1. "PKK is sincere in its changes’, an interview with Belgian Parliamentarian, Jan Beghin.

2. "Iran denies presence of senior Kurdish rebel commander on its soil", the interior ministry here denied Sunday Turkish media reports over the presence in Iran of a senior field commander of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Cemil Bayik, the official IRNA news agaency reported.

3. "Turkey: Middle East Crisis Puts Great Strain On Turkish Leadership", Israel's security crackdown on Palestinian territories is forcing Turkey into a delicate situation. Ankara has strongly criticized Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's action while at the same time rejecting the possibility of severing military ties with Jerusalem. Analysts believe that, despite the strain put on Ankara by the current crisis, relations with Israel is likely to remain a priority for Turkish policymakers.

4. "Turkey Faces the EU", the publication in February of confidential e-mails from the European Commission's envoy to Ankara Karen Fogg has fuelled debate in Turkey on its relations and aspirations with the European Union. Turkish prosecutors on March 11th sought jail sentences of up to three years for the publishers, but by then the discussion over the EU's role in Turkish affairs was threatening to destabilise the government.

5. "Turkey: Economy spells trouble for Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan", new economic figures from Turkey are raising some old questions about energy planning that could soon cut into gas exports from Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan.

6. "An Adventure in Turkey and Northern Kurdistan: Diyarbakir - Welcome to Martial Law", a visit to Diyabakir a few days before Newroz

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1. - Yedinci Gündem - "PKK is sincere in its changes’:

an interview with Belgian Parliamentarian, Jan Beghin / 30 March /

translated by Kurdish Media

Belgian Parliamentarian Jan Beghin, who visited Southern Kurdistan and met with Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masud Barzani, and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Leadership Council Member Osman Ocalan, observed the ‘Newroz’ (Kurdish New Year) holiday in Diyarbakir.I spoke with Beghin, who had met the Kurdish party leaders together with Ferdy Willems and Vincent Van Quicken borne, regarding the goals and the results of their visit to Southern Kurdistan, as well as regarding the EU’s [European Union’s] views of both Turkey and the Kurdish issue.

Q: You went to Southern Kurdistan and met with the Kurdish organizations. When the visit hit the press, there was a minor crisis experienced between Turkey and Belgium. Was this an official visit? What was the goal of our trip?

A: The actual purpose of our trip was to visit the Kurdish organizations. We were a delegation composed of three Parliament members and various journalists. As parliamentarians, we can go and have meetings wherever we like. But it would not be correct to call this an official visit. Our purpose was to see personally what is happening. The reason for my being here in Diyarbakir is the same. In other words, to see the problems and the situation on the spot.

With whom did you meet in the framework of your visit?

We spoke with Masud Barzani, Jalal Talabani, and Osman Ocalan. We also had discussions with other organizations there.

Did you go to the PKK camps in order to meet with Osman Ocalan? Or was the meeting somewhere else?

It was not all that easy to reach Osman Ocalan. And it was rather dangerous getting there, at times in a jeep and at times in a car. We had to walk for an hour. This was also difficult. We got there at about 4:00 in the afternoon. And it was difficult to find the place where he was. He was very well protected by the natural environment and was able to hide. Watchmen took us to Osman Ocalan. Until that moment, we weren’t certain that we would be speaking with him.

How did you explain to Osman Ocalan your purpose in going there?

We explained to them as well our reasons for being there, and then we asked whether or not they were going to wage war henceforth. The response that we received was that they are not going to use weapons any more, and that they are open to dialogue. They explained that, throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, the Kurds have revolted 28 times,, and that these revolts have not brought the Kurds a solution, and so henceforth they are going to seek a solution without fighting.

What sort of impression did you get from your meeting with Osman Ocalan? Do you support the PKK’s policy?

This visit does not mean that I support the PKK in every respect, or that I agree with everything they say. In my talk with Osman Ocalan, he said this to me very clearly: “Henceforth, the PKK will absolutely not initiate an armed struggle. And it will seek to develop a solution through the path of dialogue.”
The most important message that he gave to us was to the effect that, from now on, there will be no wars.
The point that has been reached after such a long period of war and struggle is quite important from the standpoint of the Kurds. In Turkey as well, circles that represent the Kurds, such as HADEP [People’s Democracy Party], are also speaking of a democratic solution, and they are saying that the method of dialogue must be taken as the basis. A federal system such as exists in Belgium or in Germany is possible. At this point, we see that it is not the Kurds, but rather the Turkish government that is not prepared for dialogue.

