31 May 2002

1. "Turkish parliament to be asked to end state of emergency in Kurdish areas", Turkey's powerful National Security Council will ask parliament to put an end to the state of emergency in two Kurdish-majority regions in the east of the country where it was imposed 14 years ago, a statement issued after a council meeting said Thursday. The two provinces are Hakkari and Tunceli.

2. "Turkey's Leader Too Ill for Meeting", Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, recovering after being hospitalized twice in the past month, was not well enough to attend a key meeting of military and political leaders on Thursday, his spokesman said.

3. "Armenia, Turkey take steps towards rapprochement", after decades of hostility, there are now signs that two of the Caucasus’ staunchest foes – Armenia and Turkey – are seriously exploring a rapprochement.

4. "Cem: our steps forward are for the sake of Turkey, not the EU", in an interview in the current issue of Turkish magazine Aktuel, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem offers his views on Turkey’s relations with the European Union.

5. "Turkey: Facing Oversupply, Ankara May Sell Excess Gas", Turkey is reportedly trying to sell some of the gas that it planned to import after years of denying that it would face a problem of oversupply. The effect on pipeline investments by several countries remains unclear as Ankara maneuvers to avoid penalties for contracts it has signed.

6. "If the death penalty is to be retained let us solve Cyprus", opinion by M. Ali Birand.

1. - AFP - "Turkish parliament to be asked to end state of emergency in Kurdish areas":

ANKARA / May 30

Turkey's powerful National Security Council will ask parliament to put an end to the state of emergency in two Kurdish-majority regions in the east of the country where it was imposed 14 years ago, a statement issued after a council meeting said Thursday. The two provinces are Hakkari and Tunceli.

The MGK council which is dominated by top army leaders but also includes civilian officials convenes monthly to draw up policy guidelines.

It will also recommend that the state of emergency be extended for the last time for another four months in two other Kurdish regions, Sirnak and Diyarbakir.

Parliament usually rumber-stamps council recommendations.

The lifting of the state of emergency in the eastern and southeastern provinces where the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has waged a bitter war against Turkish domination is among the steps the European Union has asked Ankara to take before any membership talks can be opened.

The Turkish government said last year it would act to end the state of emergency but did not give a date.

The council also asked the government to speed up its reform program in view of future EU membership and called on the European Union to set a timetable for the talks before the end of the year.

The three-party government of convalescing Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, who for the first time in the council's history did not attend the meeting, is deeply divided over which reforms to adopt, among them the abolition of capital punishment, a television program for the country's ethnic Kurds and Kurdish-language education.

The PKK formally ended its armed rebellion to push for a separate state in September 1999 after 15 years, at the request of its imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan who was sentenced to death in June 1999 for treason and separatism.

Fighting, which according to official figures claimed some 36,500 lives, has since practically stopped.

2. - AP - "Turkey's Leader Too Ill for Meeting":

ANKARA / 30 May 2002

Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, recovering after being hospitalized twice in the past month, was not well enough to attend a key meeting of military and political leaders on Thursday, his spokesman said.

Turkey's powerful National Security Council, which groups the country's top generals and ministers, met Thursday without him. The meeting was expected to discuss the country's efforts to join the European Union (news - web sites).

Ecevit's spokesman Cem Avci told journalists that doctors examined the premier at his home early Thursday and "decided his condition was not suitable for attending a long meeting." Avci did not elaborate about Ecevit's health.

Avci said Ecevit telephoned Turkey's President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who leads the council's meetings, to say he would be unable to attend.

After Ecevit was discharged from hospital earlier this week, he said he would probably attend the meeting.

His absence is likely to fuel fears that Ecevit is not well enough to run the government. His ill health has already shaken financial markets with fears he might resign.

Ecevit's three-party coalition government is largely held together by the premier's personal authority.

There are also fears that Ecevit's withdrawal could jeopardize a recovery program, backed by billions of dollars of international loans, that aims to end a deep economic crisis.

Ecevit is suffering from a broken rib and circulatory troubles in a leg.

