28 March 2002

1. "Turkish police detain some 100 people in Kurdish language demo", senior members of a pro-Kurdish party were among 100 people arrested on Wednesday in a demonstration calling on Ankara to legalize education in the Kurdish language, organisers said.

2. "Turkish Christians complain of red tape", "When you convert to Christianity in Turkey it is simple: either your atheist friends suddenly become Muslim and reject you or the state denies you," laments the reverend Ihsan Ozbek. Ozbek, 39, heads a parish of about 300 people in the small church of Kurtulus (Salvation) in Ankara.

3. "Kurds Ready to be Next N. Alliance", high on a spring-green escarpment in northern Iraq, elite Kurdish forces decked out in camouflage and maroon berets are training for the day they hope they realize their dream: helping US forces topple Saddam Hussein.

4. "Turkey grants new political rights", the Turkish parliament has passed a series of laws easing restrictions on freedom of speech, but Kurdish and human rights campaigners say the measures are inadequate.

5. "Iraq: Turkey, Kurds Might Consider Status Quo As Lesser Of Evils", any U.S. military intervention against Iraq is likely to have serious consequences on the regional balance of forces that emerged after the 1991 Gulf War. Not surprisingly, possible strikes against Iraq have raised concerns in Turkey and in Iraqi Kurdistan, which has enjoyed de facto autonomy for the past decade.

6. "MGK to discuss politicization of PKK", EU role in new PKK steps is discussed.

7. 'Turkey needs to maintain reform momentum'", with the Turkish Parliament having just legislated a set of reforms harmonizing Turkish laws with the European Union norms, Motherland Party (ANAP) leader Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz said Turkey needed to maintain the momentum of these favorable developments both at home in the Turkish reform process and in Turkey's relations with the EU.

8. "Saddam and bin Laden help fanatics, say Kurds", a TALEBAN-style Islamic group said to be linked to Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein is expanding its ranks at a stronghold in Kurdish northern Iraq.

1. - AFP - "Turkish police detain some 100 people in Kurdish language demo":

ISTANBUL / March 27

Senior members of a pro-Kurdish party were among 100 people arrested on Wednesday in a demonstration calling on Ankara to legalize education in the Kurdish language, organisers said.

Around 1,000 protestors marched to a main post office to send a symbolic fax to parliament demanding amendments to the article in the constitution that bans education in Kurdish, a spokesman for the People's Democracy Party

(HADEP) told AFP. Police prevented protestors from entering the post office and detained about 100 people, including the head of HADEP's Istanbul branch and around 15 other party officials, Nizamettin Ozturk said.

Turkey's sizable Kurdish minority has recently organised mass petition campaigns demanding education in their mother tongue, which is also a key criterion which the European Union is demanding that Turkey must meet if it is to succeed in its bid to join the EU. But the government has ruled out such a reform on fears that it could fan separatist sentiment among Kurds and rekindle a 15-year Kurdish rebellion for self-rule in southeast Turkey, which has recently calmed down.

In a bid to boost the country's EU membership bid, the Turkish parliament on Tuesday passed a package of democratic reforms, which included an amendment paving the way for Kurds to publish material in their own language. The government is also contemplating television broadcasts in Kurdish.

2. - AFP - "Turkish Christians complain of red tape":

ANKARA / March 28 / by Burak Akinci

"When you convert to Christianity in Turkey it is simple: either your atheist friends suddenly become Muslim and reject you or the state denies you," laments the reverend Ihsan Ozbek. Ozbek, 39, heads a parish of about 300 people in the small church of Kurtulus (Salvation) in Ankara.

He converted to Christianity in 1981 "without problems," but underlines that most Christians are not that lucky in mainly Muslim Turkey. "If you live in a big city it is easier. But if you are in the (more conservative) southeast, it may cost you your life," Ozbek says. He explains the difficult stages of becoming a Christian: "First you confront your family, then the Turkish society, which is very conservative and not open to new ideas, and finally the state."

In Turkey, which has a strictly secular order, 99 percent of the some 70-million population is Muslim, according to official figures. But the priest contests the official statistics as misleading, stressing that every new-born child is authomatically registered as Muslim. An actor by profession, Ozbek has quit his job because travelling to theaters across the country keeps him from fulfilling his religious duties on Sundays.

He regularly receives death threats and "knows" that his telephone is being tapped by the police. "We are not a tolerant country, there are religious and ethnic prejudices. All we want is rights equal to those of the Muslims," the priest says.

Turkish authorities are always shocked to see that Turks, who in their eyes should be Muslims by rule, can convert to Christianity, he says, adding that the shock is followed by a series of bureaucratic hurdles. "For the authorities, if you are a Christian you are at the service of the enemy -- the western countries -- and you become a suspect," Ozbek says. He explains, for instance, that a Protestant church in the western city of Izmir was closed two years ago on the grounds that it violated construction laws, which require all inhabitants of a building to give their consent if a place of worship is to be opened in a building.

