22.
August 2002
2. "Turkey presses EU to set date for accession talks", Turkish Foreign Minister Sukru Sina Gurel renewed an appeal to the European Union Wednesday to set a date for the start of accession talks by the end of the year.
3. "EU views the election with concern", for the first time since the reform package was passed Turkey has sat down for talks with the EU amid astonishment and, at the same time, suspicions regarding the implementation of these laws.
4. "Turkey's president seeks to annul part of EU-oriented reform package", President Ahmet Necdet Sezer on Wednesday asked Turkey's top court to annul part of a set of reforms aimed at improving Turkey's chances of joining the European Union .
5. "War of words between Turkey and KDP", KDP: In the event of a Turkish military intervention in the region, KDP forces will make the region a graveyard for Turkey
6. "Think before leaping into war", there should be little mystery about the outcome of an American war on Iraq. History and the neighborhood teach us the necessary lessons. Let us consider two possible scenarios for an attack
Dear reader,
due to the holiday time our "Flash Bulletin" will not be forwarded to email addresses from August 1, 2002 until August 25, 2002. It can be viewed, however, right here in the internet at www.flash-bulletin.de as usual.
the staff
1.
- AFP - "Turkey's Dervis to join leftist party for elections":
ANKARA, August 21, 2002
Turkey's popular former economy minister Kemal Dervis is set to join
the center-left Republican People's Party (CHP) ahead of early November
elections, party chief Deniz Baykal said Wednesday.
"Mr Dervis will officially join our party on Friday," he
said after a four-hour meeting with Dervis.
Dervis seemed to confirm the information saying "from now on"
he would work with the party of Bakyal, a long-time rival of ailing
Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit.
Dervis, an independent credited with rescuing Turkey from financial
collapse through a series of IMF-backed reforms, stepped down earlier
this month to build a pro-European alliance ahead of the snap poll.
He had been expected to join the New Turkey party formed by former
foreign minister Ismail Cem and had sought to ally the party with
the CHP for a leftist pro-Western bloc in the November 3 election.
But his planned unity grouping failed when the New Turkey party said
it would stand alone in the election rather than join the popular
former economy minister. Dervis responded by saying he would therefore
not join Cem's New Turkey party.
Dervis said Wednesday that he hoped to see the CHP, Turkey's oldest
political party, sweep the elections and hold majority power in government.
"We will aim to reinforce the CHP -- because governing Turkey
alone is of vital importance to the future of our country," Dervis
said, reiterating his belief that the fractured leftist and rightist
parties that have governed Turkey in recent years have led to unstable
ruling coalitions.
A strong pro-Western government in NATO member Turkey is seen as required
to advance the country's bid to join the European Union and tackle
the fallout
of a possible US strike against neighboring Iraq.
The failure to forge electoral alliances could propel to power the
opposition Justice and Development Party (AK), whose Islamist roots
are a source of suspicion both among investors and the strictly secular
establishment of the mainly Muslim country.
The fragmentation of both Turkey's mainstream left and right has enabled
the AK party, an offspring of a banned Islamist movement, to lead
in opinion polls with only some 20 percent of the vote.
The CHP has seen its popularity rise since the previous elections
in 1999 when it was left outside parliament for the first time ever.
It was founded in 1923 by the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk.
2. - AFP - "Turkey presses EU to set date for accession talks":
ANKARA, August 21, 2002
Turkish Foreign Minister Sukru Sina Gurel renewed an appeal to the
European Union Wednesday to set a date for the start of accession
talks by the end of the year.
"We want and expect the European Union to give us a date at the
(December) Copenhagen summit," when the EU is to outline its
enlargement calendar, Gurel told reporters.
Ankara has been pushing for the EU to set a date for it to formally
start negotiations to join the 15-member bloc since parliament earlier
this month adopted a series of human rights reforms demanded by Brussels.
"We have fulfilled the required criteria and now it is the EU's
turn to acknowledge this," said Gurel, who is regarded as something
of a euroskeptic.
"Mid-way formulae that could be proposed instead of a negotiation
date will be insufficient as long as they are separated from a date
for negotiations," he said, without elaborating on the alternative
measures.
Ankara expected the EU to set a date that was "reasonable"
and "within reach," he added.
