19
December 2002
2. "EU stresses scale of reforms needed in Turkey", EU leaders and lawmakers stressed Wednesday the scale of reforms needed by Turkey before it can start EU entry talks, a prospect delayed at a summit last week.
3. "Turkey to continue on path mapped by IMF", the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government is committed to main objectives of the stand by between Turkey and the International Monetary Fund, a senior minister said on Wednesday.
4. "Turkey’s Obstructionist Front", here in Turkey, we have an ‘obstructionist front’ which has maintained a years-long presence on the political scene. This front’s hallmarks notably include an appeal to the lowest common denominator and a demagogic exploitation of our nation’s deepest fears and nationalist pride.
5. "Turkey rejects EU's decision to admit Cyprus", Turkey on Wednesday denounced as unacceptable the European Union's decision to admit the divided island of Cyprus as a member in 2004.
6. "A changing Turkey awaits European recognition", Turkey’s effort to move toward European Union membership faced a severe blow on December 13, when EU leaders in Copenhagen refused to commit to a date for accession talks. That decision has left Turkey still waiting for European affirmation after nearly four decades.
1. - The Asia Times - "Turkey: The ugly duckling":
HONGKONG / 19 December 2002
By K Gajendra Singh
"It's all right to be born into a duck family if you aren't
a swan."
- Turkish journalist Ferai Tinc, recalling Hans Christian Andersen's
"The Ugly Duckling"
Turkey's November parliamentary elections, which gave a two-thirds majority to the Islamic-based Justice and Development Party (AKP), might yet prove to be a blessing in disguise after all. And for all - Turkey, Europe and the West.
If two secular parties had succeeded in crossing the 10 percent threshold needed to have representation in parliament, which they narrowly missed, with 34 percent of the total votes, the AKP would have been forced to form a coalition government, like its parent Welfare Party in 1996, leaving room for maneuver and confusion both at home and abroad. The Welfare-led government was forced to resign by the armed forces in 1997.
But as it turned out, Christian Europe was forced to decide on Turkey's possible entry into the European Union against a backdrop of the massive AKP majority government in Ankara, and in the face of a full frontal and vigorous charge led by the AKP's undisputed leader, Recip Tayyip Erdogan, and new Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, assisted by Turkish President Ahmet Sezer, a former head of Turkey's Constitutional Court.
They left no stone unturned, for everyone to see, in seeking an early date for talks on Turkey's accession to the EU, preferably by the end of 2003, or early 2004, and well before the 10 new countries, now admitted, were scheduled to become members formally.
But a firm EU leadership, while trying to humor the Turkish leaders
at last week's Copenhagen summit and at their capitals earlier, agreed
only to discuss a date for accession at the end of 2004. In announcing
the decision on December 12, Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen,
the current EU president, said that only if the EU leadership decided
in December 2004 that Turkey had fulfilled formal criteria for all
candidate states as set out in a 1993 document, "then we will
open accession negotiations with Turkey".
When asked when the negotiations would begin, Rasmussen appeared to grope for the right words. "Well, it's a very clear message," he said. "The answer to that, well, you ask me, when. It is a good question and the answer is very clear. As soon as possible. Because we stick to principle. We stick to principle that Turkey can get a date for the start of accession negotiations when Turkey fulfills the political criteria."
Gul reacted angrily, accusing the EU of discrimination. "This means our efforts are not appreciated and there is a prejudice against us," he said. Erdogan, for his part, accused the EU of double standards and behaving like a "Christian club".
Yet there was no disguising the rebuff to the efforts by the Turks, as well as those of the British and the energetic US lobbying, which served largely to infuriate many Europeans. Jacques Chirac, the French president, was singled out for furious criticism by the Turks. He had been angered by Ankara's aggressive lobbying, described by a senior EU figure as "blackmail". "It's not enough to respect European law," Chirac was quoted as saying, "You also have to be polite and civilized." Gul retorted that it was the French president who was doing "the real blackmailing".
"What the Americans fail to understand is the difference between a military alliance like Nato and the EU," a senior EU official said. "What we have to do is to persuade European consumers that they should be happy to have a Turkish head of the food standards agency. The EU is not about foreign policy but domestic issues."
