30
August 2002
2. "Cem: 'Elections will be like Russian roulette'", YTP leader Cem sees Turkey playing Russian roulette. "Because of the hatred that the programme inspired in people, we now have the most awkward Russian roulette-style election in our modern history," Ismail Cem said at his new Ankara headquarters.
3. "Cyprus and the Clash of Civilizations", the Bush administration has so many foreign policy crises on its plate now that it can be forgiven for not wanting to spend much time on second-tier international issues. At first glance, Cyprus looks like the definition of such an issue.
4. "Turkey: Ankara And KDP Battle Over Shape Of Post-Saddam Iraq", Ankara and the leader of a major Iraqi-Kurdish faction are engaging in an increasingly acrimonious war of words over what direction Iraq should go, should the U.S. oust Saddam Hussein from power.
5. "Turkish police detain 40 in jail protest", Turkish police on Thursday detained some 40 protestors who handed in a petition to the French consulate here against controversial new jails, which have led to a long-running hunger strike by prisoners, the Anatolia news agency reported.
6. "What to expect from General Ozkok",
the new chief of staff takes office during the most important period
in the history of the republic. Both the country and the TSK are faced
with the need to take critical decisions.
1.
- NTV Türk - "Öcalan will be told he is not to be
executed":
August 29, 2002
With the banning of capital punishment those prisoners who had been
sentenced to death will be directly informed that they no longer face
execution.
An official delegation of prosecutors will visit the imprisoned terrorist
leader Abdullah Öcalan to inform him that his sentence of death
has been converted to lifetime sentence.
The delegation will visit Öcalan, the head of the outlawed separatist
group the PKK, in his one person prison on the island of Imrali but
will also meet in person with other prisoners sentenced to death and
inform them of the end of capital punishment.
Although capital punishment was Turkey ‘s statute books, not
executions have been carried out since 1983.
In its bid to qualify for membership of the European Union, Turkey
controversially abolished the death penalty, except in times of war
or near war conditions, two months ago.
2. - Reuters - "Cem: 'Elections will be like Russian roulette'":
ANKARA / 30 August 2002
YTP leader Cem sees Turkey playing Russian roulette. "Because of the hatred that the programme inspired in people, we now have the most awkward Russian roulette-style election in our modern history," Ismail Cem said at his new Ankara headquarters.
Turkey's former foreign minister, rushing to build a new party, on Wednesday compared the nation's November polls to Russian roulette, saying popular fury over poverty wrought by IMF-backed reforms made any outcome possible.
"Over a million lost their jobs, a hundred thousand or more small businesses closed," Ismail Cem told Reuters. "Watch the television and you see people, furious, they've lost their job, their crops aren't worth anything any more."
Cem resigned and founded the New Turkey Party (YTP) a month ago as the government he had served for three years crumbled.
But the centre-left party suffered an early blow when Kemal Dervis, steward of the economy since crisis struck last year and one of the political midwives of the YTP, turned his back on Cem and joined a rival centre-left party.
The result further deepened a division in the mainstream vote that could deliver power to a party suspected by some, especially the powerful military, of Islamist tendencies.
Cem, a quietly spoken, urbane man with swept back greying hair, said the electorate of the Muslim NATO country sought new parties to replace forces that had failed them in the past. A $16 billion-dollar IMF crisis programme, sealed by Dervis, had caused "nothing but sorrow, nothing but pain" for many Turks.
Some of the reforms, such as restructuring of lumbering state banks, had done much good. But too little attention was paid to the human consequences, too much left to "technicians".
"Because of the hatred that the programme inspired in people,
we now have the most awkward Russian roulette-style election in our
modern history," he said at his new Ankara headquarters. "Everything
is possible."
"Islamists" benefit from disarray
The party most successful at the moment in embracing the angry masses is the one-year-old Justice and Development Party (AKP). AKP comment is watched closely by the IMF and by NATO allies, especially Washington which would need Turkish support for any military action in neighbouring Iraq.
