20
December 2002
2. "Turkey's President Vetoes Legislation Favoring Erdogan", Turkey's president on Thursday vetoed legislation that would have enabled the leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party to become the country's prime minister.
3. "After the EU summit", at eight in the evening on December 13th, the doors of the European Union swung open. The leaders of ten countries eager to join were ushered in to meet those of the 15 current members.
4. "Turkish Cypriot leader backs talks", Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash has said he is ready to hold talks with the Greek Cypriots on a United Nations plan to reunify their long-divided island.
5. "Turkey and Europe: A Tale of Two Complexes", "How proud the person who can say: I am a Turk!" This sentence, set in large letters, leaps out at you thousands of times on streets and squares in Turkey's cities and villages.
6. "A European snub", Turkey will have to wait, said the EU. Yes, Europe said, Turkey has made progress in reforming its economy and by outlawing the death penalty, but more needs to be done.
7. "The domino effect of EU's misgivings on Turkey", last weekend's summit meeting of the European Union in Copenhagen showed the EU a bit older, potentially much larger, but certainly no wiser. Ten new prospective members, mostly former states or satellites of the Soviet Union, were welcomed in a chorus of self-congratulations. But Europe failed to see why it would hasten to bring Turkey into the family.
8. "Kurdish Fighters Don't Expect Call From
U.S.", "if America attacks Iraq, they will not need
our help, because we are not so strong," said Hamid Afandi, minister
of pesh merga for the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which controls the
western part of the Kurdish zone. 
1. - The Kurdish Observer - "Ocalan was not allowed to see his lawyers again":
19 December 2002
KADEK President Abdullah Ocalan has been allowed to see his lawyers and family members for three weeks. Irfan Dundar, one of his lawyers, stated that they expected a reply to their petitions soon.
As actions for Ocalan continues in Kurdistan, Turkey and Europe, KADEK President Abdullah Ocalan was not allowed to see his lawyers and sisters this week either.
His lawyers Irfan Dundar, Dogan Erbas and Asya Ulker, and his sisters Fatma Ocalan and Havva Keser went to Bursa's district of Gemlik the other day in order to go to Imrali island to see him. But it was not allowed due to "bad weather conditions". The lawyers and his sisters Ocalan and Keser went back to Istanbul without being able to see him.
"Reply will come soon"
Lawyer Irfan Dundar stated that they expected a reply for their petitions to Justice Ministry, Bursa Public Prosecution Office and General Directorate of Prisons. Dundar listed their demands in the petitions as follows: "recognition of right to defence, lifting all unlawful aspects of his life conditions."
Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan could meet with his lawyers on November 15 after five weeks of lack of visits. The next week the lawyers were not taken to the island on the pretext of "a out-of-order boat", following two weeks of lack of visits they met with him on November 27. This was the last time the lawyers could see their clients.
KADEK warned
The Kurdistan National Congress (KNK) and KADEK launched a campaign to claim and defend President Apo on December 10. The aim of the campaign is to attract attention to his isolation. In Kurdistan, Turkey and Europe there are a number of actions for Ocalan's freedom. KADEK had made a statement, warning that in case that the concept continued a war would begin.
9 lack of visits in 3 months
Lawyer Irfan Dundar stated last week that they faced with a new concept
last week. Dundar has drawn attention that Ocalan had been allowed
9 of the 12 visits in the last 3 months.
2. - Associated Press - "Turkey's President Vetoes Legislation Favoring Erdogan":
ISTANBUL / 20 December 2002
by Aberin Zaman
Turkey's president on Thursday vetoed legislation that would have
enabled the leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party to
become the country's prime minister.
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer overruled the legislation adopted by
the Justice and Development Party dominated parliament saying the
changes were designed specifically for party leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Laws could not be tailored to meet the needs of inviduals but needed to serve society as a whole, the president, who is a former constitutional court judge, argued. Mr. Erdogan, whose Justice and Development Party swept to power alone in the November 3 polls was unable to become prime minister because of a past conviction on charges of seeking to incite religious hatred through a poem he read. His deputy Abdullah Gul became prime minister instead.
Mr. Erdogan who began his career in an overtly pro-Islamic party has disavowed his Islamic roots and insists that the Justice and Development Party, which he found last year, is a conservative party and has no religious agenda.
But analysts say Turkey's pro-secular establishment, including the powerful Armed Forces and the president continue to view Mr. Erdogan with suspicion.