Did you also meet with the guerrillas? Was there any difference between the PKK that you had conceived of and the PKK that you actually saw?

It is rather difficult for me to say anything on this topic. One cannot say that I saw the PKK in all its different aspects. The PKK has also made many errors, and both sides have had great losses and experienced much sufferingin the war. I am not at this point discussing whether or not the PKK is terrorist. Even so, these things are at this point in the past. Now we must look at ways to resolution. I am not saying that we should forget about all that has happened in the past. Certainly, let us learn from the mistakes made in the past, and let us not take them out of our minds. But it is now finally time for a solution. What is important is what happens from here on.

Well, then, have you been convinced that the PKK wants dialogue in a strategic sense?

Yes, but in my view, if there is going to be a dialogue, the PKK will not be able to be one of the sides in this. Political parties can be sides in the dialogue, and in my view HADEP, being a political party, could be one side in the dialogue.

You said that you also met with Talabani and Barzani. What was the impression that you got from these discussions?

The officials of both the PUK and the KDP said that they were prepared to seek solutions to problems within a democratic framework. There was no mention of an independent state in what they had to say, and they were calling for a democratic solution within the borders of the states within which they are now, that is, within the borders of Turkey and Iraq. The PUK officials, in particular, stated that they saw the solution in Iraq as being within a federal state. Despite the reality of Saddam, they said that they were prepared for a solution with Iraq. The basis of the problem in Iraq is, similarly, the lack of a democratic regime. They say that the solution will not come about through an uprising or a revolt, and that interventions from abroad will also not bring a solution.

The PKK has not been included in the European Union’s “terrorist” list. How does Europe evaluate the PKK?

The initiatives of the Belgian and Dutch foreign ministers were influential in the fact that the PKK is not included on this list. In not including the PKK in its listing of terrorist organizations, Europe said the following: The things experienced in Turkey, the loss of so many lives and the other problems, cannot be ascribed only to the PKK. And the purpose in this was to try to express that “There are so many who have died, there are so many losses, and this cannot all be blamed on one movement.” There was another side to all this and this was the Turkish military. This was what, symbolically, this showed.

How do you evaluate the debates over the EU in Turkey?

The debates in Turkey are still continuing. On the one hand, there is the approach that says “Let Turkey be accepted as an EU member, and then changes will come.” On the other hand, it is being stated that Turkey must accept these changes prior to becoming an EU member, must implement the Copenhagen Criteria, and must make an opening on the Kurdish question. I have been following via the press certain positive changes in Turkey, but we are sceptical regarding the reality and the sincerity of these. Before becoming a member, Turkey has to make fundamental changes.

Is the EU policy in Brussels the official policy of the EU? Or do Germany, Belgium, and France all have separate policies?

In general, the states in Europe are not concerning themselves with the problems of the Kurds in Turkey; the Kurdish issue is not the focal point of their attentions. These countries have a Middle East policy that is more directed towards their own interests. And certainly one must also speak of pressure from the United States. It is largely in these countries that we have to overcome the Kurdish problem and explain it to people.
Turkey has great strategic importance in the Middle East, and is also a very strategic partner of the United States. In a sense, it has gotten its strength from there. The EU has to have its own policy, and must not just tag along behind the United States. There are a number of things that Europe has called for from Turkey in the process of accession to the EU; these are both economic and political demands. In my view, the most important ones among these are those which involve human rights. The most important of the Copenhagen Criteria are those items that will provide for democratization in Turkey. These are my own personal views. We have to struggle in terms of this stance both within the EP [European Parliament] and within our own national parliaments. Democracy and peace are at the basis of the EU, and they are among of the reasons for the establishment of the EU. For the EU, against this tradition, to close its eyes to Turkey’s anti-democratic behaviour and its violations of human rights is totally incomprehensible. But on this topic, I accept that it will be in fact quite difficult to convince the governments of Europe.

You came to Diyarbakir for Newroz. Deputy Prime Minister said a while ago that “The road to the EU passes through Diyarbakir.” Do you believe that this is so?

Yes; in my view, this is the only road. Democracy means the recognition of the Kurds’ cultural and other rights. And it cannot be expected that a regime that is not democratic can become a member of the EU. This is the only way.

