7
January 2001
1. "Top figure in militant Kurdish group seeks
Dutch asylum", a leading member of the militant Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK) has applied for asylum in the Netherlands, Dutch
state security said Sunday.
2. "Report: Turkey to curb 'political Islam'", Turkey's civilian and military leaders have debated measures to further curb religious education and to tighten controls over Islamic businesses, in an apparent move to expand the campaign against political Islam.
3. "Film on Turkish-Kurdish language divide is a hit in Turkey", Hejar, a 5-year old Kurdish girl, escapes a bloody police raid on a relative's home and ends up under the protection of a 75-year-old retired Turkish judge.
4. "Turkish government party leader says "terrorists" must be executed", State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), said on Sunday [6 January] that a sound structure should be provided in Turkey's banking sector as soon as possible.
5. "PKK, Turkey & Terrorism", Turkey is angry at the European Union because Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is not included on its list of terrorist organisations.
6. "'Turkish model is paradigm of civilization'", interview with turkish Foreign Secretary Ismail Cem. (full version).
1. - AFP - "Top figure in militant Kurdish group seeks Dutch asylum":
THE HAGUE
A leading member of the militant Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
has applied for asylum in the Netherlands, Dutch state security said
Sunday.
"Nuriye Kespir, a member of the PKK presidential council, filed an application for asylum in the Netherlands in the second half of last year," a spokesman of the interior security services said. Kespir is currently in the Netherlands while his application is being processed by immigration authorities, the spokesman said. Another senior PKK figure, Murat Karayilan, was refused asylum in the Netherlands in 1999.
Kespir is understood to be an associate of Osman Ocalan, brother of PKK chief Abdullah Ocalan, whom a Turkish tribunal sentenced to death in 1999 for treason. His execution has been put on hold pending an appeal to the European human rights court. The PKK waged a violent 15-year campaign for self-rule in mainly Kurdish southeastern Turkey.
Fighting in the predominantly Kurdish southeast significantly
diminished after September 1999, when the PKK declared an end to its
armed campaign and agreed to seek a peaceful solution to the Kurdish
conflict following peace calls from the imprisoned Ocalan. But Ankara,
which sees the PKK as a "terrorist" movement, has played down
the peace overtures and the army continues to hunt down the rebels,
who are now said to be focusing on political efforts for Kurdish rights.
The Kurdish conflict has claimed some 36,500 lives since 1984 when the
PKK took up arms for self-rule. 
2. - AP - "Report: Turkey to curb 'political Islam'":
ANKARA
Turkey's civilian and military leaders have debated measures to
further curb religious education and to tighten controls over Islamic
businesses, in an apparent move to expand the campaign against political
Islam.
The National Security Council -- made up of top generals and political leaders -- discussed the measures in a meeting on December 28 to push the parliament to approve a series of draft laws to curb the rise of political Islam -- perceived as one of the greatest threats to the officially secular nation, the Hurriyet newspaper reported Thursday.
But, measures such as controlling activities of Islamic businesses, suspected of financing Islamic groups in Turkey, and imposing new bans on Islamic schooling are likely to fan tensions between the secular establishment and Islamic circles.
"We are on the verge of implementation of practices that could lead to polarization," Prof. Ali Yasar Saribay, a political analyst at Uludag University, told private NTV television. "Adopting tough measures would not serve the good of democracy."
Most National Security Council decisions are not announced and officials were not available to comment on the report.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party, criticized the measures on Thursday.
"Avoiding practices that harm social peace is extremely important for the country's future," Erdogan told his deputies in parliament.
While the overwhelming majority of Turks are Muslims, the government is staunchly secular and has striven for years to reduce the clout of Islamic political groups.
Last summer, Turkey's Constitutional Court closed down an Islamic party's anti-secular activities after it decided to field women candidates who wear head scarves -- the fourth such ban in three decades.
The measures outlined in a report submitted to the Security Council signaled that the powerful military is determined to maintain its crackdown on political Islam.
The report suggested controlling transactions of Islamic-leaning businesses, accused of financing Islamic activism in Turkey. The Islamic-oriented companies have a market value estimated at several billion dollars.
It also said that religious high schools should also be closed down by extending compulsory education from the current eight years to 12 years, practically limiting religious education to universities.
Under pressure from the powerful military, the government closed down religious secondary schools and Koranic courses in 1998, one year after the army forced an Islamic government out of power.
Since then, the government has strictly enforced a ban
on Islamic-style head scarves at universities and state offices.