Despite the president's veto, under Turkish law, the amendment can be brought before the the parliament for a second round of voting. The president does not have a second right of veto but he could call for a referendum.
He could also apply to the country's constitutional court to have
the law repealed.
3. - The Economist - "After the EU summit":
And now let's have another look at the road map
BRUSSELS / December 19th 2002
The enlargement agreed at Copenhagen leaves plenty still to be done
AT EIGHT in the evening on December 13th, the doors of the European Union swung open. The leaders of ten countries eager to join were ushered in to meet those of the 15 current members. Their applications had been approved. Champagne and speeches flowed. Latvia's President Vaira Vike-Freiberga proclaimed (in English and French) that “justice has been done.” Peter Medgyessy, from Hungary, averred that for his country “history begins again today, after an interruption of 60 years.”
Then came an awkward moment. The leaders of three candidates not yet accepted, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, were allowed to join the throng. Abdullah Gul, Turkey's prime minister, did not disguise his bitterness. Turkey had been told that the earliest it might even start negotiating was the end of 2004, and then only if a demanding series of political reforms had been put in place. “Far from satisfactory,” he said, though it would not deflect Turkey from its determination to join.
But the Copenhagen summit was indeed historic. What began as a club of six West European countries, linked by the horrors of a recent war, is due soon to number 25, up to—indeed, with the Baltic states, into—the edges of the former Soviet Union. The accession treaties must still be ratified. Nine of the ten would-be members will put them to referendums next year. Hungary is expected to go first, on April 12th. Current polls put approval there around 75%, and EU officials hope this will create momentum in places such as Estonia, where a recent poll recorded just 39% (albeit with only 31% against). Votes in Malta and Latvia too may be close.
The most eagerly awaited vote will be in Poland, with 39m of the hoped-for 75m new EU citizens. The last stages of the Polish accession negotiations were bitter, and its anti-EU voices are strong. Still, current polls show clear “yes” majorities.
And then?
If all goes well, the new members will join on May 1st, 2004. There
will then be three key issues: their economic development; their impact,
as members, on the EU; and the EU's handling of those countries still
banging on its door, in particular Turkey.
Central Europe's economies are mainly doing well. All are growing faster than the EU average: by 5% in free-market Estonia last year. Free trade with the EU, except in farm products, is already in force. Taken together, Czech and Hungarian exports have almost trebled since 1993, over 60% going to EU buyers. Especially to these two, foreign investment is pouring in. Poland is a worrying exception; its GDP is barely rising and unemployment is near 20%.
All the candidates hope that actual membership will give a further boost. But they also worry about the costs of EU social and environmental rules, and wonder how their farmers will cope with competition from more-subsidised West European producers. Still, well-educated and low-paid labour should help all these countries to go on doing better than their new partners—as they must, if EU enlargement is to fulfil its central promise of closing the gap in living standards.
In Brussels the main concern is about the impact of the newcomers on the Union. Some are logistical: how long will EU meetings go on, if 25 countries have to say their piece; can the translation system cope? Officials are already dreading the negotiations over the next EU budget, as the newcomers struggle to improve what many see as the rotten financial deals of their entry terms, while current members fight to hold on to the loot.
As for policies, for “budget” read, notably, farm policy as such, a big issue for the newcomers; and, no less, the sundry EU efforts to help poor members catch up with rich ones. The newcomers will also affect the EU's fledgling foreign policy. They are likely to be more pro-American than some current members. George Bush recently got loud cheers when he gave a speech outdoors in Lithuania; he could barely risk such an event in parts of Western Europe.
The biggest foreign-policy issue for the new EU will be how to deal
with the queue of further applicants. Six months after the new members
join, the EU of 25 will be called upon to judge whether Turkey is
fit to begin negotiations. Cyprus could prove troublesome. Hopes that
talks in Copenhagen outside the summit could lead toward a deal to
reunite the island came to little, but Cyprus was accepted anyway.
Might its (Greek-)Cypriot government try to block Turkey's entry,
as the Turks fear? Meanwhile, Romania and Bulgaria are already at
the door, and others will surely come. The historic enlargement agreed
at Copenhagen will not be the last.
4. - BBC - "Turkish Cypriot leader backs talks":
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash has said he is ready to hold talks with the Greek Cypriots on a United Nations plan to reunify their long-divided island.
19 December, 2002
"We will continue talks until the end of February "
The UN settlement plan calls for the parties to reach an agreement
by 28 February, with the goal of ensuring that a united Cyprus joins
the European Union in 2004.
