Untitled Document

15. January 2002

1. "Message To Us On Iraq", Prime Minister Ecevit's visit to Washington and the issues to be discussed during the visit

2. "Turkey Opens Spy Satellite Station", Turkey has launched a ground station for a U.S. reconnaissance satellite that will provide Ankara with intelligence information on its neighbors.

3. "PKK retreated, we forgot about the Southeast!", as a society we have a very short memory. But this is simply too much. No one is thinking of it. No one is lifting a finger. We have already forgotten all about it. Once again we have abandoned the Southeast to its sad fate.

4. "Turkey's Leader Visits U.S. to Plead for Urgent Economic Aid", Turkey's prime minister arrives in Washington on Monday to ask for urgent help for his economy, bringing a last- minute offering to make the case: a $5 billion bailout for the nation's banks.

5. "Analysis: Bush Foreign Policy Wins Few Friends in Mideast", Bush's policies in the Middle East may have diverged from those of his predecessor Bill Clinton more in style than substance since he took office on Jan. 20, 2001.

6. "Phase II and Iraq", As military operations in Afghanistan wind down, it is well to keep in mind President Bush's injunction that they are only the first battles of a long war.

1. - Milliyet - "Message to US on Iraq":

Columnist Fikret Bila writes on Prime Minister Ecevit's visit to Washington and the issues to be discussed during the visit.

During Prime Minister Ecevit's visit to the US, the Middle East and Iraq will be two of the main issues to be discussed. Prime Minister Ecevit and Foreign Minister Cem expect that US President Bush will bring up the subject. It is a well-known fact that Washington has not wavered from the idea of a military intervention in Iraq. Washington also knows that Ankara and Prime Minister Ecevit believe that such a policy has certain drawbacks.

Ankara has conveyed to Washington the stance it will take in such an event. When a delegation of 10 US senators visited Ankara recently, the problem was discussed at length. Turkey's approach to the issue was explained to the delegation led by Senator Joseph Lieberman, both by military and government officials.

Ankara is inclined to take part in the probable events rather standing by. The reason for such a policy is that, the consequences of a probable intervention will lead to crucial developments in Turkey. The stance conveyed to the US senators visiting Ankara may be summarized as, first, Turkey cannot accept the division of Iraq and the establishment of a Kurdish state in the north. Second, Turkey is closely concerned with the consequences of the intervention rather than its reasons as these will greatly affect Turkey politically, economically, and militarily.

Third, the consequences of an intervention can be accepted by Ankara if the formation of a Kurdish state is not allowed, and only an autonomous Kurdish zone is left as in the past, and a Turkmen autonomous region is formed in addition to a Shiite autonomus region in the south.

Fourth, Turkey prefers to face the probable events actively to protect its border security, territorial integrity and its own interests rather than facing them at its borders. Ecevit's visit is taking place after this sounding off by the US senators. Ankara said to the senators that the situation in northern Iraq came into being after the Gulf War and posed a danger for Turkish security.

The PKK was strengthened in the power vacuum and it increased its attacks on Turkey. Ankara is not interested in Saddam. However, even if Saddam stays in power or is overthrown, Ankara is concerned that Iraq may be divided, a Kurdish state may be proclaimed and the Turkmen may be oppressed...The US has to take Ankara's concerns into consideration.

2. - Middle East News - "Turkey Opens Spy Satellite Station":

ANKARA

Turkey has launched a ground station for a U.S. reconnaissance satellite that will provide Ankara with intelligence information on its neighbors. The government of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit has opened the Ikonus Satellite Base Station in Golbasi. The station will operate the U.S. Ikonus satellite, regarded as one of the most advanced commercial satellites available.

Officials said Ikonus would provide Turkey with intelligence information. They said Ikonus will provide Turkey with military reconnaissance until Ankara launches its own facility. "It is clear that a facility that can produce such images is a rare thing indeed," Defense Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu said. "It is providing our country with high technology in this field. This achievement will provide imaging services that will help various sectors such as intelligence, tourism, national resources, tourism and mapping."

3. - Turkish Daily News - "PKK retreated, we forgot about the Southeast!":

ANKARA / by Mehmet Ali Birand

I feel like screaming, grabbing those in Ankara by the lapels. This much indifference is simply too much. There had been bloodshed for 15 years, the country was divided. In the end security was established -- at a very high cost. Ocalan changed his attitude. The PKK adopted a new approach. The military said, we have done our share of the job and now it is your turn.