Nicole Fontaine, the French industry minister, said, "It's certainly not up to the president of the United States to interfere in something so important and which mainly concerns Europe." British Prime Minister Tony Blair warned that French and German resistance to delay the start of negotiations would prove a strategic error in Europe's dealings with Islam. Later, putting a spin on the agreement, he said that it was a "huge step forward". He admitted that Turkey would have liked an earlier date, but added, "For 40 years, Turkey has been waiting for a firm date, and this is a firm date." Foreign Minister Jack Straw added that the UK government "wanted to see a democratic market economy Muslim country coming into the European Union".
But the Turkish attitude had irritated even friendly diplomats. "They have snatched defeat from the jaws of victory," said one diplomatic source. "This kind of thing does not make it any easier to argue their case." Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi confirmed that Ankara's pre-summit lobbying may have worked against it. "There has been strong pressure from Turkey, which many didn't like." German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer took exception to Gul's strong language at the summit. But he added that the December 2004 date on which Turkey's membership chances would be judged "was a real breakthrough".
European parliament president Pat Cox said, "Turkey has won
a political victory at the Copenhagen summit. You should celebrate
this instead of considering it a defeat." Swedish Prime Minister
Goran Persson said, "The 2004 decision we took for Turkey proves
that Turks will be a EU member, because you deserve it." While
EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana said, "We have made Turkey
feel relieved. This decision showed that there can't be a Europe without
Turkey."
Sources said that the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Finland were least keen on an early membership date. Against considerable lobbying from the US, with Britain, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain favoring Turkey, France and Germany took a firm line, dashing Turkish hopes.
Any date before June 2004 was out of the question as it would have affected elections to the European parliament. The German Christian Democrat opposition leader, Edmund Stoiber, is an outspoken critic of Turkish membership and the ruling Social Democrats feared serious losses in those elections if Turkey was already a candidate. Chirac was also opposed, fearing that the next European elections could be hijacked by the French far right.
Once the verdict was delivered, the French and German duo did not even shake hands with Erdogan, not even for the cameras. Western leaders will in time make their own assessments about the AKP and its leadership to formulate their policies, but the haste, style and clumsy diplomacy shown by the AKP over admission did not go down well, never mind that it was for consumption in Turkey to show that the AKP was as keen as any other party to fight for Turkey's entry into the EU.
The Turkish media expressed deep dismay at the outcome. "Once again, a broken dream," read a headline in the Cumhuriyet. Later, Gul said, "We did our best but the negotiation date appeared a little bit delayed. Our road is clear. We will make reforms for our people, even if there will be EU membership or not."
Meanwhile, Erdogan added that he was not pleased with the political decision, but the road map was in favor of Turkey and the journey would continue. He even denied that he was angry and vowed that Turkey would continue its reform efforts, with the goal of passing the 2004 review. "We're not upset, but it could have been a better decision," he said.
But the speaker of the Turkish parliament, Bulent Arinc, one of the most influential men in the AKP, condemned the decision, while deputy prime minister Abdullatif Sener said, "The decision was a step forward for Turkey, and we assess it as a closer approach to the EU. The glass is not half empty. We need to look at the full half." Such differing views must have horrified the Turkish Foreign Office and its sedate Euro-leaning mandarins.
President Sezer, who did some canvassing at the NATO summit in Prague earlier, had concluded that the European leadership was not serious and did not even attend the Copenhagen summit. His office expressed disappointment at the decision.
It was a bit of theater of the absurd played around the world; in
Turkey, the US, European capitals and Girne, the capital of Turkish-controlled
Cyprus. Even President George W Bush took time from his war on terror
and plans for a regime change in Iraq to meet with Erdogan and support
Turkey's entry into the EU.
If one looks through the smoke screens, though, the final result was crystal clear from the very beginning. But it was an education and even amusing to see the charade unfold, bringing out into the open the attitudes and positions of the various governments and their compulsions.
Here is a quick summary of Turkey's journey so far to join the EU. Turkey, a member of NATO since 1952, applied in 1959 and became an associate member of the European Economic Community, as the EU was then known. In 1970, Turkey signed an agreement foreseeing Turkey's eventual full membership of the now renamed European Community (EC). In 1978-79, the EC asked Turkey to apply for membership along with Greece. Turkey declined, and perhaps missed the best chance it had ever had. After the military takeover in Ankara in September 1980, relations with the EC were frozen, but after the parliamentary elections in 1983 relations resumed.