Efforts to reach a preliminary agreement at an EU summit in Copenhagen
last week failed after Mr Denktash pulled out of the summit because
of ill health.
Greek Cypriots and Western diplomats as well as opposition figures
in northern Cyprus accused the veteran leader of obstructing peace
efforts.
Mr Denktash told a news conference in Ankara he was not to blame for
the failure to reach a solution before now and he called on the UN
and the Greek side to show more understanding and flexibility.
Earlier, the UN Security Council's current president, Alfonso Valdivieso,
said it was regrettable that Mr Denktash, had not, as he put it, responded
in a timely way to initiatives prior to last week's EU summit.
Mr Denktash, who is recovering from a major heart operation, and his
Greek Cypriot counterpart Glafcos Clerides have not met face-to-face
since UN Secretary General Kofi Annan unveiled his peace plan for
the island in November.
If no deal is reached, only the internationally recognised Greek part
of Cyprus will be admitted to the EU.
Greek-Cypriot poll
On Wednesday, the Greek Cypriot government said it would hold the
first round of presidential elections on 16 February with a run-off,
if needed, a week later on 23 February.
President Clerides, who is 83, has said he does not intend to run
for president again.
The timing of the election means Mr Clerides could be replaced as
the crucial talks resume ahead of the UN deadline.
5. - Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Switzerland) - "Turkey and Europe: A Tale of Two Complexes":
by Andres Wysling / 17 December 2002
"How proud the person who can say: I am a Turk!" This sentence, set in large letters, leaps out at you thousands of times on streets and squares in Turkey's cities and villages. The father of the modern Turkish republic, Kemal Ataturk, coined this dictum to restore the pride of the Turkish nation after the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. It still accompanies Turks everywhere, reminding them each day that their government wants them to be proud. But behind the words lurks the opposite meaning: Turkish society today is still plagued by a lack of self-confidence, by a collective inferiority complex. On the basis of that emotional state, membership in the European Union has become a matter of honor. Accession would prove that, as a nation, the Turks have achieved a "European standard"; the start of negotiations on membership would constitute at least provisional acknowledgement. From the Turkish standpoint, what is at stake is far more than mere alliance policy and an economic zone - namely, confirmation of Turkey's full value and equality as a European nation.
The striving to move from oriental backwardness to European modernity is the red thread running through Turkey's history in the last two centuries. It began back in the days of the sultans. Railway construction during the late Ottoman Empire was an expression of the urge for progress and renewal. Later, Ataturk assembled his republic from set pieces of European provenance: French centralism, German military discipline, Swiss civil law, and large-scale projects in the Soviet style - all of it based on the European ideology of the nation-state. By introducing the Latin alphabet to replace Arabic script, he gave an unmistakable sign of his unconditional determination to westernize his country; to change its script was also to change its cultural sphere and to break with the past.
Few peoples have undertaken so much. For decades the modernization of Turkey was forced, decreed from above by presidents, generals, judges, officials, and implemented from below on command, with a subject's obedience but also with appreciation for the purpose and meaning of progress westward. Without a broadly supported consensus in the Turkish populace, this undertaking would have failed long since. The effort at modernization has not succeeded in all points, and has remained superficial in some. There have been setbacks, unforeseen events and forces pushing in the opposite direction. In Istanbul, for example: The Turkish metropolis continues to grow as a result of migration from the interior - and in the process, its urban character is overlaid by a rural way of life. In many of its neighborhoods, the great metropolis on the Bosporus resembles a gigantic Anatolian village. At the same time, the newly arrived villagers are being gradually transformed into city folk. Such tensions are inevitable, and they are characteristic of the transformation of Turkish society on its path from East to West.
In the West we hear voices saying: "Turkey is not a European country." This position was clearly enunciated recently by former French President Giscard d'Estaing, who added the warning that granting Turkey membership would mean the end of the European Union. Giscard was thus giving voice to what many leading politicians were thinking but not daring to say. The issue is not primarily geographic; rather, it is tacitly about religion and "values," whatever one may understand by that. Turkey is a Muslim country, while the European Union is a "Christian club," at least in the minds of leading Christian-democratic politicians and probably also a majority of the European peoples. The "Turkish threat," the primal fear of Islamic conquest, apparently still haunts Christian Europe, although it has long ceased to exist. This, too, is a complex from the past, with consequences for the shaping of the present and the future Europe.
