17
December 2002
2. "Island of troubles", although the European Union’s Copenhagen summit was deemed a success, there was no deal on Cyprus. Can an agreement to reunify the island be reached before a final deadline of February 28th?
3. "A Western Turkey", Turkey is a rare bird among Muslim nations: a secular democracy. Moreover, it is pro-Western and broadly supports U.S. security interests. Add the fact that it's the natural gateway to the Middle East, and one would think strengthening relations with Turkey would be a top priority throughout the West.
4. "Turkey reports drop in U.S. compensation offer", the United States is said to have reduced its military compensation package to Turkey for Ankara's participation in any U.S.-led war against Iraq.
5. "Turkey in Europe", it was Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, former president of France and now chairman of the convention on the constitutional future of Europe, who broke the long, embarrassed silence in early November. Turkey, he said, is “not a European country”.
6. "Death toll in Turkish prison hunger strike rises to 62", in Turkey, a woman prison inmate involved in a long-running hunger strike to protest jail reforms became the latest prisoner to starve herself to death, bringing the total number of fatalities to 62.
1. - Turkish Daily News - "Progress or Deja-vu?":
ANKARA / 17 December 2002
by Seda Serdar (*)
The long awaited Copenhagen summit has finally ended and, once more, with a smile on the European Union's (EU) face. Both during and after the summit the atmosphere and outcome have been intensively discussed in the Turkish media. Some have demonstrated the result of the summit as progress, though not as the desired 'big one.' Even though the declaration of a date by the EU does carry some importance, the way it was formulated brings us almost to where we started.
When the Ankara Agreement was signed in 1963 and Turkey became an associate member there was an article in the Agreement describing the future relation of Turkey with the then called European Economic Community (EEC). According to Article 28, "As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community."
Today, thirty-nine years later, the EU puts forward the following decision, stated in paragraph 19, taken at the Copenhagen summit: "The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay."
When one looks at it, at first glance, it seems to be a progress since a certain date is given for the accession negotiations to begin. However, leaving the unsatisfactory proposed date aside, it can be argued that this simply is not a realistic progress; it can more likely be described as deja-vu. A progress would be: the declaration of when the negotiations would begin, without this issue of once more being brought before the European Council in December 2004. This simply implies that there is no guarantee provided to Turkey. Nevertheless, Turkey, determined to achieve its goal of "westernization" by becoming a full-member of the EU will continue to play this never-ending waiting game.
And why? Is it because there is no other alternative? Is it because the ultimate goal set long ago is the best possible future for Turkey? Maybe so, but it is also necessary to consider what the other party has in mind. Despite the declarations of some European elites, such as the former president of France and the current President of the European Convention Valery Giscard D'estaign and the leading German politician Edmund Stoiber, that Turkey should never become a full-member, Turkey is very determined to finalize this act. The reaction of these leading figures and the European public opinion can be explained by their perception of Turks. Europeans, in order to identify themselves, have for centuries considered Turks as the "other." Having this historical perception in mind, it seems very unlikely to convince Europeans that Turkey is going to become one of "them."
It can be argued that no matter how hard Turkey works on the Copenhagen Criteria, other obstacles are likely to emerge. As stated above, identity is certainly one of them -- but there are more concrete issues, such as the increasing Turkish population, which threaten the EU. Even more concrete an obstacle, and connected to economic problems, is the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), which will become a heavier burden to the EU than it is today when and if Turkey becomes a full-member. Therefore, when cheering for the conditional date proposed by the EU, it should also be kept in mind that there are more obstacles to come to delay Turkish full-membership.
(*) Researcher at European Studies Desk of The Center For Eurasian
Strategic Studies (ASAM) 
2. - The Economist - "Island of troubles":
16 December 2002
Although the European Union’s Copenhagen summit was deemed a
success, there was no deal on Cyprus. Can an agreement to reunify
the island be reached before a final deadline of February 28th?
THE European Union’s enlargement summit in Copenhagen lived up
to expectations. Ten countries, mostly from Central Europe, were formally
invited to join the Union in 2004. Turkey was given a date—albeit
later than it would have liked—after which it can start to negotiate
its own entry into the club. There was even a deal, on the sidelines,
to deploy an EU army for the first time, in the Balkans. And yet,
among all these landmarks, one diplomatic setback stood out: failure
for the umpteenth time to agree on a UN-brokered plan to reunify the
divided Mediterranean island of Cyprus.
