22 January 2002

1. "Turkey inches forward on human rights", the Turkish government is expected on Tuesday to submit to parliament an awkward compromise on the human rights reforms which are a precondition for starting talks on joining the European Union.

2. "Kurdish education problem may delay social peace process", scores have been detained, and nine have been arrested after presenting petitions demanding education in Kurdish, causing a spark of a controversy during a period when foreign circles, especially the European Union, are keeping an eye on Turkey.

3. "To hang or not to hang", it is clear that a new controversy is shaping up in Turkey between those who want to execute Ocalan and those who oppose it.

4. "Yucelen's circular puzzles EU diplomats", EU to voice concerns over the detention of students demanding Kurdish education.

5. "Denial of the right of mother tongue violates EHRA", Antonio Bultrini, Secretary of European Council Regional and Minority Languages Accord, stated that every member of the EC should give the right to education in one's mother tongue which is one of main provisions of European Human Rights Agreement.

6. "Cyprus Still Split by a Zone Where Time Stands Still", Capt. Louise Burt stood in the muddy no man's land between enemy lines and pointed toward two flag poles that held aloft the star and crescent of Turkey and the similar banner of the Turkish Cypriots.

7. "lisu Dam: A response from the World Archaeological Congress", By Professor Martin Hall: Council of Europe: Report on the Cultural Aspects of the Ilisu Dam Project, Turkey: a response from the World Archaeological Congress.

8. "Demirel: Ocalan was surrendered by USA", participated in the program "Kafe Siyaset" on CNN TV, Suleyman Demirel, former President of the Turkish Republic, confessed that PKK President Abdullah Ocalan was surrendered to Turkey by USA.

1. - Financial Times - "Turkey inches forward on human rights":

ANKARA / by Leyla Boulton

The Turkish government is expected on Tuesday to submit to parliament an awkward compromise on the human rights reforms which are a precondition for starting talks on joining the European Union.

A so-called "mini-democratisation package" reduces to four from seven days the period of police detention for all suspects, including those held under emergency rule in the Kurdish-dominated south-east. The new draft legislation, designed to implement ambitious constitutional reforms adopted last year, also stipulates detainees' right immediately to contact lawyers and family.

While these reforms are likely to be welcomed as reducing scope for torture and meeting some of the EU's "political criteria" for candidate countries, other proposals are likely to disappoint both the EU and advocates of reform within Turkey.

In particular, the proposed legislation does little to liberalise draconian restrictions on freedom of expression, the other area it is meant to address. While halving maximum prison sentences, the government is proposing to expand the scope both of article 312, punishing incitement to hatred, and of article 159 covering insults to the Turkish state.

Officials said the proposals were the minimum common denominator acceptable to all three parties in a coalition government combining the rightwing National Action Party (MHP) with former leftists, and liberal conservatives. "If we cannot make monumental changes in one step we'll do it in several steps," said one official on Monday.

The MHP is openly hostile to some of the changes sought by the EU, including a ban on the death penalty, a medium-term step agreed by Turkey with the EU. Having sought exemptions for terrorist crimes, the MHP wants first to carry out a death sentence imposed by a Turkish court on Abdullah Ocalan, captured leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) guerrilla group.

The MHP has defended its stance by arguing that the EU has no intention of admitting Turkey no matter what it does. It cites as proof of EU "hypocrisy" a failure to include in the bloc's recently-adopted list of terror groups, the PKK and the leftwing DHKP-C, which between them have killed thousands of people in Turkey.

One area not touched on by the package is the revised constitution's implicit promise that a ban on Kurdish-language broadcasting would be lifted.

2. - Turkish Daily News - "Kurdish education problem may delay social peace process":

Esra Erduran

Scores have been detained, and nine have been arrested after presenting petitions demanding education in Kurdish, causing a spark of a controversy during a period when foreign circles, especially the European Union, are keeping an eye on Turkey.

Interior Ministry and Emergency Rule (OHAL) Governors' Office claimed that a mass petition for Kurdish education was a new activity urged by the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) that aimed at becoming a political organization after the cease-fire ordered by its imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan.

The conflict between the PKK and military claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people in more than 10 years of armed conflict in Turkey's southeast region.

Human rights advocates of Turkey fear the recent events evolving from Kurdish education may lead to more serious problems or may cause a delay in the social peace process.