Opponents of the inclusion of Turkey in the EU like to play on this fear complex. They say, for example, that the "third siege of Vienna" by Turkish immigrants is already in full swing, and they insist that if Turkey should become a member of the Union there will be no stopping the process, Europe will be flooded with Turks. Granted, with 70 million people the country is a big chunk to bite off. But the EU's previous expansion has not triggered any mass migrations, nor is the latest round of eastward enlargement likely to do so.
Another argument used by opponents of Turkish EU membership is that Turkey is a poorhouse, and cleaning it up is more than the European Union will be able to handle. That is to grossly underestimate this threshold country's economic potential. Still, the question remains: Why, despite all its modernization efforts over the past decade, has Turkey failed to get ahead economically, but instead finds itself in crisis? The main reason has doubtless been the war against the Kurds in East Anatolia, which, according to official figures, cost 36,000 lives and drained the Turkish treasury of more than $100 billion, nearly half its national debt of $260 billion. To a considerable extent, Turkey's economic problems are due to this enormous squandering of energy, to the point of exhaustion - a failure of national policy.
There are a good many signs today that Turkish political life has entered a phase of fundamental renewal. In the recent elections, the parties which had ridden the country into a swamp were booted out of the executive and the legislature. With the Justice and Development Party (AK) headed by a moderate Islamist, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a political grouping has come to power that represents new forces in the country rather than the tired, old elites. According to everything known about it so far, this party has no plans to establish a theocracy, but is aiming for a democratic state under the rule of law, one which also takes into account the religious and social ideals of Islam.
The leading opposition to the new ruling party is Turkey's military establishment, whose generals have long seen themselves as the guardians of Ataturk's secular state. But their autocratic high-handedness has been shaken by the fact that they were not victorious in their expensive war against the Turkish Kurds and came away with no more than a stalemate. In recent years they have allowed a progressive softening of the rigid state ideology. They now seem prepared to grant more civil rights to the Kurds and other minorities and to tolerate moderate Islamists. Given these circumstances, it may be anticipated that Turkey's still unsatisfactory record on human rights will continue to improve.
If the latest constitutional reforms are implemented and human rights respected, Turkey will have fulfilled the preconditions laid down by the European Union for negotiations on membership. That would put the EU in the position of having to make the next move. The Turks want clarity at last as to whether they are really welcome in the "club" or in fact not, despite all previous assurances. Advocates of Turkish membership point to the country's obvious strategic importance. As a leading regional power in the Near East it dominates the land bridge between Asia and Europe, one of the ancient Silk Roads, and thus a major route for future oil transport. Many politicians and business people consider those factors decisive. But they are probably not enough to dissipate the doubts about Islam held by large segments of the West European population. That will be possible - if at all - only when the European public can be convinced that Turkey is continuing to approach the "European standard" - and that will take time.
Fed up with waiting, many Turks have abandoned their long-nourished
euphoria over Europe in recent years, some of them with a sense of
injury. But they are nonetheless determined to stick to the path of
modernization. As one businessman in the Anatolian countryside put
it: "We need the reforms anyway - if not for the European Union,
then for ourselves." His statement bears undertones of both pride
and defiance, along with a new self-confidence. Overcoming the complexes
on both sides is certain to make relations between Europe and Turkey
easier.
(First published in German, December 14th, 2002)
6. - The Chicago Tribune - "A European snub":
December 19, 2002
The European Union formally invited 10 mostly Eastern European nations into the club last week. Once, this might have been a defining moment for Europe, the deep scar of its East-West divide now firmly a Cold War relic.
But the event was overshadowed by the invitation pointedly not issued, one that could presage a divide along the treacherous fault line of religion. Turkey will have to wait, said the EU. Yes, Europe said, Turkey has made progress in reforming its economy and by outlawing the death penalty, but more needs to be done.
President Bush tried to pressure the EU to speed up Turkey's invitation, making an appearance last week in Washington with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who heads Turkey's new ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party. The U.S. interest in making Turkey happy is clear. Turkey has been a key, strategic member of NATO for 50 years and U.S. access to its military bases in the event of war with Iraq would be essential.
The U.S. also has a longer-term strategic interest in bringing peace and prosperity to the region. Fostering a stable, democratic Turkey benefits the Turks and their neighbors and sends a hopeful signal about future prospects to the rest of the troubled Islamic world. The signal is twofold--that democracy and Islam aren't incompatible and that a democratic Islamic nation will be welcomed in the councils of Europe.
