15
November 2001
3. “Solving and realistic politics”, what is of important is first of all being principled and willed and supporting the unity. Kurds of course will support whoever approaches the problem correctly for their own national interests. What is important is that the national interests do not conflict with the interest of the peoples in the region.
4. “Two Kurdish party members injured in revenge attacks in Istanbul”, two members of Turkey's pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HADEP) were injured Wednesday in attacks on party offices in Istanbul, a HADEP official said.
5. “EU report: Turkey must do more”, the European Union welcomed Turkish steps towards expanding civil liberities on Tuesday, but said in its progress report on candidates that the reforms far from guarantee freedoms required for membership in the bloc.
6. “EU Progress Report”, opinion by Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik, Independent Deputy for Istanbul.
1. – BBC – „No dam, but plenty of energy”:
Where Ilisu would be built: Renewable energy could
replace it - in time 
Dams are often seen as the ideal way to generate energy without
burning fossil fuels and adding to global warming.
But if the Ilisu dam is not built, Turkey should still eventually find environmentally friendly energy sources.
It can improve the efficiency with which it uses energy, and it can turn to renewables. Solutions like these would cost Turkey far less in many ways. A year ago the World Commission on Dams published its final report. It was chaired by the South African Education Minister, Professor Kader Asmal.
He said: "It means nothing to build billion-dollar dams if your monuments alienate the weak. It means nothing to stop all dams if your protests only entrench poverty." The commission said dams worldwide had provided many benefits, but often at too high a price.
Wind potential
It said rotting vegetation trapped under water released carbon dioxide and methane, both potent greenhouse gases, and this could cause more pollution than production of electricity from fossil fuels.
The commission concluded that there was far greater scope for using alternative ways of meeting people's needs, including renewable energy, recycling, better irrigation, and reducing water losses.
Aegean Tech is a Turkish technology and renewable energy group. It says: "It is estimated that in 2023 Turkey will need 600 billion kWh a year. "If we pursue an intelligent policy, then in 2023 about one-third of the energy need of the country could theoretically be harvested from the wind." Dr Smail Khennas is senior energy specialist at the Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG).
He told BBC News Online: "In Turkey's case, renewables would not be able to fill the gap in the short term, over the next five years or so.
Twice the average
"Ilisu would produce so much energy it will be quite a lot longer than that before renewables can provide the answer. But in the meantime, Turkey could work on improving its energy efficiency."
Greenpeace says: "The potential for Turkey to reduce its energy usage is massive. It uses twice as much energy per unit of gross national product (GNP) as the European average.
"In the last three decades European countries have increased their energy efficiency. However International Energy Agency figures show that Turkey's energy efficiency actually decreased during this period.
"In 1996 the cost of wasted energy was $4.5bn, roughly equivalent to the amount that Turkey spent the previous year on imported energy.
"The Turkish Chamber of Electrical Engineers estimates that up to 30% of the electricity generated in Turkey is lost during transmission and distribution from power stations to end users. The international standard is 6-6.5%."
Thinking small
Hannah Griffiths of Friends of the Earth (FoE) told BBC News Online: "Turkey is ideally placed to exploit its solar energy potential.
"It doesn't need centralised generators, but mini-power stations on the roofs of homes and other buildings.
"They could feed current into the grid by day, and
the users could take electricity from it when the sunlight wasn't enough
to meet their needs." 
2. – Financial Times - “EUROPE: EU throws down the Cyprus gauntlet as it pursues policy on enlargement: There are likely to be diplomatic ructions from Brussels' readiness to admit a divided island”:
By LEYLA BOULTON, JUDY DEMPSEY and KERIN HOPE 
Some EU diplomats would rather not discuss it. Others shudder at
the thought.
For Gunter Verheugen, the European Union's enlargement commissioner, the issue is clear-cut. Cyprus' accession to the EU will not be held hostage to diplomatic caution or political intransigence by Turkey.
The Commission's annual progress reports on the 13 candidate countries published this week said the divided island of Cyprus should be able to complete negotiations to join the EU by the end of next year, and should be ready to join by 2004.
This is because the Greek Cypriot government, which has had no control over the Turkish Cypriot north, meets the EU's political criteria for the rule of law, human rights and an independent judiciary. It also has a functioning market economy that, according to the Commission, "should be able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces in the Union".
The EU is committed to taking Cyprus in, despite the risk, restated by Bulent Ecevit, Turkey's prime minister, earlier this month, that Ankara would respond by annexing the north of the island. It was Mr Ecevit who dispatched troops to the island in 1974 in response to a coup designed to merge the island with Greece.
Some EU diplomats interpreted Mr Ecevit's statements as an outright threat, others as a sense of panic. Either way, said a US official, Turkey was boxing itself into a corner.
"Turkey thinks it is now geographically and strategically much more important since September 11," he explained. "With this kind of thinking, it may overplay its hand with the Europeans especially since it wants to eventually join the EU. The Europeans are going to admit Cyprus, with or without a settlement."
Cyprus's pending accession has yet to act as the catalyst hoped by diplomats to restart negotiations. Long running "proximity talks" between the two sides under the auspices of the UN secretary general collapsed a year ago, over demands from Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, for them to continue on a state-to-state basis. Subsequent efforts to woo Mr Dentash back to negotiations have failed.
Mr Verheugen tried it in Zurich last August where he met Mr Denktash. A month later, Mr Denktash rejected an invitation to meet with Glafcos Clerides, his Cypriot counterpart, when Alvaro de Soto, special envoy of Kofi Annan, UN general secretary, visited the island.
Yesterday, George Vassiliou, Cyprus's EU negotiator, appealed to the Turkish Cypriot side: "There's still a window of opportunity open. It's starting to close, but the Turkish-Cypriots are welcome to join the talks at any point," he said.