Turkish newspapers have speculated that Ecevit also suffers from Parkinson's disease (news - web sites) and myasthenia gravis, a nerve disease characterized by weakness and muscle fatigue. The premier has neither confirmed nor denied those reports.

The Council's Thursday meeting was expected to discuss reforms that the EU has demanded from Turkey before it can open membership negotiations.

They include granting broader rights for Turkey's estimated 12 million Kurds, who are not recognized as an official minority, and abolishing the death penalty.

Ecevit's nationalist coalition partners have objected to the EU's demands, and insisted that Abdullah Ocalan — leader of a Kurdish rebel group whose struggle for autonomy has cost some 37,000 lives since 1984 — should be hung.

3. - Eurasianet - "Armenia, Turkey take steps towards rapprochement":

ISTANBUL / 29 May 2002 / by Jon Gorvett

After decades of hostility, there are now signs that two of the Caucasus’ staunchest foes – Armenia and Turkey – are seriously exploring a rapprochement. Improved Armenian-Turkish ties could have a broad stabilizing effect across the Caucasus, improving the potential for a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement and enhancing the prospects for regional energy development projects.

A May 15 meeting involving the foreign ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, taking place on the fringes of the NATO summit in Reykjavik, Iceland, served as the catalyst for the new dialogue between Yerevan and Ankara. While the three parties have kept quiet about the particulars of the Reykjavik meeting, a number of surprise developments since then have provided strong clues that Armenia and Turkey are prepared to engage in a normalization process.

"I don’t think we’re witnessing any imminent restoration of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia," commented a spokesman for the Turkish foreign ministry, "but there are some positive moves being made."

The first of these indicators came on May 25, when news broke in Turkey that Armenian President Robert Kocharian would visit Istanbul on June 25 for a meeting of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC). This is a regional body consisting of all the Black Sea littoral states, plus other interested parties such as Greece and Armenia. Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliyev is also expected to attend.

Kocharian’s visit represents a significant shift in the largely hostile relationship between Armenia on the one hand and Turkey and Azerbaijan on the other. The reasons for this hostility from Ankara run deep, having become intertwined with history, especially the events surrounding the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Armenians living under Ottoman rule during World War I.

A top foreign policy priority for Armenia is to win global recognition of the Armenian Genocide in 1915.Yerevan maintains that modern Turkey’s predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, carried out a deliberate policy of ethnic cleansing against Armenians during the war.

Turkish officials and scholars steadfastly refuse to characterize the events of 1915 as genocide. Ankara argues that at the time, Ottoman forces were trying to repel a Russian invasion of what is now eastern Turkey – an area then largely inhabited by Armenians. Hundreds of thousands of Armenians died during the struggle. Much of the suffering occurred because of an Ottoman decision to deport the entire Armenian population, which was perceived by Ottoman leaders as being pro-Russian, away from the front lines to the southeast.

In recent years, the Armenian communities in the United States and France have mobilized to advocate for international recognition of the Genocide. Turkey has strongly objected to genocide recognition attempts. Every April, when the Armenians commemorate the slaughter, there is usually a noticable deterioration in bilateral relations.

Another second source of Armenian-Turkish tension has been the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Starting in 1988, neighbors Azerbaijan and Armenia fought a war in which some 30,000 people died over the enclave, which lies within Azerbaijan but which is inhabited mostly by ethnic Armenians. Armenian forces emerged victorious, and ended up occupying a large chunk of Azerbaijani territory adjoining Karabakh. Since 1994, the enclave has been under the control of an unrecognized ethnic Armenian government.

As Azerbaijan’s strongest ally in the region, Turkey imposed a blockade on Armenia, essentially shutting off Yerevan’s road and rail links to the West. Until now, Turkey has maintained that a normalization of relations with Yerevan can happen only if Armenian forces withdraw from occupied Azerbaijani territory.