3. - AP - "Film on Turkish-Kurdish language divide is a hit in Turkey":
ANKARA
Hejar, a 5-year old Kurdish girl, escapes a bloody police raid on a relative's home and ends up under the protection of a 75-year-old retired Turkish judge.
The girl cannot speak Turkish, and the authoritarian judge objects to the use of Kurdish in his house.
Partly sponsored by the government, the movie about their tense relationship and the old man's gradual questioning of Turkey's strict one-language policy has won over moviegoers here. ``Big Man, Small Love'' reflects a more relaxed attitude toward Kurdish language and cultural expression, and is Turkey's selection to compete for the foreign-film category of the Oscars.
The movie includes bits of dialogue in Kurdish with Turkish subtitles.
Kurdish is still banned in formal settings and in education in Turkey; a recent plea by Kurdish university students that the government allow the language to be taught on campus has landed on deaf ears.
But things have loosened up since the days when Turkey's estimated 12 million Kurds - nearly a fifth of the population - were banned from speaking Kurdish under a policy enforced from 1983 to 1991.
In the film, Hejar ends up with a relative in Istanbul after her parents are killed in their village in clashes between government forces and Kurdish rebels. The relative is sheltering two fugitive rebels, and all three are killed when police raid the home. Hejar escapes by hiding in a cabinet.
Horrified at the extra-judicial killings, the judge takes Hejar in while he tries to decide whether to hand her over to police or look for her other relatives.
Many girls in villages in Turkey's impoverished and mainly Kurdish southeast speak only Kurdish, a language related to Farsi.
The judge, however, refuses to believe that Hejar cannot speak Turkish, and he bans the little girl and his Kurdish maid, Sakine, from conversing in Kurdish.
``Don't let me hear you speak Kurdish again,'' the judge, played by actor Sukran Gungor, tells the woman in one scene.
Like Turkey itself, however, the old man eventually mellows and even learns some Kurdish words.
``Negri!'' (``Don't cry'' in Kurdish) he pleads with Hejar.
Recently, Turkey's parliament, under European Union pressure, partially lifted a constitutional ban on broadcasts in Kurdish, but security forces can still order broadcasts off the air for security reasons.
Restrictions on Kurdish stem from the government's fear that granting cultural rights to Kurds would divide the country along ethnic lines and amount to concessions to the rebels who have waged a 15-year war for autonomy. The fighting has claimed 37,000 lives.
A unilateral rebel cease-fire declared in 1999 has reduced clashes to a trickle, prompting the easing of attitudes on language.
In the movie, Hejar (played by 6-year-old Dilan Ercetin) repeatedly screams obscenities in Kurdish. Turkish subtitles appear on the screen, prompting chuckles from one recent audience in Ankara.
``I can identify with the judge,'' said Pinar Ayaz, a student. ``So many of us have difficulty accepting that some people in the east cannot speak Turkish. Our mentalities are now slowly changing.''
The movie's writer and director, Handan Ipekci, a relative newcomer to Turkish cinema, said the violence in the southeast inspired her to tell this tale and base it on the language divide.
``It was a difficult time, people were killing each other, I thought something had to be done,'' Ipekci said in an interview.
The Ministry of Culture contributed some dlrs 30,000 while Euroimages, which sponsors European films, provided the rest of the dlrs 850,000 budget.
The film won five awards at the Antalya Film Festival, Turkey's leading film awards, including best film and best screenplay.
Turkey's top movie critic, Atilla Dorsay, calls it ``the
most important production of contemporary Turkish cinema. I don't recall
ever seeing such a Turkish film.''
4. - BBC - "Turkish government party leader says "terrorists" must be executed":
BRUSSELS
State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Devlet Bahceli, the leader
of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), said on Sunday [6 January] that
a sound structure should be provided in Turkey's banking sector as soon
as possible.
Bahceli proceeded from Brussels to Germany after attending the Fourth Great Congress of Turkish Federation...
Responding a question about death sentence, Bahceli said: "Parliament has not approved any of 57 capital punishments since 1984. I mean to say that there has been a tendency not to execute capital punishments in Turkey.
The MHP also shares this tendency; however, it wants execution
of death sentences of terrorists till the day when terrorism will be
totally eradicated. Latest constitutional amendment includes this expression.
I want to emphasize once again that it is necessary to achieve success
in Turkey's fight against terrorism..."
5. - Kurdish Media - "PKK, Turkey & Terrorism":
By Dr Kamal Mirawdeli
Turkey is angry at the European Union because Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK) is not included on its list of terrorist organisations.