But the councils of Europe are stalling. The EU held out the prospect that membership talks for Turkey could begin in December 2004--provided Turkey takes action before then to halt torture in its jails, grant greater rights to its Kurdish minority and end military influence in politics.
The EU is entitled to set benchmarks for membership. To be considered, countries must get their financial houses in order and demonstrate a commitment to democracy, rule of law and human rights. Political and economic stability are critical because citizens of all member countries have the right to travel throughout the union.
Expanding the EU beyond its present 15 members is an expensive proposition. The current member nations will finance the estimated $41 billion it will cost to bring in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and the two Mediterranean island nations of Cyprus and Malta.
But there is the suspicion that Turkey will never be able to meet the EU's exacting standards, not because it can't deal with its problems, but because it can't alter the one criterion that separates it from all other EU members. Turkey's population of 70 million is predominantly Muslim. Historically, the rest of the EU has been predominantly Christian.
When former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing said that allowing Turkey to join means the "end of the European Union," many inferred a racist xenophobia in his words that is privately shared by other European leaders.
There is no question that Turkey is not your average European country. It is distinctly Eurasian in the way that Russia is, straddling cultures and continents. But it is also a secular democracy that has embraced relatively free markets. It is poor but growing in prosperity, turbulent but growing more stable.
The republic's founder, Kemal Ataturk, set the nation on a secular course by strictly limiting religious influence in state affairs in 1923. Though the roots of its present-day ruling party are Islamist, Erdogan and Turkey's new prime minister, Abdullah Gul, have made clear they plan no break with Turkey's historic secularism.
The EU is entitled to insist that Turkey be measured by the same
criteria as any other potential member. But Turkey then is entitled
to an invitation. If the EU keeps balking, it will be telling the
world that stable democracies with free-market economies only need
apply if they're Christian. That's indefensible.
7. - The Christian Science Monitor - "The domino effect of EU's misgivings on Turkey":
WILTON (CONN.) 17 December 2002
by Richard C. Hottelet
Last weekend's summit meeting of the European Union in Copenhagen showed the EU a bit older, potentially much larger, but certainly no wiser. Ten new prospective members, mostly former states or satellites of the Soviet Union, were welcomed in a chorus of self-congratulations. But Europe failed to see why it would hasten to bring Turkey into the family.
One consequence, felt right away, is indefinite delay in resolution of the Cyprus problem, leaving serious uncertainties hanging loose in a continental community trying to button itself up.
It should have been quite clear in Copenhagen that Turkey is engaged in what could be a historic transition holding enormous stakes for Europe as well. This fall, the Turkish people swept away the political parties whose incompetence and corruption stood in the way of economic revival and social stability. A free election gave the moderate Islamist AKP - the Justice and Development Party - a huge parliamentary majority and a mandate, the first to a religion-based group, to govern the country.
The AKP's victory is, however, somewhat conditional. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, decreed it be a secular state. The Army, a dominant power in the land, sees its duty as preserving this legacy, and has over the years removed a number of governments that aroused its disapproval.
Together, with those who suspect the AKP of having a hidden activist Islamist agenda, it is watching the new government very closely. Nationalist elements, including hard-liners who, among other things, want no relaxation of Turkey's hold on northern Cyprus, have mounted vociferous opposition.
Internationally, election of the AKP, with its pro-Western orientation and willingness to make far-reaching democratic reforms, offered the chance of a settlement in Cyprus. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan contributed a compromise plan to end the military stalemate between the Turkish and the majority Greek Cypriots. Carefully crafted to meet the basic demands of both sides, it is the first realistic comprehensive design to bring them together as autonomous but equal parts under a common roof after nearly 30 years of forced separation. The Annan plan remains on the table. Meanwhile, as Greek Cyprus joins the EU, Turkish Cyprus remains isolated, unrecognized by the world except for Turkey.
Before Copenhagen, it seemed that Ankara was ready to challenge the nationalists by persuading the hard-line Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to drop his veto.
But the new government needed help to strengthen its hand, specifically through the EU at last setting a date to start negotiating Turkey's own admission to the EU. Membership is a longstanding aim and a high priority for the new regime as well as for significant segments of public opinion.
The Europeans, who work by consensus, waffled. Some felt queasy about having Turkey, a Muslim state of 70 million, added to historically Christian Europe.