Surveys show mainstream parties struggling to clear the 10 percent hurdle to enter parliament, while AKP consistently polls at least 20 percent.
"Polls give enormous ratings to the AKP. I believe it won't stay so high, but we must ask ourselves why this is," Cem said.
The AKP was one of two parties to emerge from the banning of an Islamist party last year. It says it has abandoned religious tenets, learning from the fate of an Islamist government eased from office by an army-led campaign in 1997, and embraced Turkey's Western calling and free market economy reforms.
But markets are still wary and would like to see Dervis back at the
economic helm. The military has made no secret of its disapproval
of its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has served a jail sentence
under Turkey's strict sedition laws.
Regaining lost ground
Cem is still a man regaining his balance after Dervis pulled a political rug out from under him. Cem, Dervis and a third defector from Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's government had emerged as prime movers in the creation of what became the YTP.
Newspapers had lauded, or derided, according to their taste, the "Troika" that would overcome the factionalism that has so often paralysed Turkish politics. Weeks later Dervis announced he was joining Deniz Baykal at the Republican People's Party (CHP), currently the strongest of mainstream parties in surveys.
Cem laughs as he echoes back the inevitable question. "What went wrong? I have a very quick answer as to what or who went wrong, but I won't go into that."
"That was his choice," he said, lighting a cigarette. "Polls showed his decision hurt us to an important degree...but the Dervis-CHP thing has reached its peak, where our party is now going upwards...above 10 percent," he said.
Cem sees no problem presenting himself as a "new broom" after serving three years in the current government. "I worked 16 hours a day as foreign minister to better Turkey's world position, improve relations with...Greece, with the European Union."
The YTP may fare well among the urban middle classes but could have trouble in rural Anatolia where the AKP might prevail. The rightist Nationalist Action Party is part of the present government, but may trade there on its role as "opposition" within that government where it constantly challenged Dervis.
Cem said the YTP had almost finished organising across a vast country, stretching from the Balkans to the Iraqi border.
He saw no alliance now with Dervis's CHP; there was little common ground. "The cleavage now is between old and new."
Outside, over the front of the building hung a huge portrait of the YTP leader and a large, red Turkish flag.
Some see the intensely personal nature of Turkish politics as one of the hindrances to consensus. Cem disagrees.
"For the YTP, this is one of our major assets. People can compare
leaders. Which one can I trust my child with?..."I think on that
matter people have pretty much made up their minds."
3. - The Washington Post - "Cyprus and the Clash of Civilizations":
By John Sitilides and Paul Glastris / August 30, 2002
The Bush administration has so many foreign policy crises on its plate now that it can be forgiven for not wanting to spend much time on second-tier international issues. At first glance, Cyprus looks like the definition of such an issue. It has been 28 years since Turkish troops were dispatched to the Mediterranean island republic in response to a Greek-led coup. Since then, Cyprus's ethnic Greek and Turkish populations have been separated by a barbed-wire divide that is heavily militarized but reasonably stable. No one expects any fighting in the foreseeable future. In fact, the Greek side of the island has grown so prosperous that Cyprus will be invited to join the European Union in December.
Yet when that EU invitation comes, Cyprus suddenly is going to become crucial to the great overarching security challenge the West faces. The United States and its NATO allies must project power into the "arc of crisis" stretching from Egypt to the West Bank to Baghdad to Afghanistan and beyond -- but in ways that do not lead to a clash of civilizations with the Islamic world. Cyprus can either make this vexing challenge easier or much harder, depending on whether the Bush administration engages more heavily than it has so far in solving the Cyprus problem.
The outlines of a Cyprus settlement have been known for years. Basically the Greek side would give up some land and municipal authority in return for both sides joining a federated state. But decades of U.N. mediation, including an attempt in May by Secretary General Kofi Annan, have proven fruitless. Most observers understand that only a major push by the United States can resolve the dispute. But if that push doesn't come soon and there is no Cyprus settlement by December, the EU will invite only the Greek side to join. Turkey has warned that when that happens, it will all but annex the Turkish side of the island, where 35,000 Turkish troops are deployed.