In 1984, members of the Turkish parliament participated in the Council of Europe. Under prime minister Turgut Ozal, Turkey applied for full membership and was registered in 1987. In 1989, the EC accepted eligibility but deferred assessment of the application. On January 1, 1996, a customs union with the EU came into force. In December 1997, the EC refused candidate status. Ankara was angry. In the 1999 elections, leftists and fascist parties won by big margins. So in December 1999, Ankara was granted candidate status. In October 2001, Turkey streamlined the constitution drafted in 1982 under the military regime to fulfill the EU's political criteria.
To strengthen its case for the vital 2002 Copenhagen summit, the Turkish parliament passed sweeping constitutional reforms, including the abolition of the death penalty and the easing of bans on the use of the Kurdish language, to meet some of the EU's human rights criteria. On December 11, the Turkish parliament overwhelmingly approved a package of human rights reforms, including sanctions against torture, but it stopped short of full ratification pending technical procedures.
Before September 11, 2001, Erdogan would not have even dreamt of visiting the White House. Prior to the November elections he would have been given a polite no, but now he is being dined but not wined in Washington. He addressed think tanks and press conferences in the US capital, capped by a good meeting with Bush. Later, he met with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. His whirlwind tour covered 15 European countries.
To an uneasy Christian world, with terrorist attacks spreading, it
must have been a relief and a reassuring sight to see Erdogan in a
Western suit, albeit somewhat crumpled and old fashioned, wanting
to join the Christian club. More so after the October elections in
Pakistan, a front line ally of the US against terrorism, in which
Islamic parties led by the fierce-looking traditionally clad Fazlur
Rehman and his ilk made the best ever showing in Pakistan's history
of religious parties. Their pro-Taliban coalition, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal,
won on an anti-US manifesto. It has already formed a government in
North West Frontier Province and is in a coalition in Balochistan.
It will play an important role in Pakistan's politics.
Thus, in an era of growing confrontation between Islam and Christianity, led on one side by the elusive Osama bin Laden, his al-Qaeda and its clones in the Islamic world and Bush on the other, the efforts of Erdogan to exchange views with Western leaders should lead to a better understanding.
In 1994, when Gul was spokesman for foreign affairs for the Welfare Party, he had said, "Turkey should not join the European Union, we have said this from the beginning. Look at a European city, and then look at Istanbul. It's not a Christian city."
A few years ago, Erdogan recited a poem that included the verses, "Minarets are our bayonets, domes are our helmets, mosques are our barracks, believers are our soldiers." For this, he was jailed and subsequently debarred from contesting the November elections for having a criminal record. Should the constitution be amended, though, he would be able to stand for elections, at the earliest in February.
The AKP, by embracing the EU cause, is working to further undermine the secular parties, which have traditionally worked for Europe and NATO. Most Turkish businessmen want Turkey in the EU. The majority of the electorate in general identifies Europe with more jobs, prosperity, and the freedom to travel and work in the continent.
The US, with Turkey's critical importance in its strategic algebra in general and immediate support for plans for a regime change in Iraq, gave its maximum support to Turkey. From the isolated comforts of plush media or think tank premises, Muslim American writers recommend to the Christian EU that it should let in Muslim secular Turkey in a grand gesture of Christian Muslim synthesis. This did not fool the Europeans, nor does it fool Muslims who remain opposed to US policy.
For the UK, apart from toeing the US line, Turkey's admission would be more in line with its perception of how the EU should evolve into a federation of states and not what France and Germany want - a more unitary body. Also, the English, whose empire was built from the East India Company, would not miss a chance for a commercial deal.
Hoping for a contract for Istanbul's third bridge across the Bosporus, which was never built, then-premier Margaret Thatcher even claimed to Turkey's prime minister Turgut Ozal in the 1980s that "I am an Ozalist". In India, whenever an air force jet trainer deal or some other purchase is under consideration, the British leaders sing a more favorable tune on Kashmir, but soon revert to the old song of neutrality or favoring Pakistan. So Tony Blair's efforts and the spin that Turkey after 40 years has a deal is aimed to win some brownie points with the Turks.
The unitary political systems in France and Turkey are quite similar, but the French give more importance to culture. It was elder statesman and former president Giscard D'Estaing, now working on a conceptual framework for the EU, who stated the French view earlier (and perhaps that of many others), that Turkey is not in Europe, its culture is different and Turkey's entry would end the EU. At a media conference in Copenhagen, when a Turkish journalist rather rudely enquired if he was sorry for his stand, Giscard replied that he had nothing more to add to his earlier view. It must be remembered that France has 3 million Muslim Arabs from its former colonies in Maghreb. But their borders end in the sands of the Sahara, unlike Turkey's, which lead to states like Syria, Iraq and Iran.