This is not strange given the degree of conceit and complacency the
Turks use in their approach to the outside world. They behave not like
the sick-man of Europe, which they really are economically and politically,
but like its spoiled child.
Indeed they have been spoiled by the US whose policy makers under the influence of the Israeli lobby give a much inflated role to Turkey in the current reshaping of the map of world politics in the wake of September 11 terrorist attack in the US.
In fact the war in Afghanistan has greatly reduced any theoretical strategic role Turkey might have had in support of US strategies. The US now has direct engagement with many Central Asian states and Russia is becoming a more strategic partner to the US. In fact Turkey with its rigid, outdated, fascist-style System is a great liability to the US whose unconditional and in most cases inhuman support for such regimes as Turkey at the expense of US's own principles of human rights, freedom, and decent behaviour and the blood and suffering of weaker nations, is one of the main reasons why so many people around the world feel hatred towards the US. On the other hand, under the Turkish influence and its Israeli lobby, the US has wasted many years wavering to adopt a right firm policy towards Iraq and in particular Kurdistan.
Now unlike the European Union (EU) the US State Department and, following blindly, Britain regard PKK as a terrorist organisation. Is there any justification for this? What are the grounds for this decision?
One expects US as a sole superpower, and a democracy like Britain to act reasonably and make their policy decisions on the basis of well-tested, well-established constant principles with universal rational, validity and legitimacy. We cannot avoid the basic issue of the definition of terrorism here again. But whatever definition we adopt for terrorism, no one can assume that terrorism and being a terrorist is a permanent essentialist attribute of some people, parties and groups.
Like anything else in life, terrorism is a condition, a historical one with its own determining factors and changing perspectives. The constant element in all acts of terrorism is that they are unjustifiable in their targeting and implementation as they aim at harming almost everyone and anyone to achieve desired, often political, objectives. But there are differences between terrorisms. There are some that are more rational than others. This means they are clearly stated as the oppressed people's response to more lethal forms of terrorism carried out usually by dictatorial and fascist States. However, I do not agree with the simplistic hypothesis that anti-state or national liberation movements are by definition immune from the charge of terrorism. Albeit the end is to prove a point of justice, ends cannot justify means.
Thus it is true that IRA did resort to terrorist acts - so did and does the Basque movement. And so did the PKK at certain stages and instances of its struggle. And it is absurd to claim that what the Palestinians do, especially the suicidal acts of terror, is not terrorism. It may be the last resort, language of despair, but death is death and the killing of children is unjustifiable.
My point is that recognising terrorism and locating it in its historical and political context is the best way to deal with it. Terrorism is not an idea, an ideology or an organisation. Terrorism is action. There is no terrorism without acts of terror. That is without using terror/terrorism as a weapon and as a main or partial means of struggle. By choosing armed struggle as a means of achieving their aims many national liberation movements do become involved in acts of terror whether they are prepared to define it so or not.
Thus the PKK in its early stages did carry out acts of terror but mostly against Kurdish people guided by extreme left-wing ideology (fighting feudalism in Kurdistan!) or by following the impossible principle of "either you are with us or against us" punishing many poor peasants for being left with no alternative but to co-operate with the Turkish army to avoid sure massacres.
But to evaluate the phenomenon of terrorism, it is crucial to determine whether the aims in themselves are terrorist aims (and in this case an organisation as a whole can become a terrorist organisation); or that the aims and objectives are just and justified but the method or parts of the method represent acts of terror. In this case it is possible for an organisation to grow, learn lessons, become mature and reform its methods whether voluntarily or under the pressure of external and international events and developments. The more we give opportunities for an organisation, however small it might be, to reform itself and give up terrorism, the safer our world will be.
A case in point is the IRA. Yes it was involved in acts of terror. But the political aims of the IRA did have some legitimacy and the British government had to accept this. The point then was not to essentialise and eternalise the description of the IRA as a terrorist organisation but to pressurise it to give up acts of terror and eventually armed struggle as a means to achieve its aims and choose instead peaceful democratic political processes.
This transformation was not easy and a quick fix. It had to be a prolonged process characterised by understanding, difficult negotiations, mutual trust and then real breakthrough. Now Mr Tony Blair's government has not only recognised the IRA as a legitimate partner in the peace process, but it has also released many IRA political prisoners who were actually involved in acts of terrorism including murder. No rational person can have anything but praise and appreciation for Tony Blair for taking this responsible approach to save the present and next generation from the tragedies of war, terror, murder and destruction.
