24 June 2002

1. "Opposition following the footstep of the MHP", the DYP and AKP, both of which address the same conservative constituency as the MHP, are fearing that the nationalist party might organize the conservative electorate by itself through its discourse supporting the death penalty and are therefore forced to support MHP policies to preserve this punishment at the expense of abandoning their pro-European Union rhetoric and losing credibility.

2. "Turkey seeks launch date for accession talks", European Union enlarge-ment negotiations took a new twist at the Seville summit after Turkey demanded a date for starting accession talks during December's Copenhagen summit.

3. "Possible decision on Turkey's EU membership talks this year:draft", the European Union could take a decision to admit Turkey to membership talks this year, according to draft conclusions prepared for an EU summit here on Saturday. The draft said a decision could be taken at the EU's Copenhagen summit in December.

4. "Council of Europe Torture Prevention Committee Appeals to Improve Ocalan Prison Conditions", the Committee for the Prevention of Torture affiliated with the CoE, which last year carried out inspections in prisons in Turkey and Kurdistan, has called for the prison conditions of KADEK General Chairman Abdullah Ocalan to be improved, and for him to be given his rights.

5. "Council of Europe Torture Prevention Committee Appeals to Improve Ocalan Prison Conditions", the Committee for the Prevention of Torture affiliated with the CoE, which last year carried out inspections in prisons in Turkey and Kurdistan, has called for the prison conditions of KADEK General Chairman Abdullah Ocalan to be improved, and for him to be given his rights.

6. "Iraq's Kurds: A Key to Stability", this article by Nechirvan Barzani was originally presented at a international conference hosted by the American University Center for Global Peace and Mustafa Barzani Scholar of Global Studies in Washington D.C. on June 8.

1. - Turkish Daily News - "Opposition following the footstep of the MHP":

The DYP and AKP, both of which address the same conservative constituency as the MHP, are fearing that the nationalist party might organize the conservative electorate by itself through its discourse supporting the death penalty and are therefore forced to support MHP policies to preserve this punishment at the expense of abandoning their pro-European Union rhetoric and losing credibility.

ANKARA / 24 June 2002 / by Kemal Balci

The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) is trying to secure a victory by applying a very famous Turkish combat tactic on its political rivals. The crescent move, which aims to lure the enemy towards the front line, siege them on the sides and terminate them once and for all, is a trap that inexperienced enemy troops easily fall for. The MHP is now about to erase its rivals True Path Party (DYP) and Justice and Development Party (AKP) from the political scene through the crescent move.

The DYP and AKP, both of which address the same conservative constituency as the MHP, are fearing that the latter might organize the conservative electorate by itself through its discourse supporting the death penalty and are therefore forced to support MHP policies to preserve this punishment at the expense of abandoning their pro-European Union rhetoric and losing credibility.

When the MHP understood that it will not be able to stop its coalition partners Motherland Party and Democratic Left Party (ANAP) from lifting the death penalty, which led it to lure the opposition to its side and lock them in its conservative cage. Thus, the MHP was seeking both to avoid the possibility of lifting the death penalty and keep the conservative constituency in Anatolia together in an anti-EU block at the elections.

Because this conservative electorate are also the grassroots of the DYP and AKP, the latter two had to fall for the MHP's trap at the expense of damaging the credibility of their pro-EU approach. Otherwise, they felt, they would lose the conservative constituency to the MHP as a whole.

Having prevented ANAP and the AKP from pursuing pro-EU policies by luring them to its own lines, the MHP will manage to veil the failure to execute Abdullah Ocalan, which will be the most damaging weapon these parties will be wielding against it at the elections. DYP leader Tansu Ciller and AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who failed to notice the trap set by the MHP, have begun to propose the most unlikely conditions to lift the death penalty. Whereas they could have caught the MHP in its own trap. If they were to openly support the bill drafted by the DSP and ANAP to lift the death penalty, the MHP would have had a hard time staying with the government.

As the MHP intends to use the execution of Abdullah Ocalan as its ace for the elections, it would then have lost its opportunity to do so and might have turned up in an unwanted position in view of the electorate. In order not to take this risk, the MHP could have used resignation as a threat against its partners and would have withdrawn from the government if that plan failed, thereby paving the way for snap polls.

The DYP and AKP would then have reached their aims, as the two opposition parties who want the government to resign as soon as possible and to be replaced with an election government. Besides an election to be held in autumn is particularly important for the AKP, because the Constitutional Court has ordered Recep Tayyip Erdogan to quit his post as a founding member of the party by September. Erdogan could have engaged in an election government and cleared the way for the passage of legislation that would have enabled him to be elected as an MP. There's no other formula that could lift the political ban on Erdogan other than an election government.