Germany's relationship with Turkey is much more historical and complex,
beginning from the time when Ottoman janissaries twice reached the
gates of Vienna in the 16th century. Turks and Germans fought for
control of East Europe and the Balkans and both ruled over it. When
the Ottoman Empire started declining, to counter superior European
arms and military training, the Ottomans relied on German assistance,
which influence still abides in the mental make up of the Turkish
armed forces. The Turkish and German disciplinary view of life also
converges. So it was natural that Turks allied with the Germans in
World War I, after which the Ottoman empire was finally unraveled.
There was great internal pressure on Turkish president Ismet Inonu
to join Hitler in World War II, but before dying in 1938, Kemal Ataturk
had warned Inonu not to go against the strongest Western power, ie
England.
Under Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, the Turks could not get west of the gates of Vienna, but under his namesake Suleiman Demiral (seven times prime minister of Turkey from the early 1960s until he retired as president in 2000), a new relationship developed with Turks emigrating to meet the needs of Germany's fast expanding economy in the 1960s. They now number over 3 million, out of which nearly a quarter are Kurds. Most of them came from poor and backward east and south Turkey. They now face the hostility of pro-Christian parties following the end of the economic boom, but most of the hybrid Turks, ill at ease in Germany and in Turkey, have preferred to stay on in Germany.
The Kurdish organizations are very active in Germany and the AKP and its parents, like the Welfare Party, easily collect huge funds and recruit supporters as Turkish politics are echoed in Germany, especially Turkish Kurdish rivalries.
For instance, Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan, after being expelled from Syria, was looking for asylum and was arrested in Rome on a warrant issued at Germany's behest. But Germany, afraid of repercussions at home, dared not extradite Ocalan. So for left of center politicians like Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Turkish support and votes are very important. But they would be happier if the problem did not become bigger, which it would with Turkey inside the EU. With free travel, many millions of Turkey's 70 million population could seek new pastures. In the EU, only a now united Germany has a larger population.
But in spite of Turkish recriminations against Germany, skilled Turks returning home helped Ozal carry out the industrialization of Turkey. On the other hand, there are nearly 15,000 Turks in German universities, according to a recent report. And there are 40,000 Turkish-owned businesses, mostly shops and restaurants, in which billions of dollars are invested and which employ over 125,000 people, including many Germans.
Erdogan's time as a mayor of Istanbul gave him only limited exposure to the world of diplomacy and negotiations. As part of prime minister Necmettin Erbakan's cabinet in 1996-97, Gul had more exposure, but the sensitive ministries of foreign affairs, defense and interior were held by the coalition partner, the True Path Party. Western leaders and their diplomats shied away from meeting Welfare ministers. But even at home, the AKP leadership has to learn how to deal with the Pashas, as the top military brass is called in Turkey. The Pashas have already instructed Gul at their first briefing about the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism.
The Turkish Chief of General Staff is next in state protocol after the president and the prime minister, but has perhaps more real power. The armed forces exercise their influence through regular monthly meetings of the highest policy-making National Security Council, dominated by them (it was the model for President General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan). Every year, military officers who are suspected of any Islamic tendencies or connections are expelled from the armed forces. Islamist leader Erbakan, when he was prime minister in 1996-97, had to swallow and sign such a decree. According to EU political norms, the armed forces have no role in political decision making, except in an advisory capacity.
While the self-styled custodians of secularism in Turkey guard the constitution, such a role itself will remain a great hindrance for Turkey in gaining entry into the EU. But without the armed forces, one can guess the state and health of democracy and secularism, with such examples as Pakistan and Algeria.
Lacking experience and young, carried away by a massive unexpected
victory and warm diplomatic receptions abroad, Erdogan and his colleagues
are already making mistakes, such as the wife of the AKP's parliament
speaker covering her head in a scarf.
Erdogan claims that his daughter studies in US because there is freedom to wear scarves. AKP leaders are unwisely raising such matters in public too early. Erdogan made a faux pas by linking Turkey's entry into the EU with a solution to the Cyprus problem and the use of NATO assets by the EU's rapid defense force without clearing it with the Foreign Ministry and the armed forces.