The church was subsequently reopened following international pressure. Earlier this month, Turkey's broadcasting watchdog, RTUK, suspended a private radio station, Shema, for propagating Christianity in the first such penalty in the country. The radio's head, Ismail Serinken, dubbed as "ridiculous and unjust" the one-month suspension, which was imposed for programmes on the Bible and the life of the Christ. "We have created a certain unease among RTUK and Islamist circles," Serinken said, adding that the radio had appealed against the decision. Shema's staff is comprised of about 10 people, all of whom have converted from Islam to Christianity like Serinken himself. Both Ozbek and Serinken agree that Turks should change their mentality of intolerance if they are to join the European Union, to which Turkey has been a candidate for membership since December 1999.

Ozbek stresses that Turkish Christians do not intend to "embarrass" Turkey at the international arena bu lodging complaints with European rights watchdogs, as Turkey's Kurdish minority frequently does. "We prefer dialogue," he said.

The priest has appealed to the Turkish establishment to "re-define" the meaning of secularism in Turkey, where "to open a church one needs the authorisation of the mufti (senior Islamic cleric)."

3. - Christian Sience Monitor - "Kurds Ready to be Next N. Alliance":

SULAYMANIYAH, NORTHERN IRAQ / By Scott Peterson / Mar 28, 2002

High on a spring-green escarpment in northern Iraq, elite Kurdish forces decked out in camouflage and maroon berets are training for the day they hope they realize their dream: helping US forces topple Saddam Hussein.

To the southeast, in another part of the divided US- and British-patrolled "safe haven," a rival Kurdish force is gearing up for exactly the same anti-Hussein mission. In the bright morning sun, soldiers gather around 120-mm mortar tubes and artillery pieces, practice with a rocket launcher, and learn about the range of antiaircraft guns from veterans with stars on their epaulets.

The shockwaves of the decisive US military campaign in Afghanistan are reverberating here, and changing thinking among Kurdish chiefs and Pentagon planners alike.

Spurred on by the Afghanistan example – in which a rebel group made up of ethnic minorities seized Kabul, backed by a heavy US airstrikes – Kurdish leaders have a new conviction that the road to their future security leads through Baghdad.

This new, broader strategy coincides with thinking among some Pentagon planners to use Kurdish forces to fight alongside American troops in any push against Saddam Hussein.

Political leaders here say that to date they have received no US request for military help, and that only a total US commitment to oust Mr. Hussein will convince them to join up.

But if spit and polish is any measure, these forces are preparing to play a key role, if Washington resolutely decides to apply the "Afghan model" to change the regime in Iraq.

"America is the best friend of the Kurdish people, to help us get self-rule and a voice in Baghdad," says Sheikh Jafar Mustapha, a senior commander of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) forces. "If America attacks Saddam ... we can help the US achieve success in that battle."

With many Kurds within Iraqi artillery range – and the regime's ability to re-occupy this entire region in a matter of days – Kurdish leaders must publicly adhere to a careful non-confrontational line, and call only for "democratic change" in Iraq.

But they have battled heavy-handed – at times even genocidal – rule from Baghdad for decades. Target practice with sniper rifles is de riguer, even for women of this Kurdish force called peshmerga, which means "those who face death."

"We can't photocopy the Afghan cause, but we can benefit from it," says Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), whose family has been at the forefront of Kurdish opposition politics for decades. The key lesson from Kabul, he says, is that minority groups "took full control of the situation there, and have become owners of the cause." Kurds, too, will now "focus on solving Iraq problems first."

Both Kurdish factions say they gave up aspirations for an independent Kurdish state long ago. Ethnic Kurds are a minority in Iraq, along with Arab Sunni Muslims – from which the regime draws most of its support. Iraq's Shiite Muslims from the south make up a 60 percent majority, and have their own rebel movement.

But the Kurds now recognize that to guarantee self-rule in their own northern area will require powerful influence in Baghdad. That means taking on Iraq-wide issues, being a vanguard for all the Iraqi opposition, and possibly serving as Iraq's future powerbroker.

"We could be the magnet for all the opposition in Iraq," says Hoshyar Zebari, a top KDP strategist. "We are not claiming statehood, but we want a new Iraq where we can live in peace. The solution is in Baghdad. This new momentum is gaining ground, and terrifies Baghdad."

Kurdish forces fought each other in the mid-1990s, and have since signed a cease-fire that has allowed significant development in their territories. Divisions still exist, but they do agree about Baghdad.

"If I want security in [the Kurdish capital of] Arbil, I must have a powerful say in Baghdad," says Barham Salih, prime minister of PUK territory. "For the first time in our history, we have a real opportunity to help build a new Iraq."

That means fitting a version of the "Afghan model" to Iraq. Two chief components may transfer easily. The air campaign could be far more successful than the 42-day airstrikes of the 1991 Gulf War, since US capabilities have improved, Iraqi air defenses are weaker, and targets in Iraq are easier to find than in Afghanistan.

Likewise, analysts say, there is no reason that the use of US special forces' spotters can't also be used in Iraq, to call in pinpoint strikes.

Far less certain are similarities between the Afghan alliance and Iraqi opposition forces – which have virtually no tanks or armored vehicles. And how to weigh the Taliban against Hussein's military and security apparatus, which make up the largest conventional force in the Mideast?