And what has the state done? Has it kept any of the promises it had made? As a society we have a very short memory. But this is simply too much. No one is thinking of it. No one is lifting a finger. We have already forgotten all about it. Once again we have abandoned the Southeast to its sad fate. Once again we have shown that we cannot rid ourselves of the habit of solving the problems merely by hitting and breaking, that is, with brute force.

We have obviously nothing to do with modern practices, such as using reason, striving for that, making plans according to a program or dressing the wounds. What a great shame... I am sure you too are full of resentment. Just think about the fact that for a period of 15 years this region saw only terror, counter-terror, blood and death. Some 30,000 people of this country lost their lives. Millions migrated to other parts. Hundreds of thousands suffered. Hunger, misery and death abounded. All the systems of the country were in tatters. Democracy received incredible wounds.

While the fight against terrorism was continuing, the state kept making the same pledges over and over. If terrorism came to an end people's expectations would be met, funds would be channelled into the region, the shortcomings would be eliminated and people would be treated as human beings should. The only condition was that terrorism should come to an end. At that time, the persons who said all these made ample promises -- whether because they did not believe that terrorism would come to an end or whether they did not want terrorism to come to an end, we do not know. And, what is worse, everybody believed them. In the end, thanks to the great sacrifices made by the security forces, the change in the international conditions and Washington's making a choice in favor of supporting Turkey, terrorism was brought to a halt.

Abdullah Ocalan of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) changed -- or was compelled to change -- his basic policies. He forced the PKK as well to undergo a similar change. And a brand new development began. Terrorism withdrew from the region. Tranquillity was achieved. The military was the first to make the most significant announcement: We have done all we could to bring the terrorism to a halt. From now on the wounds have to be dressed. This task belongs to the political authority. And the political authority made high-sounding statements, disclosing a series of "measures packages" which turned out to contain not even a pebble.

Then the economic crisis came to dominate the country's agenda and the promises made in the past were forgotten. Had it not been for the replies given to a formal question Diyarbakir Deputy Sebgetullah Seydaoglu posed to the prime minister in Parliament, we probably would not remember how bad the situation is.

It is known that the number of evacuated villages is around 4,000. Official statistics indicate that hundreds of thousands of people live in misery in nylon tents. And, in the face of all that, what has the state done?

Over the past two years, the state has reportedly had 770 houses built in 11 settlements in the context of the "returning home" program. Construction is reportedly continuing on another 435. And, for the hundreds of people driven out of their villages, 5,853 houses have reportedly been built at the provincial or county seats where they live.

Over the past 17 months only 30,000 people have reportedly been permitted to return to their villages and TL 3 trillion has been spent to reconstruct their houses which had been burnt down, torn down or in a decrepit state due to the fact that no one was taking care of them.

My God! These figures sound like a joke. It is as if they are making fun of the people. Look, especially, at the amount of aid provided in a city such as Diyarbakir, a city which attracted the greatest number of people driven out of their villages, a city full to the brim: A total of TL 250 billion was handed out during the 2000-2001 period.

One would be too embarrassed to disclose such a figure. The state has "closed up the book" now that terrorism has come to an end, the PKK has laid down its weapons and Ocalan has been jailed. It has shelved the "file." And the officials are no longer getting lavish amounts of compensation anyway. So, just never mind! The governor of Diyarbakir has made so many statements in a row. He has said that somebody has to make a move. He points out that a new "repentance law" must be passed and that funds must be channelled into the region. Not a voice is being heard from Ankara.

You would think that the gentlemen there are preoccupied with major policies, wouldn't you? Out of the question. They have been caught in a vicious circle. They cannot go beyond gossiping. And, since not a word is coming from the politicians, the bureaucrats continue to sit smugly.

If hunger and misery continues in the Southeast in this manner the state may come face to face with the kind of situations that would make the PKK trouble seem a small issue. Hungry and desperate people would not care for anybody. If you sacrificed a small number of your posh cars, if you trimmed down the bureaucrats' lavish spending, you can find the resources needed to dress the wounds in the Southeast.

The people of the Southeast do not deserve this treatment. Later, when they take up pickaxes and spades and start marching, none of us will have the right to open our mouths. And we will be too ashamed to turn to the military and say, "Save us!" Wake up! It is high time you did that.

4. - The New York Times - "Turkey's Leader Visits U.S. to Plead for Urgent Economic Aid":

ISTANBUL / by Douglas Frantz

Turkey's prime minister arrives in Washington on Monday to ask for urgent help for his economy, bringing a last- minute offering to make the case: a $5 billion bailout for the nation's banks. Parliament passed the bailout in a midnight session last Thursday, completing a last requirement to get a $10 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund.