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2. - AFP - "Iran denies presence of senior Kurdish rebel commander in its soil":

TEHRAN / April 7

The interior ministry here denied Sunday Turkish media reports over the presence in Iran of a senior field commander of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Cemil Bayik, the official IRNA news agaency reported.

"Turkish Media reports on the presence of Cemil Bayik are unfounded and untrue and we have asked the Turkish government to submit related documents if they have any", Jahanbakhsh Khanjani, interior ministry spokesman said.
Turkish officials said Wednesday they had "official information" that Bayik, one of the closest aides of condemned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, was on Iranian territory and asked Iran to extradite him.

"Based on this information, we have made a formal request that the person in question is arrested and extradited to Turkey," Turkey's ambassador in Tehran, Selahattin Alpar, told Anatolia news agency last week. Alpar said he had no information on whether Iranian authorities had already detained Bayik, who, according to Turkish media reports, was in the city of Ouroumieh near the Turkish-Iranian border.

Bayik, a senior member of the PKK leadership council, was tipped as one of the possible successors of Ocalan when Turkey captured the latter in February 1999 and sentenced him to death for treason several month later. But the PKK subsequently decided to keep Ocalan, the sole inmate in the prison island of Imrali, as their chairman. Bayik was also reported to be opposing a peace bid by Ocalan, under which the PKK declared in September 1999 that it was laying down its arms and withdrawing from Turkish territory.

He was based in northern Iraq, but was frequently crossing to Iran, a country that Ankara has accused of sheltering Kurdish rebels, according to media reports. Alpar also said that relations with Iran had recently recorded a significant progress, particularly on cooperation against the PKK.

Iran's ambassador to Turkey, Mohammed-Hossein Lavasani, told Iranian radio two weeks ago that Iran and Turkey had agreed to recognize the PKK and Iran's main armed opposition, the People's Mujahedin, as "terrorists."

"The decision to consider as terrorists the MKO (Mujahedin) and the PKK was taken during a recent meeting and will enable the development of relations of trust between Tehran and Ankara," Lavasani said.

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3. - Radio Free Europe - "Turkey: Middle East Crisis Puts Great Strain On Turkish Leadership":

PRAGUE / 5 April 2002 / By Jean-Christophe Peuch

Israel's security crackdown on Palestinian territories is forcing Turkey into a delicate situation. Ankara has strongly criticized Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's action while at the same time rejecting the possibility of severing military ties with Jerusalem. Analysts believe that, despite the strain put on Ankara by the current crisis, relations with Israel is likely to remain a priority for Turkish policymakers.

Prague, 5 April 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Torn between its friendly ties with Israel and its stated willingness to improve relations with neighboring Iran and Arab countries, and compelled to compromise between its security and domestic agendas, the Turkish government is looking at the dramatic developments in the Middle East with increasing uneasiness.

On the one hand, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's coalition cabinet has significantly toughened its stance toward Israel over the past few days, up to the point of suggesting that it may revise some aspects of its relations with Jerusalem in the future. But, on the other hand, it has so far resisted demands made by Islamic opposition parties to cut off military ties with Israel. Ankara's delicate position has prompted regional experts to liken the Turkish cabinet to a tightrope walker.

A strongly worded statement released earlier this week (1 April) by the office of Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem lambasted Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, describing his action against Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and his people as a "violation of human rights."

Stressing that Arafat is "the president of a state Turkey officially recognizes," Cem said, "No one has the right to act with such disrespect toward a head of state and the nation he represents."

Raising the protest even further, Prime Minister Ecevit yesterday accused Israel of carrying out "genocide" against the Palestinians and blamed Sharon for what he called "step-by-step" destruction of the Palestinian lands.

He subsequently sought to downplay the charge, saying in a statement released today his accusations of genocide "simply reflected Turkey's growing anxiety over violence in the Middle East."

Yet, despite such forthright criticism of Israel and apparent support for the Palestinian cause, Ankara does not seem to have a clear-cut policy regarding the current Mideast situation.

Dov Waxman is a Middle East analyst at the Washington, D.C.-based School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University. He told RFE/RL that Turkey's leaders are caught between two fires, and thus are sometimes driven into making conflicting remarks.

"The Turkish public opinion is obviously very supportive of the Palestinians in this conflict and, therefore, is uncomfortable with open relations with Israel. But at the same time, the Turkish military, particularly, are probably the keenest supporters of maintaining those relations [with Israel], and no Turkish government is really in a position to contradict their wishes."

