27.
July 2002
2. "Turkish PM moots early election", Mr. Ecevit has not spoken in public for two months
3. "Turkish Premier's Wife Is Key Ally", when some 3,000 people came to Ankara to wish Turkey's ailing prime minister a speedy recovery, his wife jumped on top of a bus used during election campaigns, grabbed a microphone and addressed the crowd.
4. "The Iraq equation: How to subtract Hussein", president Kennedy had his Bay of Pigs. Now concern that a misstep in Iraq could leave President Bush with something similar - like a "Bay of Basra" - is influencing deliberations over how to carry out the president's order to depose Saddam Hussein.
5. "Is Turkey turning toward the east?", some recent events made observers question whether Turkish foreign policy was turning eastward
6. "EU Discussions: The current state of Turkey's EU bid", in a strange coincidence, those against Kemalism are in favour of entering the EU unconditionally.
1. - AP - "Turkey premier plans to return in 3 weeks":
Istanbul, 6-27-2002, by Ben Holland
Turkey's premier, too ill to work for most of the last two months,
underwent medical tests yesterday and said he was making a good recovery
and expected to be back on the job within three weeks.
In Bulent Ecevit's absence, financial markets have plunged amid fears
that he might be forced to withdraw, perhaps leading to the fall of
his government and triggering elections in Turkey, a NATO member and
a key US ally in the anti-terror campaign. Last week, Turkish peacekeepers
took command of the international force in Kabul, Afghanistan.
But Ecevit, 77, said after the hospital tests that doctors had told
him he was recovering and could return to work after resting at home
for two or three weeks more.
Ecevit has been unable to work for two months after suffering intestinal
problems, a vein infection, a cracked rib, and a spinal injury.
Ecevit is seen as the main force holding the three-party coalition
government together, and in his absence divisions appear to have widened.
Nationalists in the government threaten to block reforms, such as
lifting the death penalty and granting Kurds wider rights, that are
crucial for Turkey's long-term goal of European Union membership.
Financial markets have hit new lows almost daily. Yesterday, the Istanbul
benchmark stock index dropped to 8,627 in early trading, down more
than 5 percent from Tuesday's close. The lira hit a record low of
around 1.63 million against the dollar.
Turkey has won praise from the United States as a model Muslim society
- a stable democracy that supports the anti-terror campaign.
While the government has a clear parliamentary majority and could
survive under another leader, it is not clear if anyone but Ecevit
could hold the fragile coalition together. 
2. - BBC World - "Turkish PM moots early election":
Ankara, 06-27-2002
Mr Ecevit has not spoken in public for two months
Turkey's ailing Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, has made a statement
which appears to acknowledge that elections could be brought forward
from 2004.
Speaking at a party meeting in the capital Ankara, he said he did
not want to see early elections but added that they were "on
the horizon" and urged his party's MPs to spend the summer with
their voters.
The 77-year-old prime minister has been under pressure from the opposition to step down as a long list of ailments have kept him away from the office since early May.
Thursday's speech was his first in public for two months.
Correspondents say he was apparently unable to walk up the steps to deliver his speech from the podium and had to speak into microphones on the floor.
Recovery programme
Earlier this week a group of MPs from Mr Ecevit's own Democratic Left Party called on him to step down from the party leadership. They are concerned about increasing divisions within the three-party governing coalition.
Mr Ecevit has argued that early elections would derail an economic recovery programme backed by $16bn in loans from the International Monetary Fund.
He has been suffering from intestinal problems, a vein infection, a cracked rib and a spinal injury - but has insisted he will remain in office, and that there will be no election until the scheduled date of 2004.
Markets have been nervous in recent weeks, with stocks falling amid
speculation that the government would collapse if Mr Ecevit's health
forced him to quit.
3. - AP - "Turkish Premier's Wife Is Key Ally":
Ankara, 6-26-2002
When some 3,000 people came to Ankara to wish Turkey's ailing prime minister a speedy recovery, his wife jumped on top of a bus used during election campaigns, grabbed a microphone and addressed the crowd.
``Rehearsing for the leadership,'' the Ortadogu newspaper headlined
the next morning.