The prime minister, Bulent Ecevit, with an entourage of 200 government officials and business leaders, now hopes to persuade the I.M.F. to come through with the loan promptly, and to convince the Bush administration that Turkey's strategic importance warrants special trade help. Experts here and in Washington predict mixed results. The I.M.F. board is expected to approve the loan later this month, but the Bush administration is unlikely to grant any trade preferences. Improving the fragile economy of Turkey, which has sustained economic setbacks similar to Argentina's in recent months, is the key to survival for Mr. Ecevit and his coalition.

The government is trying to turn around the economy before elections scheduled for 2004, and analysts give them good odds of clinging to power, barring a renewed financial crisis. "There is an optimistic mood in the country at the moment that things are getting better, but any indication to the contrary would undermine the entire process of economic recovery," said Ilter Turan, a political scientist at Bilgi University in Istanbul. Indeed, the Turkish government is eager to portray the country as back on the road to financial stability after a bumpy ride over the last year that ended with bleak statistics: the economy shrank by 8.5 percent in 2001, consumer inflation ended the year at 68.5 percent, the national currency lost more than 50 percent of its value, 27,000 businesses closed their doors and 1.5 million people lost their jobs.

But there was some good news. Under international pressure, the government took steps to insulate banking and other industries from the demands of politicians, who have traditionally used state-owned banks and government contracts to extract campaign contributions. Analysts said that injecting new capital into weak banks and other regulatory steps should speed up the pace of mergers and help restore the industry's health. Parliament also passed laws to bring greater integrity to public purchasing and to liberalize the tobacco industry by reducing subsidies to farmers and paving the way to privatize Tekel, the state-owned tobacco and alcohol monopoly.

The reforms did not come easily. Kemal Dervis, the economy minister, threatened to resign unless the bank bailout passed last week, according to the Turkish press. In the end, the three coalition parties voted for the bill and the opposition members of Parliament walked out. Last year exports grew 15 percent, though partly as a result of the devalued lira. The Istanbul stock market recorded some year-end gains as Turkey benefited from the realization that the Argentine default would not lead to a collapse in other emerging markets. "We are off to a better start this year, but we cannot talk about good economic conditions yet," said Akin Ongor, an executive at Garanti Bank and an official with the private Foreign Economic Relations Board.

Mr. Ongor, who will be making the trip to Washington, said the delegation would press officials in the Bush administration to eliminate quotas on Turkish textiles, reduce restrictions on the country's steel and adopt preferences that put Turkey on an equal footing with European countries. Mr. Ecevit and others also are scheduled to meet with officials in New York, including Mayor Michael Bloomberg, to press for better business ties. Senior Turkish officials, including Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, have talked publicly about leveraging the country's strategic relationship with the United States, which has become more important since the events of Sept. 11, into a closer economic partnership.

They complained that Americans bought only $3 billion worth of Turkish goods last year compared with $3.5 billion in American products imported by Turkey, which has a population of about 70 million. But American trade officials in Washington said the Turks should be prepared for a disappointing response from Washington. While there may be small concessions on textiles, which account for half of Turkey's exports to the United States, they said the administration would not cut steel restrictions or end textile quotas, which are to be eliminated on Dec. 31, 2004.

Mr. Ecevit is likely to be disappointed, too, when President Bush raises the issue of $2 billion owed to Motorola by Turkey's second-largest cellular phone company, Telsim. The State Department and American lobbyists have already pressed the Turkish government unsuccessfully to persuade Telsim's owners to repay the debt. Administration officials said they expect Mr. Bush to raise the matter again. Analysts said the disputed loan has harmed Turkey's ability to attract foreign investment, but Turkish officials said they cannot force Telsim, a private company, to repay the debt.

5. - Reuters - "Analysis: Bush Foreign Policy Wins Few Friends in Mideast":

LONDON / by Alistair Lyon, Middle East Diplomatic Correspondent

Frustrated, disappointed and angry. Many in the Middle East feel this way about U.S. foreign policy in President Bush's first year in office -- unless they happen to be Israeli. The signals are not reassuring for those who believe that the sense of impotence and injustice pervading the region helps explain why the likes of Osama bin Laden can recruit suicide bombers willing to commit mass murder in the name of Islam.