Having immobilized the opposition politically and made them dependent on itself, the MHP has now acquired the power to set the election date together with its coalition partners. The DSP, which failed to secure the necessary support from the opposition, must earn time by postponing the issue till the autumn. It will be impossible for ANAP and the DSP to lift the death penalty, which is a condition for EU membership, unless some extraordinary developments occur in this period.

Although they refrain from spelling it out loudly, some DSP and ANAP executives consider that extraordinary development as a natural death for Abdullah Ocalan in prison. In this case serious doubts would arise about Ocalan's death, but they think, by opening to all sorts of international probes, it could be proven to the international community that he died a natural death. What leads the DSP and ANAP to such a low cost but desperate solution is viewed as the MHP's crescent move, which turned out to be a relatively successful tactic.

The DSP and ANAP deputies are suggesting that in the case of Ocalan's natural death all obstacles to democratization would disappear and neither the MHP nor the DYP and the AKP, all of which come from the same conservative constituency, would have an excuse to impede the elimination of the death penalty from criminal codes.

The greatest obstacle to this desperate scenario is Abdullah Ocalan himself. Ocalan is known to be in a very healthy condition. Furthermore the state's security forces have taken all the measures for his well-being in order not to leave doubts in the international community. All efforts will be exerted to let him live and he will live no matter what.

A hot summer is awaiting the Turkish politics even though it seems to be postponed till autumn. We will inevitably live a lot of surprises and shockwaves throughout the summer. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's health, above all, keeps the door ajar for political surprises. In this atmosphere, just like the Turkish national soccer team who scores by damaging the game order of its rival, the MHP is capable of urging both its partners and opposition parties to play in its own ground and limit their actions. Meanwhile, the opposition parties are not aware that they are giving a helping hand to the MHP to achieve its goal.

The EU which is at the heart of the domestic political life, seems to maintain its position until it is understood that it also carries the key that can end the deadlock it created.

2. - Financial Times - "Turkey seeks launch date for accession talks":

SEVILLE / 24 June 2002 / by Judy Dempsey in Seville

European Union enlarge-ment negotiations took a new twist at the Seville summit after Turkey demanded a date for starting accession talks during December's Copenhagen summit.

The request by Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Turkish president, is likely to put additional pressure on Denmark, which next week takes over from Spain the EU's six-monthly rotating presidency.

Denmark is saddled with one of the most ambitious agendas of any presidency. By the Copenhagen summit, it intends to complete enlargement negotiations with up to 10 candidate countries.

Yet member states are divided over the financing of enlargement. Ireland has still to ratify the Nice Treaty, which sets out institutional changes required for enlargement. And prospects for reaching a settlement over the divided island of Cyprus are uncertain.

Since January, the United Nations has been hosting direct talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, hoping to reach a settlement before Copenhagen.

Although the EU has agreed to accept a divided island, the last thing it wants is to inherit a dispute with the potential for destabilising the region. Diplomats said Turkey, which occupied the northern part of the island in 1974 after the Greek junta tried to launch a coup, will try to link concessions over Cyprus with receiving a date for starting enlargement negotiations.

Their real concern is that enlargement, Cyprus and Turkey's demand for a date, the three issues the EU has wanted to keep separate from each other, could be used by Ankara as trade-offs ahead of Copenhagen.

In Seville, Mr Sezer said "a date should be fixed for launching full membership negotiations". If there was no definite date, "it could damage the motivation for reform in Turkey. The sincerity of the EU will be questioned by the Turkish population".

Germany and other countries oppose giving Turkey any date.

To make matters more complicated for Denmark is the defence issue. Denmark has an opt-out on EU-related military or defence issues. This means Greece, holders of the presidency from next January, will chair all the EU's Political and Security Committees specifically related to defence.

Yet Greece and Turkey are at odds over any military operations carried out by the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The wrangling over ESDP does not bode well for the EU. With Greece in the defence chair from July 1, it will have to negotiate with Turkey over resolving the long-running EU-Nato dispute. "I promise you," said an EU foreign minister, "the next six months will not be boring."

3. - AFP - "Possible decision on Turkey's EU membership talks this year:draft":

SEVILLE / 22 June 2002

The European Union could take a decision to admit Turkey to membership talks this year, according to draft conclusions prepared for an EU summit here on Saturday. The draft said a decision could be taken at the EU's Copenhagen summit in December.

"New decisions could be taken in Copenhagen on the next stage of Turkey's candidature in the light of developments in the situation," according to the draft. Turkey gained conditional EU candidate status in December 1999, but was told it could not join 12 other countries in membership talks until it had cleaned up its record on human rights and democracy. Some of the reforms required by the EU have proved politically sensitive, including a demand it abolish the death penalty and improve Kurdish minority rights.