But if Turkey does this -- and powerful interests in the country will demand it -- then Brussels will almost certainly revoke Turkey's candidacy for EU membership. That would be a huge blow to U.S. policy, which for decades has been premised on drawing Turkey, NATO's only member in the Muslim world, ever more tightly into the Western orbit. Though the EU's action will have been prompted by Turkish behavior, Muslims around the world will see it as evidence that the West will never grant an Islamic country a place at the table of economic prosperity. Anti-Western Muslim extremists will surely amplify that message, severely undercutting U.S. efforts to win Islamic hearts and minds in the war on terrorism.
By formally assimilating Turkish Cyprus, Turkey would also probably put itself back on a war footing with Greece. That, too, would be a disaster for U.S. interests. Greece and Turkey are both members of NATO but also long-standing rivals, with Cyprus being their biggest bone of contention. Though relations between Greece and Turkey have improved in the last few years, serious issues remain between them, which routinely compromise NATO readiness.
Two years ago, for example, a major NATO exercise in the eastern Mediterranean ended abruptly after a legal quarrel led Turkey to deny Greek fighter jets flyover rights. Such disputes have been only modestly harmful as long as NATO was focused on its traditional mission: deterring a Soviet/Russian invasion of Western Europe.
But Russia now has formal relations with NATO, and the real threats to European and American security are emanating from the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans. NATO must be able to project power more vigorously in these regions if it is going to be of any real military relevance. Some in the Bush administration understand this and they are talking about the prospect of winning at least some NATO backing for any war to oust Saddam Hussein or for policing a peace settlement in the West Bank and Gaza. None of this can happen effectively, however, if the two NATO members closest to the region, Greece and Turkey, are busy having dogfights over the Aegean and otherwise hindering alliance operations.
All these negative consequences will be realized if a Cyprus peace agreement isn't reached by the end of this year. But if the Bush administration becomes engaged and an agreement is reached, the positive consequences will be considerable. Tensions between Greece and Turkey will largely disappear. NATO's southern flank, as well as its ability to respond to regional threats and emergencies, will strengthen. Turkey's EU candidacy will accelerate. Greek and Turkish Cypriots will join the EU together as one. And Turkish will become an official language of the EU -- a powerful sign to Muslims the world over that when we in the West say we accept Islam, we mean it.
John Sitilides is executive director of the Western Policy Center.
Paul Glastris is a senior fellow at the center and editor in chief
of the Washington Monthly magazine.
4. - Radio Free Europe - "Turkey: Ankara And KDP Battle Over Shape Of Post-Saddam Iraq":
PRAGUE / 29 August 2002
By Charles Recknagel
Ankara and the leader of a major Iraqi-Kurdish faction are engaging in an increasingly acrimonious war of words over what direction Iraq should go, should the U.S. oust Saddam Hussein from power. As RFE/RL reports, the hostile exchanges are in sharp contrast to the good relations the two parties enjoyed a year ago and reflect their deep differences over what they want from a post-Saddam Iraq.
Over the past year, relations between Turkey and one of the two key Iraqi-Kurd factions, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), have degenerated from cooperation to open hostility.
The extent of the change became clear this month as Turkey and the KDP engaged in a highly public war of words in which both sides spoke of the possibility of armed conflict between them.
The verbal battle saw Turkey warning the KDP over what it sees as increasing efforts by the group's leader, Mas'ud Barzani, to give northern Iraq the trappings of statehood. Those efforts include Barzani's recent proposal of a draft constitution for a post-Saddam Iraq which would grant extensive autonomy to Iraqi Kurdistan.
Similarly, Barzani has proposed that within the federation, Iraqi Kurdistan would have the oil-rich city of Kirkuk as its capital and the right to its own parliament, presidency, and flag.