We expect that in the same way as Britain approached the IRA and in the same way as the USA supported this process; they would also use similar criteria to define the transformation of any organisation from a supposedly terrorist one to a political peace-oriented one. Terrorism is acts of terror. Once an organisation theoretically, that is as a matter of principle and ideology, and practically, that is in action over a reasonably long period of time, proves that it has changed its course of action and means of struggle, then the most natural rational thing to do is to recognise, appreciate and evaluate this process of transformation and reach new rational conclusions not influenced by prejudice or inhumane political interests. But unfortunately, the US and UK's approach to PKK cannot be justified according to any principles of fairness and political logic. Their decision to enlist PKK as a terrorist organisation is an indecent compromise and act of injustice to appease Turkey. However, we have to congratulate the European Union for its rational and politically sound and principled stand by refusing to compromise its principles for the sake of a regime immersed for over 7o years in grave acts of violations of human rights and the worst cases of state terrorism.
Since the abduction and imprisonment of its leader, Mr Ocalan, in 1999, PKK has proved in every way and means possible that it has totally given up armed struggle as a means of achieving its political aims and transformed itself into an organisation committed to peaceful, political and democratic processes and means of struggle to achieve the legitimate national and cultural rights of Kurdish nation in Turkey.
In spite of initially losing a lot of support among its own party and Kurdish nation in general, the PKK has been consistent and steadfast in its approach and keen to prove that its commitment to peaceful-political means is a real lasting political strategy.
I think it is after thorough evaluation, understanding
and appreciation of this radical transformation in the PKK's strategy
that the EU has decided justly and logically not to include PKK in its
terrorist list but rather to ask Turkey to stop its aggression and oppression
against Kurdish people and recognise their cultural and political rights
to deserve to be a member of civilised nations in this twenty first
century. The EU's is an honourable example which the US and Britain
should follow immediately.
6. - Turkish Daily News - "Cem: 'Turkish model is paradigm of civilization'":
Sept. 11 and Turkish vision 
TDN - Mr. Minister, in the post Sept. 11, 2001 fast changing
new world and changing international climate, what vision do you have
for Turkey?
ISMAIL CEM - The unfortunate events of Sept. 11, 2001 and ensuing developments have confirmed and consolidated some fundamental preferences of the Turkish foreign policy. Besides, they have boosted Turkey's strategic importance. Within this framework, I can summarize our vision and contribution of post Sept. 11 developments to this vision as such:
- For years, Turkey has kept on explaining to the international community what terrorism is, the consequences of it, the importance and the need for international cooperation in struggling against it, and have kept on making proposals at international platforms methods of a collective struggle against terrorism. Sept. 11 has proved how right Turkey's sensitivity on this issue was. What everyone is trying to do collectively today is no different to that which Turkey has strived to achieve for years.
- In the aftermath of Sept. 11, it was observed clearly that there are wide abysses of intolerance and a lack of understanding between various groups of culture and creed. These groups don't know each other sufficiently, they pursue historical prejudices and could be offensive against each other. Thus, in the aftermath of Sept. 11, in haste and selecting the easiest option a wrong correlation was attempted to be established between Islam and terrorism. Everyone has acknowledged the necessity of these groups of culture and creed get to know each other better. In this new atmosphere, Turkey, with its historical development, identity and function, has come to the forefront as the bearer of a conciliatory, peaceful and synthesizing role. Turkey, being both an Asian and European country, with its peculiar capability of making a synthesis of the Eastern and Western cultures, has provided the opportunity in the post Sept. 11 period to utilize more from these peculiarities.
- Turkey, among the societies with Islamic identity, is the sole example possessing all of the norms, such as "sharing the values of the age," "democracy," "human rights," "secularism" and "equality of gender." In the post Sept. 11 period, during which radicalism and extremism made themselves heard more and the dangers they pose were understood better, the "Turkish model" has gained more importance.
In the world that has lived the Sept. 11 experience, the strategic value of the assertions and peculiarities that exist in the Turkish vision have increased.
Turkey and the European Union
TDN - Mr. Minister, at the recent Laeken summit, the European Union, for the first time, mentioned opening membership talks with Turkey in the summit declaration, and invited Turkey to the European Convention, which would shape the future of the European Union, along and on equal standing with other candidate countries. Mr. Cem, a few years ago the belief was that Turkey's European Union candidacy was a distant dream of Turks. Now, not only has Turkey become a fully-fledged candidate, the incoming term president, Spain, has set opening of accession talks with Turkey as one of its term presidency targets. What has changed on the part of Turkey and on the part of the EU? What has been the contribution of the changing international climate to this development? To what developments do you attribute these important developments in Turkish-EU relations?