Whether Turkey has done enough to meet the EU's demands will emerge after the European Commission issues its annual progress reports on candidates in October, the paper said. On Friday, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer urged the EU to set a date before the end of the year. Along with leaders of other candidate countries he was due to meet EU leaders on Saturday. A Turkish diplomat said the EU leaders' message was a positive signal for Ankara.

"I think its a positive step to maintain the momentum," he said, adding Turkey had also been heartened by comments on Friday by Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Pique that the EU wanted to fix a date "as soon as possible". However, some EU diplomats said at the time they were surprised by Pique's comments, and that he was speaking on his own behalf rather than the EU. One diplomat said he suspected that Pique was attempting to use words to win over Turkey, a NATO member, over to a deal on EU relations with the transatlantic military alliance which would allow the EU to send its new security force to Macedonia.

4. - Ozgur Politika - "Council of Europe Torture Prevention Committee Appeals to Improve Ocalan Prison Conditions":

18 June 2002/ translated by Kurdish Medya

The Committee for the Prevention of Torture affiliated with the CoE, which last year carried out inspections in prisons in Turkey and Kurdistan, has called for the prison conditions of KADEK General Chairman Abdullah Ocalan to be improved, and for him to be given his rights.

The Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) affiliated with the Council of Europe has sent a letter to the Ministry of Justice calling for the rights of KADEK General Chairman Abdullah Ocalan to be recognized. A delegation had toured Imrali Island last year and then drawn up a report. The Ministry of Justice will provide the final answer to the demands of the Committee.

In spite of the amendments to Article 16 of the Law on Countering Terrorism such that political prisoners in F-type prisons can have the right to telephones and open visitation, Imrali Island has, upon the wishes of the Justice Ministry, been kept separate from this policy. The fact that the CPT has drawn attention to the serious violation of Ocalan's rights, particularly in a time period during which debates over the death penalty have been ongoing in Turkey, carries a serious message. The report drawn up by the delegation in question calls for the following rights to be granted:

- He should be granted telephone privileges, and should be able to make as well as receive calls. He should be able to speak with his relatives and his lawyer;

- He should be provided a television and a radio able to receive short-wave broadcasts;

- Ocalan's status of "special imprisonment conditions" cannot continue without limit. He should be able to have contact with other prisoners;

- He should be given permission for participation in useful activities, particularly hobbies;

- He should be given permission to spend more time in the yard; this would not create a security problem;

- His being isolated in his cell, and his lack of contact with the outside, could give rise to psychological problems.

What does the report contain?

The CPT had visited prisons in Turkey and Kurdistan during the period 2 - 14 September 2001. And in its report issued last March, it had called for the isolation conditions of the KADEK General Chairman to be lifted and for him to be transferred to an environment in which he could be assured dialogue with others. The CPT report stated that "Conditions of isolation can in certain circumstances lead to inhumane and degrading treatment. Conditions of isolation should in every instance be kept as short as possible."

The report also expressed the following with regard to Ocalan: "Mr. Ocalan should be integrated as soon as possible into an environment in which he would be able to have contact with other prisoners, and in which there would be greater possibilities for various activities."

Meanwhile, the report also includes calls for the general improvement of conditions in prisons in Turkey. It points out in particular that police engage in brutal treatment of individuals in police stations, and that female prisoners also are subjected to degrading treatment. It also criticizes the fact that no efforts have been made to change the practices in interrogation rooms in police stations in Kurdistan.

5. - Ozgur Politika - "Turkey Compensation for ECHR Rights Violation Verdicts at $11 Million":

19 June 2002 / translated by Kurdish Medya

Despite the fact that we have already got accustomed to the fact that suits are being filed against Turkey at the European Court of Human Rights, the number of these suits has recently reached its peak. The ECHR has ruled against Turkey in the majority of these cases. The ECHR has already sentenced Turkey to pay indemnities amounting to $11 million. Turkey, which has already paid $1,500,000, will have to pay an additional sum of $9,5 million on grounds of the ECHR rulings handed down by 15 March 2002.

The ECHR began to discuss the suits that have been filed from Turkey in 1987. Approximately 5,000 individual suits have been filed at the ECHR against Turkey so far. The ECHR handed down its first ruling against Turkey in 1989. During these 12 years, the ECHR has ruled against Turkey in 157 cases and has ruled in favor of Turkey in nine cases. Friendly agreements were reached with regard to 400 cases.