He also had to backpedal on his embracing a Belgium-like solution for the intractable Cyprus problem, which was also shot down by the Foreign Ministry and the armed forces. As expected, a solution to the Cyprus problem, necessary for its entry into the EU, could not be found before the end of the summit in Copenhagen. The Greek and Turkish sides signed a letter of intent to continue negotiating under UN auspices and to undertake to reach an accord by March 2003.
It may be true that Erdogan had a successful tenure as mayor of Istanbul, partly because of corrupt and inefficient predecessors or their parties. But many a time the celebrations of his achievement smacked of an election campaign. But running a big country going through a crippling economic crisis and with a decimated political opposition waiting to trip the new regime will need the utmost care, caution and finesse.
In 1994, US-educated prime minister Tansu Ciller, with a PhD in economics, attempted real and serious economic reforms. She had become prime minister in spite of opposition from her godfather, party chief Demirel, who had moved over to the presidency. So, led by Demirel and assisted by others, her bold reform measures were thwarted. So was her attempt to even look at a solution to the Kurdish problem by the armed forces. The Kurdish conflict must have cost Turkey over $100 billion since 1984, and is perhaps a major cause of the current economic malaise. The bureaucracy appointed by other political parties will be sullen, if not hostile. The West will wait and watch, but it is doubtful whether it will really promote a resurgent AKP.
The Copenhagen summit statement said, "Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the union." This writer had argued that full membership will remain a dream and that at the Copenhagen summit "EU politicians will go through many contortions and make soothing noises, but visa-free entry to Turks and freedom to work in EU countries is out of question, and the AKP might attempt to drive a hard bargain and consolidate its position".
And now this writer would wager that whatever a secular Turkey, but with its 99 percent Muslim population, might do, accession to Christian fortress EU is unlikely to happen for a long time. Even when Turkey deserves it. While wishing success to Turkey, this writer would happily lose the bet.
K Gajendra Singh, Indian ambassador (retired), served as ambassador
to Turkey from August 1992 to April 1996. Prior to that, he served
terms as ambassador to Jordan, Romania and Senegal.
2. AFP - "EU stresses scale of reforms needed in Turkey":
STRASBOURG / 18 December 2002
by Pierre Glachant
EU leaders and lawmakers stressed Wednesday the scale of reforms
needed by Turkey before it can start EU entry talks, a prospect delayed
at a summit last week.
"Reforms on paper are not enough. We still need to see that nobody
dies after being tortured in a Turkish prison," said EU enlargement
envoy Guenter Verheugen.
The EU, which postponed until December 2004 its decision on Ankara's
entry application last Friday, listed abolishing torture and amending
the role of the army among key reforms needed.
EU leaders agreed at the Copenhagen summit to ask the European Commission
to assess Turkey's progress in reforms and to make a recommendation
to it in time for the end of 2004.
Turkey, which has been an EU candidate since 1999 but which is alone
in not having started entry talks, had been seeking to begin negotiations
next year.
"We didn't give a promise on accession," said Danish Prime
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who brokered the compromise offer
to Turkey on the first day of last week's EU summit.
"There is no question of giving special treatment to Turkey,
in any sense,"
he added.
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia were all invited at the EU summit last
week to join the Union.
The European Union, which came under pressure notably from the United
States to improve its offer to Turkey, has praised reforms implemented
this year by the Ankara government.
But it insists that new legislation must be implemented on the ground.
"Firstly the political conditions must be fulfilled," said
Verheugen, referring to EU rules on human rights, democracy and the
treatment of minorities.
"Only after that can we decide on negotiations," he added.
Lawmakers, debating the results of the Copenhagen summit in Strasbourg,
pinpointed key problems in Turkey.
"What is missing in Turkey is .. that the civil power has to
have supremacy over military power," said Enrique Baron Crespo,
head of the Socialist group in the European parliament.
"That is the key question .. which we would put to our Turkish
friends," he added.
The Turkish army, which makes recommendations to the government on
security issues at home and abroad, is widely seen in Europe as having
too much power over the political hierarchy in Turkey.
"A few formal changes will not be enough to transform fundamentally
the place of the army in Turkish society," said Ari Oostlander
of the centre-right European People's Party.
Turkey on Wednesday denounced as unacceptable the European Union's
decision to admit the divided island of Cyprus as a member in 2004.
"Turkey does not accept from a legal and political standpoint
the decision regarding Cyprus in the conclusions of the EU Copenhagen
summit. EU member countries and the European Commission have been
notified," the foreign ministry said in a statement.