Turkey also alleges that Armenia still holds territorial claims on Turkish soil, and given such weighty problems, Turkish-Armenian relations have long been written off by many observers. Armenia’s closeness to Russia, with Turkey a strong US ally, and Ankara and Moscow long term rivals for influence in the Caucasus, seemed to mean the old Cold War division was set to continue. However, a variety of geopolitical developments, in particular the post-September 11 campaign against terrorism, have exerted pressure on Armenia and Turkey to resolve their differences.

Prior to the launch of the anti-terrorism offensive, tentative attempts to explore reconciliation had stalled, the most visible effort being the formation of the now inactive Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan said the Reykjavik meeting provided important momentum to the normalization process.

"All three of us [Reykjavik participants] behaved as equal partners, each country committing itself to contribute to the improvement of the situation in the region," Oskanyan was quoted as saying by the Armenian newspaper Azg on May 21.

Larger geopolitical developments are helping foster a favorable diplomatic atmosphere. At their recent summit, US President George W. Bush and Russian leader Vladimir Putin pledged to work together to promote settlements to Caucasus conflicts, including Karabakh and Abkhazia. Oskanyan also noted that improved NATO-Russian ties could have important stabilization ramifications for Armenia. "The closer Russia-NATO ties get, the more effective Armenia’s complimentary policy will be," he said.

Meanwhile, Putin is due to visit Turkey this summer for the opening of the Blue Stream pipeline, a natural gas conduit lain along the floor of the Black Sea that will bring Russian energy to the Turkish market. Turkey’s relations with Russia are now better than they have been for many years, as growing economic ties have pulled the two countries closer together. This too may influence the Armenian issue.

Editor’s Note: Jon Gorvett is a freelance journalist based in Istanbul.

4. - Sabah - "Cem: Our steps forward are for the sake of Turkey, not the EU":

In an interview in the current issue of Turkish magazine Aktuel, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem offers his views on Turkey’s relations with the European Union.

Criticizing certain domestic political circles who are well known for their anti-EU ideas, Cem states that democratization, enhancing human rights and abolition of the death penalty should be considered positive steps for the development and welfare of Turkey itself rather than concessions to be made for the sake of EU membership.

Cem remarks that since the Turkish government has already made significant progress on its path towards the EU, Turkey would never miss the EU train. “The accession period might drag out longer than expected, which would result in a delay and loss of current opportunities,” says Cem.

“However, such a delay would never adversely affect Turkey. In other words, contrary to what some domestic circles insistently claim, our country would neither be in need of some other countries’ interference to develop nor would it shrink from democratization. I believe that fulfilling the EU’s Copenhagen criteria would greatly contribute to Turkey’s economic and social development.”

5. - Radio Free Europe - "Turkey: Facing Oversupply, Ankara May Sell Excess Gas":

Turkey is reportedly trying to sell some of the gas that it planned to import after years of denying that it would face a problem of oversupply. The effect on pipeline investments by several countries remains unclear as Ankara maneuvers to avoid penalties for contracts it has signed.

BOSTON / 30 May 2002 / by Michael Lelyveld

Turkish energy officials have opened talks to sell excess natural gas to other countries, less than two weeks after voicing concern that reports on the surplus could damage its state-owned pipeline company.

The latest sign of a gas glut could affect plans for new pipelines to Turkey, which has signed a series of agreements with countries including Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan.

Speaking at a conference in Istanbul, Energy Minister Zeki Cakan said on 23 May that "a number of parties" were interested in buying cargoes of liquified natural gas (LNG) that Turkey is scheduled to import from Algeria and Nigeria this year.

IBS Research and Consultancy, an Istanbul-based consulting firm, said that some companies have approached Turkey, seeking surplus LNG cargoes on the spot market. The Turkish state pipeline company Botas is sending a delegation to Algiers, IBS said.

Cakan's statement may be meant as an assurance that Turkey will find ways to deal with its oversupply problem after a long period of denying its existence. Ankara has relied on inflated demand forecasts for years in signing a long list of gas contracts with foreign suppliers. Turkey has struggled since February 2001 with an economic slump that has sharply reduced its growth in energy use.