Thousands of left-wing militants, unionists, students, and rights activists have taken to the streets of Istanbul and Ankara this week to denounce Sharon's assault on the West Bank and protest military ties between Turkey and Jerusalem.

In parliament, opposition deputies have demanded that Ankara cancel a controversial defense industry project signed last month between the two countries.

Under the $668 million contract, Israel's defense contractor Israel Military Industries (IMI) is to modernize 170 Turkish M-60 tanks. Part of a major renovation project that aims to overhaul some 900 aging tanks, the deal has been strongly criticized for its lack of openness, with opponents alleging that the Turkish government selected IMI without calling a tender.

Both Ecevit and Defense Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu have dismissed calls to cancel or freeze the deal, saying it was "too late" to consider such an option. Yet, Turkish leaders have taken steps apparently aimed at appeasing domestic opposition.

Earlier this week (2 April), Ecevit hinted that Ankara might "review its [defense] ties with Israel in the future." The next day, both the Defense and Foreign ministries denied Turkey had plans to hold military exercises with Israel.

Turkish media had earlier reported Israel was scheduled to join Turkey and the United States for joint air forces maneuvers in southern Anatolia later this month (22 April). These reports prompted Temel, a deputy from the moderate Islamic Felicity (Saadet) Party, to press for the exercise to be canceled, lest Israeli pilots "who dropped bombs on the Palestinians" reach Turkey's soil.

It is unclear whether Israel in fact ever intended to participate in the military exercises, as Cakmakoglu claims, or whether its role was cancelled to avoid further embarrassment.

Since 1996, Israel and NATO member Turkey have been linked by a number of defense agreements and have held several joint military exercises, most often with the participation of U.S. forces. Israel defense firms have already modernized dozens of Turkey's fighter jets and are considering supplying Ankara with a wide range of high-tech weapons.

Despite Ankara's criticism of Sharon's policy, analysts generally see ties with Israel as remaining a priority for Ecevit's cabinet, especially if one considers the influence exerted by the military on Turkey's decision-making process.

Waxman believes that neither Ecevit nor any other Turkish politician has enough power to challenge the strategic partnership with Israel initiated by the General Staff in the 1990s.

"[Politicians] are not really the ones who basically decide what Turkey's policy should be on this. It is basically, primarily, in the hands of the military, who are the ones who really decide Turkish policy towards Israel, and no Turkish politician is in any position to change that policy. Just look at when [Islamic Prime Minister Necmettin] Erbakan was in power in 1996. He [had] made numerous statements [saying] that he wanted to cut off Turkey's relations with Israel. But, once in power, he was forced to sign a number of agreements with Israel. That just points to the limited power that any Turkish politician has on that issue."

Unlike Israel, Turkey does not generally see Arab countries as an immediate threat to its security. But Turkish leaders nonetheless remain wary of the Arab world -- with the noticeable exception of Palestinians, for whom Waxman says they feel "some kind of historical responsibility," rooted in the former ties that existed between Palestine and the Ottoman Empire up until 1918.

Since the founding of Israel in 1948, Ankara has maintained a delicate balance in its relationship with both Jerusalem and Arab capitals, sometimes successfully using one against another.

Throughout the 1950s, Turkey developed a discreet, though important, relationship with Israel to counter Egypt, which both countries then considered as an enemy.

During the following two decades or so, secular Turkey cultivated its relations with the Arab world, joining the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1969 in a bid to gain international support on its dispute with Greece over Cyprus and eventually downgrading its diplomatic ties with Israel.

In the early 1990s, Turkey was the first country in the Middle East to join the U.S.-led coalition to drive Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's troops out of Kuwait. Since the end of the Gulf War -- which Turkey claims cost its economy billions of dollars in lost revenues -- Ankara has been moving steadily to restore ties with Iraq and other Arab countries, while reinvigorating its relationship with Israel at the same time.

Over the last decade, Turkey used its relationship with Israel as leverage to force then-Syrian President Hafez al-Assad to expel Kurdish separatist leader Abdullah Ocalan out of Damascus.

Ankara also benefited from its ties with the Israeli lobby in the U.S. Congress to boost its own relations with Washington. Bulent Aliriza is the Turkish Project Director at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He told our correspondent that these latest results could not have been achieved without propitious conditions in the Middle East. But he believes further violence in the West Bank and the growing prospect of Ankara's participating in possible U.S. military action against Iraq will make it increasingly difficult for Turkish leaders to uphold their current policy.