CEM - It is correct that in Turkey there was not much anticipation that Turkey would be declared a candidate country at the Dec. 1999 Helsinki Summit. I was seeing that possibility because some conditions, both inside Turkey and outside, had changed, and the Turkish Foreign Ministry was persistently trying to explain this change to the EU. The Turkey of 1999 had to a large extent confined the terrorism menace that had been continuing for the past 15 years, and with the 1999 elections, for the first time in many years, had produced a stable government enjoying a sound parliamentary majority. In the April-July period a series of political reform laws were legislated. Economy was on a sound track. The role of Turkey in its historical geography was enhancing, and a foreign policy pursuant to that was being applied. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline has come to the realization stage. While in 1997, relations with almost all neighboring countries (Iran, Syria, Greece) were going bad, in December 1999 those relations were all improving. Again, while in 1997 we were living a "Frigate crisis" in relations with the United States, at the end of 1999 Turkish-American relations reached a cooperation scheme which in some areas were having strategic content. Perhaps, most important of all, Turkey was not evaluating itself well, but was as well making a correct analysis of the EU. Turkey was determinately trying to explain to EU foreign ministers and the commission that EU membership was not an obsession, but an "aim" which would provide a new strategical dimension to the EU, and with Turkey's candidacy, not only Turkey would benefit, but the EU would benefit greatly as well. As a result of all these and the policies devised with utmost care, Turkey's candidacy was realized.
Here, what should be taken into account is the fact that in essence, the relation between the EU and a candidate country is in effect a matter of mutual interests. That is by making a country candidate or member, the EU is not granting anything to that country. Similarly, a country becoming a candidate or member of the EU is not granting anything to the EU. Therefore, this relationship is concrete and healthy. Thus, because these relations are not static but dynamic, it is natural that they are affected both from the developments within the country, as well as developments within the EU and the strategic global happenings.
To come to the Laeken Summit in December 2001, the positive legal arrangements Turkey has developed; the constitutional amendments made that also conform with the Copenhagen Criteria; the completion of the Accession Partnership and National Program; the positive contributions of the Turkey-EU Association Council May 2001 Luxembourg meeting; the clear will of the government on EU accession; the continuous contacts between our ministry and the EU Commission and EU foreign ministers; have led to the positive result at the Laeken Summit.
Turkey is trying diligently to develop its place in its historical and cultural geography, and this situation being taken into account carefully by the EU circles was also a positive factor. Besides, developments in Cyprus or the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) issues which were not "conditions" in Turkish-EU relations or which were not described as "political condition" in the Helsinki Criteria or the succeeding Accession Partnership also had positive contributions to Laeken.
TDN- Can you say after the Laeken Summit that Turkey's EU membership has become discernible?
Turkey's EU membership candidacy had become clear with the Helsinki Summit anyhow. At Laeken, it was stated that we have come closer to the "negotiations phase," the preluding stage of accession. Of course, Laeken was very important and we could say that it has opened a new page in Turkey's bid for EU accession.
TDN- Naturally, Turkey's EU accession is a two-way road and both Turkey and the EU have duties to be fulfilled as they walk along that road. Has the EU fulfilled its obligations towards Turkey? And, has Turkey undertaken all its responsibilities and obligations?
CEM- I can say that as regards to the current stage of this process, both sides can be said to have fulfilled most of what's expected of them.
Turkish-EU relations not a 'black and white' issue
TDN- Mr. Cem, despite all the positive developments, it is a fact that unless Turkey complies in full with the Helsinki political criteria, it will not be able to open accession talks with the EU. What steps has Turkey taken so far and what further steps are in the pipeline in order to meet the Helsinki criteria? How long do you believe it would take for Ankara to fully comply with the Helsinki political criteria?