The Human Rights Association (IHD) General Secretary Suleyman Esmer told the Turkish Daily News in a telephone interview that submitting a petition is a Constitutional right that should not be treated as a criminal act, and underlined the fact that this move may create more serious problems in terms of social peace.

On the other hand, one of the prominent human rights associations in Turkey, the Association of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed Peoples (MAZLUM-DER), told the TDN that demanding to learn a language is a part of the human right.

"Arresting or detaining people for submitting a petition and demanding a right without being involved in violent acts is not in harmony with law," MAZLUM-DER Chairman Yilmaz Ensaroglu said.

Ensaroglu stated that those who present petitions for Kurdish Education are viewed within the context of the struggle against terror. The MAZLUM-DER chairman noted that there were a number of people who caused a delay in the development of the Southeast, giving terrorism as an excuse.

"We have lost tens of thousands of people and millions of dollars over the years. The recent events may cause a delay in the social peace process," Ensaroglu added.

Timing of the petitions causes controversy

An increase in the number of petitions submitted to the Education Ministry and other state organs came during Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's visit to the United States, causing a rumor that it aimed to gain support of foreign circles.

On the other hand, it is also argued that a number of people believe that the constitutional amendment package has opened a path for education in Kurdish.

The government, last year, amended some articles of the Constitution as a part of its pledges to the European Union. But the education in Kurdish issue was not one of the amendments.

According to the Article 42 of the Constitution, "No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institution of training and education. Foreign languages to be taught in institutions of training and education and the rules to be followed by schools conducting training and education in a foreign language shall be determined by law."

3. - Turkish Daily News - "To hang or not to hang":

Ilnur Cevik

It is clear that a new controversy is shaping up in Turkey between those who want to execute Ocalan and those who oppose it...

The death penalty remains a matter of controversy in Turkey as well as in the coalition government. Those in favor of maintaining the death penalty feel it should be used against terrorists and campaign for the immediate execution of Abdullah Ocalan, the terrorist leader of the PKK.

Those who oppose the death penalty do it for two different reasons. Some who respect human rights say the death penalty is cruel and should not be used as a form of punishment in any way whatsoever. Another group does not really care too much about human rights but feels capital punishment is a major obstacle in Turkey's quest to become a member of the European Union (EU).

The opponents and proponents of the death penalty have been struggling against each other for a long time despite the fact that Turkey has not hanged a single individual since 1984 and thus the death penalty in essence is redundant.

The death penalty was partially lifted in the recent Constitutional amendments but it is clear that this has not appeased our European counterparts who still want a major overhaul of the law completely banning capital punishment.

Meanwhile, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the senior partner of the coalition has started to push hard for the execution of Ocalan. MHP officials are on record saying "we'll hang him (Ocalan) and if necessary pay compensation of $10 million to the European Court..."

On the other hand, the Motherland Party, the junior partner of the coalition, says it is imperative that the death penalty should be unconditionally lifted if Turkey wants a place in the EU.

It is clear that MHP and the Motherland will clash creating new complications in the cabinet.

Some observers say MHP is simply playing domestic politics to save face as it is being accused of bowing to its coalition partners and giving concessions on its nationalist agenda.

What is strange, however, is that the PKK terrorist organization has launched a strange campaign of civil disobedience which will only help to antagonize the Turkish masses and thus turn the tide against Ocalan. Very few people have participated in this campaign until now but its propaganda affect of capturing the attention of the Turkish masses has been rather successful...

Either the PKK wants to get rid of Ocalan and thus is trying to further alienate the Turkish masses who may become indifferent to the demands of the MHP to execute him or they are naive and do not realize what their actions could lead to...

4. - Turkish Daily News - "Yucelen's circular puzzles EU diplomats":

EU to voice concerns over the detention of students demanding Kurdish education

SAADET ORUC

During the Turkish-European Union Association Committee meeting to be held in Brussels on Thursday, the European Union will voice concerns related with the detention of the students giving petitions for receiving education in Kurdish, senior EU officials said.

Speaking to the Turkish Daily News on Monday, EU sources stated that there were "undoubtedly" concerns over the "response" given by the Turkish authorities to the students giving petitions for receiving education in Kurdish.

Deputy Undersecretary Akin Alptuna and Director of the European Commission Michael Leigh will co-chair the association Committee talks.

The Turkish-EU Association Council meeting will be held in March.