Some 1,500 suits have been filed against Turkey from the Kurdish provinces. In this regard, these provinces have filed the highest number of suits against Turkey. The majority of these suits are related to the 1990-1996 period, during which a war was waged in Kurdistan. These suits complain about the burning of the villages, the unsolved murders, the summary executions, and torture.

The People Will Pay the Price for the War

The people in Turkey will have to pay the price for the human rights violations. Not being able to cope with the fines that Turkey has been sentenced to pay, the government has decided to establish a fund in order to pay indemnities to those who were wronged. The government aims to pay these indemnities with the taxes that will be collected from the sales of alcoholic drinks, cigarettes, and vehicles and with the donations.

Within the framework of the EU process, great emphasis has recently been put on the 20-article draft law pertaining to meeting the damages caused by terrorism and the struggle against terrorism. By passing this law, Turkey, which is facing difficulties in paying the fines, aims to decrease the number of the suits that will be filed at the ECHR and to pay indemnities to those who have not chosen to file suits at the ECHR.

Commissions that will be headed by the province deputy governors and that will consist of representatives from the province organizations, the security directorate or the gendarmerie, and professional institutions will be established at the instructions of the Interior Ministry in order to determine the damages. The commissions will complete their studies on the applications within three months. They will be able to receive information and assistance from the relevant institutions. Furthermore, these commissions will be able to assign public workers as experts.

Those who cannot afford to attend the meetings on the damages suffered by their relatives will receive travel expenses. After determining the nature of the damages, the commissions will decide how these damages will be compensated and will determine the amount of the indemnities.

6. - Turkish Daily News - "Iraq's Kurds: A Key to Stability":

24 June 2002 / Nechirvan Barzani

Iraq's population is made up of two major nationalities - Arabs and Kurds - and other groups, including Turkmen, Assyrians and Chaldeans. Iraq is considered the cradle of one of the oldest civilizations. Yet, present Iraq is not only faced with serious internal difficulties, it is also finds itself in a difficult position with its neighbors, and within the international community.

Iraq's problems emanate from its crisis of government. Since its establishment in 1921 Iraq has not managed to have a truly merited system of government, a system that could mirror the multiethnic and religious nature of the community, and secure a peaceful existence for its inhabitants. A minority has always ruled the majority, and often the people have suffered the tribulations of one-man rule. The Iraqi citizen has, therefore, had no chance to enjoy his rights, his freedoms, or his individual identity. The consequences of this has been instability at home and confrontation abroad. Today Iraq is seen as a pariah in the international community, saddled with burdensome economic sanctions.

Real change is, therefore, needed in the relationship of the people with the authority, and also in the manner in which Iraq deals with its neighbors and the world beyond. A credible political system is required that will enable the country to live in peace with itself, and in harmony with the outside world, a system capable of narrowing that ever-widening gap between itself and the people.

Iraq must face up to the alienation of many segments of the society, to the root causes of the brain drain, and the fleeing of so many of its citizens seeking refuge and asylum elsewhere. It needs to rethink and make up for the inhumane and racist manner in which Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, and Chaldeans have been treated.

The Iraqi state's problem from its inception parallels the existence of the Kurdish question in the country. Apart from the general injustice and the unequal treatment of the rest of the community, the inability to resolve the Kurdish problem has been at the base of Iraq's politically unstable and socially disrupted internal order. Overwhelmed by the consequences of its own policies, Iraq's belligerent stance has transcended its borders where in the last two gulf wars we have seen the evidence.

Iraq could enjoy peace and harmony once it tackles and resolves its central issues. The following may be considered as a part of those possible solutions:

First, the Iraq of tomorrow needs to be a democratic, parliamentary, federal state where its energy and performance would be directed towards progress, the pursuit of the public welfare, harmony, and order within the society; effecting a more equitable distribution of justice and resources to all parts and segments of the community.

Second the people of Kurdistan, proportionate to their numerical strength, must participate in the central authority in Baghdad, where they will shoulder their responsibility in rebuilding and preserving the tranquility of the country as a whole. Within the Kurdistan Region, a fully functioning federal system must be established in accordance with an Iraqi federal constitution. We stand for a democratic resolution of the Kurdish problem on the basis of federalism, within the framework of a federal democratic Iraq.

We believe the preservation of the experiment of the people of Kurdistan and the enhancement of its achievements to be an important responsibility of the future Iraqi political system.

For the achievement of the freedom that they enjoy today, the Kurds have struggled long and hard, and for the defense and protection of which they remain forever prepared. The Iraq of tomorrow must not only be an entity capable of comprehending the meaning of that freedom, but it must also share the burden of protecting it.