"I don't think any Iraqi groups compare to the Northern Alliance, in cohesion or battle experience, or knowing how to take on an urban target," says Geoffrey Kemp, a defense analyst and Mideast specialist at the Nixon Center in Washington.

"In Afghanistan, the opposition basically collapsed and ran away, but Baghdad is not Kabul," says Mr. Kemp. "What if Saddam makes a stand in a city? Or his troops don't throw down their weapons? And he puts tanks and artillery next to mosques and schools – as he will do.

"Then, even the most sophisticated air campaign will result in horrendous TV coverage," Kemp adds. To be successful, any Iraq campaign will require the very real threat of a "huge" US ground force – even if only to maximize the chances that Hussein will capitulate before it needs to be used. "[President] Bush can't afford to fail. This president will be finished if the bombing goes on, there are civilian casualties, and Saddam emerges somehow."

Kurdish leaders insist that their forces can play a role that will prevent just such an outcome. They say they are far better organized than the Northern Alliance, have a more substantial territory from which to operate, and have worked hard in the past decade to build on the remnants of the peshmerga units that launched a failed uprising in 1991. "The Taliban were stronger than Saddam – they had a political base and were committed to fight," says the Kurdish opposition leader. "Saddam's power base is very narrow – he is a minority within his own Sunni Arab group. People despise him, and the military is unhappy. If you fight for Saddam Hussein, you do not expect to go to heaven."

Kurdish officials claim that they can muster between 60,000 and 70,000 ready-to-fight peshmerga to confront Iraq's 400,000 troops. And Kurds of both factions want to show they have regularized their guerrillas in the past decade, and have hammered them into a willing fighting force.

But pursuing the "Afghan model" in Iraq is "not likely" to work, says Kenneth Pollack, a former National Security Council analyst now at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. "In Afghanistan, the military balance between the opposition and the Taliban was quite close, which is why limited US actions were able to tip the scales decisively," he writes in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, in which he makes the case for an all-out US invasion of Iraq.

By the end of the Gulf War, he notes, Iraqi forces were a "shadow of their former selves. Yet weak as they were, they still had enough strength to crush the largest insurrections in Iraqi history and keep Saddam in power. Those who favor the Afghan approach against Iraq are therefore betting that a US military effort significantly smaller would somehow produce much greater results this time around."

4 . BBC - "Turkey grants new political rights":

27 March

The Turkish parliament has passed a series of laws easing restrictions on freedom of speech, but Kurdish and human rights campaigners say the measures are inadequate.

It is the second package of democratisation reforms to have been passed this year, giving legal force to constitutional amendments announced in 2001.

The reforms are intended to help Turkey's entry into the European Union - but several key restrictions remain in place.

Some 100 people were arrested in Istanbul on Wednesday after they petitioned the government to allow education in the Kurdish language, which Turkey still refuses to do.

EU demands

Under the new laws, criminal suspects will have greater access to defence lawyers, while police and security services who are found to have tortured suspects will be held personally financially liable for some of the damages.

The banning of political parties has been made more difficult - instead of immediate closure, the courts can now cut off their state funding as a first step.

Islamic and Kurdish parties have been banned in the past.

But there was no change to the ban on broadcasting and education in Kurdish - a key demand of the European Union.

The death penalty also remains in force.

The three-party governing coalition is at present unable to agree on how or when to change these laws.

5. - Radio Free Europe - "Iraq: Turkey, Kurds Might Consider Status Quo As Lesser Of Evils":

Any U.S. military intervention against Iraq is likely to have serious consequences on the regional balance of forces that emerged after the 1991 Gulf War. Not surprisingly, possible strikes against Iraq have raised concerns in Turkey and in Iraqi Kurdistan, which has enjoyed de facto autonomy for the past decade.

PRAGUE / 26 March / By Jean-Christophe Peuch

In the early 1990s, NATO member Turkey was the first country in the Middle East to join the U.S.-led coalition to drive Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

Despite fierce resistance from the army's top officers, then-President Turgut Ozal opened Turkey's airspace and military bases to U.S. and allied war planes. The late Turkish leader hoped that endorsing the U.S.-led operation against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would help Ankara boost its role as a Western stronghold in the region and accelerate its admission into the European Union.

Yet the political dividends imagined by Ozal did not materialize. In addition, the war cost Turkey an estimated $40 billion in lost revenue, despite subsequent compensation from the United Nations.

Eleven years later, the situation inside and outside Turkey has changed. Leaders in Ankara do not support the idea of strikes against Iraq, which U.S. President George W. Bush lists as among countries sponsoring terrorism and attempting to produce weapons of mass destruction. Turkey does not want Washington to solve the Iraqi issue by force and says it favors diplomatic efforts to force Saddam to allow UN weapons inspectors back into the country.

Officials in Ankara say a war near Turkey's southern border might jeopardize the government's efforts to sort out the current economic crisis. They also say attempts to force Saddam out might create a political vacuum that could stir unrest in Iraq's ethnic Kurdish northern provinces and impact Turkey's own restive Kurdish regions, reviving the specter of an independent Kurdish state.

Yet analysts believe there might be other, more structural, reasons behind Turkey's reluctance to endorse U.S. military action against Iraq.

