turkey in its bid to become an EU member had received significant support, noting that statements made on Turkey in the summit declaration were the most encouraging ever.

Economic reforms implemented to harmonize with the Copenhagen criteria had received praise, said FM Gul. He noted that in the latest progress report, it was stated that if the Cyprus issue was not resolved, Turkey could not become a member of EU, adding that this statement had been altered in the summit declaration, due to Turkish objections, to say that a resolution of the Cyprus issue would greatly enhance Turkey's EU membership process.

Gul said that preparations for a solution on the island before May 1, 2004 were underway in both Turkey and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) and these would bring the issue to closer to a resolution.

Gul said no matter which party won in the KKTC, Turkish Parliament would have the last say, noting that Turkey was a guarantor power and none of the parties in the KKTC could act independently of Turkey.

Gul said a new era was dawning in Iraq with the capture of Saddam Hussein, and there was nothing to stop Iraq from rapidly developing. He warned that a breakup of Iraq would have a destabilizing affect on the region, asking regional leaders not to ruin the country as Saddam had done.

He said Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to the United States in late January would involve discussions on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK/KADEK) and economic cooperation. He said relations between the U.S. and Turkey were based on a sound foundation, noting that Turkish firms had been invited to participate in Iraq reconstruction projects.

5. - The Financial Times - "Kurdish intelligence may have played a role":

14 December 2003 / by James Drummond

Lieutenant-General Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of US forces in Iraq, on Sunday refused to be drawn on whether he would be paying a reward for the information that led to the capture of Saddam Hussein.

In July, when Mr Hussein's two sons Uday and Qusay were killed in an operation in Mosul in northern Iraq, it was as a result of a tip-off by - it is thought - the owner of the house in which they were staying. The motive was financial.

This time it may be Jalal Talabani, the prominent Kurdish leader, and one of his commanders in his Patriotic Union of Kurdistan who lay claim to some or all of the $25m (£14m, €20m) bounty offered by the US. Intelligence provided by the Kurds could have been important in helping American forces seize the former dictator.

Gen Sanchez said only that Operation Red Dawn was launched after intelligence had been gathered about the farm south of Tikrit where Mr Hussein was finally captured on Saturday evening.

With the amount of money on offer, the US-led coalition forces have not been short of "walk-ins" - people claiming to know where the former Iraqi leader and the other 54 Ba'athist leaders listed on its most-wanted list are hiding. The problem has been in substantiating the many leads.

"It was intelligence, actionable intelligence . . ." Gen Sanchez said on Sunday. "It was great analytical work."

Six hundred men drawn from the 4th infantry division's First Brigade Combat Team, including cavalry, artillery, aircraft and special forces, had only 1½ hours' notice to move against the target, Gen Sanchez said. The operation was completed without a shot being fired.

The isolation of the farm where Mr Hussein was hiding almost certainly helped ensure that he was captured rather than killed.

The fact that crowds were building up during the operation against Uday and Qusay forced US forces in Mosul to finish the operation more quickly than they might have wished, US officers told the Financial Times last month.

Even when the site of Saturday's capture was identified and searched, the hiding place of the former Iraqi dictator could easily have been overlooked.

The "spiderhole" was camouflaged with bricks and dirt and furnished with a fan and a breathing device, Gen Sanchez said.

The view that Kurdish intelligence may have played a significant role in the operation was supported in a statement released on Sunday by the Iraqi Governing Council.

Ahmad Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi National Congress, said that Qusrat Rasool Ali, believed to be a leader of Mr Talabani's PUK, had helped with information.

Moreover, the first reports that came via the Iranian press agency in Tehran quoted Mr Talabani as saying that a combination of US "and [Kurdish] peshmerga forces" had tracked down the former Iraqi leader.

The US-led coalition has been putting increasing pressure on its Iraqi allies - Mr Talabani's PUK, Mustafa Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic party, the Iraqi National Accord, the Iraqi National Congress and the Shia Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq - to pool their intelligence assets.

6. - Turkish Daily News - "IHD reacts to Kurdish poster ban":

12 December 2003

The Turkish Human Rights Association (IHD) reacted angrily against state officials banning their Kurdish posters in Hakkari, Van, Bursa, Mardin and Siirt in a written statement. Assistant Chairman of IHD Reyhan Yalcindag said that the theme of the Human Rights Week is peace.

"We hung Kurdish posters which said "peace will win" in 34 cities where we have offices. However, bigoted officials banned our posters in Hakkari, Van, Bursa, Mardin and Siirt. These oppressors justified this decison with a court verdict that said Kurdish posters will damage the constitution," Yalcindag said.