More than 10,000 students all around the country handed petitions to university administrations defending their rights to be given education in the Kurdish language.

More than 50 students have been imprisoned on charges of having links with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

In Afyon Kocatepe University, 49 students were dismissed from the school.

In reference to the right of petition, the EU officials, who broadly debated the issue during the routine meetings of the EU ambassadors, criticized the arrest of the students.

In an earlier Turkey-EU meeting held in Madrid on Jan. 8, the EU side raised concerns over the prevention of the opening of an office for the international human rights organization, Amnesty International (AI).

The "petition" issue and the barrier put in front the AI office by the ministers from the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), such as Health Minister Osman Durmus and Agriculture Minister Husnu Yusuf Gokalp, caused uneasiness in the EU, as time passes for the completion of the period for the fulfillment of the short-term criteria.

Yucelen's circular puzzles

Interior Minister Rustu Kazim Yucelen's circular on the prevention of the violation of the Constitution "puzzled" the EU officials.

Senior EU diplomats told the TDN that, "Yucelen might get European visitors asking for clarification on the circular."

Last Thursday, Yucelen ordered the 81 governors and Gendarmerie Forces to take the necessary measures to prevent the violation of the Constitution.

Yucelen said in the circular that the PKK had a new strategy for giving priority to the Kurdish identity, Kurdish education and the use of the Kurdish language, defining these attempts as a part of the "Second Attempt for Peace."

Yucelen said in the circular that the petitions were started on Dec. 27, 2001.

The short-term criteria asked by the EU from Turkey includes the removal of legal prohibitions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their mother tongue in TV/radio broadcasting.

"We know that education in Kurdish is a medium-term priority, however it is seen that no step is being taken for the short-term expectation related with TV broadcasting," EU officials say.

5. - Kurdish Observer - "Denial of the right of mother tongue violates EHRA":

Antonio Bultrini, Secretary of European Council Regional and Minority Languages Accord, stated that every member of the EC should give the right to education in one's mother tongue which is one of main provisions of European Human Rights Agreement.

STRASBOURG / MHA

Antonio Bultrini, Secretary of European Council Regional and Minority Languages Accord (ECMRA), stated that denial of right to education in one's mother tongue and not supplying the facilities for it violated European Accord on Human Rights Agreement (EAHR)

Bultrini commented on a case against Belgium. Stating that European Human Rights Court (EHRC) condemned Belgium in 1986 according to the article 14, continued to say the following: "EHRC ruled that Belgium violated the article 14 in the mixed regions by not ensuring the right to education in one's mother tongue. In other words, it decided that the fact that children had to be educated in a language they did not know violated the article 14 which banned discrimination."

Why ECMRA?

Bultrini emphasized that EAHR was against discrimination but as it did not mention individual languages clearly, the European Council established ECMRA in order to find a more detailed and permanent solution, adding the following: "The Accord arouse from multiculturalism and the need to preserve language as a means of communication, seeing it a cultural legacy of humanity."

The Secretary noted that one of the missions of the Accord was to protect half-dead languages and improve them including regional and minority languages.

Bultrini stressed that whether they were a party to the ECMRA or not, states had reserves about mother tongues and regional languages not to be exploited for discriminative and separationist ends. The Secretary had to say the following: "That is, this measure derived from the worries about official languages being totally rejected or excluded. Those who prepared the accord avoided to state which languages were minority and regional languages and which of them should be taken under protection, because the situation is more sensitive than it is supposed and every country has its own peculiar conditions."

Turkey and Italy did not signed it

Bultrini said that Turkey and Italy did not signed the agreement but he did not want to make comment on it. He noted that France had signed it but the President did not ratify it, saying that it did not comply with the existing Constitution. Bultrini had to say the following: "The European Council is now preparing a supplementary protocol. It will shed more light on the article 14 of the EAHR and I think it will be useful."

Swedish Parliament discussed the matter

The campaign for Kurdish education was discussed in the Swedish Parliament.

Leftist Party Deputy Murat Artin brought the matter onto the agenda. Artin said the following: The sole crime committed by the students who have been detained and charged of separationism is to demand 'education in one's mother tongue' which is the most ordinary human right." Deputy Artin stated that in a number of cities students were detained, drawing attention that 11 HADEP administrators were arrested on the grounds that there was an organic connection between the campaign and HADEP which was a democratic and legal party.