Others are uncomfortable rubbing elbows with the 15 million or so Muslims who already live in Europe. And then, there are official requirements for EU membership that apply to all applicants, such as transparent, democratic government; civil control of the military; respect for human and minority rights; stable finances; a market economy; and a free press.
Turkey has long been deficient in many respects and the role of the military, above all, will not soon change.
But since August, parliament has been working on reform legislation. The new government has been especially diligent, from ending jailhouse torture to planning a new European-style constitution. A start has been made on relaxing fierce official restrictions on the large Kurdish minority.
Keeping Turkey out of Europe was never an option in Copenhagen, but some sought to delay starting the membership process. Germany and France proposed late 2005. Others, including Greece, Turkey's ancient foe, wanted quicker action. The summit finally settled, gingerly, on December 2004.
There is something unreal in the EU's misgivings about Turkey. The fear of millions of Turks streaming in, looking for jobs and upsetting the European order is ridiculous. Turkey has long been part of Europe in its most essential aspects, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (which preserved Western Europe's freedom in the cold war and remains a foundation of European unity) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, a broad-based political action body.
But with practically a whole political and economic system to be overhauled, it will be 10 or 15 years before Turkey is a full member of the EU. By then it is likely to be in many ways a different country.
What the Copenhagen summit has done is to give the emerging forces of change in Turkey a focus for their energy and a prospect of reward (in the process maybe even resolving the Cyprus dilemma).
This is an approach that holds promise elsewhere, too - and nowhere
more than in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict not far away.
8. - The New York Times - "Kurdish Fighters Don't Expect Call From U.S.":
ALAK (Iraq) / December 19, 2002
by C. J. CHIVERS
Many of the limitations of Kurdish opposition to Saddam Hussein were on display today in a lonely picket manned by Borhan Chato, a would-be guerrilla adjusting to life as a conventional soldier.
Mr. Chato occupied the last Kurdish position on front lines separating Mr. Hussein's Iraq from the independent Kurdish zone in the country's north. He was supposed to be with five other soldiers, but they had all gone home for lunch, leaving him alone to face platoons of Iraqi soldiers on the ridge overhead.
He had a rifle and five rusting magazines holding 150 cartridges. He had no helmet, no first-aid kit and no radio. His cartridge belt was stolen Iraqi equipment, bearing the distinctive eagle insignia of a nation he is sworn to fight. His mission, should he sense suspicious Iraqi movements, was to telephone his headquarters, a 30-minute drive away, to report something was amiss.
The Kurdish military is made of men like Mr. Chato, 21, who call themselves pesh merga, meaning "those who face death." Though they live off their lore as guerrillas who carried on the Kurdish struggle during decades when no one else could, their transition to standing army since the Kurds gained quasi-independence in 1991 has been difficult. They are hardly a modern force.
Now they approach a moment of reckoning. The pesh merga wonder: If war comes to Iraq, will they be called to fight with American soldiers, like the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan?
Increasingly, Kurds are answering their own question. Their answer is no.
Perhaps, America will sponsor a proxy force, but with weapons inspections continuing to the south, it is too soon to tell. There is no doubt that the pesh merga are willing to fight. But when they look at their meager equipment and ammunition, and describe what they sense as a lack of American interest in a military courtship, these storied resistance fighters have begun talking about war in another way: as bystanders trying to divine a superpower's intent, and then carving out some independent supporting role. Talk of seizing cities has all but ceased.
"If America attacks Iraq, they will not need our help, because we are not so strong," said Hamid Afandi, minister of pesh merga for the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which controls the western part of the Kurdish zone.
Fairadoon Abdulkader, minister of the interior in an eastern zone controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, was equally blunt. "America does not want our help," he said. "It will be a technological war."
Political power in the Kurdish zone largely rests with the two parties. Each claims a full-time army of roughly 25,000 fighters, and a reserve unit of the same size.
The armies are a source of regional pride. It has been a feat to assemble them directly under the nose of Mr. Hussein and in a land squeezed by sanctions. But mere numbers, even if not exaggerated, are deceptive. Kurds know that they lack the weapons, ammunition and training to be an offensive threat.
It is an assessment shared by the West. In the limited comment to date about Kurdish military strength, American experts have been dismissive.
"Kurds can be effective mountain fighters in small, defensive engagements, but they so far have only developed symbolic military capabilities," Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July. "Now and indefinitely into the future, Iraqi military forces could rapidly re-enter the Kurdish security zone and defeat the Kurdish factions in settled areas in a matter of days."