Those Kurdish areas (Kirkuk, Khaneqin, Shekhan, Sinjar, Zummar and Mandaly), where the government has been trying to forcibly change the ethnic and demographic identity of the land and the people must rejoin the territory of our region and all racist measures against Kurds, Turkmen and other ethnic groups must be rescinded.

The Kurds who constitute more than 25 percent of Iraq's population can be an important factor of stability in the Iraq of the future. Events of the last 10 years in Kurdistan clearly confirm the fact that when given the opportunity the Kurds can play an active role in the stability, the establishment of democracy and the rebuilding of the country.

May I at this point request your indulgence and briefly touch upon a few other points:

1. Observers everywhere will attest to the fact that in spite of difficulties and unforeseen circumstances, the last 10 years of the Kurdistan people's experiment has been a noticeable achievement for the people of the region. Today in Kurdistan there exists a free and democratic political system that can act as a model for the Iraq of the future.

2. The Kurds' relationship, be it with Shiite and Sunni Arabs or with other ethnic groups in Iraq, during our history of coexistence together, has been a positive one. Kurdistan has always been a place of sanctuary and refuge for those fleeing from persecution. The Kurds can justifiably claim the justice of their cause, and that they have never acted in a spirit of hatred or revenge. For example, during the uprising of March 1991, and in spite of the bitter legacy of the Anfal, war of chemical weapons, and other crimes committed against the people of kurdistan, some 120.000 Iraqi officers and soldiers who were captured or who surrendered, were freed unharmed. In spite of the difficult circumstances of the struggle of our people and the Iraqi government's cruel policies, guided by Barzani's advice and leadership, at no time have we allowed the dispute between us and successive regimes in Iraq to become a war between Kurds and Arabs.

3. The performance of the last 10 years in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region proves that the Kurds can be a factor of peace and stability in the region. Regardless of many hurdles put in our path, persistent efforts have been made in developing relations based on friendship, and other avenues of cooperation with our neighboring countries. In spite of the length of the borders we share with our neighbors we have tried to minimize problems arising from that situation, as we have refrained from interference in their internal affairs.

4. In spite of adverse propaganda against the Kurds, a good level of relationship has been developed with Arab countries. In addition, friendly and enduring contacts have been established with a number of Arab cultural and religious organizations and personalities.

5. On the international level and taking advantage of the small opportunity given to us, we have managed to knock on many doors in the international arena and have been able to build reasonably good relations. We believe we have gained knowledge and experience that have served well the interests of the people of Kurdistan, as well as those of Iraq in general.

Taking the above realities into consideration, we can confidently say that the Iraqi Kurdistan experiment can perhaps be duplicated, throughout the country and act as a transforming link between present and future Iraq, the kind of Iraq that will be capable of offering solutions to the chronic crisis of government and the Kurdish problem.

We the people of Kurdistan, who have not abused the rights of others - on the contrary we have suffered much in the pursuit of our own rights. Once given the freedom and the opportunity, we will be able to play an important role in the restructuring of Iraq for a better tomorrow. Within the new Iraq we must openly engage one another. We must review the past not for the sake of grudge or revenge, but to learn from it. We must not allow injustice and inequality to once again prevail. Kurds must be full Iraqi citizens and not half or second class citizens. That can happen only in a democratic and federal Iraq.

Deriving strength and confidence from our experience, we seek in the new Iraqi individual the kind of education and upbringing that will teach respect for freedom, the rights and views of others as well as the community in general, an education that is opposed to terrorism and violence as we ourselves confront terrorism, expose and condemn terrorist tactics and polices.

We demand doing away with all weapons of mass destruction, weapons that were used in Halabja and other parts, weapons that have sown death and destruction among the people of Kurdistan.

We wish for Iraq's problems to be solved peacefully, whereby Iraq will abide by all international decisions and allow the return of U.N. inspectors into the country. We firmly believe that a tranquil, federal Iraqi Kurdistan can give weight and strength to the creation of a peaceful and democratic Iraq, the kind of Iraq that can once again claim deference within the international community and coexist amicably with its neighbors.

In closing, I would like to convey the gratitude of the people of Kurdistan to those countries that have played the major role in protecting the Kurdistan region and may I in particular mention the United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey.

May I also express our thanks to all those international NGOs and humanitarian organizations who during the early days of difficulties and want, came to help our people.

We thank all UN agencies for the task of implementing the 986 Oil for Food program in Kurdistan.

Finally, our special thanks to the world media who have had a distinguished role in publicizing the Kurdish question among both official and public world opinion.

This article by Nechirvan Barzani was originally presented at a international conference hosted by the American University Center for Global Peace and Mustafa Barzani Scholar of Global Studies in Washington D.C. on June 8.