"Throughout [the last decade], Israel was committed to the Oslo process and there was no significant diplomatic cost to Turkey's relationship with Israel. Now, with the Oslo process in tatters, with a conflict between Israel and Palestine and with tensions from the entire Arab world, there are diplomatic costs to this relationship. So what Turkey needs to do is to balance that relationship -- the pluses of [its] relationship with Israel against the minuses."

Waxman of SAIS believes the ongoing crisis in the Middle East is unlikely to fundamentally affect Turkish-Israeli relations. At most, he says, "it is going to drive them underground and encourage Turkish policy makers to be more discreet in cultivating these relations."

Aliriza doubts that Turkey's leaders -- who are battling the country's worst economic crisis since World War II and depend almost exclusively on international assistance channeled through the International Monetary Fund -- have any alternative to replace their relationship with Israel. In his opinion, the only option left to Turkey is to convince the U.S. to reactivate the Middle East peace process.

"The government is in a quandary. Its best hope is that the U.S. government re-engages even more vigorously in the conflict and, somehow, the conflict begins to de-escalate. If Turkey is seen to have used its relationship with Washington to bring [the U.S.] into greater activity, that would be portrayed by the government as a success. But that's a very optimistic scenario. If that does not happen, then the government -- and certainly the military that does not want to disengage from Israel in any way -- is going to come under increasing pressure."

Addressing an emergency parliamentary session called to debate the situation in the Middle East, Foreign Minister Cem on 2 April urged Washington "to use its influence to help bring an end to occupation and terror and implement a peaceful settlement [of the conflict.]" He also suggested that an international conference be organized to try to bring Israelis and Palestinians back to the negotiating table.

Aliriza says there is little Turkey can do beyond such attempts, adding, "I'd hate to be in Ecevit's shoes."

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4. - Oxford Bussines Group - "Turkey Faces the EU":

April 8

The publication in February of confidential e-mails from the European Commission's envoy to Ankara Karen Fogg has fuelled debate in Turkey on its relations and aspirations with the European Union. Turkish prosecutors on March 11th sought jail sentences of up to three years for the publishers, but by then the discussion over the EU's role in Turkish affairs was threatening to destabilise the government. On March 7th the Secretary General of the National Security Committee General Tuncer Kilinc suggested that Turkey look to Russia or Iran as regional allies. The following day Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit reiterated Turkey's commitment to joining the EU, saying it was Ankara's only option. All the while the government has been trying to push through legislation to bring the country closer to the EU by a March 19th deadline, and has been looking for its support in Turkey's imminent role in Afghanistan.

Although Ms Fogg's e-mails were published by the left-wing magazine Aydinlik in apparent collusion with the leader of Turkey's Workers Party Dogu Perincek in early February the events have left their mark. Perincek called Fogg a spy and claimed that she was supporting Kurdish publications and rights, and along with a number of other Turkish political figures called for her withdrawal back to Brussels. The publication said that the e-mails indicated an EU plot to break up Turkey. Government officials expressed their regret that this could happen but the debate over Turkey's role in Europe has come to the forefront.

Turkish prosecutors have called for harsh punishments for the owner of the weekly publication Aydinlik, Emcet Olcaytu, and Perincek. They have demanded prison sentences of up to three years for each of them in addition to the relatively modest fines they would receive. The prosecutors are annoyed at the embarrassment the incident has caused Turkey and that the magazine published a second group of e-mails after being reprimanded for the first lot.

Turkey has been ruled out of admission to the EU in 2004, when a number of other smaller ex-communist states will be allowed in, as Brussels claims that Ankara has not done enough to rectify its human rights record, implemented decisions to allow broadcasting in languages other than Turkish and abolished capital punishment. Many Turks are convinced that the EU is moving the goalposts, should not interfere in Turkish internal affairs, is not helping Turkey to combat terrorism by outlawing its terrorist groups- such as the PKK- and has undermined the whole admission system by saying that it will admit Cyprus even without a comprehensive agreement.

Aside from initially condemning the e-mail hacking incident and claiming that the source was not in the state's apparatus, the government had been quiet on the row between Turkish liberals and nationalists. The military was drawn into the debate on March 7th by General Kilinc who claimed that the EU had never helped Turkey in its efforts to joint the club and did not have Turkey's interests at heart. He suggested that rather than worry about EU membership Turkey's allies- besides the US- should be Iran and Russia. This was largely read as the official military viewpoint- although Kilinc said he was only speaking for himself- and despite the obvious difficulties of Ankara allying itself with an Islamist regime and Moscow, with whom it has had disputes covering Chechen and Kurdish rebels respectively.

Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit intervened on March 8th and sought to calm European concerns by saying that Turkey's future was in Europe despite occasional obstacles and misunderstandings between the EU and Ankara. The Foreign Minister Ismail Cem has also condemned impressions that the EU was the "enemy" saying that Turks had been considering the "subject of the EU in the most incorrect way".

The government meanwhile has to fulfil its short-term pledges to the EU of legislating on reforms by March 19th, although some could be postponed to a later date- one or two years from now- in a medium-term package. The amendment to abolish the death penalty falls into the category, but one of the junior coalition partners, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), has called for delays on other amendments. These include issues such as use of the Kurdish language and restricting Gendarmerie forces in rural areas.

The MHP's caution in adopting what it sees as EU-imposed reforms is reflected in its concerns about Turkey joining the EU, although it claims it is committed to the idea. At the other end of the coalition spectrum the Motherland Party (ANAP) is very much in favour of implementing reforms and has accused the MHP of spoiling the national programme for EU admission. The MHP leader Devlet Bahceli retorted by criticising the ANAP for blindly following EU requests, but reports on March 15th indicated that a compromise had been found. The draft bill was sent to parliament for approval on March 16th.The main sticking points had been the abolition of the death penalty and the possible use of Kurdish in broadcasting and education, but these will now be brought to Turkey's legislature at a later date. The agreement comes just before the EU summit in Barcelona starting on March 15th, which Ecevit and some ministers attended, but reports indicate that by the time of the March 19th deadline Ankara had only completed just over half of the reforms the EU requires, and those were mainly concerned with economic issues.

Aside from practical help from the EU in reforming his country's laws Ecevit has also sought their support in clearing the problems of Turkey's up-coming leadership of the ISAF in Afghanistan. Turkey already has around 260 troops in Kabul and is due to take over the leadership of the military operations by the end of April when the British mandate will expire. However, Ankara had voiced concern at the cost of increasing its force by around 1000 men, at an estimated cost of $60m, at a time when the country is still trying to recover from last year's economic crisis. After talks in Ankara between the US, Britain and Turkey it appears that Washington will provide some financial assistance and will encourage other countries to do so as well, clearing the way for Ankara to take over command. The Us secretary of State Dick Cheney said on March 19th that Washington would give Turkey $228m to cover military expenses, also taking into account action against Iraq.

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5. - Eurasianet - "Turkey: Economy spells trouble for Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan":

By Michael Lelyveld / 6 April

New economic figures from Turkey are raising some old questions about energy planning that could soon cut into gas exports from Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan.

On Sunday, Turkey's State Institute of Statistics announced that the country's gross domestic product fell 7.4 percent last year, while its gross national product, which includes foreign income, plunged 9.4 percent.

The numbers were far lower than the forecasts of the International Monetary Fund, which has consistently overstated the pace of Turkey's recovery from an economic crisis that started 13 months ago.

Last October, the IMF forecast that Turkey's GDP would drop 4.3 percent. In December, it raised the figure to 6.1 percent. But Turkey's long-delayed official results suggest that the economic decline kept accelerating toward the end of the year. Reuters reported that GDP in the fourth quarter fell 10.4 percent from the year-earlier period.

Most recently in February, the IMF estimated that Turkey's GNP would grow 3 percent this year, a goal that may be hard to achieve. The fund has committed $31 billion in loans to Turkey since December 1999. Impatience is growing, not only with the slow progress but with the forecasts.

In an angry editorial Tuesday, the Turkish Daily News slammed a group of economists who were surveyed last week and predicted slightly better numbers than those announced on Sunday.

The paper said, "The same people, who could not predict anything and drew rosy pictures, today, are once again spearheading a campaign saying we are out of the crisis and well on our way to recovery. Absolute rubbish!" The editorial added, "but this is Turkey. You can always twist and bend figures, toy around with regulations and declare a positive growth."

Turkey has also invested heavily in its own energy forecasts, which call for stellar growth despite steep economic downturns in two of the past three years.

In January, Energy Minister Zeki Cakan predicted an 8 percent rise in energy demand this year, far more than the most optimistic growth rate for the economy as a whole. Cakan said the demand could not be met without rapid moves to increase competition in the power sector, leaving some doubt about whether the figures were real or meant only to accelerate reforms.