"This type of oppression in an EU candidate country is very thought provoking," Yalcindag said, "After the verdict, the posters were removed and our office in Hakkari was raided by security forces on Dec. 10. It is very clear that the core of this verdict is suppressing the Kurdish language. It is laughable to claim that a language spoken by almost 20 million citizens damages the unity of a country."

Yalcindag said that the court decision violated legal arrangements and law legislated during the harmonization process. She added that this decision should be reversed.

7. - EurasiaNet - "Will Turkey Meet The Strategic challance In Georgia":

12 December 2003 / by Mevlut Katik*

Many Turkish critics are chastising Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for Turkey’s tentative outreach to the reformists who succeeded Shevardnadze on November 23. Turkey’s focus was elsewhere. As Shevardnadze was resigning, effectively acknowledging that he had overseen rigged parliamentary elections on November 2, Turkey was dealing with devastating suicide bombings in Istanbul and preparing for elections in Cyprus this month. Those elections are key to Turkey’s bid to join the European Union. But Turkey’s inveterate caution and single-minded focus on Europe may stunt relations with Georgia and the rest of the Caucasus.

While President Ahmet Necdet Sezer waited more than a week after Shevardnadze quit to telephone interim Georgian president Nino Burjanadze- and reportedly called Shevardnadze as well- Russia sent its foreign minister to Tbilisi during the crisis and strengthened ties with Ajaria after it.

But Turkish officials were hardly ignoring foreign affairs between the November 2 vote in Georgia and Shevardnadze’s November 23 departure. Erdogan was on a diplomatic mission in northern Cyprus on November 15 ahead of the upcoming elections there. Many observers see the legitimacy of those elections, scheduled for December 14, as pivotal to European Union (EU) members’ willingness to consider Turkey’s accession. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul was in Sweden lobbying for EU membership the same day, when suicide bombers killed 15 people and wounded 300 at Istanbul synagogues. More deaths came five days later in an attack on an Istanbul bank.

Some argue that Turkey should not obsess over the European Union or linger in mourning while the chance to shape events in Georgia remains strong. Georgia, on this view, is the weak link in a potential axis from Azerbaijan to Turkey’s Mediterranean shores. Columnist Tuncay Ozkan, in the center-right daily Aksam, has argued this case in recent weeks. "Turkey has established very close ties with Georgia right after its independence," he wrote on December 1. "Ankara sent Georgia tons of wheat and opened a credit worth $50 million during its early days when Georgia did not even receive world attention… Turkey and Georgia have started jointly using an air base 30 kilometers out of Tbilisi." But Okzan concluded from the government’s conduct that "Turkey is now unable to even understand the developments [in the Caucasus], let alone to manipulate them." Other commentators, notably Sami Kohen of the daily Milliyet, have noted that worsening conditions in Iraq could fuse with instability in Georgia, threatening Turkey’s hopes for regional stability.

This pessimistic take ignores the possibility that Turkey’s almost silent stance during the ongoing Georgian crisis may have been to some degree deliberate. Turkish foreign policy, since Kemal Ataturk became its first secular president, has always followed a strict anti-interventionist path. Except with explosive situations like Iraq or disputed territories like Cyprus, Ankara generally avoids alienating any potential new leader who might seek warm ties. It did not weigh in on the elections in Azerbaijan, which also lack popular or international legitimacy. Even though Mikhail Saakashvili is overwhelmingly favored to win Georgia’s presidential elections on January 4, restive breakaway republics could undermine that election. Erdogan’s government might have held its cards in Georgia even without other international distractions, at least until that country’s leadership becomes clear.

Turkey cannot help but relate closely to Georgia. The countries have strong trade ties, and many expect the intensified trade and military covenants to strengthen them both. Turkish officers have pursued the idea of training Georgian soldiers, and both national armies have worked on a joint military program to protect pipelines. Turkey is also known to have influence over Georgia’s breakaway provinces of Ajaria and Abkhazia, since many ethnic Caucasians live in Turkey and have relatives throughout the region. Turkish officials coordinated negotiations with Abkhaz and Ajarian officials at an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe summit in Istanbul in 1999. In 2000, then-Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin reportedly tried to breach differences between Georgia and Ajaria. True to Turkish tradition, these talks sought to establish Turkey as a likable neighbor in every party’s view.

With an eye on European Union commissioners in Brussels, Turkey may simply be acting more guarded about similar initiatives. On December 5, Gul met with his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts and pledged: "Turkey is ready to contribute [to resolving problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan] and undertake the role of catalyst." To some critics, this sort of talk gratifies European Union idealists at the expense of building strong regional ties with a receptive Georgia.