Artin also touched the subject of minorities, saying the following: "The Turkish state violated the article 42 of the Lausanne Agreement and recently repression and threats against Assyrians/Syrians, Armenians and Greeks have increased."

Artin also drew attention to F-Type Prisons and torture cases. Secretary of the State Lindh is expected to reply the questions.

6. - New York Times - "Cyprus Still Split by a Zone Where Time Stands Still":

NICOSIA / by DOUGLAS FRANTZ

Capt. Louise Burt stood in the muddy no man's land between enemy lines and pointed toward two flag poles that held aloft the star and crescent of Turkey and the similar banner of the Turkish Cypriots.

"Look closely," said Captain Burt, a British Army officer with the United Nations peacekeeping force that patrols the buffer zone separating Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. "See the barbed wire wrapped round the poles?"

Sure enough, a strand of rusted wire snaked menacingly up each pole, protection against a sometimes lethal game of Capture the Flag carried on from time to time between the soldiers who have stared at each other across the narrow divide day and night for 27 years.

The Berlin Wall is history. So is the Iron Curtain. Peace prevails much of the time in Northern Ireland.

Nicosia is the world's last officially divided capital, stubbornly split by an ugly scar that symbolizes the deep differences between two ethnic groups that cannot seem to share this island of mountains and beaches in peace.

The island's formal division dates to August 1974, when troops from Turkey landed in northern Cyprus. They came in response to a short- lived coup by Greek Cypriots that threatened to make Cyprus part of Greece and seemed to endanger Turkish Cypriots.

Since then, Cyprus, half the size of New Jersey, has been divided by a neutral zone about 116 miles east to west and up to 3 miles wide.

But in the historic district of Nicosia, the capital, the distance shrinks to as little as 10 feet, at a place called Spear Alley. The name comes from the days when soldiers from the opposing sides strapped bayonets to broom sticks and jousted across the alley from balconies.

Those narrow points are where the danger is greatest, and where the games soldiers play to relieve the tedium or demonstrate their manhood carry the spark of violence.

Deaths have dropped sharply in recent years largely because the two sides voluntarily reduced the number of troops along the line. Still, the buffer zone remains, no longer only a line on a map but a state of mind and way of life.

"I've never been to the other side," said Takis Moriatis, 26, a carpenter who works in a shop next to the buffer on the Greek Cypriot side. "I've never even seen it, really, and I don't care to."

Though a new round of reunification talks opened this week with some optimism, no one is talking yet about erasing the fortified line that separates the island's 800,000 people, of whom about three-quarters are Greek and one-quarter Turkish. That line defines a forbidden zone that makes up 4 percent of the island and is open only to United Nations peacekeepers.

Outsiders who manage to wangle a tour find a place where time was ordered to stand still, though the buildings refused to obey. The damage of the years is particularly evident in Nicosia, where the division is known as the Green Line.

City streets dead end where the zone begins, blocked by ugly barricades. Neighborhoods are divided. and in one case so is a factory that used to make springs. What were once some of the city's most elegant buildings are scarred by bullets and ruined by enforced neglect, their walls of mud and brick crumbling.

A former Turkish Cypriot school that was the scene of fierce fighting in 1974 is riddled with shell holes and is on the verge of collapse. Nearby a small Greek Orthodox chapel, said to have been built in the fourth century, is falling down.

Time seems frozen in other places. Dust-covered tables wait for long- gone customers inside the Café Berlin, and a rusty sign hangs outside a beauty shop. Fifty-six Toyota cars sit marooned in a basement, each with 38.7 miles on their odometers to mark the drive from the port at Famagusta to Nicosia 27 years ago.

Soldiers watch each other through peepholes in fortified observation posts. During the day, the enemies slouch carelessly and mooch cigarettes from passers-by. At night, they often cut the boredom by firing stones from slingshots at each other. Sometimes they fire rifles.

Most of the posts are ramshackle. But the Greek Cypriots created a tourist attraction out of the post at the end of a popular pedestrian walkway on Ledra Street. People climb the metal stairs to the wood-paneled platform and peer across at the Turkish Cypriots on the other side. It is something like going to a weird and sad zoo.

Nearby, the Greek Cypriots set up an exhibit of photographs from 1974, carefully labeled "Turkish atrocities." Across the buffer zone, a similar display portrays what are called "Greek Cypriot war crimes."