Those suggestions sparked a sharp statement from the Turkish Foreign Ministry last week that "the political parties in northern Iraq must not forget the need to carefully avoid any assertions about the future of the country." That was a diplomatic signal that Ankara would not tolerate anything that looked like too much Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq -- something Ankara fears could incite its own restive Kurdish minority to seek the same.
And, just in case Barzani did not understand the warning, Turkey's Defense Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu added one of his own. He told reporters that "Turkey considers northern Iraq to be under its direct care and Ankara would not tolerate the region being subjugated to the interests of others."
Cakmakoglu also said that Turkey has not given up its own territorial claims to the area. He said northern Iraq was "forcibly separated" from Turkey by the Western powers that partitioned the Ottoman Empire and that because of the presence of a Turkic-speaking Turkoman population there, he considered the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul to be "Turkish soil."
The defense minister's statements got an angry reception from the KDP, which warned Ankara that any Turkish intervention in northern Iraq would be resisted by force. The KDP -- whose territory borders Turkey -- said that the Turks "will see that we are ready to sacrifice ourselves and they will see we are ready to make this land a graveyard for the attackers."
The tit-for-tat threats between Ankara and the KDP are in sharp contrast to what appeared to be a cooperative relationship between them just a little over a year ago. That relationship was founded on Turkey's enlisting the KDP's help in destroying bases in northern Iraq used by the now-defunct Turkish-Kurd guerrilla movement, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Ankara and the KDP also engaged in an extensive cross-border trade in smuggled Iraqi oil that helped enrich the KDP and strengthen it in its struggles with its rival Iraqi-Kurd faction, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani.
But observers say that the alliance now has largely collapsed in the wake of Turkey's capture of PKK head Abdullah Ocalan in early 1999 and the successful clearing of most of the PKK bases in northern Iraq. Only the smuggling of Iraqi oil continues as before, because it is in the economic interest of both sides.
Mustafa Osman is a political analyst in London and an expert on Kurdish affairs. He says that over the past 10 years, Ankara was willing to close its eyes to political developments in northern Iraq because it was more interested in security issues, namely destroying the PKK. Now, with its battle with the PKK won, Ankara's attention has again focused on politics.
"During the last 10 years, [the Turks] have been treating this Kurdish issue as a security issue only, not as a political issue, not as an issue of a people who have aspirations and so on. That's why they were always trying to utilize the [Iraqi] Kurds for their purposes against the PKK, which was a threat to them."
He continues: "Now, in the last two years, of course, the PKK threat is no longer there and the Turks have changed. And they started grumbling about autonomy, about the [Iraqi Kurds'] aspirations, about a signpost which is at the border saying 'Welcome to Kurdistan,' about a flag, whatever -- all these things which were there before. But they never complained much because they needed the [Iraqi] Kurds for their security purposes."
Osman also says that during the past decade, the KDP cooperated with Ankara against the PKK because the Turkish-Kurd guerrillas equally represented a threat to the Iraqi Kurd faction's control over its own territory. But the analyst says that now Barzani fears Ankara will try to make a deal with Washington to curb the Iraqi Kurds' aspirations as the price of cooperating in any military campaign against Baghdad.
"Turkey has already raised this with the Americans. They have told the Americans that they don't want to see any Kurdish entity in Iraqi Kurdistan, even autonomy -- whatever -- and, of course, that is one of the reasons Barzani is afraid [the Turks might try to make a deal with Washington in exchange for cooperation]."
Many Turkish analysts agree that Barzani's federalist aspirations are a major concern for Ankara. Sami Kohen, a columnist for the Turkish daily "Milliyet," wrote recently that "Barzani's draft of a federal -- practically independent -- status for Iraqi Kurdistan...has deeply disturbed Turkish officials." He added, "Whether or not the United States attacks Iraq...[northern Iraq] will continue to occupy Ankara."