Gurel became foreign minister after the resignation last month of
Ismail Cem who joined a mass desertion by MPs from Prime Minister
Bulent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (DSP) amid a political crisis
triggered in part by a government split over the EU reforms.
The package adopted August 3 included abolishing the death penalty
in peace time, legalizing broadcasts and courses in the language of
the Kurdish minority and other measures at bringing mainly Muslim
Turkey closer to EU democracy norms.
The EU hailed the move, but made it clear that it did not guarantee
the opening of membership talks and that implementation of the reforms
would be closely watched.
Advancing Turkey's EU bid may also depend on whether a strong pro-EU
government emerges from a legislative election being held November
3, about 18 months early.
Gurel downplayed concerns that the reforms might not be fully carried
out.
"These steps are the reflection of the Turkish people's will
to become an EU member. Nobody should doubt and nobody has the right
to doubt that their implementation will be carried out accordingly,"
he said.
Gurel, who has in the past questioned whether the EU is sincere in
wanting to admit Turkey, said Brussels "sometimes put forward
irrelevant conditions that were not demanded of other candidates."
That stance suggests that "Turkey's solid will (to integrate
with the EU) does not exist on the opposite side," he added.
There are also doubts whether Ankara will be given the green light
without a resolution to the long-standing conflict on EU membership
front-runner Cyprus, which has been divided since 1974 when Turkey
invaded its northern third.
Gurel said Turkey's accession and the Cyprus question were two separate
issues and expressed hope that peace negotiations between the Greek
and Turkish Cypriot communities on the island would produce a solution.
3. - Turkish Daily News - "EU views the election with concern":
ANKARA / August 22, 2002
by Mehmet Ali Birand
For the first time since the reform package was passed Turkey has sat down for talks with the EU amid astonishment and, at the same time, suspicions regarding the implementation of these laws
Copenhagen
With Mesut Yilmaz I went to the meeting held with European Union term president Rasmussen. Holding the EU term presidency is very important. If they want to accelerate a given process they can facilitate the task. If they want to, they can push it uphill.
Rasmussen visited Ankara last April. At that time I had a long talk with him. He had told me, "Turkey will get a date if it fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria." This time too we had a talk and is reaction was one of, "Turkey is now closer to Europe than it had been in April."
Currently, Europe is on a vacation. It would not be able to gather itself together fully by mid-September. Therefore it is hard to take the EU's pulse fully. However, Denmark, the term president, was an important stopover in that it provided the "first impression".
Here too I sensed that they were astonished just as the other EU officials I had talked to had been. Prime Minister Rasmussen clearly said, "I am surprised."
He explained the reason for that in the following manner:
"I too am a politician and I know it. No one would be willing to vote on so important, so sensitive issues especially after taking an early election decision. They would prefer to leave these to the post-election period. The fact that the adaptation to the EU bills were passed in such a climate and with such a big margin indicates the existence of a political will in Turkey. I was surprised in this regard."
According to the Danish prime minister Turkey is now closer to the EU. However, not everything has been completed yet. Now that the hardest part of the Copenhagen criteria has been passed the rest will have to be passed and, more importantly, there is the problem of having the reform package implemented.
EU apprehensive about the implementation
In recent years Turkey has deceived or misled Europe so much that
a significant confidence problem is being experienced.
The way Turkey has kept signing agreements and then failing to implement them has made them too wary. It is common knowledge that the laws get amended not with "how the Turkish bureaucracy would implement these" kind of mentality but with "how the Turkish bureaucracy would not implement these" in mind. This is why the EU has, by now, become extremely sensitized on the "implementation" issue.
The word "implementation" that Rasmussen has on his mind does not pertain only to the next few months.
On the contrary, this pertains to the aftermath of the election. As he was talking to me he gave the first clue to this effect:
"There would be no problem if the Nov. 3 election led to a government consisting of those who support the rapprochement with the EU. An anti-EU government, on the other hand, would increase the pressure coming from those in Europe who view Turkey with suspicion. There may be serious obstacles to the setting of a date."
Though he did not openly say so, the Danish prime minister was referring to a potential Justice and Development Party (AKP) - Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) coalition. A coalition that includes the MHP, especially, would make it harder for Turkey to obtain a date from the Dec. 12 Copenhagen summit.
This issue has been put forth for the first time. In the next few months we will hear more on this issue.