Cyprus has been split into Greek and Turkish parts ever since Turkey invaded in 1974 in response to an Athens-backed Greek-Cypriot coup attempt. The island is one of the biggest thorns in the side of relations between Turkey and the EU, and a constant source of tension between the island’s two motherlands—despite having a population no bigger than that of an Istanbul suburb. Around four-fifths of the 750,000 or so inhabitants are Greek Cypriots and live to the south of the UN-policed “green line” that divides the island; the remainder, in the north, are ethnic Turks, protected by some 30,000 soldiers from the mainland.
There had been much diplomatic manoeuvring prior to Copenhagen in the hope of clinching a deal. The UN drew up a reunification plan, then revised it just before the summit started. The idea was to hold talks chaired by Alvaro de Soto, the UN’s mediator on Cyprus, and to get a deal to coincide with the summit’s close on December 13th. Turkey, the only country that recognises the Turkish Cypriot republic, was especially keen to see agreement, because that would have given it more leverage in talks about its own accession. But Rauf Denktash, the famously intransigent Turkish Cypriot leader, was apparently too ill to attend following heart surgery. He remains as combative as ever. While the summit was taking place, he said that “the European Union’s interest is to delay Turkey and to take Cyprus, to possess Cyprus and to build something like a Christian fortress around Turkey.”
Where now? The UN and EU have set a final deadline for agreement of February 28th. Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general, has asked leaders on both sides to sign a letter of intent committing themselves to a deal by then. Turkey remains hopeful, as does the UN itself. The two sides have “never been closer”, said UN chief spokesman Fred Eckhard on Friday.
If a deal is reached, Cyprus will be able to enter the EU in 2004 as a united entity. But if talks fail, the EU has said it is prepared to admit the Greek part alone, leaving the impoverished Turkish Cypriot community out in the cold. (The Greek bit was one of the ten countries invited to join in Copenhagen.) Were that to happen, the Greek Cypriots would most likely oppose Turkish membership for some years.
The main obstacle to progress is the 78-year-old Mr Denktash. He is seen as preferring integration with Turkey (the likely outcome if there is no deal) to a settlement that involves painful compromises. He has capitalised on opposition to a deal among some sections of Turkey’s highly influential armed forces. European diplomats have been urging the new Turkish government, elected last month, to rein Mr Denktash in. Some blame the new administration’s inexperience for the failure to reach an accord at the summit; it was simply outmanoeuvred by hardliners opposed to a deal, they say.
If Turkey does what the diplomats want, it will be out of fear that
the country’s timetable for starting EU accession talks could
be derailed if the Cyprus issue remains unresolved. But there are
good reasons why Cyprus has become known as the “diplomats’
graveyard”—the most recent casualty being Richard Holbrooke,
who had previously managed to broker the peace accords in Bosnia.
There is a lot to do between now and February.
3. - The Washington Times - "A Western Turkey":
16 December 2002
by John C. Hulsman / Brett D. Schaefer
Turkey is a rare bird among Muslim nations: a secular democracy.
Moreover, it is pro-Western and broadly supports U.S. security interests.
Add the fact that it's the natural gateway to the Middle East, and
one would think strengthening relations with Turkey would be a top
priority throughout the West.
Alas, some European Union nations don't see it that way. At the Dec.
12 conference on EU membership in Copenhagen, the EU rebuffed, yet
again, Turkey's decades-long effort to get the ball rolling toward
EU membership.
Over the years, the EU has put forth one reason after another for
not acting on the Turks' application. There was the country's poor
human-rights record, its questionable adherence to democracy, and
numerous other cultural and economic objections held by many in the
EU.
Turkey has made good faith efforts to address those objections. It
has, for instance, passed legislation abolishing the death penalty
and granting language rights to its Kurdish minority.
But despite Turkey's responsiveness, the EU has barely budged. Turkey's
demand that it be given an accession date in 2003 was rejected out
of hand and the EU offered only a tentative "commitment"
to set an accession date by December 2004. Even that intermediate
step remains contingent on Turkey continuing to implement EU-approved
political and human-rights policies.
Why all the foot-dragging by the EU? For starters, there are economic
concerns. Applying the EU's Common Agricultural Policy to Turkey's
large and relatively poor agrarian economy would break the EU bank.
Perhaps more importantly, Turkey would shortly become — by virtue
of population — the largest voting block in the EU, shifting
power away from Western European countries such as France and Italy,
long accustomed to having a major say in EU policy outcomes. These
obstacles and the inherent indecisiveness of the EU, where any one
nation can block Turkish accession, make it unlikely that the EU will
accept Turkey as a full member any time soon.