Hamit Bozarslan is a Turkey expert at the Paris-based School of Higher Studies in the Social Sciences, better known under its French acronym of EHESS. He told RFE/RL that, in his view, Ankara wants to preserve the regional balance of forces, fearing any disruption could affect its national interests.

"True, Turkey today is much more frightened by the Iraqi Kurd experiment and its possible impact on its own Kurdish regions today than it was in 1991. But I think that [it] is also very, very strongly committed to preserving the existing status quo, the existence of states in their present form, and to preventing any possible change, any possible re-mapping [of the region] that could result from an outside intervention."

Bozarslan says this commitment originates from the "nationalist" trends he says have re-emerged in Turkish politics over the past few years, even though Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's cabinet has been trying to bring Turkey closer to the West. This trend explains why Turkish politicians and military leaders are so concerned by what Bozarslan describes as "imaginary threats."

"The Turks [also] fear that, if an attack on Iraq or on any other country is decided, states would no longer remain free to decide for themselves, and that the policy of interference might someday become common practice and -- who knows -- applied against Turkey itself."

Northern Iraq is covered by one of the two "no-fly" zones imposed on Baghdad by the U.S. and Britain after the Gulf War. Controlled by two rival Kurdish factions -- Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and Masood Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) -- the region has been enjoying de facto autonomy for most of the past decade. After years of infighting, the two groups have progressively normalized their relations, creating calm in the region for the first time since the 1960s.

Northern Iraq's 3 million Kurds have been living under relative economic self-sufficiency since 1991, receiving a 13.5 percent share of Baghdad's export revenue under the UN-supervised oil-for-food program and levying taxes on cross-border trade.

The fact that the area is off-limits to Baghdad has proved a valuable asset for Ankara, as well. Turkish contractors are helping Kurds build much-needed infrastructure, Turkish businessmen are involved in illicit cross-border trade with Iraq and Iran transiting through Iraqi Kurdistan, and Ankara's armed forces conduct regular incursions in the area in pursuit of militants of the Turkish-based Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) who fled there three years ago after the arrest of their leader, Abdullah Ocalan.

Although Ankara maintains alternatively good relations with both the PUK and the KDP, which have helped Turkish troops crush the PKK, it fears a change in leadership in Baghdad might result in the Kurds being granted a say in Iraqi politics. Although Kurds are formally opposed to Saddam, they are also against any U.S. attempt to remove the Iraqi leader from power, fearing an uncertain future.

David McDowell is a U.K.-based historian and an expert on Kurdish affairs. He told our correspondent that there is no guarantee the situation will change for the better under new Iraqi leaders, even if they are backed by Washington.

"Although I am sure [the Kurds] would be very happy to see Saddam's regime disappear, they also have to be very realistic. And realism implies quite strongly that even if [Saddam] personally disappears, his apparatus is unlikely to. And that's because the [ruling] Baath [Party] regime under Saddam Hussein is not really replaceable. It's only replaceable in terms of changing a few names. But basically, the intelligence network [and] the armed forces will remain [no matter] who takes control in Baghdad. And [the Kurds] know perfectly well that any ruler in Baghdad will view [them] with immense distrust."

In an interview broadcast on Turkey's NTV private television channel last month (8 February), KDP leader Barzani -- who says he is negotiating with Baghdad to create a federative state that would legitimate Kurdish autonomy -- said he saw "no guarantee that the alternative will be better than Saddam."

In comments aired on NTV that same day, PUK leader Talabani said: "We prefer the current situation to a change we cannot accept. At least, Saddam is now under pressure and contained, isolated, and powerless, and we are under international protection."

Bozarslan of EHESS believes that four decades of war have exhausted the Kurds' fighting spirit and that the population of northern Iraq longs for peace. Therefore, he says, they might consider relinquishing their dream of an independent state, provided they can secure their autonomy.

"They [now] consider the creation of a Kurdish state with extreme caution. My impression is that they would content themselves with changes in Iraq -- not [necessarily] democratic changes, because I think they're not the kind of people to be fooled -- but with more or less pacific changes, provided their current status is preserved. I believe they would prefer to live in a modified Iraq rather than in an independent state squeezed between Turkey and Iran."

McDowell also dismisses the possibility of a landlocked independent Kurdistan coming into reality because of the stiff opposition such an outcome would raise in neighboring countries, which he says would not allow the new state to survive.

"Although I am very sympathetic to the Kurdish feelings about self-determination, I actually think that if they would have a state of their own, that would turn into a nightmare. And, ultimately, it would be a nightmare because Iraq, Turkey, and Iran would, in fact, compete to dominate this rather weak -- economically weak -- state and to control it. The pressure would be absolutely intolerable. I think life might be easier for Kurds, quite honestly, within the states that exist if only they could achieve a kind of recognized basis, on which they would be allowed to operate as Kurds."

Bitter past experience might be another reason to explain the reluctance of Iraqi Kurds to back a U.S. military operation against Saddam. During the 1991 Gulf War, then-U.S. President George Bush encouraged the PUK and the KDP to launch a joint insurrection against Baghdad to support the allied offensive in southern Iraq. But Washington decided to stop its advance on Baghdad, leaving the Kurds to their fate and allowing Iraqi troops to suppress the rebellion.