Mehdi Nuzhet Cetinbas, president of Istanbul’s Caucasus Foundation, called Turkey’s recent policy towards Georgia "inadequate" and "wrong" and said Ankara should have promoted democratic reforms long before the November crisis. "The new leadership in Georgia has rather nationalistic discourse and may initiate harsh measures against secessionist republics," Cetinbas told EurasiaNet. "Russia could have an edge in Georgia and in the Caucasus in general, as the leadership of Ajaria."

Georgian leadership seems receptive to warmer ties with Turkey. Saakashvili and Burjanadze have offered strong criticism of Russia and stressed their support for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. [For background see the EurasiaNet Insight archive]. The friendship, assuming Saakashvili takes office soon, appears to be Ankara’s to join. However, to create beneficial ties, Turkey’s leadership will have to express and embrace a broader strategic vision of its role in the Caucasus than they have managed so far.

* Editor’s Note: Mevlut Katik is a London based journalist and analyst. He is a former BBC correspondent and also worked for The Economist group.

8. - The Christian Sience Monitor - "Turkey chafes at European 'snub'":

ISTANBUL / 15 December 2003 / by Yigal Schleifer

In a bustling cafe, a crowd gathers in front of a large-screen television to watch Istanbul's Besiktas soccer team take on England's Chelsea. The fans shout with disgust at every missed pass and shot on goal.

Besiktas would go on to lose the game 2-0, but many of the people watching said they felt cheated before the match even started. It was supposed to be played on Besiktas's home field, just up the road, but was moved to a stadium in Germany by the Union of European Football Associations, which cited safety concerns after four suicide bombings struck Istanbul last month.

It was the second game to be moved out of Turkey by the nongovernmental UEFA following the attacks. And Turkey reacted with universal derision that quickly took on a political hue.

"It's the same message the Europeans have been giving us for 10 years - you are not part of Europe. If the same thing would have happened in Italy, the games would have been played in Italy," says Rustu Daglaroglu, who was watching the match with friends.

If the Istanbul bombings were initially expected to bring Turkey and Europe closer, many Turks say they feel the opposite is true. Observers in Turkey and Europe say the attacks actually may have exposed some underlying rifts in the Turkish-European relationship and a fundamental difference in how each perceives that relationship.

"The initial impression after the incidents was that this would generate an awareness of common problems, and would maybe bring both sides together and lend further credence that Turkey is the new front line in Western defense," says Ilter Turan, a professor of international relations at Istanbul Bilgi University. "But the way the [European Union] countries have behaved has been at best confusing. While people related messages of sympathy ... Turkey was made to suffer deprivations."

Relocated soccer games are not the only post-bombing measures that have alienated Turks. Britain issued a travel warning for its citizens, saying further attacks in Turkey were "imminent," and instituted visa restrictions for Turks. Members of the German opposition called into question Turkey's EU candidacy after the attacks, saying that admitting the country would import terror into the Continent.

The criticism aimed by Turkish politicians at Europe's response was especially sharp. Speaking on Turkish television, Turkey's foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, recently said that Europe "failed the solidarity test in the fight against terrorism."

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, speaking earlier this month to a gathering of ambassadors from EU countries, told the group: "Messages of support issued in the aftermath of the attacks have touched us. But seeing signs that these declarations of support are to remain on paper has seriously worried us."

Perhaps in response to Turkey's chiding, some European countries recently took some steps to show solidarity with Turkey. France last week sent its justice minister, Dominique Perben, on a brief trip to Turkey. A group of Italian parliamentarians visited the country, and some of them even offered to play Turkish parliamentarians in a friendly game of soccer.

Turkey is not yet part of the EU family

EU officials say the Turkish criticism is unwarranted. Jean-Christophe Filori, the EU's spokesman for enlargement issues, says the organization sent Turkey a "clear and encouraging" message that the terrorist acts in Istanbul will not dictate either the EU's relations or negotiations with Turkey. Turkey is in the process of undertaking several human rights, economic, and democratization reforms to meet EU membership requirements. The EU is scheduled to make a final decision at the end of 2004 on starting negotiations with Turkey over its membership candidacy.

"The best answer to give to terrorism is to remain extremely firm to the road we have designed," Mr. Filori says.

Daniel Gros, director of the Center for European Policy Studies, an independent think tank in Brussels, says Turkey's unhappiness with the European response stems not from what the Europeans might have done or not done, but from a gap in how each side perceives the relationship. While Turkey might expect that its status as an EU candidate might already make it part of the European family, the EU feels differently, Mr. Gros says.

"Until it becomes a member, Turkey should expect to be treated as someone who is not very welcome," Mr. Gros says. In that sense, it may have been a mistake for Turkey to look at the bombings as a test of its relationship with Europe, Gros says. "For Turkey, this was a crude way to realize the nature of the relationship," he adds.