Suspicions about Turkey's gas projections have troubled analysts for years. Despite recent cuts in the forecasts, the Turkish state pipeline company Botas still says that gas demand will climb 25 percent this year to 20,000 million cubic meters and more than double again by 2005.

The accuracy is hard to judge because of years of lagging electrification and bureaucratic delays. But past predictions have already proved wildly high, prompting further questions about whether forecasting has been seen as a way to promise economic growth.

In recent years, other countries have also invested in the Turkish growth forecasts by committing billions of dollars for gas pipelines to serve a fast-growing market that has yet to appear. Russia already pipes gas to Turkey by two routes and is due to open a third with the Blue Stream project across the Black Sea this year. Iran opened a pipeline in January, and Azerbaijan is planning a Caspian line by 2005.

While Ankara insists it will not face a glut, it is working on underground storage, and last month it signed a protocol with Greece to build a 285-kilometer pipeline linking the two Mediterranean rivals to ease the pressure of oversupply.

But there are already signs that the same political pressures are being applied to the pipeline and energy forecasts in Greece. According to the Turkish Daily News, the $300-million pipeline will initially carry 500 million cubic meters of gas annually when it is built in about two years.

Botas figures indicate that Turkey will have 5,000 million cubic meters in oversupply this year, or 10 times as much as the pipeline would carry, although it insists that demand will wipe out the surplus by 2003. Analysts have been skeptical.

According to IBS Research & Consultancy in Turkey, the plans for a 36-inch pipeline date back to a meeting in 2000, when Greece's gas demand was forecast to reach 7,500 million cubic meters this year. But figures this month from the Paris-based International Energy Agency indicate that Greece's gas consumption was only 2,000 million meters in 2001, up just 1.1 percent from the previous year.

Earlier this month, Georgios Agrafiotis, the head of Greece's Development Ministry, said that Russian President Vladimir Putin had promised to double the capacity of the Russian pipeline connection to Greece from 3,000 million cubic meters to 6,000 million annually. Russia already supplies nearly all of Greece's gas, but it appears to be in a race with Iran which hopes to use the Turkish link as an opening to Europe.

Despite the talk of growth, Greece negotiated a decrease in its take-or-pay contract with Russia's Gazprom in 2001 after it fell short of its forecast demand. Ultimately, Greece hopes to build yet another pipeline to Italy, a major gas user which consumed 70 billion cubic meters in 2001.

But it seems that both Turkey and Greece are trying to pass on not only the gas from the east, but also the effects of bad forecasting. Suppliers may have to decide when enough gas is too much.

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6. - Kurdish Media - "An Adventure in Turkey and Northern Kurdistan: Diyarbakir - Welcome to Martial Law":

I exited the plane at set foot on Kurdistan’s soil for the first time in my life. After being involved in pro-Kurdish activism for years, I had finally arrived in Kurdistan and I was extremely excited. A few days before Newroz, the Kurdish New Year celebration, I was fortunate enough to be in Diyarbakir, the largest Kurdish city in the world. My excitement lasted for about two minutes, as I was soon approached by plainclothes policemen, called “civil police” by the locals, many of whom are perhaps unaware of the irony of this label. The plainclothes policemen walked around the area holding a list bearing the name of every passenger scheduled to arrive in Diyarbakir at that time. They systematically questioned each person who had left the plane, asking them why they had come to Diyarbakir.

As Diyarbakir is not exactly a popular tourist destination, I was the only foreigner on the plane. Two confrontational policemen approached me and began speaking in Turkish. They asked me my nationality, and then proceeded to ask a few other questions that I did not understand. A few minutes later the men who were scheduled to pick me up at the airport arrived. They approached the police and said a few things in Turkish, and I was finally free to go. As I entered their car, I thought to myself, “Welcome to martial law.” Indeed, Diyarbakir is one of the four provinces (along with ?irnak, Hakkari, and Tunceli) still under “Emergency Rule” (OHAL – Ola?anüstü Hal) by the Turkish government. “Emergency Rule” is simply a nice way of saying martial law, as I soon saw with my own eyes.