McDowell says wounds inflicted on Iraqi Kurds in the past have not healed: "I think that [the Kurds] know that the U.S. is a very perfidious ally. They also know that the U.S. will be there as a matter of convenience in United States policy, but not for the sake of the Kurds. The permanent reality for the Kurds of Iraqi Kurdistan is Baghdad, not Washington. So, very simply, they are not going to compromise their long-term future on behalf of Washington."

In a clear reference to the Gulf War, both Barzani and Talabani have said that, this time, they would not take orders from outside powers. They have also made it clear that they do not want to be assigned the same role as the anti-Taliban opposition in Afghanistan -- a mere auxiliary force in a U.S. operation to depose Saddam.

Bozarslan says Iraqi Kurds are unlikely to participate in an operation to remove Saddam. Yet he believes that, should Washington ask them to allow U.S. soldiers or members of the Iraqi opposition through their territory, they would have no other choice but to comply.

(Correspondent Sami Shoresh of Radio Free Iraq contributed to this report.)

6. - Turkish Daily News - "MGK to discuss politicization of PKK ":

EU role in new PKK steps is discussed

ANKARA / SAADET ORUC / 28 March

The National Security Council (MGK) will discuss the politicization efforts of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in its monthly meeting to be held on March 29, security sources have said.

Representatives from the related units of the State met on Tuesday at the MHK to prepare the meeting's agenda.

The organization's name change, from the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) to the People's Freedom Party, and its attempts to become more politicized were broadly discussed by the experts.

The influence of certain EU States on the policy carried out by the PKK was also reportedly raised at the meeting.

Ankara is looking ahead to the reported shift in the policy carried out by the PKK.

Another topic to be discussed at the MGK meeting, is Kurdish broadcasting. State Minister Yilmaz Karakoyunlu will reportedly make a presentation at the meeting. A change in the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTUK) is required for radio/TV broadcasting in Kurdish.

The PKK has threatened to renew war against Turkish forces if the government executes imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan. NTV reported Monday that during a congress held in neighboring northern Iraq recently, the group warned that the execution could be "cause for war."

NTV, quoting unidentified security sources, also said that the PKK had changed its name to the Peoples' Freedom Party. The PKK announced earlier this year that it was abandoning its old name as part of a campaign to transform itself into a legitimate political force.

A petition campaign was also carried out by pro-Kurdish circles for the right to education in the Kurdish language, however the petitioners are being charged with links to the outlawed group, the PKK.

Following the imprisonment of Ocalan, the PKK avoided getting into armed attacks against Turkish security forces, in an aim to affect the court's decision.

7. - Turkish Daily News - 'Turkey needs to maintain reform momentum'":

Yusuf Kanli / March 28

With the Turkish Parliament having just legislated a set of reforms harmonizing Turkish laws with the European Union norms, Motherland Party (ANAP) leader Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz said Turkey needed to maintain the momentum of these favorable developments both at home in the Turkish reform process and in Turkey's relations with the EU.

Turkish Parliament approved on Tuesday a string of political and human rights reforms as part of a bid to join the European Union.

In an exclusive extensive interview with the Turkish Daily News, Yilmaz said the alignment of the Constitution and other relevant legislation with the EU acquis was a priority for the three-way coalition government, and that it would continue its efforts in order to fulfill this commitment.

Turkey is sincere in its EU bid

Describing Turkey's full membership to the EU as "the most significant project of our Republic's history," Yilmaz said EU membership was a project that would affect, to the first degree, the lives of people who live or will live in this country.

"Today, Turkey is at one of the most important turning points on the path to full EU membership. Our full membership path has never been so clear as it is today, in the chronology of our approximately 40-year long relations, which have had their ups and downs. The National Program, approved by our government on March 19, 2001, and the steps taken to date, especially the constitutional and law amendments on the way to the implementation of this program, of course, have had a very important influence on this outcome," Yilmaz underlined.

The ANAP leader, who has apparently pinned his political future on Turkey's EU accession, said, "I want to express that I see the discussions, which will enable the emergence of new openings in certain security and foreign policy issues, not as a problem, but as an opportunity that will pave the way for the solution of these problems."

Stressing that Turkey is "sincere and adamant" about the EU membership issue, Yilmaz said even the steps taken since the Helsinki Summit were enough to show this sincerity of Turkey. "Turkey has bravely managed to leave behind the problems it was challenged to solve, and the steps it had difficulty in taking for many years, thanks to the EU membership process. This process of course will be troublesome for both sides, but its results will be useful for both Turkey and the EU," he said

2002 the crucial year

Yilmaz said the prerequisite for initiating accession negotiations was compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria. "It is evident that Turkey must complete its homework, in other words fulfill this requirement, in order to achieve its objective to commence accession negotiations," Yilmaz said, adding that "2002 will indeed be a crucial year in respect of attaining a target date for the initiation of negotiations."

The deputy prime minister said that during the past year, Turkey had covered considerable ground to that end, with the wide-ranging reform measures adopted in both the political and economic fields. "In this manner, it also displayed its political resolve to meet the requirements for membership of the EU. The Laeken European Council took note of these concrete steps and consequently placed on record for the first time and at the highest level the prospect of initiating accession negotiations with Turkey."