Bush's policies in the Middle East may have diverged from those of his predecessor Bill Clinton more in style than substance since he took office on Jan. 20, 2001. But bitterness at those policies now seems to be felt as keenly by Washington's Arab allies as by its foes in the region. This was heightened after the September 11 attacks on the United States by U.S. media suggestions that Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the countries from which most of the hijackers hailed, were as much part of the problem as the solution to terrorism. At street level, many Arabs and Muslims point to the misery of Palestinians under occupation and Bush's support for what is arguably the most hard-line government in Israel's history.

The U.S. debate over what target to hit after Afghanistan in Bush's war on global terrorism -- Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Somalia and Sudan are among the candidates -- lends plausibility to Muslim radicals who argue that the United States is inherently hostile to Islam, despite Bush's many efforts to stress the contrary.

ARAB DISILLUSION

Even pro-Western Arab capitals have seemed impatient with Bush's reluctance, especially in his presidency's early months, to get more closely involved in stopping a decade of peacemaking from sinking in a welter of Israeli-Palestinian bloodshed. ``Most Arab leaders are really frustrated with the Bush administration's conduct of American foreign policy in the Middle East.

They are totally disappointed and don't expect it to get better,'' Mohamed al Sayid Said, deputy director of Cairo's Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, told Reuters. He said Bush's record had trashed a long-held idea that Arabs can expect a fairer deal from Republicans than Democrats, as well as the hope that he might emulate his father, who launched a Middle East peace process after the 1991 Gulf War. Bush had regained some credit with Arabs by talking of a Palestinian state, Israeli ``occupation'' and Palestinian ''suffering,'' rather than only decrying Palestinian ''terrorists.'' ``But he stopped short of saying several key things like calling for a full (Israeli) withdrawal and calling for a new approach to negotiations,'' Said added.

An Egyptian government official, who asked not to be named, said public opinion in his country was frustrated and angry. ``The government is also frustrated, but more silent,'' he said. ``We had hoped that Bush would build on his father's legacy in terms of the Madrid peace process, but this didn't happen. ``We were hoping for more from this administration, but it completely advocates the stand of (Israeli Prime Minister Ariel) Sharon,'' the official said. ``There is a lack of vision.''

SOURCE OF RESTRAINT

Palestinians loyal to President Yasser Arafat still see the United States as the only possible source of restraint on Sharon and pressure on Israel to return to the negotiating table. ``Israel is putting endless obstacles in the way of U.S. efforts. We hope they (the Americans) apply more pressure on Sharon to give a kickstart to the peace process,'' said Ahmed Abdel-Rahman, a top aide to Arafat, recalling the elder Bush's role in bringing Israel to the 1991 Madrid peace conference. ``So far, the U.S. pressure is insufficient to deter Sharon. Sharon himself is a catastrophe because he is not interested in peace (but) in his expansionist policy,'' Abdel-Rahman added.

Understandably, Israelis have sweeter words for the men governing their superpower protector. ``It's a friendly administration and it's also a very determined one. We fully support everything they are trying to do,'' said Danny Ayalon, foreign policy adviser to Sharon. ``We think their policy is very clear and careful and considerate and we think it's a smart one.'' Ayalon said U.S. envoy Anthony Zinni appeared to be adopting Sharon's view that any rigid framework or timetable for peace was doomed to fail and that Arafat was to blame for the impasse. ``Instead of creating a future for his people, Arafat has opted for terror and everyone is suffering the consequences. He is the most problematic obstacle to any kind of dialogue and that is why we declared him irrelevant,'' Ayalon declared. ``Arafat has to understand there will not be a way out unless he performs and this is what Zinni wants and has been saying.''

IRAN TIES ON ICE

The Bush administration has made no serious move to heal years of hostility with non-Arab Iran under its reformist, but politically hamstrung, President Mohammad Khatami. No surprise there for Iranian political analyst Ali Amini, who said Washington had no real incentive to improve ties with Iran as long it was ruled by a ``corrupt'' establishment weakened by popular discontent that was allowed no political outlet. ``The result is a weak Iranian state which does not have a clearly defined foreign policy and therefore can be of no threat to U.S. expansionism in the region,'' Amini said. ``In the short-term, in terms of realpolitik, this is the best option for the United States which believes that, in regard to Iran, it can afford to patiently wait and see,'' he added. Turkey, as the only Muslim member of NATO and a neighbor to Iraq, Syria and Iran, has seen a gain in its strategic weight during Bush's presidency following the September 11 attacks.