Meanwhile, Turkish resentment of EU temporizing grows. Decades of
futility, compounded by the EU's tepid appreciation of reforms made,
now fuel suspicion on the Turkish "street" that the EU sees
itself as a Christian club that will never open its doors to a predominantly
Muslim country. The imminent accession of the Republic of Cyprus —
the half of the island controlled by Greek, not Turkish, Cypriots
— only adds more fuel to the fire.
Turkey rightly feels singled out. Every other aspiring member of the
EU has been given an accession date before meeting all the membership
criteria. Indeed, most of the 10 countries invited to join the EU
at the just completed Copenhagen conference still have not met all
of the criteria. The EU's refusal to give Turkey a firm accession
date clearly signals reluctance to consider Turkish membership under
any circumstances.
Such faithlessness by the EU could incite popular hostility toward
Europe and the West — something that could undermine U.S. national
security. Should Ankara decide to impress its importance upon shortsighted
Europeans, it might well withdraw its support of peace initiatives
in Cyprus and rapprochement with Greece and pursue, instead, closer
relations with repressive regimes like those in Syria, Libya and Iran.
Further, it could obstruct use of NATO assets in Turkey and refuse
the U.S. use of its military bases.
America dare not watch idly as Turkey turns away from the West. To
forestall the possibility, the U.S. should pressure EU nations to
offer Turkey a firm and none-too-distant date for accession talks.
Indeed, we should encourage Turkey to turn the tables on the EU, urging
them to give Brussels a firm deadline for setting the date.
Regardless of progress toward this goal, America should proceed to
strengthen bilateral relations with Turkey by:
• Assuring Ankara we will not support a Kurdish state in any
post-Saddam settlement involving Iraq.
• Expanding joint military exercises and increasing military
assistance to better equip and prepare Turkey as an ally in the war
on terrorism.
• Partially compensating Turkey for economic losses arising from
its activities in Afghanistan and curtailed trade with Iraq.
• Offering a U.S.-Turkish bilateral trade agreement — a
free-trade agreement if Turkey decides to withdraw from the EU Customs
Union and joins the European Free Trade Area (EFTA).
The U.S. — and all of the West — have much riding on the
EU's dealings with Turkey. Too much, in fact, to let these matters
drag out indefinitely or — worse — resolve themselves unfavorably.
The U.S. must step forward to provide Turks both economic and military
assurances that they are valued and welcome allies despite EU intransigence.
John C. Hulsman is research fellow for European affairs and Brett
D. Schaefer is Jay Kingham fellow in international regulatory affairs
at the Heritage Foundation.
4. - Middle East Newsline - "Turkey reports drop in U.S. compensation offer":
ANKARA / 16 December 2002
The United States is said to have reduced its military compensation package to Turkey for Ankara's participation in any U.S.-led war against Iraq.
Turkish officials said the compensation package presented by the Bush administration has fallen far short of the original estimate of $3.5 billion. They said the real value of the package appears to be between $1 billion and $2 billion.
The aid figures were discussed during last week's visit by Turkish ruling party chief Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Washington. Erdogan, head of the Islamic-oriented Justice and Development Party met President George Bush and senior administration officials regarding Ankara's participation in the war against Baghdad.
Officials said Erdogan tried to pin down the White House on exactly
what the United States was offering Turkey. After several attempts,
they said, Erdogan was provided with figures that were at odds with
the pledges of administration officials during their visit to Ankara
last month.
5. - Monday Morning (Lebanon) - "Turkey in Europe":
BEIRUT / 16 December 2002
It was Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, former president of France
and now chairman of the convention on the constitutional future of
Europe, who broke the long, embarrassed silence in early November.
Turkey, he said, is “not a European country”. It has “a
different culture, a different approach, and a different way of life”,
and its admission would mean “the end of the European Union”.
What he meant was that Turkey is an overwhelmingly Muslim country,
though officially a secular one.
Once Giscard had spoken the unspeakable, other old, white, conservative men leapt into the fray. Among them were bishops, who warned that in shaping Europe’s future the continent’s “religious heritage” should not be forgotten. Germany’s opposition leader, Edmund Stoiber, declared that “[Europe’s] borders must be based on shared values, culture and history. Turkey’s membership would breach those borders”. And former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine warned that if the EU did not draw the line at Turkey, “we will end up with a union of 40 countries, including Russia, the Ukraine, Turkey, the Balkan states and North Africa”.