But officials have only recently started to cope with the consequences of signing too many take-or-pay contracts. Two weeks ago, Cakan lectured the press for reporting that Botas would have to pay Iran and Russia for gas that it would not use this year, saying it was "hurting" the company.

Cakan said, "Speculations that Botas has paid $170 million extra for unconsumed gas in the first three months and will have paid $500 million for unused gas by the end of the year are untrue, fraudulent, and ill-intentioned," the "Turkish Daily News" reported.

But in the same week, the London-based magazine"The Economist" said that "Turkey is looking for ways out of its excessive gas purchase commitments." The weekly concluded that until revised agreements are reached with suppliers, "Botas will either have to take gas it cannot use, or pay a penalty for having badly misjudged its needs."

Turkey at first denied it would have to pay Iran a penalty after taking delivery of only about half the contracted amount of gas in the first quarter of the year. But the National Iranian Gas Company warned Turkey that "it will still have to pay the price for the whole amount even if [it] doesn't import."

"The Economist" reported that Turkish officials have been pursuing several possible solutions, including offering longer purchase pledges in return for reduced contract terms now. The problem is that Turkey's growth forecasts and contract commitments are already too high. According to the latest Botas estimates, the country will use 24 percent less gas than it has contracted to buy this year.

Selling all the LNG purchased from Algeria and Nigeria to other countries could reduce the oversupply to 4 percent, assuming that the Botas forecast is right. "The Economist" suggested that it may be about 12 percent high. But other proposed solutions seem to make even less sense.

Two weeks ago, Botas General Manager Gokhan Bildaci said Turkey could use underground storage in Ukraine for excess gas, if needed. But most of Turkey's gas comes from Russia, which is negotiating to use the same storage facilities as part of a long-term deal with Ukraine. Russia's $2.5 billion pipeline across the Black Sea known as Blue Stream is due to increase the gas flow to Turkey later this year.

Bildaci also said Turkey could build LNG terminals to sell gas to the United States when fuel starts to arrive from the Caspian Sea. One analyst contacted by RFE/RL, who asked not to be identified, called that idea "zany," noting that the price would be prohibitive. "The Economist" said the global market for LNG is already oversupplied.

Ironically, Turkey's belated attempts to deal with the oversupply problem come just as its economy is showing the first signs of life in over a year.

The government recently reported that industrial production in March jumped 18.7 percent from a year earlier, pushing output for the first quarter up 3.5 percent. Analysts warned that the activity may be due to inventory adjustment, but any activity is welcome after Turkey's two economic crises since 1999.

Even if recovery comes, it may be too little and too late to justify the investments that countries like Russia and Iran have made in pipelines to serve Turkey's growth.

Although Turkmenistan has made no progress on a route to supply Turkey with gas by 2005, Azerbaijan plans to start building a new line through Georgia. The Turkish gas glut is raising concerns in Baku. This week, Ilham Aliev, vice president of the Azerbaijani state oil company SOCAR, gave assurances that there would be other customers for gas from its offshore Shah Deniz field if Turkey fails to honor its purchase agreement, the Turan news agency and RFE/RL reported.

All the rivals now hope that their gas can pass through Turkey to Europe, but it seems far from certain that all will succeed.

Turkey's bid to divert its gas supplies from Algeria and Nigeria may mark a first step toward redirecting some of the resources that it has previously tried to attract. But the effect on investment remains unclear after years of planning for growth that has been delayed.

6. - Turkish Daily News - "If the death penalty is to be retained let us solve Cyprus":

The MHP must not block this country's path. If the death penalty is going to be used as vote-getting material at all costs, let us at least give priority to Cyprus. Let the MHP adopt a different stance on this issue. Cyprus is much more crucial for Turkey in the short run

Opinion by M. Ali Birand

I cannot believe that the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) has taken such a stance. Maybe it has always been like that. Obviously we came to harbor a wrong impression about that party because we were overoptimistic.