The path winding between two halves of the city is rutted and overgrown with weeds. Coils of barbed wire line the sides, and signs in three languages warn of minefields.

The United Nations refuses to clear the mines because, Captain Burt said, that would constitute tampering with the status quo, which the peacekeepers are there to maintain, making sure neither side appears to build a higher wall or encroach into the buffer zone.

United Nations officials fear that the most trivial matter could turn ugly fast. They cite a particular brick wall on the Turkish Cypriot side. Not long ago, several rows of bricks were added to the wall, a violation. The United Nations painted the top row of bricks white so the wall could go no higher.

A few days later the wall appeared to be higher, although the white row was still at the top. A count revealed that the Turkish Cypriots had removed the painted bricks, added several rows and put the white ones back on top. So the line was painted 10 rows below the top, making the chore of moving it so burdensome that the Turkish Cypriots gave up.

7. - Kurdish Media - "lisu Dam: A response from the World Archaeological Congress":

By Professor Martin Hall

Council of Europe: Report on the Cultural Aspects of the Ilisu Dam Project, Turkey: a response from the World Archaeological Congress

The Wider Context and the Proper Remit of the Report

Of primary concern is the degree to which the report is a measured and fair assessment of the cultural heritage impacts of the Ilisu project. The report suggests that it is 'limited to reviewing the possible impact of the Ilisu dam on the cultural heritage in the area affected by its reservoir' (section 1.2) yet clearly exceeds this remit on a number of occasions. And when it does so, its comments are often inaccurate. For example, it states that 'it is impossible not to see development in the area as a priority both in terms of social and economic conditions but also a means of reinforcing peace and security in the region' (2.2.). This is the rationale for the GAP project of which Ilisu is a part but which has, in fact, been questioned by many commentators. The statement that this opinion is reflected at all levels of the local population is simply not true as evidenced by local campaigns and opinions, fact finding missions and official reports. Furthermore, the unsupported comments on water as 'the best energy source in this context' (2.4) and Ilisu as the best available site for the dam (6.3.1) have also been refuted by some of these reports. These include the Environmental Impact Assessment for Ilisu (EIAR) and critical reviews of it, UK government reports, fact-finding missions by NGOs and by parliamentary committees. Many of these are cited in the bibliography of the report.

Nowhere is it clear that extensive consultation took place with local organisations which have highlighted issues surrounding the cultural heritage impacts of this and other GAP projects, with cultural organisations generally or with people affected by the project. However, WAC notes that thanks are expressed to the Turkish authorities and in particular, to the DSI which is the promoter of the project (1.3) and which facilitated the fact-finding mission around the affected area (appendix 2). Furthermore, a letter that Mrs Stepova wrote to thank the authorities is available on the DSI website. Her wish to 'underline that my approach is intended to be positive. My aim is to support integration of the cultural heritage in the sustainable social and economic development of the region' belies any claim that this report is a fair and balanced assessment of the cultural heritage impacts of the dam.

While exceeding its remit in one way, the report is methodologically flawed in that it does not take into account the history of, and conditions in, the region where the dam would be built. It refers to issues of resettlement such as 'the relocation of families' and the 'rebuilding of communities' as being factors 'wider than the cultural dimension', which have been covered by others (2.5). 'The Kurdish question' and the 'displaced Kurdish population' are also referred to as issues which are dealt with elsewhere in the Council (2.5). This results in the report's failure to address the human rights violations and repression endemic to the region where the dam would be built and their obvious relationship to cultural heritage impacts and cultural rights. This is certainly part of the remit proper to addressing those impacts for these reasons: firstly, international guidelines, professional codes of ethics and practice and established procedure require archaeologists to consult with and involve the communities with whom they work in decision-making regarding cultural heritage. The longstanding repression of the Kurdish majority in the region where the dam would be built continues today and is well documented in records of human rights violations and indeed, the 200 judgements of the European Court of Human Rights against Turkey. This repression has included cultural repression of the Kurdish language, the forcible destruction of communities and the distortion and denial of Kurdish heritage. At present, the State of Emergency (OHAL) in the area where the dam would be built means that under Turkish and international law, the Turkish Ministry of Defence is responsible for the protection and evaluation of cultural property. Because of the history outlined above, along with continuing security operations in the region and the state of emergency which remains in force, women, children and men cannot speak freely regarding their opinion on the dam. In addition, Turkish law does not recognise different ethnicities and therefore, the heritage of all affected ethnic groups in the area cannot be addressed with regard to their specific rights and needs.