Greece, which takes over the EU presidency from January 1, meanwhile
attacked the activity of Turkish war planes in the Aegean sea on Wednesday.
The two long-time rivals, both members of NATO, regularly swap words
over the issue in the Aegean where they have territorial differences.
The rivarly between the two has however taken on a new significance
with the EU's planned expansion east and south and Turkey's bid to
enter into a deeper partnership with the bloc.
"I have to stress that Turkey's attitude is not compatible with
its efforts to join the EU," said Greek Defence Minister Yannos
Papantoniou.
3. - NBC - "Turkey to continue on path mapped by IMF":
An interim budget will be tabled in the parliament later this week, Sener said.
December 18, 2002
The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government is committed
to main objectives of the stand by between Turkey and the International
Monetary Fund, a senior minister said on Wednesday.
Speaking after the conclusion of a meeting of the cabinet on Wednesday
afternoon, Deputy Prime Minister Adullatif Sener said that the government
would maintain the objectives set out in the agreement reached with
the previous administration to lower inflation to 20 percent next
year and achieve economic growth of five percent.
“There will be no change to the program targets already announced.
The target for inflation (by the end of 2003) is 20 percent, as outlined
in the programme, growth is five percent and the primary surplus target
is 6.5 percent,” Sener said.
The Deputy Prime Minister also said that a law governing the conducting
of public tenders, in line with international standards, would come
into force in the new year and that the government would table an
interim budget to cover the first three months of 2003 later this
week.
4. - Aksam - "Turkey’s Obstructionist Front":
December 18, 2002
by Semih Idiz
Here in Turkey, we have an ‘obstructionist front’ which has maintained a years-long presence on the political scene. This front’s hallmarks notably include an appeal to the lowest common denominator and a demagogic exploitation of our nation’s deepest fears and nationalist pride. The very same front is now blindly insisting that last week’s Copenhagen summit constituted a clear-cut defeat for Turkey. By so doing, it is trying to mask its own deep-rooted fear of change. The reason for this is quite obvious: The universal values which will take their place as our guiding principles once Turkey unites with Europe are quite beyond the limited imaginations of these obstructionists.
Turkey’s goal of integration with Europe is at the same time shaking an age-old political-bureaucratic interest group. The members of this circle know full well that they don’t stand a chance of holding back the values which Turkey’s EU membership would entail. And certain ‘experts,’ who suffer from a lack of both wisdom and vision, provide the ‘intellectual logistics’ the objection front needs. They label the quest for a settlement on the Cyprus problem as a ‘giveaway policy’ or as a concession for Turkey’s EU membership, thus blaming the EU supporters for ‘selling out’ the island. We have to admit that this line of argumentation strikes a deeply resonant chord in Turkish society. Even the so-called leftist Republican People’s Party (CHP) has taken a similar stance.
In the face of all this, the new government, which certainly did
not return from Copenhagen with an empty plate, has one indispensable
mission, namely to maintain Turkey’s EU orientation. True, the
Copenhagen summit fell short of meeting fully Turkey’s expectations.
Yet, the fact that our accession negotiations could begin in 2005
is an undeniable advance for the nation. Now we have two more years
to make the necessary arrangements before the December 2004 rendezvous.
But when that day arrives, could the EU do an about-face? Maybe. But
for the moment, it’s not the Union’s future stance on Turkey
which we should be worried about, but rather our ‘glorious’
obstructionist front which is ready to sell out Turkey’s future
for its own interests.
5. - AFP - "Turkey rejects EU's decision to admit Cyprus":
ANKARA /December 18, 2002
Turkey on Wednesday denounced as unacceptable the European Union's
decision to admit the divided island of Cyprus as a member in 2004.
"Turkey does not accept from a legal and political standpoint
the decision regarding Cyprus in the conclusions of the EU Copenhagen
summit. EU member countries and the European Commission have been
notified," the foreign ministry said in a statement.
The EU's invitation at last week's Copenhagen summit was made to the
internationally-recognized Greek Cypriot government, the accepted
legitimate authority on the island since 1974 when Turkey occupied
the northern third of Cyprus.
The breakaway Turkish Cypriot state in the north, recognized only
by Ankara, has never been involved in the EU candidacy process.
"There is no single state, government or parliament authorised
to represent the whole island. Two separate peoples, two separate
democratic systems, two separate legal systems and two separate states
are present in Cyprus today," the Turkish statement said.