As I entered the car to be driven to my hotel, the two drivers began speaking in Kurdish. While my heart rate was still a little elevated from my encounter with the belligerent policemen, I was happy to hear Kurdish being spoken. I soon discovered that Kurdish is only spoken in private in Diyarbakir, because one can be harassed on arrested for doing so publicly. I can only assume that these two men were speaking Kurdish to each other because they did not know I could distinguish it from Turkish. I quietly sat in the back seat and gazed at historic Diyarbakir after dark.
After arriving at my hotel, unpacking, and getting things organized, I called an activist who was to meet me in Diyarbakir. The two of us had a conversation in the hotel lobby, speaking very carefully, using a lot of hinting and innuendos so as not to get ourselves, or anyone else, in any sort of trouble. All the time there were was one man who was smoking cigarettes, intently staring at us, and making a great effort to listen to every word we were saying. My activist friend said to me, “Let’s go for a walk and find some place we can speak easier,” and I agreed. We set out for a nighttime walk around Diyarbakir and discussed life and politics, all the while looking over our shoulders to make sure that there were no soldiers or police listening in on us.

The first time one walks around Diyarbakir, they cannot help but notice that something is wrong. This is not a normal city, it is a city under military occupation—a city held hostage. There are soldiers and policemen everywhere, and the line between soldier and policeman is very thin, for both carry assault rifles. There are also undercover policemen everywhere. There are military bases set up throughout the city, and outside of each of these ubiquitous buildings are men in fatigues with assault rifles, frequently standing behind concrete shields. Of course, there also decorative busts of Atatürk! The perimeter of these buildings is marked by concrete barriers topped with fencing and razor wire. Signs dot the perimeter labeling the area a military zone. It is not unusual to see military trucks driving through the streets, nor is it out of the ordinary to see armored personnel carriers parked on the side of the road. The civilian citizenry of Diyarbakir is almost 100% Kurdish, but one will only hear Turkish spoken in the street. One young man explained to me that if you asked a soldier a question in Kurdish, he might reply by saying, “Come with me…”

Everybody in Diyarbakir must speak Turkish in public. When I sat down to dinner with a Kurd from Diyarbakir and said I few words in Kurdish, I received stares from those around me. A few days later I was having dinner with another Kurdish citizen at one of the nicest hotels in the city. Like the overwhelming majority of high-end restaurants throughout the city, this particular one featured a live singer. She sang a few Turkish-language songs and walked around to receive requests. As is custom, I wrote a request on a napkin and handed it to her. My request was a Kurdish song. She politely read my request and then explained in Turkish that she was from western Turkey and did not know Kurdish, but said she would sing me a Turkish song instead. As soon as she mentioned Kurdish language, a group of businessmen who had been having more than a few drinks at a nearby table glared at me. I think that they were ethnic Turks who were offended by my request, but I do not know for sure because I didn’t bother to have a conversation with them. Instead, I ordered a glass of raki (a Turkish alcoholic beverage flavored with anise seed), ate some more pistachios, and enjoyed the music.

Diyarbakir is a beautiful city. The ancient city walls still stand, although now, in some places, they feature portraits of Atatürk. There are many mosques throughout the city, each with their own unique charm. Even more ubiquitous than the mosques are the pastry shops (pastaneler), which are as delicious as they are inexpensive. I found myself eating far too many pastries each day before, between, and after meals, and, while I thoroughly enjoyed the various deserts Diyarbakir had to offer, I am grateful for the sake of my health that these high calorie delicacies are not so easily available where I live!

The people of Diyarbakir are very polite and courteous. Many times I went shopping and found myself being offered tea and cigarettes. I habitually accepted the tea but declined the cigarettes. I communicated with a few people who knew a little English. I also spoke a little Kurdish with the locals. While they were overjoyed to find a tourist who knew any Kurdish at all, they were careful only to speak Kurdish when nobody was listening. In one store I enjoyed a cup of tea with the owner and spoke a little Kurdish with him. However, as soon as a potential customer walked in, the owner nodded to me and began speaking Turkish. This customer left and another man walked in. The owner addressed this man in Turkish as well, but told him that I was a tourist who knew a little Kurdish. Obviously, this man was not a potential customer, but rather an old friend. The owner’s friend then greeted me in Kurdish and shook my hand. While I was received warmly by the people of Diyarbakir, I noticed that they do not seem to trust each other very much. I suppose that this is a consequence of years of oppression and death. After spending a few days in Diyarbakir, I hopped in a dolmus, the large van that is the preferred mode of long-distance transportation in the region, and looked forward to seeing even more of Kurdistan.