CEM- Turkish-EU relations are not a "black and white" subject. It is neither possible to put everything all at once into order, and no one has any such expectation from you. The EU is a process, and what is important is that you undertake in goodwill what's required from you, and demonstrate the will that you will achieve it. The EU is not a rude and merciless "big brother," as some would think, that monitors you. Within this understanding, I am of the opinion that Turkey can meet the Copenhagen Criteria. Most of these, again, were not having a "black and white" meaning. In most of them, the principle is important, but the application of it may vary from country to country and be shaped in accordance with the realities of that member country. What is important is goodwill, determination and principles. Besides, as I have just mentioned, in major decisions of the EU, conjecture and strategic developments have always played a role. If at the negotiations stage, Turkey is sustaining its political stability; if its economy is cleared of the "unemployment, production woes, and inequality" menaces; if the positive line in foreign policy can be sustained; if Turkey managed to consolidate its position in its historical geography, for example if some ground is covered in Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project and if Turkey is solving all its problems with its neighbors; then it will be much easier for the negotiations process to start.
EU, IMF neither saviors, nor villains
We have to avoid some mistakes in approaching EU relations. We may mention two mistakes in our general approach.
The first, it is extremely wrong to place the EU at the core of all discussions, in all fields, whenever and wherever we consider it in our interest. By constantly hiding behind the excuse of "the EU wanted it so," or "the EU has not said so," and such, we have tarnished the image of the EU in Turkey. Whatever we do, an atmosphere has been created, as if we were doing it for the EU. And we kept on listening to stories about what the EU would do to us if we did not do those things. In our own domestic political discussions, we used the EU sometimes as an excuse, sometimes as a shield and sometimes as the bulls eye. That attitude appeared to be the easy way out. Thus, we have taken the EU from its natural place. We have come to a point that if it rained we would say that it rained because of the EU or expect the cleaning of our doorstep by the EU membership.
In Turkey, EU membership has a strange situation. It has an image of both "savior" and "villain." We have a similar wrong perception in the economy. Lately, two "savior/villains" were created: In politics in the EU and the IMF in the economy. Everything related to Turkey is attributed to this duo... Whereas neither the IMF, nor the EU are either savior or villain. We have attributed that image to them. We perceive them as such.
I can cite the way constitutional amendments were presented and perceived as an example to our wrong approach to the EU. The issue was handled in such a manner as if the constitutional amendments and democratization moves were not thought of, but were brought to the agenda specifically for the EU. If you look at the way the public, press and politicians perceived these amendments, you may easily reach to that conclusion. Whereas, that's wrong. Many people in Turkey writers, and politicians have been struggling for those reforms for years. They were struggling to achieve those reforms seeing Turkey's benefit in achieving them. The elements included in the constitutional reform package are issues on which I and many other people have been writing on persistently for the past 30 years. The democratization laws undertaken by the governments, in which I participated, coincide to times before EU accepted Turkey's candidacy in December 1999.
We have to perceive the EU well and place it in its right place in Turkey's development process. An attitude that contravenes this will be disrespectful to both to Turkey and the EU. After the Helsinki Summit of 1999, where we secured our EU candidacy, I, as the minister heading the talks with the EU had said: "The EU is an important external dynamic in Turkey's development process. It is an important 'rational,' a contribution that may help Turkey attain its already established targets more easily, with less effort and in a shorter period. We have to know the value and the responsibility of our EU candidacy. Exaggerating this, downplaying it, or exploiting it will be an injustice to Turkey."
TDN- The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) deadlock between Turkey and the European Union appears to have resolved thanks to the efforts and mediation of the U.S. and Britain. Still, Greece appears to be objecting to the compromise reached. Would you elaborate on this delicate issue?
CEM- Working together as major NATO members (the UK being a major EU member as well) we were able to produce a text which was balanced and acceptable for all NATO and EU members. It is absurd to think that our three countries undermined the legitimate rights of another NATO member. I know that Greece has some concerns; hopefully those concerns will dissipate after a thorough study of the text.
Neither pessimistic, nor optimistic on Cyprus
TDN- A new impetus was provided to the Cyprus talks process by President Rauf Denktas of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) and Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides with their decision to open a new and invigorated direct talks process aimed at providing finally a resolution to the almost four-decade-long Cyprus problem. Are you optimistic that the new exercise that the two leaders, under the auspices of the United Nations secretary-general, will start on Jan. 16, 2002 may achieve a breakthrough towards a resolution? What are the parameters for a breakthrough on Cyprus? To what extent have the latest developments helped progress of Turkish-EU relations? Is Cyprus an impediment, as some industrialists had recently charged, on Turkey's path of integration with the EU? At a recent speech you have underlined that if the Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders succeed in coming out of the new direct talks process with a "common Cyprus vision" that would be a breakthrough towards a resolution of the Cyprus problem and a settlement to the Cyprus problem would become discernible. Would you elaborate on that?
CEM- I am not optimistic or pessimistic, but rather realistic.