Rahsan Ecevit - the founder of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's Democratic
Left Party - has long been her husband's closest political ally, and
now many wonder if she is becoming a more powerful figure as her husband's
health deteriorates.
Newspapers say Rahsan has been running the political party and controlling
access to the 77-year-old premier, who is recuperating from a series
of illnesses at home.
``She is the gatekeeper,'' said Ilter Turan, a professor of political
science at Istanbul's Bilgi University. ``She wields influence by
manipulating access to the prime minister.''
That has left many Turks uncomfortable in the traditional society
where few women hold powerful positions.
And in a country where sultans' wives once ruled from behind the throne,
often manipulating events for their personal benefit, the idea of
a powerful wife wielding control is especially troubling.
After doctors advised Ecevit to work from home last month, a cartoon
in one of Turkey's leading newspapers showed the prime minister ironing
the laundry while Rahsan shouted at him to do the dishes next.
Rahsan, 78, has been meeting daily with party officials. But newspapers
say she has been blocking Husamettin Ozkan, long regarded as Ecevit's
right-hand man, from seeing the prime minister. It is not clear, the
papers say, whether this is due to personal tensions between Ozkan
and Rahsan or whether she is trying to limit the influence of a potential
rival.
Ecevit has been holding meetings at his home since May while he recovers
from intestinal problems, a vein infection, a cracked rib and a spinal
injury. He has said he will return to work if a medical check goes
well on Wednesday. He has not said what he will do if the results
are poor.
Ecevit admits that his wife is his key confidant. The two met during
their last year of high school while helping stage a school in 1944.
They married the following year. They have no children.
``If it weren't for Rahsan, I wouldn't have been this successful in
politics,'' Ecevit told journalist Mehmet Cetingulec, who is wrote
a book about the couple. ``Her political intuitions are very strong.''
When Ecevit was imprisoned following the 1980 military coup, Rahsan
acted as a go-between for her husband and his allies. She founded
the Democratic Left Party in 1985 when the generals barred Ecevit
from politics and nurtured the party until his return in 1987. She
remains the party's deputy chairwoman and picks the party's top candidates.
Critics refer to the party as the ``Ecevits' Party'' and speak of
decisions made ``in the family assembly.''
``The Democratic Left Party is as of now only 'Mrs. Rahsan's Party''',
Okay Gonensin, a commentator for Sabah newspaper, wrote recently.
When members of the state-owned meat and fisheries organization wanted
to ask for a postponement of the company's privatization, they lobbied
Rahsan. Ecevit later granted their wishes.
The couple have been criticized for the dictatorial style in which
they have led the party, crushing dissent and eliminating rivals.
That style has become a crucial factor now, as party officials realize
that there is no other powerful figure in the party and therefore
no clear successor to Ecevit if his health further fails.
support to lead the party herself.
Rahsan, who dresses simply and is an uncharismatic speaker, is widely
reviled in the press.
``Let's put it bluntly: she does not radiate warmth,'' Turan said.
In some newspapers, Rahsan seems to have become a lightning rod for
criticisms of her popular husband.
Newspapers, for example, have blamed her for her husband's deteriorating
health, claiming that she insisted on his early discharge from the
hospital and later discouraged doctors from paying him home visits.
The Ecevits have denied those reports.
Many Turks also blame her for a much-criticized prison amnesty that
freed some 40,000 convicts in the past two years.
4. - The Christian Science Monitor - "The Iraq equation: How to subtract Hussein":
Washington, 06-27-2002, by Howard LaFranchi
President Kennedy had his Bay of Pigs. Now concern that a misstep in Iraq could leave President Bush with something similar - like a "Bay of Basra" - is influencing deliberations over how to carry out the president's order to depose Saddam Hussein.
Mr. Kennedy's 1961 plan to free Cuba from the Marxist Fidel Castro
using anti-Castro Cubans ended in disaster - and only bolstered a
regime that survives today. Mr. Bush has approved stepping up cooperation
with the Iraqi opposition, largely through the CIA and State Department,
with the goal of bringing down Hussein's regime.