There are many reasons for this vulnerability.
Problems begin with recruiting. In a region of about 4 million people, fit young volunteers are hard to find. On Saturday, six platoons of recruits underwent drills at an indoctrination camp on a mountain plateau at Raniya. They ranged from boys who had not yet shaved to men in the advanced grip of gray hair.
When calisthenics began after a 10-minute jog, one man appeared old enough to be nearing infirmity. He could hardly swing his arms.
This is only the beginning. Among veteran pesh merga, some of them hardened by multiple campaigns, the ranks are bedeviled by logistics, and fighters are under-equipped.
Kurdish units have rifles, light machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars. Only a few have heavy machine guns, and Kurdish officials say that for 50,000 troops there are only three aged tanks, a half-dozen armored vehicles and a small collection of multiple rocket launchers and artillery pieces. They have no airplanes or helicopters, only a handful of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles and poor communications gear.
"We don't have much equipment," said Azad Miran, director of a military school of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. "All we have is people, and our high morale."
The pesh merga also have almost no ammunition reserves. Northern Iraq is essentially under double sanctions: first from the United Nations, which limits imports, but also from Syria, Turkey and Iran, all of which have their own uneasy Kurdish populations and worry over Kurdish military success in Iraq.
As a result, ammunition is almost impossible to obtain. Pesh merga munitions are either remnants of what was seized from Iraqi garrisons after the Persian Gulf war in 1991, or what they have bought from demoralized Iraqi soldiers or smugglers along the porous front. Kurds also complain that Turks have been putting pressure on Americans not to arm them, a worry confirmed by an American official.
"Basically, the Turks have been saying you can't trust the Kurds," the official said.
The ammunition shortage restricts training. In boot camp, each new pesh merga fires only 100 bullets, said Col. Muhammad Ali, commander of the Raniya camp. One hundred bullets is not nearly enough to train a competent marksman. It also limits combat operations. Pesh merga face Iraqi lines and simultaneously occupy a front near the Iranian border, a zone occupied by Ansar al-Islam, a Muslim group that has declared holy war against the secular Kurdish government.
"We do not have ammunition to fight two fronts," said Mamosta Hassan, of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan general staff. This was made clear earlier this month, when Ansar militants overran two small hills as the pesh merga ran out of bullets. Kurdish officials say more than 70 pesh merga were killed.
That battle showed other limitations. A Kurdish official said the pesh merga had been warned of an impending assault but went to bed a little more than hour before Ansar attacked. It was a breakdown of discipline and a source of deep embarrassment, after Ansar posted Internet bulletins boasting of routing pesh merga and commandeering their equipment.
Such failures in leadership seem matched by lapses in planning. For instance, although the two parties say they can conduct joint operations, they have never held a joint training exercise and do not have a joint command staff. Moreover, members of many pesh merga units said they had stopped training for the year because it was too cold.
Another American official said the Kurds' political leadership had also been told to curb their military ambitions, especially plans for Kirkuk, an oil-rich city that ethnic Turkmen and Kurds alike claim. Earlier this fall, some Kurdish officers said publicly that they would capture Kirkuk. "We've basically said to them, this talk is not helpful," the official said.
All of these factors have pushed Kurds to talk of limited war aims. They still hope for direct American help against Ansar.
But as for fighting Iraq, Mr. Afandi, the minister of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, is pragmatic, and does not see his soldiers as an American proxy. He talks of deploying troops to the front in a war and then moving south slowly, to provide security in areas the Iraqi Army abandons. He said he would commit troops only if he sensed that the war was largely won and Mr. Hussein's ouster was certain.
Mustafa Said Kadir, deputy commander of forces of the Patriotic Union, said he knew that the Pentagon was massing troops and matériel in the region, but he has yet to meet an American soldier or official, and is now planning simple, independent assaults.
"If America wants to change the regime, and really will attack, we don't have any choice — we will make our own move," he said.
But even as he talks of offensive operations, he defines limits, saying he envisions his party's troops moving south, but on security missions or peacekeeping duty, and ultimately deferring to a new government in Baghdad. He avoids talk of occupation, as does the Kurdistan Democratic Party.
"If there will be no more Iraqi forces fighting and the regime
will be changed for sure, we will try to be everywhere to keep order,"
Mr. Afandi said. "It would not be to occupy, but to keep security,
to make peace."