Objectively, to reach a joint solution is extremely difficult, for both nations in Cyprus. This is to be acknowledged in order to contribute to a positive settlement: The global trends, both ideological and practical, are for the fragmentation of societies, not for their integration. Beginning with the 1980s, the internationally acclaimed and promoted concepts were those of diversity, of subcultures, of ethnic rights, auto-determination, etc. The overemphasis of ethnicity and ethnic values became a fashion. Societies were encouraged to split on ethnic lines, rather than to conserve their integrity. I have to add that I always opposed these trends, philosophically and politically. But, this is a reality. Yugoslavia is an example. With the prevailing ideological atmosphere, even countries or regions which were the result of divisions, were inclined to subdivide, as it was observed in the cases of Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro. The breaking up of Czechoslovakia was facilitated by a conceptual environment, by an overall affirmation that legitimized and encouraged divisions and secessions.
Given these disintegrating trends throughout Europe and the persistence of problems even between peoples of same ethnic origin, same religion but different sects, or between peoples of same religion but of different ethnicity, Cyprus seems to be an impossible case: Two different nations, two different cultures, two different religions and a heritage of mistrust and of bloody feuds. Therefore, objectively, the quest to unite those that are radically different, in an environment where even those that are alike are splitting, is almost an impossible mission that requires utmost caution.
As a guarantor country (Zurich Agreement of 1960) and the motherland of Turkish Cypriots, Turkey supports the quest for a mutually acceptable solution in Cyprus. In order to move forward in the actual process of dialogue, I believe that an effort by the two leaders to reach a common vision for the future of Cyprus and to define the end-result they want to achieve is the essential precondition for progress. Unless there is a common vision and an agreement on the essential end-result, the process would most probably be unsuccessful. On the contrary, if there is a common vision and an agreement on the end-result, conditional to the overall agreement on all pending issues, then, to address all difficult and intricate matters would be facilitated.
I do not consider Cyprus to be an impediment on Turkey's path of integration to the EU. If some EU circles consider Cyprus to be an impediment on Turkey's path of integration with EU, this is wrong but it's their business. Formally, there is no such condition in the EU acquis in regards to Turkey (Helsinki Declaration, Accession Partnership). Politically, I had declared solemnly on Nov. 30, 1999, ten days before the Helsinki Summit, that Turkey's eventual candidacy will not alter our position on the Cypriot issue. I remember sending this text to EU countries as well. For Turkey, "Cyprus" and "Turkish - EU relations" are not and will not be potential subjects of a trade-off.
TDN- Turkey is an active member of the international coalition against terrorism. Indeed, Turkey has been one of the first countries that was stressing all through the past decades the need of an international concerted cooperation and collaboration against international terrorism. Apart from the United States, which is heading the anti-terror coalition, is Turkey satisfied with the anti-terrorism stand of its western allies?
CEM- It is too early for comment; there have been some positive decisions but we have to wait and see their implementation.
TDN- In the aftermath of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, Turkey's bridging role between the Islamic World and the Western Christian World has come to the forefront once again. Turkey was quick in offering to host a meeting of the Organization of Islamic Conference and the European Union. What roles Turkey can and could play in avoiding a confrontation or image of a clash of civilizations in this new international campaign against terrorism?
CEM - An example of what Turkey could do can be seen in the forthcoming Feb. 12, 2002 meeting of the OIC and the EU. For the first time these two organizations will be coming together for a political exchange of opinions. Besides, in the aftermath of Sept. 11 we are strongly opposed to the wrong perception of placing terrorism and Islam side by side. I had spoken with many of my Western colleagues and drew their attention to the sensitivity of wording used. That has had some effects at governments and states level. Nobody of course can control public opinion. As I have tried to explain at the beginning of our talk, in correcting such mistakes and in establishing some sort of a harmony, Turkey has a pioneering place that is provided to it by its history, culture and modern identity. We have to act in awareness of that responsibility.
Kabul visit a message
TDN- Mr. Cem, you were the first foreign minister to visit Afghanistan after the American-led anti-terrorism operation on that country. Indeed, you were the first Turkish foreign minister to visit Afghanistan in almost 40 years. What was the message of that visit? Were not you scared of the prevailing conditions in that country?