He said the momentum of these favorable developments needed to be maintained both at home in the Turkish reform process and in Turkey's relations with the EU. "As long as we sustain the political will and popular support that currently exists within Turkey for reform and to join the EU, I don't believe there is any one measure that we cannot achieve or that can hold us back from pursuing and realizing our goal," he said.

A different world, a different Europe

Stressing that the set of circumstances that existed some forty years ago when Turkey began its long association with the EU, or Community as it was then, has changed radically, Yilmaz said that today, as a result of the developments that have shaped the post-Cold War era, a whole set of new circumstances exist that Turkey, along with the rest of Europe has also had to adapt itself to.

"The rules of the game have changed drastically from those that applied in the '60s when the Ankara Agreement was concluded," Yilmaz said.

"The landscape of Europe has changed and the EU is currently on the brink of its largest enlargement wave. It is expected that the EU decision on those candidate countries to join the union will be determined at the Copenhagen European Council," he said.

"It is widely understood that up to 10 candidate countries who have successfully concluded their accession negotiations can become members by 2004. The accession of the remaining two candidate countries will be deferred to a later date, and in this context, the year 2007 has been pronounced in various circles. Turkey has been pursuing its objective of full membership in the EU for long enough and therefore must be part of the current that is shaping the future of Europe. Turkey's candidacy for membership, on an equal footing with the other 12 candidates, was officially recognized in Helsinki. As the EU absorbs its first wave of new members, Turkey should on its own track maintain the momentum generated for its eventual membership and not fall behind the pack. That is why I believe it is crucially important that a decision on a date for initiating accession negotiations be adopted at the latest during the Copenhagen European Council meeting to be held in December 2002. Once accession negotiations have begun, Turkey must display its resolve to conclude them in as swift a manner as possible," he underlined.

Is Turkey ready to compromise on its sovereignty?

At a time when concerns have been raised by various sectors of society regarding the transfer of some elements of Turkish sovereignty to the EU after eventual Turkish accession, Yilmaz said Turkey has been a sovereign state throughout history.

"The nation-state concept, as you know, developed in Europe through a long and harsh struggle, and no country in Europe, not even the European Union member states, are willing to relinquish their sovereignty completely. The EU has developed as a sui generis entity with a supranational model of decision-making. EU membership has never meant concessions from state identity for the 15 member states that make up the union. Even though since the late 1950s, there has been an increasing convergence among the different economic policies of these states in many different areas, they have retained their sovereignty, particularly in decision-making in the political arena. EU membership will entail for Turkey the economic and political strength of being part of the world's biggest trading partner, as well as an emerging political actor on the world stage. Turkey wants to join the EU because it is in her national interest to be a part of this huge market with more than 300 million inhabitants. The road we have embarked upon consists of tremendous work in terms of the harmonization of national legislation with the EU acquis in a wide range of areas. We are fully aware that in today's world, no country can claim absolute national sovereignty. We are prepared to share our sovereignty within the EU, as other members do, based on common goals, interests and values. We are making progress in our quest towards full membership with this understanding," he stressed.

Delicate issue: The ESDP

On the delicate European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) issue, Yilmaz said Turkey's approach to this matter was a constructive and stable one.

He said Turkey supported the ESDP from the outset, based on the NATO Washington Summit decisions. He said the issue of how the non-EU European Allies would participate in the ESDP was an important issue and was clearly reflected in the NATO Washington Summit decisions of 1999.

"The Washington Summit also established a delicate balance between the possible use of NATO assets for future EU-led operations and the participation of non-EU European Allies in the EU's ESDP. Since then, there have been a number of studies within the alliance on arrangements for making available NATO's assets and capabilities to the EU. At the same time, a solution that could be satisfactory to all allies and partners on the crucial issue of participation was being sought," he explained.

The deputy prime minister said that after a long process, an "Ankara text" was indeed developed that could provide the basis for a solution to the participation issue.

"Turkey gave its consent to this text at the highest political level over two months ago. In this process," he said adding, "Turkey has displayed significant flexibility in the efforts to find a compromise and, by giving its consent, has fulfilled its end of the bargain. We now expect the EU to adopt the Ankara text in full, thus making it an integral part of the acquis communautaire. In other words, the ball is in the EU's court, and the fifteen need to solve this matter internally."

"It goes without saying that any attempt to change the existing text or add any new elements to the package will almost certainly take us back to the drawing board, and will undermine the efforts within the alliance for the finalization of NATO-EU arrangements," he warned.

Regarding the outcome of the Laeken summit of the EU, and reports that Spain has set opening of accession talks with Turkey as one of its term presidency targets, Yilmaz said Spain had not made such a declaration.

"The Spanish Presidency has designated enlargement and furthering this process as one of its most important tasks. In this context, it has underscored that 'the reforms undertaken in Turkey during the past year have brought forward the prospect of opening accession negotiations with Turkey and that, in line with the conclusions of Laeken, it will encourage Turkey's pre-accession strategy, which should mark a new stage in assessing its preparedness for alignment on the acquis, and if required, set new objectives in the accession process.' Naturally, since we share a special affinity with Spain as Mediterranean countries, we hope that the Spanish Presidency will be particularly supportive of our efforts to secure a date for beginning accession negotiations by the end of 2002. We also welcome and expect to benefit from the cooperation that Spain has offered to Turkey to share experience and expertise in preparation for EU membership," he said.