The Turkey picture on the MHP's mind definitely does not inspire hope in the young generation. The Turkey the MHP dreams about is an inward-looking country without vision suffering from complexes, a country who cannot think big and is not capable of growing in its own region to reach an international power status, a poor country that plays always in the Second League. These people have no right to create such a country by blocking Turkey's path.

Look at this picture...

MHP leader Bahceli is doing politics over Ocalan's "neck." He is trying to transform into votes the quarrel on Ocalan's death sentence.

Furthermore, his ultimate goal is not having Ocalan executed. He knows that he cannot be executed. Besides, the MHP figures themselves who were among the officials who postponed the execution two years ago and then signed a document in favor of the abolition of the death penalty.

Yet, Bahceli now turns to his coalition partners and says, "Let us be, ostensibly, insisting on this issue. Let us make it seem that you yourselves are pardoning him with the help of the opposition. In that case I will not bring the coalition to an end. I would just close my eyes to that development."

This approach amounts to "ignoring the country's long-term interests for the sake of short-term party interests," does it not?

Just at that spot the military come up and do the thing that the MHP should have done, suggesting a new arrangement in place of the death penalty. Yet, the military are more highly sensitized on the Ocalan issue than any other group. If they insisted that Ocalan's death sentence should be enforced, one could understand that. They have fought against Ocalan's outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and lost men in that fight.

Despite that, when the country's long-term interests are at stake, the military choose to view the issues in a realistic manner and adopt an approach that strikes a balance between the realities and the sensitivities.

The politicians are failing in the test while the military are moving into a higher class.

Let us save at least Cyprus during this fight

It has become obvious how the MHP will act from now on.

Using nationalistic-heroic-patriotic slogans, it will not move a finger on those problems that are blocking Turkey's path. It will do all it can to satisfy its grassroots.

Yet, during the next few months, another issue that is probably more important and urgent than the death penalty and Kurdish language issues, will have to be resolved. That issue is Cyprus.

The death penalty and the Kurdish issues may perhaps be left to the coalition governments expected to serve in the wake of the next general election. These two issues can be shelved for some time at the risk of not being able of obtaining from the European Union a specific date for the start of EU-Turkey accession talks. Though that would entail major damage, we could grit our teeth and wait.

Cyprus, on the other hand, is a different kettle of fish.

On the Cyprus issue, there is a clear deadline.

Either a solution will be found in October, or at the latest, in November this year, or Cyprus will be lost. Maybe, for some time, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) will not be lost and the Turkish presence will continue, but, in the long run, Turkey will pay a much higher price for Cyprus. (I will try to explain the nature of that price in future articles.)

It is because of two reasons that I am saying that Cyprus is much more important for Turkey:

* Cyprus is one of the biggest international obstacles on the country's path. As long as that obstacle is not removed, Turkey will not be able to join the EU. Even if it abandoned its attempt to join the EU, Turkey would not be at ease in the international arena.

A Turkey that has missed its EU rendezvous but managed to resolve the Cyprus issue, would be able to breath more easily. A Turkey that has failed to solve Cyprus, and at the same time, missed the EU boat, would hardly be able to "breathe."

* Even if it acts a little belatedly in complying with the EU's Copenhagen criteria, a Turkey that has found a solution in Cyprus may still be able to get a certain perspective -- if not a specific date -- from the EU's year end Copenhagen summit for the start of the accession talks.

During my talks with the EU circles in recent weeks, I felt that Cyprus is increasingly coming into the foreground. As weeks pass, the EU comes under strain, seeing that a lack of a solution in Cyprus will entail a very high cost. This is why it is viewing Ankara in a different light. The EU circles stress that compliance with the Copenhagen criteria can materialize eventually, even with some delay, whereas, in the Cyprus case, the boat may be missed on a no-return basis.

I wonder whether the MHP leaders think about that.

I wonder whether they intend to balance out with the Cyprus issue, the hard-line stance they have taken on the EU issue.

I do not know.

The only thing I know is that it is high time the MHP made a choice. Since it can hardly act any way it wants on virtually all issues, should it not reassess its Cyprus stance?