To which one is tempted to reply “Yes, and your problem is...?”
Such a 40-country union would merely restore a zone of peace, common
law and shared citizenship over most of the territories that enjoyed
the same benefits as provinces of the Roman Empire two thousand years
ago. But Europe’s pro-expansion leaders confined themselves to
more specific replies.
Turkey “absolutely has its place in Europe”, affirmed President
Jacques Chirac, implicitly rebuking his predecessor. “Turkey
is a European country which has every right to join if it meets the
conditions”, said a British government spokesperson. Gerhard
Schroeder, the German chancellor, declared that “the real question
now is to decide a date, not for Turkey’s accession to the EU,
but for the start of entry talks”. But it is a highly contentious
issue in Europe, and the Turks wanted that date to be set at the EU
summit in Copenhagen on December 12 (after these lines were written).
There was not one hurdle to be cleared at Copenhagen, but three. Extending
formal invitations to 10 countries to join the EU in 2004 (Poland,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia, Malta and Cyprus), and two more in 2007 (Romania and Bulgaria),
is actually the easiest part. Of the Class of 2004, only Poland is
of serious economic import -- its 40 million people outnumber the
other nine candidates’ populations taken together -- and while
talks on the rights of Polish farmers will go down to the wire, final
success is assured.
The second hurdle is getting a peace deal on Cyprus before it joins. The island has been partitioned between its Greek-speaking majority and its Turkish-speaking minority for a generation. Both mother countries, Greece and Turkey, are now eager for an arrangement that creates a reunited Cyprus of two largely self-governing linguistic communities, more or less along the lines of Belgium. And then there is the question of Turkey itself.
Turkey already has 66 million people, and it is growing fast. If it joins, by 2020 it would be the EU’s biggest country, outnumbering even the Germans, so letting it in would have a big impact on the EU’s identity even if the Turks were not Muslims. The original promise that it would eventually become a candidate for membership is 40 years old, and it has been an official candidate since 1999, but many Europeans never realized that the promise might one day have to be kept. That day has arrived.
Over the past year, Turkey has carried out drastic legal reforms that remove most of the human rights obstacles to its membership. It abolished the death penalty, legalized Kurdish-language broadcasting and schools, and ended legal curbs on press freedom. And it has now elected a government of ‘Muslim democrats’ who look like they might hold the key to reconciling the traditionally conservative force of religion in Turkey with modernity and democracy.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), was laying great importance on getting a date for the start of Turkish entry talks. “We don’t see the EU as a club of Christians and we don’t want to see it as a club of Christians, but if we can’t get a date from Copenhagen, suspicions will emerge. It is very important to prove that the culture of Islam and democracy can indeed co-exist and be in harmony”.
When the AKP talk about being ‘Muslim democrats’, they are consciously modelling themselves on the ‘Christian democrats’ who emerged in Western Europe after 1945. The point about those Christian Democrats is that they replaced the reactionary, anti-modern, clerical-dominated parties of the pre-war era (some of which did not shrink from alliances with fascists) with the tolerant, secular and lay-run Christian parties of today who have successfully reconciled religious faith and a commitment to a secular democratic system.
This is exactly what the Muslim Middle East needs as well, and it
would be criminal not to encourage the phenomenon when it appears
in the country which has been the traditional bridge between Europe
and the Middle East. Letting Turkey join Europe would certainly be
a leap of faith for the current members -- it would give the EU common
borders with Iraq and Iran -- but it would also be a leap in the right
direction. After all, in classical times, what we now call ‘Europe’
and ‘the Middle East’ were part of the same broad culture.
They could be again.
6. - Deutsche Welle - "Death toll in Turkish prison hunger strike rises to 62":
16 December 2002
In Turkey, a woman prison inmate involved in a long-running hunger
strike to protest jail reforms became the latest prisoner to starve
herself to death, bringing the total number of fatalities to 62. Feride
Harman, an extreme left-wing prisoner on a six-month temporary release
due to her deteriorating health, died overnight on the 512th day of
her fast, a spokeswoman for the Turkish Human Rights Association said.
The protest was launched in October 2000 by mainly left-wing inmates
to protest the introduction of new jails in which one to three-person
cells replaced large dormitories for dozens of inmates.The strikers
say the new cells leave them socially isolated and more vulnerable
to mistreatment by warders and police.