"The European Union does not have the right to take unilateral
decisions on the future of Cyprus in breach of international agreements
and create international obligations" it added.
UN efforts to secure an island reunification deal on the sidelines
of the Copenhagen summit failed, but the European Union urged the
island's rival communities to reach agreement by February 28, under
a UN solution timetable.
The ministry statement, issued just as top army and government officials
started to meet here to discuss the Cyprus problem, said Turkish Cypriot
leader Rauf Denktash was ready to negotiate on the UN proposals for
a Cyprus settlement, and was backed by Turkey on his stance.
"Turkey desires a political agreement which ensures the continuation
of peace and current guarantees in Cyprus, protects the balance between
Turkey and Greece, and aims at establishing a new partnership on Cyprus
through consensus," it added.
"Turkey supports the continuation of negotiations on the proposals
of the UN Secretary General (Kofi Annan)," it said.
The UN blueprint for a solution on Cyprus, the original of which was
handed to the two sides on November 11 and a modified version last
week, envisages a Swiss-style confederation of two equal states, with
some common institutions and speaking with one voice in international
bodies including the EU.
Both sides have outlined several objections to the plan.
Turkey invaded Cyprus in response to an Athens-engineered coup by
Greek Cypriots seeking to unite the island with Greece, leading to
its 28-year division along ethnic and religious lines, with a UN-manned
buffer zone in between.
6. - Eurasianet - "A changing Turkey awaits European recognition":
by Mevlut Katik: / 19 December 2002
Turkey’s effort to move toward European Union membership faced a severe blow on December 13, when EU leaders in Copenhagen refused to commit to a date for accession talks. That decision has left Turkey still waiting for European affirmation after nearly four decades.
Waiting is a familiar mode for Turkish leaders and citizens. Turkey signed an association agreement with the union’s predecessor in 1963, and formed a customs union with the European Union in 1996. But as the European Union became more cohesive, Turkey did not get closer to membership. The country failed to properly address reform concerns that the Europeans raised in 1987, mostly because of political bickering and mismanagement.
Since 2001, though, the criteria for accession have moved to the center of Turkish political life. European leaders in Copenhagen, citing various reasons, said that Turkey could not hope to set a date for accession talks until the end of 2004. Even the most optimistic forecasters say this schedule would delay membership in the European Union for at least another decade.
Desire for membership led Turkish lawmakers to broaden free-speech protections. It also led officials, with guidance from the International Monetary Fund, to privatize several industries and reform finances beginning in February 2001. Turkey abolished the death penalty in August, in keeping with European strictures, and began confronting its policy toward Kurds. Officials in Copenhagen said they would need to see these reforms in practice before admitting Turkey. This raises new questions about how smoothly Turkey can change course and how ready Europe is to recognize Turkish progress.
It is unclear that Turkey can tailor itself to EU requirements in two years. It is also unclear whether the European Union, which is enlarging to absorb small countries, is ready to include Turkey’s nearly 70 million citizens. After the Copenhagen summit, some Turkish observers revived the claim that the European Union is a “Christian Club” without any Muslim nations. However, Prime Minister Abdullah Gul rejected the use of this term. Similarly, initial complaints that the Union was “discriminating” against Turkey faded, and Gul pledged his month-old government's commitment to the reform agenda. “We will go ahead with reforms for the Turkish people,” he said. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who leads the ruling Justice and Development party, also spurned any self-pity. “This is the time for the country’s take-off,” he said on December 15. “We will continue, with determination, our journey with the EU.” Erdogan’s formulation stresses the benefits that Turkish accession could bring to Europe. As currently configured, the European Union includes 18 million Muslim citizens, for whom Turkish membership might provide a vital link to Islamic heritage. Turkey serves as a physical bridge to countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia and would encourage European leaders to deepen their connection to these countries. This dynamic might eventually make Russia more solicitous of EU priorities, and could bolster efforts to promote and enhance democratic values and practice throughout the former Soviet Union.
This is, undoubtedly, an ambitious agenda for a Turkey that still
needs to cement a host of reforms. But Turkish citizens seem ready
to animate 2001’s legal reforms by exploring the promise of free
speech and political participation. Most Europeans presumably see
their culture as distinct from what goes on in Turkey. However, as
Europe plays an increasingly weighty role in global politics, the
role and potential of a truly modern Turkey may become harder to ignore.