The report actively misrepresents the security situation in the region, referring only to previous 'security problems' (5.3) and current improvements but with security remaining 'a consideration' (2.1). The 'evidence' for this - the fact that the delegation had to be given a full military escort when driving to Ilisu itself - is in itself evidence of the lack of fundamental freedoms for the people of the area.

In fact, people cannot be consulted in any fair manner regarding their heritage and certainly no oral history or 'traditional knowledge' can be accurately and fairly recorded. This is particularly the case with regard to the history and archaeology of the recent conflict in the region and with regard to women's history - women form the majority of those in the area who cannot read or write and who speak only Kurdish, which engenders a number of difficulties, given the security situation. The report notes this general problem (2.5) indirectly by commenting rather cryptically that 'there was no open response however to the questions we put in Ilisu and Hasankeyf on what recent heritage locals might wish to preserve'. But this point is never followed up. Secondly, because of this situation, it will not be possible for archaeologists to carry out their work - which must include full and equitable consultation with people affected by the dam - to the required standards. This is clearly also a professional consideration with regard to the danger it would place affected communities in. Human rights violations are already associated with the Ilisu project, as documented in the fact-finding missions of the NGOs referred to in the bibliography of the report.

Flawed Methodology and Inaccurate Account of Cultural Heritage Impacts

The narrow scope of the approach in terms of security conditions in the region, as well as the way in which it extends beyond its remit in others, result from the fact that the methodology used to gather information is fundamentally flawed and the level of technical expertise is negligible. This is so much the case that the report frequently ignores its own stated aim of reviewing the cultural heritage impacts of Ilisu.

It might be expected that such a review would be a detailed and full treatment of the material at risk and the key issues relating to it, resulting from a thorough investigation lasting longer than three days. In fact, this report adds nothing to the extensive commentary on the cultural heritage impacts of Ilisu already in existence, much of which is citied in the bibliography of the report.

The accounts of the 'cultural significance of the area' (3.1) are superficial and inaccurate. It is not enough, given the likely extent of the impacts of this dam, to make sweeping and general statements about the history and significance of the area. To quote a report which describes Hasankeyf as 'Turkish national heritage' (4.3) without any qualification as to the well-known cultural significance of the town to Kurdish people is misleading in terms of the assessment that any archaeologist, working in accordance with international guidelines, would need to make of the differing views on cultural heritage in the affected area. To refer to the area as 'once the cradle of civilisation' but in modern times 'an abandoned backwater', followed by the remark that 'the local traditions are largely Kurdish' cannot be seen as anything other than demeaning to the people who live there and inflects the report with a disturbing and discriminatory tone (2.1).

The report appears contradictory and illogical on the number and significance of sites to be affected, referring to 200 sites (3.4) when other surveys have referred to many more and to the fact that the main point is that archaeologists do not know the extent of impacts because there has been no adequate survey assessment. The report also contradicts itself on the importance of different aspects of the heritage threatened by the dam. It does refer to the fact that it is not merely Hasankeyf which will be affected (3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 5.2, 6.1) and states that the area has only been superficially surveyed (3.3) but misunderstands the nature and extent of the cultural heritage which will be lost, referring, for example, to what might emerge from the 'unexcavated mounds'(6.2), downplaying the variety of sites and significant cultural places that would be destroyed. It refers to the loss of 'traditional knowledge' as 'no less irrevocable' but is anecdotal with reference to work being done in this area and its inadequacies (3.4) when compared with the detail with which Hasankeyf, as an archaeological site, is treated. It is asserted that 'TA?DAM has produced a master plan for rescue archaeology of these sites' (5.6) but the report provides no evidence for this nor does it explain how this could have been produced when there is no adequate baseline survey of the area in question nor any possibility of consulting fairly with those affected. In investigating this matter, the report could have used the existing critiques of the TA?DAM salvage operations, of which, judging from its bibliography alone, the authors were clearly aware.