Turkey, the two Iraqi Kurdish factions, and the United States have all pledged to respect Iraq's territorial integrity. But those assurances have done little to calm the mistrust between Turkey and Barzani as Washington seeks to build a coalition against Saddam.
Barzani registered some of his unease by not attending a meeting in Washington of leading Iraqi opposition figures earlier this month. Barzani was widely reported to have stayed away because he did not want to transit through Turkey, his usual route to Washington. U.S. officials said only that he did not attend due to what they called "logistical difficulties."
At the same time, Barzani has been hesitant to publicly commit to joining any military operation against Saddam, saying he first wants specific U.S. assurances for the safety of northern Iraq. He has not spelled out what those assurances should be, but many observers say they may not only be against an assault by Saddam's forces in the event of a war but also guarantees against any Turkish intervention in northern Iraq.
Barzani's position toward Turkey contrasts with that of rival Iraqi Kurd leader Talabani, who in recent months has developed closer relations with Ankara. Talabani has courted Turkey by moving against pockets of PKK fighters who fled into his area, which borders Iran, and by announcing that he would protect minority Turkomans in northern Iraq.
While Barzani stayed away from this month's Iraqi opposition meeting in Washington, and only sent a representative, Talabani attended in person and urged the U.S. to proceed with overthrowing Saddam. After the meeting he told reporters: "I explained to the United States officials here that the Iraqi opposition, Kurds included...have tens of thousands of armed people. These forces can liberate Iraq with the support of the U.S., with cooperation and coordination with American forces."
Talabani also said U.S. officials have promised that Turkey would not interfere in northern Iraq as a result of a U.S.-led campaign against Baghdad.
The Kurdish part of northern Iraq has been virtually autonomous for
the last decade, protected from Iraqi forces by U.S. and British planes.
It has been outside of Saddam's control since the Iraqi Kurds broke
away from Baghdad at the end of the 1991 Gulf War.
5. - AFP - "Turkish police detain 40 in jail protest":
ISTANBUL / August 29, 2002
Turkish police on Thursday detained some 40 protestors who handed
in a petition to the French consulate here against controversial new
jails, which have led to a long-running hunger strike by prisoners,
the Anatolia news agency reported.
Riot police moved in to disperse the group after some 60 protestors
attempted to make a statement outside the French consulate in the
Taksim district, in the city's European quarter. Protesters had previously
attempted to hand in similar petitions to other consulates here.
There were scuffles between police and the protestors, most of them
relatives of the hunger-striking inmates, during which one plainclothes
officer was punched in the face, the agency said.
Hundreds of mainly left-wing inmates launched a hunger strike in October
2000 against the introduction of the new maximum-security jails in
which cells for three people at most replaced large dormitories for
dozens of prisoners.
The strike, in which the protestors have been fasting on a rotating
basis, has so far claimed 55 lives, including both prisoners and outside
supporters of the movement.
Backed by rights groups, the strikers say the new jails leaves them
socially isolated and more vulnerable to torture and maltreatment.
The government, however, has categorically ruled out a return to the
dormitory system, arguing that it was the main reason behind frequent
riots and hostage-taking incidents in the country's unruly jails.
There are currently only about 30 prisoners on the hunger strike after
several stopped fasting in the face of Ankara's tough stance.
In July, the Council of Europe acknowledged steps by the Turkish authorities
to ease the isolation of prisoners by allowing communal activities
and open visits, but urged further measures to relax restrictions.
6. - Turkish Daily News - "What to expect from General Ozkok":
ANKARA / 30 August 2002
by Mehmet Ali Birand
The new chief of staff takes office during the most important period in the history of the republic. Both the country and the TSK are faced with the need to take critical decisions
As of yesterday Gen. Hilmi Ozkok is the head of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the country's chief of staff. He has been properly equipped for that position and is the kind of person that is aware not only of the military requirements of that position but also of the political weight it carries and the responsibilities that entails.