Turkey has been widely supportive of U.S. action in Afghanistan and Bush is widely credited with having been instrumental in pushing the International Monetary Fund to sign a $19 billion rescue package after Turkey's financial crisis. Mumtaz Soysal, a former foreign minister, said Bush's standing in Turkey would be tested by whether he is swayed by Ankara's opposition to military action against Iraq. ``My feeling is that ... because Bush is less knowledgeable about international affairs, he is more likely to listen to advice from either side, for or against such action,'' he said. Iraq will be high on the agenda of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, due in the United States this week for a trip billed in Turkey as crucial to relations with its most important ally.

6. - The Washington Post - "Phase II and Iraq":

By Henry A. Kissinger

As military operations in Afghanistan wind down, it is well to keep in mind President Bush's injunction that they are only the first battles of a long war. An important step has been taken toward the goals of breaking the nexus between governments and the terrorist groups they support or tolerate, discrediting Islamic fundamentalism so that moderates in the Islamic world can reclaim their religion from the fanatics, and placing the fight against terrorism in the context of the geopolitical threat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq to regional stability and to American friends and interests in the region.

But much more needs to be done. Were we to flinch, the success in Afghanistan would be interpreted in time as taking on the weakest and most remote of the terrorist centers while we recoiled from unraveling terrorism in countries more central to the problem. Three interrelated courses of action are available:

(a) To rely primarily on diplomacy and coalition-building on the theory that the fate of the Taliban will teach the appropriate lessons.

(b) To insist on a number of specific corrective steps in countries with known training camps or terrorist headquarters, such as Somalia or Yemen, or those engaged in dangerous programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, such as Iraq, and to take military action if these steps are rejected.

(c) To focus on the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq in order to change the regional dynamics by showing America's determination to defend regional stability, its interests and its friends. (This would also send a strong message to other rogue states.)

Sole reliance on diplomacy is the preferred course of some members of the coalition, which claim that the remaining tasks can be accomplished by consultation and the cooperation of intelligence and security services around the world. But to rely solely on diplomacy would be to repeat the mistake with which the United States hamstrung itself in every war of the past half-century. Because it treated military operations and diplomacy as separate and sequential, the United States stopped military operations in Korea as soon as our adversaries moved to the conference table; it ended the bombing of North Vietnam as an entrance price to the Paris talks; it stopped military operations in the Gulf after the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

In each case, the ending of military pressure produced diplomatic stalemate. The Korean armistice negotiations consumed two years, during which America suffered as many casualties as in the entire combat phase; an even more intractable stalemate developed in the Vietnam negotiations; and in the Persian Gulf, Saddam Hussein used the Republican Guard divisions preserved by the armistice to restore control over his territory and to dismantle systematically the inspection provisions of the armistice agreement.

Anti-terrorism policy is empty if it is not backed by the threat of force. Intellectual opponents of military action as well as its likely targets will procrastinate or agree to token or symbolic remedies only. Ironically, governments on whose territory terrorists are tolerated will find it especially difficult to cooperate unless the consequences of failing to do so are made more risky than their tacit bargain with the terrorists. Phase II of the anti-terrorism campaign must therefore involve a specific set of demands geared to a precise timetable supported by credible coercive power. These should be put forward as soon as possible as a framework.

And time is of the essence. Phase II must begin while the memory of the attack on the United States is still vivid and American-deployed forces are available to back up the diplomacy. Nor should Phase II be confused with the pacification of Afghanistan. The American strategic objective was to destroy the terrorist network; that has been largely accomplished. Pacification of the entire country of Afghanistan has never been achieved by foreigners and cannot be the objective of the American military effort. The United States should be generous with economic and development assistance. But the strategic goal of Phase II should be the destruction of the global terrorist network, to prevent its reappearance in Afghanistan, but not to be drawn into Afghan civil strife.

Somalia and Yemen are often mentioned as possible targets for a Phase II campaign. That decision should depend on the ability to identify targets against which local governments are able to act and on the suitability of American forces to accomplish this task if the local governments can't or won't. And given these limitations, the United States will have to decide whether action against them is strategically productive. All this raises the unavoidable challenge Iraq poses. The issue is not whether Iraq was involved in the terrorist attack on the United States.

The challenge of Iraq is essentially geopolitical. Iraq's policy is implacably hostile to the United States and to certain neighboring countries. It possesses growing stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, which Saddam Hussein has used in the war against Iran and on his own population. It is working to develop a nuclear capability. Hussein breached his commitment to the United Nations by evicting the international inspectors he had accepted on his territory as part of the armistice agreement ending the Gulf War.