Despite references to other heritage, the report tends to focus on Hasankeyf as the main impact of the dam on cultural heritage without any adequate justification on historical, social or cultural grounds (1.1, 4, 6.2, 6.3.1). In complete contravention of international law and guidelines, the report at one point ignores other heritage and proceeds to discuss the way in which the dam could go ahead if Hasankeyf were completely excavated and unique monuments relocated (6.2). Quite apart from the failure to address other heritage on this point, to suggest that the solution could be the complete excavation of Hasankeyf, with relocation of some monuments, is impossible for a number of reasons in and of itself. These include the fact that firstly, many Kurdish people, and many local people in and around Hasankeyf as well as cultural organisations do not want the salvage excavations to continue but have not been consulted about their views. This is not, as the report puts it, a question of 'the relative importance of heritage' but to whom that history matters and why - an issue the report does not address at all. Secondly, the report fails to distinguish adequately between preservation in situ - preferred internationally by archaeologists and encoded in international guidelines for the protection of cultural heritage - and documentation by record (most obviously in 6.2, point 2) and as a result, ignores routine practice in the profession of archaeology. Thirdly, such a solution is a misunderstanding of the nature of archaeological material and the importance of context in the interpretation of the past. Fourthly, to completely excavate Hasankeyf would take an enormous amount of time and money, much longer than the 20 years referred to (5.8). Professor Arik's reference to 'the site' has been misunderstood - he is referring to his excavation trenches at the Sultan Suleyman mosque complex - only one part of Hasankeyf.

Lack of Supporting Evidence and Failure to Address Implications

The report routinely makes statements without any supporting evidence for them, with little or no reference to international guidelines and/or remains silent on the implications of certain statements. It notes the withdrawal of Balfour Beatty from the Consortium which planned to build the dam but declares (1.4) that this will not affect its conclusions. This is quite wrong since Balfour itself stated that it was withdrawing because none of the conditions set by the ECAs, including the condition to draw up a 'detailed plan to preserve as much of the archaeological heritage of Hasankeyf as possible', had been met. The report itself notes this failure (5.8) but neglects to address its implications. In fact, the report notes a number of issues relating to Hasankeyf, yet fails to assess their true significance for the future of the project. Quite correctly, the report notes that Hasankeyf is legally protected under Turkish law but does not comment on the question this throws up about the rationale for the subsequent excavations of the site (5.1). The discussion of the current state of the monuments in Hasankeyf is also wholly unsatisfactory particularly with respect to the unsupported references to destruction by the inhabitants (6.1, point 4) and the failure to state clearly that the lack of adequate planning process, conservation and protection (6.2) is due to the State's institutionalised neglect of Hasankeyf and as such, is contrary to national and international law. The inclusion of the remark by Patricia Hewitt, an irrational justification for the protection of a site by flooding it, is unwarranted and not an informed comment on the protection of cultural heritage.

With regard to the competency of the current salvage projects and of the Turkish authorities, the report is also contradictory. It states that the 'Turkish archaeological approach has been properly prepared and is in general being carried out with a high degree of competence' (6.1) but then proceeds to list problems such as the lack of a systematic approach, the lack of an overall management plan, the lack of a clearly defined budget and the institutionalised neglect of heritage by the Turkish State. This is quite apart from the report's complete failure to assess the degree to which the salvage projects meet international standards regarding consultation and involvement of affected communities in assessments of impacts and with regard to cultural rights.

Implications of the Report's Conclusions and Recommendations

Having said the above, the deficiencies and problems the report does highlight could only lead to a conclusion that calls for a halt to the project. This is outlined in most detail with regard to Hasankeyf - the fact that Hasankeyf cannot be flooded, as it is protected by Turkish law, that there is no plan or proper budget in place to save it, that there is not enough time to do so before impounding begins and that there was no 'open response' by local people about their heritage. The report calls for the conditions set by the export credit agencies, who were or are still considering the provision of credit for Ilisu, to be respected by any future contractors (7.3). Yet it is clear from the report itself that the condition on cultural heritage has not been met. Many organisations and individuals have sought to show that, in fact, the condition cannot be met in the present circumstances and even if it could be met, it would not be adequate to the cultural needs and rights of those most affected by the dam. Instead, the report implies on a number of occasions that the project is inevitable in some form (e.g. 1.4, 7.2 point 4, 7.3). In conclusion, we are presented with a list of technical points on how the archaeological salvage operations, and therefore the project as a whole, might proceed and without any evidence as to why it should go ahead in the first place. We are convinced that the following points need to be detailed because of their implications.