Turkey is lucky to have Gen. Ozkok serve as the top commander during the most important transition period in the history of the republic:
1. Turkey has an election ahead. The potential election results give certain circles a shiver. The way ballots will be cast may, once again, lead to a friction with those directing the state. The approach the General Staff will take will either tense up or ease the situation.
2. As Turkey's full membership rendezvous with the European Union draws near, the weight the National Security Council (MGK) and the TSK carries in politics in our country will inevitably be put on the agenda. Resolution of that problem too will depend to a great extent to the stance to be taken by the General Staff.
3. Cyprus is another issue that needs to be solved. Again, the General Staff view will play a significant part in that solution.
4. Similarly, the Iraq problem which we may experience in the coming months, will take shape in the framework of the General Staff approach to a great extent.
5. One has to add to all these the need for reorganization in the TSK to modernize it or, to put it more correctly, to have it reshape itself in line with the changing domestic and world conditions.
We may not be fully aware of this but just as the way the Turkish society and political staff are rapidly changing, so are the mentality and approaches embraced by the state cadres, starting with those in the TSK.
Although it was not debated extensively, the latest reform package especially, has initiated a process of change which would alter to some extent the "everything for the state" approach, the habit of worshipping the state.
Now, the feeling that the state should be in the service of the society, is spreading. Now everybody accepts that the period of military interventions has ended.
Meanwhile, it is no secret that the weight the TSK carries does not stem from the weapons it has in its hands but from the fact that it has credibility with those segments of the society that share the same values with the TSK.
While such a sensitive process of change is being experienced the TSK's place in the political decision-making mechanisms is being debated and reassessed both in a European Union framework and by the people and the political cadres.
The Copenhagen criteria requires that the National Security Council be under the "sovereignty" of the civilian authority.
However, we may pass as many laws as we like, Turkey will not be able to fulfil that criterion unless we manage to reach a compromise among us, that is, unless the General Staff develops a new kind of approach, a new rhetoric.
That issue depends entirely on the stance to be adopted by the new chief of staff. At a time -- in order to be able to carry into the European Union -- the society has made great sacrifices on issues such as "death penalty and education-broadcasting in the mother tongue" on which it had become highly sensitized. In such a climate the society would not expect a hardline stance when the topic of the National Security Council's position comes up.
That criterion is, in reality, in the people's minds. It is a way of looking at things, an understanding. The TSK will always maintain its sensitivity regarding the country's territorial integrity. No one can prevent that.
The TSK will continue to protect and look after the secular-democratic system. No one can prevent that either.
That is not the aim of the Copenhagen criteria anyway. What they
are demanding is not that the military watch like a bystander if and
when the country gets fragmented. This criterion is about admission
of a certain approach, of a certain concept.
The hardest thing is to change the habits
Still, we must not forget that resolution of this issue will entail a highly difficult, lengthy process.
On one side are the General Staff and the TSK cadres that have established their weight over the country's politics over the years due mostly to developments stemming from the requirements, the General Staff and the TSK that have almost been forced by the civilian cadres to have a say on such issues and, by now, have gotten used to this situation.
On the other side there is an effective part of the society that has gotten used to looking up to the General Staff and the other TSK commanders as a bulwark on the aforementioned sensitive issue. Now these people will be told, "From now on you will be left outside the political decision-making processes."
This will inevitably lead to misunderstandings and resistance.
Everything will depend on whether the chief of staff will embrace this general principle -- or approach -- or not. Whether or not he will make statements or make other commanders speak up, will change a lot. We will be experiencing a process that will require extremely fine tuning.
Whet this will be a smooth process will depend on whether the military and those circles that affect the military, will accept that concept and, also, on Gen. Ozkok's management skills and on whether he will desire such find tuning or not.
From all these aspects many believe that Gen. Ozkok can, as the chief
of staff, ensure a sound transition with minimum uneasiness.