Yilmaz said, "Undoubtedly, the main factor that contributed to the Laeken conclusions I believe was the resolve and political will that Turkey displayed during the past year with the across-the-board political and economic reforms it realized in a fairly brief period of time. As you will recall, following the approval of the Accession Partnership by the EU Council, the Turkish Government announced its National Program in March 2001. By December 2001, when the Laeken European Council was held, Turkey had realized significant amendments to its Constitution and adopted a new Civil Code. These reforms have recently also been followed up, as you are aware, with the adoption of a second reform package on secondary legislation amending, inter-alia, various articles of the Anti-terrorism Law, the Turkish Penal Code and the Code of Penal Procedure. Stated differently, Turkey has demonstrated its commitment to political and economic reform with deeds and not merely words," he said.

The deputy prime minister stressed that besides these developments, certain other issues, such as the Ankara accord on the ESDP and the Cyprus talks, played a role as well for the success for Turkey at Laeken, where it was declared a fully-fledged candidate.

"I think you could say that certain developments that Turkey played a constructive role in, such as the Ankara agreement reached on the important question of the ESDP with the United Kingdom and the United States, and the cautious optimism that the initiation of direct talks between the two leaders in Cyprus on the initiative of President Denktas has given rise to, were also some of the other factors that contributed to the favorable climate in our relations with the EU. Moreover and regrettably, it also took the tragic events of Sept. 11 to remind the EU of Turkey's political and strategic importance," he said.

The outcome of the Laeken European Council, Yilmaz said, was welcomed by Turkey as being quite positive. "I think it is fair to say that significant progress was recorded at Laeken in terms of our relations with the EU in our quest for eventual membership. Prior to the European Council meeting we essentially had three main expectations from Laeken. Our principle concern was that Turkey would be given a clearer political perspective for membership. Participation in the convention on the future of Europe on an equal footing with the other candidates was the other anticipation. Finally, in regard to the work underway in Turkey for harmonization with the EU acquis, we had hoped for a decision to start what is referred to as the 'screening' process. Two out of three, I would say, is not a bad score. Indeed, the prospect of initiating accession," he said.

The deputy prime minister said negotiations that emerged from Laeken, coupled with the decision on Turkey's participation in the convention, represented the first solid political perspective that has been given to Turkey since Helsinki in terms of its eventual membership. "I believe Laeken demonstrated that the EU has indeed taken a progressive step and that it considers Turkey to be a part of its common future," Yilmaz, who headed the Turkish team at the convention at its opening ceremony in Brussels on Feb. 28 2002, said.

"I hold the conviction that Turkey's place in the EU has been reserved, nevertheless, the ball is now in our court. Turkey must proceed with a sense of invigorated enthusiasm in its political and reform process to meet its obligations and deadlines. As far as our third expectation from Laeken regarding 'screening' is concerned, I can say that even if it did not meet our hopes entirely, we did not walk away empty-handed," Yilmaz said.

He said the sub-committees established for the purpose for preparing the ground for the harmonization of Turkish legislation with the EU acquis would resume their work soon under a new process of "detailed scrutiny."

Stressing that candidacy and alignment were constantly evolving processes: "Needs and obligations arise as we proceed. Therefore, neither party has the complacence of stepping by, claiming that it has undertaken all its responsibilities and obligations. In this context, one can say that the EU has fulfilled a number of its commitments, particularly in terms of putting into effect the legal and operative elements of the pre-accession strategy for Turkey. On the other hand, in such vital areas as the amount of financial cooperation or the launch of the screening process, Turkey's expectations have not been met fully," Yilmaz said, in response to a question of to what extend he believed Turkey and the EU were fulfilling their obligations and responsibilities towards each other.

He said the level of the EU's financial assistance to Turkey was still incommensurate with the requirements of candidacy. In the period 2002-2004, the EU's grant of aid to even some non-candidates was triple the assistance the EU extended to Turkey, Yilmaz said, adding, "We hope that the EU will rectify this unbalanced situation without further delay."

The process of detailed scrutiny, as decided at the Laeken European Council, would be launched soon, Yilmaz reiterated, saying: "This concerns Turkey's harmonization with the EU acquis in all fields. Our aim is to complete most of the work by end of the Spanish Presidency."

Turkey should not be alienated

After a successful scrutiny, he said, Turkey's expectation was that a decision on a specific date for starting accession negotiations and screening be taken by the Copenhagen European Council. "Unless this is done and a concrete perspective of accession is given to Turkey just like to the other candidates, it would be extremely difficult to prevent the negative consequences of our feeling of alienation from the enlargement process," he warned.

Turkey aware of its homework

On the other hand, Yilmaz said, Turkey was "fully aware" that it had more homework to do, particularly in the area fulfilling the political criteria. "Nonetheless, our determination is evident, and the steps taken so far cannot be underestimated. Indeed, Turkey has enacted the most comprehensive amendments to its Constitution in the history of the Republic," the deputy prime minister said.