CEM- On the first day of the holy Aid ul-Fitr (Ramadan holiday) I traveled to Kabul. My message was that the Turkish nation was celebrating the holiday of the Afghan nation and to convey the well-being wishes of our people to the people of Afghanistan in this new junction of the Afghan history. The second message was to emphasize the importance we attach on Turkish-Afghani friendship, a friendship entrusted on us by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. And thirdly, to demonstrate to the Afghan government and people our readiness to make every possible contribution within our limits, to Afghanistan. I explained to President Rabbani, new government's Defense Minister Fehim and Interior Minister Kanuni, as well as Foreign Ministry and Culture Ministry officials in the new institutionalization process of Afghanistan, we shall make contributions with our know-how, skilled personnel and organizational capabilities in some areas.
TDN- Mr. Minister, Turkey is anticipated to assume the command of the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan in June. Why is Turkey sending troops to Afghanistan?
CEM - Turkey has disclosed that it will make military contributions to peace in Afghanistan in accordance with the needs of the country and the Afghan government. If there is a need, we shall do that and may even assume further higher responsibilities.
TDN- There are remarks attributed to senior Turkish officials, indeed one to Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, that Turkey's "secular democratic system" would be the best system for peace, stability and tranquility" in Afghanistan? Could such a system work in Afghanistan? Or, are Afghan people ready for a secular state setup?
CEM- Turkey is a model of paradigm of modernization. The Turkish model is affecting the perception of future by many societies. For us, it is a universally valid successful model. We defend and promote it. But the Turkish model is not one that could be forced upon from the outside. What kind of a model they want, what kind of a model they need, and to what kind of a model they are ready are something to be decided upon by the Afghan people themselves.
Turkey sensitive on preservation of Iraq's territorial integrity
TDN- There is talk that the anti-terrorism drive may expand and include some other countries. There are claims that the next target might be Iraq or Somalia. If the operation is expanded, what would be Turkey's position? Under what circumstances may Turkey support an operation on Iraq?
CEM- Iraq is our neighbor. Conversion of the territory of a neighbor into a battlefield hurts our interests as well. In the past, Turkey's interests were seriously hurt.
TDN- Turkey has been against establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq and all through the past decade has been stressing the need of resolution of the Iraqi problem with territorial integrity of that country preserved. Why is Turkey so sensitive on Iraq's territorial integrity?
CEM- Let me first answer one aspect that you implied in your question. Turkey is a strong state. At the weakest time of Turkey, at the 1920s, an array of enemies joined their forces against us but their power could not suffice to divide Turkey. In the world of the 2000s, Turkey is an "above regions power" with its 65 million population. It has one of the most modern armed forces of NATO, the largest land forces. Turkey is a country whose national unity and territorial integrity is strong enough not to be affected from a political formation outside its borders. Turkey, in line with the dictate of international law, is not calling for territorial integrity of Iraq, but of all countries. This is one of the fundamental principles of our foreign policy. Because Iraq is a neighboring country, preservation of its territorial integrity is more important. When territorial integrity of a neighboring country is impaired; when talk starts on establishment of new states on a geography belonging to one nation, of course it would be neighboring countries to be affected first from such troubles. Bitter examples of this have been lived in the past.
Such atmospheres provide breeding ground for separatist and terrorist movements. In the past this was lived as well. Therefore, Turkey is against establishment of new states on the territory of a neighboring country.
US visit of Ecevit
TDN- Invited by President Bush and Prime Minister Ecevit's meetings in Washington will mark the beginning of 2002. What are your assessments, what will be the main topics on the agenda?
CEM- Turkey and the United States have parallel interests and concerns in a very wide geography. What's interesting and important is that almost all the interests and concerns that United States consider important from a global perspective are in areas that are the historical and cultural geography of Turkey, that is are in Turkey's prime area of interest and influence, that is the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East and the Central Asia. Therefore, Turkish-American relations are primarily strategic relations. I think at the Washington talks, evaluations will be made primarily from this aspect. Middle East and Central Asia and Afghanistan come to the top of the agenda from this perspective. A decrease in the tension in the Caucasus and a new impetus to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project will be in the interest of both countries.
With planned and decided works we and President Denktas have undertaken over the past four years we have succeeded to change to a certain extend the prejudices, accustomed cliches and wrong evaluations of the West on Cyprus, or at least made themselves question these. The Cyprus issue can be expected to be on the agenda.
On the economic issues, an area of our bilateral relations which is lagging, there are lots of things to be said. Some ideas for improvement of these could be discussed.
Finally, Washington talks will provide an opportunity for the two allies who have strategic relations and who in the post Sept. 11 era have taken front positions in fighting terrorism, to make a common evaluation and advance their relations.
TDN - Thank you Mr. Minister.