The MHP is the party that upsets the EU most. It is believed that if it takes part in the government it will not permit implementation of any of the adaptation bills.
Though the AKP is pro-EU, it too creates a certain uneasiness in the capital cities of the EU countries due to the warnings originating from Washington.
At this stage we can say that the EU capitals are gradually starting to learn what the Turkish reform package means, and that they will start shaping their stance in September-October, and that November-December will be the most critical period.
The coming months will be vitally important from the standpoint of Turkey's relations with the EU. The Dec. 12 Copenhagen summit must decide to start the accession talks with Turkey by the end of 2004, that is, before the number of EU members goes up to 27 from the current 15. The path to achieve that is to persuade the 15s.
It would be a pity if we missed this chance.
4. - Associated Press - "Turkey's president seeks to annul part of EU-oriented reform package":
ANKARA / August 21, 2002
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer on Wednesday asked Turkey's top court to annul part of a set of reforms aimed at improving Turkey's chances of joining the European Union .
Sezer last week signed into law the reform package, which granted greater rights to Kurds and abolished the death penalty. But on Wednesday Sezer said articles in the package converting prison sentences for those convicted of breaching the country's tight press laws to monetary fines, were unconstitutional.
In a statement, Sezer said the laws were against press freedom and "the necessities of a democratic social order." He did not elaborate, but_ an advocate of democratic reforms_ Sezer apparently did not think the reforms went far enough.
The EU, which Turkey hopes to join, has criticized Turkey's human rights record and its tight control over the press.
Turkish radio and television stations have been frequently closed and individuals jailed for offending the military, questioning Turkey's treatment of Kurds or its strict secular policies.
But as part of the reform package passed by parliament earlier this month, jail sentences were converted to fines.
Turkey adopted those and other measures in hopes it would persuade the EU to start membership talks by year's end.
Other reforms outlawed capital punishment in peacetime and granted minority Kurds the right to teach and broadcast in Kurdish.
But EU officials say Turkey still needs to address other problems,
such as improving the ailing economy, curbing the influence of the
military in politics and working toward a solution of the division
of Cyprus.
5. - Turkish Daily News - "War of words between Turkey and KDP":
ANKARA / August 22, 2002
KDP: In the event of a Turkish military intervention in the region,
KDP forces will make the region a graveyard for Turkey
Cakmakoglu said on Tuesday that Turkey would not sacrifice northern
Iraq 'for the aspirations of certain people'
The tensions between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
reached a new peak Wednesday when the Kurds reacted strongly to statements
by Defense Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu that northern Iraq as well
as Kirkuk and Mousul belong to Turks.
Massoud Barzani's Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) issued a strong worded statement saying that in the event of a Turkish Army intervention in northern Iraq, "the area will become a Turkish graveyard."
The KDP statement was in response to remarks by Defense Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu on Tuesday who said that Turkey would not sacrifice "northern Iraq for the aspirations of certain people."
The statement was published in the KDP's daily, Brayati (Brotherhood). Recent press reports published in the Turkish media and statements made by Turkish officials were characterized as "provocative" and it was claimed that Turkey was trying to further its interests in the region with using a U.S. operation against Iraq as a pretext.
It was also stated in the KDP sta5tement that certain circles were trying to take control of the Mousul region and that Turkey had no rights in the area.
The KDP demanded that Turkey not interfere in northern Iraq's domestic affairs and said that the "provocative" statements being made by Ankara had no effect on them.
Preparations in Kirkuk and Mousul
The KDP statement continued: "Turkey should remember the fate
of the Ottoman Army in northern Iraq. If they insist on their words,
let us give them a chance to do this. They will see that we are ready
to sacrifice ourselves, and they will see we are ready to make this
land a graveyard for the attackers."
It was also announced in the statement that necessary military preparations have been made to defend Kirkuk, Erbil and Mousul against a military operation.
Cakmakoglu: Turkey will not sacrifice northern Iraq for the aspirations
of certain people
"Turkey considered northern Iraq to be under its direct care
and Ankara would not tolerate the region being subjugated due to the
aspirations of others," Cakmakoglu had stated on Tuesday.
Cakmakoglu had also stated that Ankara was closely watching developments in neighboring northern Iraq, which he described as being within the borders of the National Pact of 1920, and thus being left to the safekeeping of Turkey.