There is no possibility of a negotiation between Washington and Baghdad and no basis for trusting Iraq's promises to the international community. If these capabilities remain intact, they could in time be used for terrorist goals or by Saddam Hussein in the midst of some new regional or international upheaval. And if his regime survives both the Gulf War and the anti-terrorism campaign, this fact alone will elevate him to a potentially overwhelming menace. From a long-range point of view, the greatest opportunity of Phase II is to return Iraq to a responsible role in the region. Were Iraq governed by a group representing no threat to its neighbors and willing to abandon its weapons of mass destruction, the stability of the region would be immeasurably enhanced. The remaining regimes flirting with terrorist fundamentalism or acquiescing in its exactions would be driven to shut down their support of terrorism.

At a minimum, we should insist on a U.N. inspection system to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, with an unlimited right of inspection and freedom of movement for the inspectors. But no such system exists on paper, and the effort to install it might be identical with that required to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Above all, given the ease of producing biological and chemical weapons, inspection must be extremely intrusive, and experience shows that no inspection can withstand indefinitely the opposition of a determined host government.

But if the overthrow of Saddam Hussein is to be seriously considered, three prerequisites must be met: (a) development of a military plan that is quick and decisive, (b) some prior agreement on what kind of structure is to replace Hussein and (c) the support or acquiescence of key countries needed for implementation of the military plan. A military operation against Saddam Hussein cannot be long and drawn out. If it is, the battle may turn into a struggle of Islam against the West. It would also enable Hussein to try to involve Israel by launching attacks on it -- perhaps using chemical and biological weapons -- in the process sowing confusion within the Muslim world.

A long war extending to six months and beyond would also make it more difficult to keep allies and countries such as Russia and China from dissociating formally from what they are unlikely to join but even more unlikely to oppose. Before proceeding to confrontation with Iraq, the Bush administration will therefore wish to examine with great care the military strategy implied. Forces of the magnitude of the Gulf War of a decade ago are unlikely to be needed.

At the same time, it would be dangerous to rely on a combination of U.S. air power and indigenous opposition forces alone. To be sure, the contemporary precision weaponry was not available in the existing quantities during the Gulf War. And the no-fly zones will make Iraqi reinforcements difficult. They could be strengthened by being turned into no-movement zones proscribing the movement of particular categories of weapons. Still, we cannot stake American national security entirely, or even largely, on local opposition forces that do not yet exist and whose combat capabilities are untested. Perhaps Iraqi forces would collapse at the first confrontation, as some argue.

But the likelihood of this happening is greatly increased if it is clear American military power stands in overwhelming force immediately behind the local forces. A second prerequisite for a military campaign against Iraq is to define the political outcome. Local opposition would in all likelihood be sustained by the Kurdish minority in the north and the Shiite minority in the south. But if we are to enlist the Sunni majority, which now dominates Iraq, in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, we need to make clear that Iraq's disintegration is not the goal of American policy.

This is all the more important because a military operation in Iraq would require the support of Turkey and the acquiescence of Saudi Arabia. Neither is likely to cooperate if they foresee an independent Kurdish state in the north and a Shiite republic in the south as the probable outcome. A Kurdish state would inflame the Kurdish minority in Turkey and a Shiite state in the south would threaten the Dhahran region in Saudi Arabia, and might give Iran a new base to seek to dominate the gulf region. A federal structure for a unified Iraq would be a way to deal with this issue. Creating an appropriate coalition for such an effort and finding bases for the necessary American deployment will be difficult. Phase II is likely to separate those members of the coalition that joined so as to have veto over American actions from those that are willing to pursue an implacable strategy.

Nevertheless, the skillful diplomacy that shaped the first phase of the anti-terrorism campaign would have much to build on. Saddam Hussein has no friends in the gulf region. Britain will not easily abandon the pivotal role, based on its special relationship with the United States, that it has earned for itself in the evolution of the crisis. Nor will Germany move into active opposition to the United States -- especially in an election year. The same is true of Russia, China and Japan.

A determined American policy thus has more latitude than is generally assumed. But it will be far more difficult than Phase I. Local resistance -- especially in Iraq -- will be more determined and ruthless. Domestic opposition will mount in many countries. American public opinion will be crucial in sustaining such a course. It will need to be shaped by the same kind of decisive and subtle leadership by which President Bush unified the country for the first phase of the crisis.