He said the second reform package, which was legislated this Tuesday in Turkish Parliament, was the subject of a lively debate in Turkish public opinion throughout the legislative process.

"In the economic realm, a significant amount of legislation has been enacted or altered in the past year. The priorities of the economic program being implemented with the IMF greatly overlap those in the National Program. We are determined in our efforts to press ahead with the political and economic reform process, which we hope will be objectively assessed by the EU. Turkey also continues its efforts to harmonize in all the other fields, as this will be necessary for the accession negotiations," he said.

Yilmaz stressed that Turkey's National Program for the adoption of the EU acquis provided a number of reforms to be enacted in the areas of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, Freedom of Thought and Expression and the Eradication of Torture, among its short-term objectives to be realized under the Political Criteria.

He said the amendments to 34 articles of the Turkish Constitution, adopted by Turkish Parliament on Oct. 3, 2001, actually coincided with those priorities.

He said further review of existing legislation in the field of fundamental rights and freedoms in order to harmonize Turkish laws with the constitutional amendments enacted has been undertaken in the past months. He said those considerations had resulted in a new package of amendments providing for greater freedoms with respect to "fundamental rights and freedoms" and "the freedom of thought and expression".

"With this package, which was adopted on Feb. 6, a lot of ground has been covered with respect to freedom of thought and expression, as well as fundamental rights and freedoms in Turkey, and hence a major achievement in terms of fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria," Yilmaz said, adding that with the most recent amendments made in several Turkish laws with the new reform package, Turkey has largely fulfilled its short term priorities under the political criteria.

Death penalty and Kurdish education

Stressing that there had been a de facto moratorium on capital punishment since 1984, Yilmaz said since that date, Parliament has demonstrated no effort in changing this situation.

"Discussions between various political parties represented in Parliament are being regularly held. The Turkish public and the media also play their role in this vivid debate, which has been going on for some time. The coalition government will see to it that Turkish laws conform with the EU acquis. As a first step, the death penalty was restricted to crimes of war, imminent threat of war and to terrorism, he said.

On the issue of education in Kurdish, Yilmaz said the removal of legal provisions forbidding the use of languages other than Turkish in TV/radio broadcasting was a short-term commitment envisaged in the National Program.

"The constitutional amendments in this regard have been made. However, ensuring cultural diversity and guaranteeing cultural rights for all citizens, irrespective of their origin, as well as the abolition of any legal provisions preventing the enjoyment of these rights, including in the field of education, is a medium term commitment to align the Turkish Constitution and other relevant legislation with the EU acquis," he stressed.

The deputy prime minister underlined that as the alignment of the Constitution and other relevant legislation with the EU acquis was a priority for the three-way coalition government, it would continue efforts in order to fulfill this commitment.

8. - The Times - "Saddam and bin Laden help fanatics, say Kurds":

From Catherine Taylor in Halabja, Northern Iraq / March 28

A TALEBAN-style Islamic group said to be linked to Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein is expanding its ranks at a stronghold in Kurdish northern Iraq.

The Iraqi Kurds say that Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam) is the world’s newest al-Qaeda cell, established under orders from bin Laden. Ansar al-Islam, which fights under the slogan “Ten minutes to Heaven”, a reference to the time followers believe that it will take for their souls to reach paradise after death in battle, might also have links to Baghdad, a Kurdish military commander said.

“We have picked up conversations on our radios between Iraqi agents of Saddam Hussein and al-Islam,” Mustapha Saed Qada, a Kurdish military commander based in Halabja, said. “I believe that Iraq is also funding al-Islam. There are no hard facts as yet, but I believe that they are supporting them because it will cause further instability for the Kurds.”

Kurdish military intelligence said that the group received about £200,000, weapons and Toyota Land Cruisers from the al-Qaeda network. Commander Qada said that Ansar al-Islam guerrillas, captured by Kurdish soldiers and held in the city of Sulimanieh, received training in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and had admitted that links between bin Laden and Saddam that go back to 1992.

The two main political factions in Kurdish Iraq, the Kurdish Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), recently said that they had settled their differences after spending much of the past 11 years fighting. They say that they are united against Ansar al-Islam, which is based in PUK territory.

The enclave of ten Kurdish villages and about 4,000 civilians is in remote mountains near the border with Iran. Villagers who have escaped the area say that beauty salons have been ransacked and razed, girls’ schools bombed, men told to grow beards and women murdered for refusing to wear the burqa.

On September 23 Ansar al-Islam insurgents ambushed a convoy of Kurdish soldiers and killed 42 men, which was taken as a declaration of war. Since then, Kurdish fighters have pushed Ansar al-Islam back towards the Iranian border. Both sides have suffered heavy casualties.

Kurd military sources say that Ansar al-Islam's leader, Kreker, is a former member of a more moderate Kurdish Islamic political party. The group’s deputy, Abu Abdullah Shafae, is also an Iraqi Kurd who trained with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan for ten years. They say that the multinational group, with about 700 fighters, includes Moroccans, Jordanians, Palestinians and Afghans, some of whom fled the US attacks in Afghanistan.