"The territory was forcibly separated from Turkey during the War of Liberation," Cakmakoglu said. "It is not a region we would sacrifice for the aspirations of certain people," he said, in response to a question from a journalist while on a visit to the town of Kutahya in western Turkey. Turkey would oppose "anyone who tried to exploit the situation in the region, whatever force might be behind them."
Meanwhile, Hoshyar Zebari, a member of the KDP's Politburo responsible
for foreign relations, will arrive in Ankara today for a planned visit
on his way back to Northern Iraq from Washington. Under the shadow
of this discussion, Zebari's visit to Turkey has gained more importance.
6. - Christian Science Monitor - "Think before leaping into war":
BRIDGTON, MAINE / August 22, 2002
By Henry Precht
There should be little mystery about the outcome of an American war on Iraq. History and the neighborhood teach us the necessary lessons. Let us consider two possible scenarios for an attack:
First, the fighting may be bloody on both sides and prolonged. When the US sent troops into Lebanon in 1982 against the Arab consensus, more than 200 Marines and diplomats fell victim to terrorism. The region was enraged against the US. This time, the psychological buildup in the region opposing a war with Iraq is even more intense and widespread, owing in great part to our association with Israel's repression of the second intifada. We can anticipate anti-American acts of terrorism worldwide.
When the 1991 coalition forces fought to free Kuwait, the price of oil shot up but subsided after a quick victory. Allies paid the bills. This time, a longer war will inflate oil prices and the US budget deficit and deflate the world economy. Despite the patriotic drama that will be played out under President Bush's war leadership, his political future will be dimmed by the distress of many families.
Let us assume a second, rosier scenario that goes according to the Pentagon's plans: Fighting is short and free of serious casualties, Saddam Hussein disappears and is replaced by a congenial coalition of our choosing, Iraqis welcome American troops as the Afghans did and only a relatively few troops remain to ensure order. In a few months, the appointed Iraqi leaders hold free elections and a new coalition takes power.
What kinds of policies will the new regime be expected to pursue? Will they serve the interests of American liberators? How will they affect the region?
First, the fresh faces in Baghdad will want to begin the work of reconstruction. That will mean maximizing income from oil production. Decent relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran will be important; all OPEC will share Iraq's interest in keeping oil prices high.
Second, the new regime will have to establish nationalist credentials. There will be little tolerance for breakaway Kurds or Shiites. (If, somehow, Kurdish autonomy is confirmed by the newcomers, won't Turkey's Kurds see an attractive model and Ankara, a threatening one?) Will the new regime yield Iraq's historic claim to Kuwait? Not if it wishes to remain consistent with historic Iraqi nationalism. Further, for Mr. Hussein's first successors, rebuilding conventional military and internal security forces will be a priority. Before long, a truly national regime will have to oppose the presence of foreign troops on Iraqi soil.
Third, democratically chosen rulers will naturally conform to the Arab consensus on the Arab-Israel conflict, an attitude bound to estrange them from Washington and bring Baghdad closer to Tehran, Damascus, and Cairo.
Fourth, if democracy is seen to work in Iraq, most Arabs will ask, why not in our land as well? The internal pressures on Washington's dependent friends in Amman, Cairo, and Riyadh will mount to open up their prisons and voting booths. Washington won't relish the prospect of Islamic radicals taking power in those capitals.
Fifth, with Iraq liberated, the Bush administration's Middle East agenda will be obliged to focus on an Israel-Palestine solution. That will mean either applying unaccustomed pressure on Prime Minister Sharon or continuing the close support of his policies, abhorred by Arabs. Either way, Washington will have a crisis in its relations with the region.
What is the alternative to these two depressing scenarios? Not an easy one, for it will mean climbing down from the rhetorical heights scaled by Mr. Bush and his war party. Indirect and multilateral diplomacy must be given an honest chance to work. The UN, the Europeans, and the regional Arab states are eager to weigh in with Baghdad to find ways to resume and guarantee truly effective weapons inspections. Baghdad just might be persuaded – given the prospect of yet another devastating defeat.
Bush should also be persuaded – by the danger that either a bloody or rosy regime-change scenario in Iraq could lead to regime change in this country.
• Henry Precht is a retired Foreign Service officer with experience
in the Middle East since 1964.