But many in the administration continue to doubt that acoup from within
will work - at least not soon enough to stop the Iraqi leader from
using the weapons of mass destruction the US contends he possesses
or is developing. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is also jittery that even
an attack following the Afghan model - US airpower and special forces
working with armed Iraqi opposition - could not guarantee success,
sources say.
So without having made any decisions yet on exactly how or when to
move definitively for "regime change" in Iraq, the Bush
administration is working toward several options. And still alive
is the idea that a full-scale US invasion - supported by "willing"
allies but much smaller than the half-million soldiers assembled for
the Gulf War - may yet be necessary.
"The Pentagon is not ready, so what the president is doing is
keeping all the options open and advancing them all," says Richard
Murphy, a former assistant secretary of state for Near eastern affairs.
"The idea is to keep everybody busy, and maybe one [option] will
work before he has to send in our troops."
Tired of dictatorship?
Central to the debate is the question of just how strong the Iraqi
leader is.
Some civilian officials at the Pentagon and close outside advisers
contend Hussein is much weaker today than a decade ago and that US
air weaponry is more powerful and precise. Some Iraq watchers say
Hussein's support from Iraqis - truly tired of life under a ruthless
dictator - would wilt with the clear prospect of his fall. Kenneth
Adelman, former Reagan arms control adviser, said earlier this year
that taking out Hussein would be "a cakewalk."
But others reject such assurances because no one can say with certainty
how Hussein's forces will respond to a coup attempt or invasion, and
when either failure or success is likely to cause profound regional
repercussions. "It's particularly reckless and very, very dangerous
to start saying this is something that's going to be easy," says
Anthony Cordesman, a specialist in Iraq at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies in Washington. "You're not dealing
with an unsophisticated force, and it's a complex and unpredictable
situation, completely different from Afghanistan."
The complexities Mr. Cordesman cites include the level of armed-forces
loyalty to Hussein, the impact of international sanctions and nationalism
on public sentiments, the response of Kurdish and other minorities
to an attack, and the impact of a decade of limited access to the
world arms market. "Iraq remains the most effective military
power in the Gulf," he says, so the many uncertainties "can
still favor either side."
The US military brass assumes, say various sources, that the only
way to guarantee American success is through a massive enough attack
that the importance of the "intangibles" is reduced. But
the Pentagon generally isn't seen as ready to stage an operation involving
up to 200,000 soldiers before early next year. And such an attack
poses its own set of complex problems.
A chief concern for military planners is that a desperate Hussein
is likely to resort to using whatever weaponry he has. To offset that,
planners say any intervention must include as much surprise as possible,
preemptive air strikes, and pre-attack cultivation of Iraqi forces
supporting an invasion.
Another problem is that the US has been working with the Iraqi opposition
at varying levels of seriousness over the last decade, and the results
are not reassuring to many US officials. For their part, some opposition
leaders complain the US has left them in the lurch at crucial moments
in the past (reminiscent of the Bay of Pigs debacle).
In any case, US military preparedness is not the only factor in the
timing. Other elements include the status of the Afghan war, the broader
battle against Al Qaeda, the extent to which the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict continues to demand international focus, and the cultivation
of an anti-Hussein coalition.
Some experts warn against allowing an obsession with Hussein to dominate
the broader terror war.
"There's a danger that Iraq will be allowed to divide the intellectual
and physical resources you have to fight Al Qaeda," says Rohan
Gunaratna, of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political
Violence at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. "Iraq
does not pose an imminent threat to the US, but the Al Qaeda organization
does, and attention to meeting that threat should be undivided,"
says Mr. Gunaratna, author the book, "Inside Al Qaeda."
He says a strong element holding Hussein back from using weapons of
mass destruction is his status as a leader and his hold on his country
- a brake not applicable to Al Qaeda, which he says continues to work
at expanding its own arsenal.
Can't ignore links to Al Qaeda
Though Hussein's clear link to the Sept. 11 attacks hasn't been found, others say, his links to Al Qaeda can't be ignored, and the US must focus on Hussein as a global threat willing to use weapons he develops.
James Phillips, an Iraq expert at the Heritage Foundation, says the
US and the international community should work now to convince the
Iraqi military that "anyone who goes along with Hussein in using
weapons of mass destruction in a battle situation will be held just
as accountable [as Hussein]."