- The report assumes that mitigation by excavation will go ahead, making recommendations about the salvage operation. The need for a balanced assessment of the full impacts - or whether this assessment can even be made in the circumstances - is never addressed. The needs and options assessments of large dams recommended by the World Commission on Dams, which must include the option not to build a dam and which involves full assessment of cultural heritage impacts, is never mentioned.

- It is incorrect to state that the legal status of Hasankeyf needs to be clarified: it is a matter of fact that it is protected in law and therefore it remains illegal to flood it. In fact, export credit agencies considering funding for the project are prohibited under their own guidelines from supporting activities that contravene host country laws. The comment that this legal protection could act as 'a deterrent to foreign investment in the dam' reads like a suggestion that the status of the site should be changed to suit the needs of the developers of the project and their backers.

- The suggestion that formal conservation would bring life to a halt in Hasankeyf is incorrect. There are several examples of successful conservation of heritage sites which continue to be lived in, including in Council of Europe countries.

- The suggestion of 'imaginative fund-raising involving the local population' is completely unfounded and patronising, most importantly with regard to the fact that local people have not been adequately consulted about their views on the project nor can they be, given prevailing political and military conditions in the region. For these reasons, no programme to document 'traditional knowledge' will be accurate, fair or valuable to people affected by the project.

- The recommendation that the Council and the EU should assist with this project and fund technical expertise is ill advised for a number of reasons: 1. the project, if it continues, would go ahead on illegal grounds on a number of counts; 2. such a recommendation would be a stop-gap measure which does not address the structural and wider social problems facing archaeologists from Turkey and all of those communities affected by this and other projects and concerned for their cultural heritage; 3. the implications of the obligation on archaeologists to consult with and involve local communities in decision-making is that people's needs and rights with regard to this or any other dam - and the question of whether they are free to express them - must come before any discussion of budgets, technical surveys and salvage operations 4. the implications for the Council and the EU of supporting, financially or otherwise, a series of projects which would, in all likelihood, further repress and distort the heritage and cultural forms of the people affected by the dam, given prevailing conditions in the region.

It is not the case that proceeding to excavate what we can before the reservoir inundates the area is the best, correct or legal strategy with regard to any large dam. A number of documents are cited in the bibliography of this report by heritage and archaeological organisations and individuals as well as other NGOs which sought to highlight the many problems of the Ilisu dam. These documents more than amply demonstrate the degree to which heritage and archaeological organisations as well as many hundreds of individual archaeologists and heritage professionals have opposed this project and sought to highlight the damage it will do in the region. In addition, WAC corresponded with the head of the assembly secretariat for Culture, Science and Education and provided information for the report along the same lines. Yet these documents and, as a result, this professional advice, are ignored, generally not referenced in the text and the section on 'international awareness' is derisory (6.5). A picture is presented in the conclusions to this report and elsewhere (see 3.2), which suggests that archaeologists welcome the project as a means to gain access to archaeological material and funding (7.1, points 1 and 2). This is an inaccurate presentation of the views of the international archaeological community. It is wrong and cynical to suggest that the only concern to all archaeologists is physical materials from the past rather than the needs and rights of people with regard to their heritage in the present. The statement that 'it is a tremendous incentive for archaeology in the area and for archaeologists throughout the world' is not only inaccurate; it is illogical in its implication that the heritage of the area is best served by building a dam which will flood it. Further, in ignoring current archaeological guidelines and professional codes of practice, it is insulting to the many archaeologists who seek to uphold their ethical responsibilities with regard to indigenous and ethnic minority communities.

Issued by World Archaeological Congress, President's Office
Professor Martin Hall

Centre for Higher Education Development
University of Cape Town
Rondebosch 7700
South Africa

Telephone: +27 -21-6502645
Fax: +27 -21-6505055
mhall@ched.uct.ac.za
21 January 2002

8. - MHA - "Demirel: Ocalan was surrendered by USA":

Participated in the program "Kafe Siyaset" on CNN TV, Suleyman Demirel, former President of the Turkish Republic, confessed that PKK President Abdullah Ocalan was surrendered to Turkey by USA.

MHA / FRANKFURT

Suleyman Demirel, having played a role on the international conspiracy which began on October 9, 1998 and resulted kidnapping of Ocalan from Turkey on February 15, 1999, said "America's role is tremendous on surrender of Ocalan to Turkey. Everybody knows it."