Mr. Phillips notes that German intelligence earlier this year concluded
that Hussein is only three years away from successfully developing
nuclear weapons. He says that prospect, plus the biological weaponry
the Iraqi leader is already assumed to possess, should be the world's
focus.
Phillips rejects the assumption that the US isn't ready for an invasion
before early next year - predicting such a move could come any time
after the summer. He concludes the number of soldiers necessary "will
be in the tens of thousands, but not the hundreds of thousands. Such
big numbers are the product of a bureaucracy that wants a wide margin
of error to act - but the evolution in airpower since [the Gulf war]
and other factors mean it's not necessary."
5, - The Daily Star - "Is Turkey turning toward the east?":
Lebanon, 06-27-2002, by Mohammad Noureddine
Three recent events made observers question whether Turkish foreign
policy was turning eastward. These events were: l the assumption by
Turkish troops of the leadership of the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Kabul; l President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's official June
17-19 visit to Iran; and l the military agreement with Syria signed
in Ankara on June 20.
The first event came as a direct result of Ankara's support for Washington
in its "war on terror" since the first minutes of the Sept.
11 attacks on New York and Washington last year.
That Turkish position was wholly in keeping with the Western orientation
of Turkish state policy as laid down by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1923
a policy that was further enhanced after World War II.
Turkey's support for the US "war on terror" also goes hand
in glove with the "1,000-year war" that Chief of Staff General
Huseyin Kivrikoglu declared against Islamist forces inside the country
and on their supporters abroad.
Turkey's position also resulted from the fact that the country is
an important pillar of American strategy in a region extending from
the Balkans in the west to Central Asia and China in the east.
The United States, for its part, desperately needed the backing of
Muslim states in its war against the Islamists of Afghanistan so as
not to give the impression of waging a crusade against Islam. The
Americans succeeded by enlisting Pakistan and Turkey to their cause.
This support was not without its price, however. The Turks received
billions of dollars to shore up their ailing economy courtesy of the
US via the International Monetary Fund. This generous aid was also
intended to demonstrate to the Islamic world the benefits to be gleaned
from secularism.
Turkey was also rewarded with a "global role" which allowed
its forces to lead the peacekeeping force in Afghanistan for six months.
The Turkish mission (which will cost $230 million) will be paid for
by Washington.
There is no doubt that allowing Turkey to play this role in Afghanistan
was a success for Ankara's foreign policy, especially since it is
a leading role that many other countries coveted. Success in the Kabul
mission would only enhance Turkey's international status.
There are already several factors that would favor Turkish success.
Afghanistan thanks to the Loya Jirga, which elected Hamid Karzai president,
who, in turn, appointed a new government has completed laying down
the foundations for its civil institutions. This means that Turkey
will be leading the ISAF at a time when Afghanistan has returned to
being a proper state once again. Turkey, moreover, enjoys excellent
relations with the Afghan people going back to the 1930s, and has
blood ties with the Uzbeks one of the important ethnic groups in Afghanistan
(Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum, a key to war and peace in the country,
has extremely close ties with Turkey).
That is not to say the ISAF's new commander, General Akin Zorlu, will
have an easy ride.
The ISAF's remit is limited to Kabul, while the rest of Afghanistan is effectively out of control. Even Kabul itself is a frequent target for inbound missiles, and ISAF soldiers are still targeted by remnants of the Taleban.
These dangers are intensified by the ongoing feuds between various Afghan tribes, as well as by the fact that both Mullah Mohammed Omar and Osama bin Laden are still at large.
In short, it is not an easy mission. By making a success of it, however,
Turkey can be sure of landing bigger roles in future.
The second defining event was President Sezer's groundbreaking two-day
trip to Tehran starting June 17. For the first time, a Turkish leader
was allowed to visit Iranian Azerbaijan, a region which is home to
almost 20 million Azeris a people intimately related to the Turks.
Also for the first time, a department of Turkish studies was opened
at Tehran University. Sezer could talk about Kemal Ataturk in Tehran
without eliciting the negative reactions such words would have evoked
in the past.
In a significant gesture, Sezer spoke of giving priority to economic
cooperation with Iran a country the US classifies as forming part
of an "axis of evil."
From the Iranian side, it was remarkable to hear President Mohammed
Khatami's wholehearted support for Turkey's membership of the European
Union. "Iran," Khatami declared, "also has an interest
in having Turkey join the EU." This Iranian position shows that
Khatami is much more enlightened than those Turkish politicians who
still oppose EU membership.
Sezer's historic visit to Iran, therefore, opened a completely new
page in relations for the two neighbors as well as for the Middle
East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, the traditional zones of rivalry
between Islamist Iran and secular Turkey.
Which brings us to the third significant event: the signing of a military
cooperation agreement between Turkey and Syria.
Indeed, this agreement, signed by General Kivrik-oglu for Turkey and
his counterpart General Hassan Turkmani for Syria, could be seen as
a historic pact in its own right, coming as it did after 20 years
of tension that characterized relations between the two neighbors
who almost came to blows in the fall of 1998.
The Syrian-Turkish accord, which represented a turning point in bilateral relations, was not born in a vacuum. It was the culmination of three years of confidence-building efforts in the economic, security, social, cultural, and sports fields. President Sezer's participation in the funeral of the late Syrian President Hafez Assad in June 2000 went some way toward breaking the ice between the two neighbors.
The agreement was a reflection of the desire of both Ankara and Damascus
to forget the past and look forward to the future.
greement did not favor one party at the expense of the other. Syria, engaged in a bitter confrontation with Israel, and subjected to intense international pressure, was eager to secure its northern flank. The agreement did just that. Turkey, for its part, is going through a severe economic crisis; this agreement will open the door to greater economic cooperation not only with Syria, but also with the entire Arab world. The agreement will also enhance Turkey's regional role (together with Sezer's visit to Iran) regarding the future of Iraq. Turkey, Syria, and Iran can now speak with one voice regarding their opposition to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq.
The new agreement, moreover, provides for better relations between
the Arab world and Turkey quite separately from the relations Ankara
maintains with Tel Aviv. It will deny the Israelis exclusive access
to Turkey. The agreement, however, is sure to elicit strong Israeli
opposition. Israel's Turkish allies will undoubtedly seek to undermine
the agreement or marginalize its effects. However, the fact that the
chief of staff himself signed it will guarantee its implementation.
So, Turkey has made great strides eastwards at a time when its westerly
relations are passing through a period of crisis, what with the Cyprus
issue and EU conditions for Turkish membership.
Have these problems with the EU anything to do with Turkey's turning
eastwards? Perhaps. Yet, it is more likely that Turkey's eastward
direction is more fundamental than that.
6. - Cumhuriyet - "EU Discussions: The current state of Turkey's EU bid":
06-27-2002, by Toktamis Ates
I would like to emphasize the fact that I am in favor of Turkey’s entrance to the EU and do not want to think of Turkey being left out of the organization. I believe that such a situation would be disaster for our nation.
But... There are two points coming after this ‘but.’ The first one is the reluctance of an significant majority of the EU member countries to admit Turkey into the Union in the foreseeable future. The second one is that it is undignified to accept all the conditions put forth by the EU in order to enter the organization.
Some writers and ‘know-it-all’s are displaying a dishonorable stand on the issue. If people merely voice the concerns on their minds, they are immediately labeled as being against the country’s admittance to the EU. These labelers think that no fears should be expressed, and all concessions be made without batting an eye and no bargaining should take place. These spineless people who see the EU as the guarantee of rights and democracy ironically adopt an antidemocratic stand against those who do not think in exactly as they do.
In Turkey the ruling power defends the admittance of the country into the Union. However, even though some want it unconditionally, some others believe that necessary bargaining should be made and some measures should be taken. In Turkey, the circles against the EU can be found mostly among the low-income sections. Such a discussion took place over Kemalism in Turkey some time ago. They had claimed that those defending Kemalism had benefited the most from the establishment. In fact, they were the ones availing themselves of the benefits of the established order. If there had not been Kemalist enlightenment, where would they have been? How much academic knowledge could they have acquired?
In a strange coincidence, those against Kemalism are in favor of
entering the EU unconditionally. It seems that we will discuss this
question for a long time to come.