Mr Denktash does appear to be feeling some of the pressure. He has sent another letter, the second in the past week, requesting a direct face-to-face meeting with President Clerides. Mr Clerides, apparently fearful of being outmanouevred, insisted yesterday in his reply a meeting must take place in the presence of a UN official or in the framework of UN negotiations.
If talks resume, Mr Clerides would still insist on a political settlement that would provide for free movement of people and purchase of property in line with EU rules. But European and UN officials blame Mr Dentash for the current impasse. Turkish Cypriots, citing unfair treatment after independence from Britain in 1960, fear that without restrictions they could see property bought up by richer Greek Cypriots, and lose jobs. They would also want guaranteed power sharing and security arrangements.But European officials blame Mr Denktash for the current impasse.
"We are talking about an entrenched Denktash," said a senior western diplomat. "But we also have a highly conservative general staff in Ankara, a (Turkish) prime minister who believes the problem of Cyprus was solved in 1974, and a government too weak to contradict Denktash."
On another level, security experts in Ankara believe there is simply not the political will to deal with the Cyprus issue. "The government operates within the paradigms of many years ago," said one expert. "Ecevit is deeply convinced this is the only option open to Turkey. Sometimes he wants to join the EU but he does not realise that this is also tied to the Cyprus problem."
To complicate matters, the Turkish military has made Cyprus into a security conundrum even though the only strategic importance of Cyprus is that it should not fall into hostile hands.
Mr Verheugen knows he has thrown down the gauntlet to Turkey - and indeed to diplomats trying to reach a settlement over Cyprus. Early next year, he will embark on a diplomatic offensive, backed by the UN.
Ultimately, however, it may be left to Washington to take
over the reins, precisely because it could not allow any conflagration
between the EU and an essential US ally. Additional reporting by Kerin
Hope in Athens and Leyla Boulton in Ankara.
3. – Kurdish Observer – “Solving and
realistic politics”:
What is of important is first of all being principled and willed
and supporting the unity. Kurds of course will support whoever approaches
the problem correctly for their own national interests. What is important
is that the national interests do not conflict with the interest of
the peoples in the region.
The preference should a local, regional solution. If the forces in the region do not accept it, then Kurds of course will support the policies having abilitiy to solve the problem. We must say that the Kurdish problem will enter into the agendo of the world again. Not only the South but the Kurdish problem is being brought into the agenda. Yes, its beginning may be South. Therefore the key of the success will be to develop a correct political-tactical approach, to focus the Kurdish national democratic movement on a common strategy, having a principled and moderrn, honorful and strong-willed policy.
ISMET KEM
Murat Karayilan, member of PKK Council of Leaders, evaluated the latest debates and developments on Kurdistan to our newspaper.
-We would like to know your comments on the news that the Turkish army has entered into South Kurdistan or will enter.
Yes. Turkey is making military preparations for an operation to South Kurdistan. It is an indisputable and well-known fact. We do not say it on the grounds that the governors of the region came together and Head of the General Staff Kivrikoglu came to Amed but we have information and observations. But that does not mean that there will be absolutely an intervention. Well, it is another problem, it will be a development depending on the political situation. Nevertheless we can say that they are making preparations for occupation South. It is striking that recently there is such an intense traffic around Amed.
-And recently there are scenarios of Western states being mentioned about Kurdistan and Kurds…
There are various speculations on the matter and different points of view. The reason is that the existing political forces do not have a clear and open policies on the Kurdish problem. All the world can debate on all the problems. But as for the Kurds the debates are behind the curtains. Therefore the Kurdish policy of various forces is a mystery. It is not clear what, when and how they do. However everybody knows that one of the most urgent problems in the Middle East is the Kurdish problem as well as Palestine.
And Kurdistan is of importance geo-politically and strategically. Its resources are rich and the importance of water is increasing. For this reason on the one hand everybody is interested in it, on the other hand all debates are hidden. The reason is that the approach to the problem has been to consider it a means of political interests rahter than a solution on the basis of human rights. Especially after the September 11 attacks the war in Afganistan will spread to the Middle East and the Kurdish problem has become an important problem. Therefore without solving it there can be no stability, democracy etc. in the region.
The Kurdish problem has become a hear of a boil. In order to cure it, first of all you must treat it. The Western states have a Kurdish policy but it is not clear. What is this policy? We have not heard an official view, therefore to arrive at decisions is difficult. Because it exists but what is its essence? Which realities is it dependent on? With which democratic forces will this system be developed?
-But even they are secret, you have mentioned that there are various approaches…
Yes, in spite of all this indefiniteness, it is well-known that there is a political approach to Kurds within the Middle East concept as the world is being re-shaped. It should be. And states in the region especiall the states dominating the Kurdistan are discomfortable from this fact. Why? Because to this day they have not been able to solve it. They have tried to silence Kurds by way of violence and repression. But it is very difficult to annihilate or assimilate such a people by violence and repression. In fact it has not been possible in Kurdistan. That is the problem still exists.
-In a sense is the West attempting to solve the problem it has created?
The historical creators of this problem are the Western powers. It is not new, in fact those responsible for the existing situation in the Middle East are again the Western powers. They are trying to change the system they own have established. But we say that the peoples in the region should solve their problem on their own without needing any external intervention. Our Party Leadership has put it very clear. His key to the solution is democracy, his project of democratic civilization. From here we can even advance to the Unity of the Middle East, to the Unity of Peoples in the Middle East, to the Unity of Democratic Republics. The European states has done it, why should not the Middle Eastern peoples? The problem cannot be solved by oligarchic approaches, dictatorian approaches. Our preference is this but it seems that the dominant powers will not accept it.
-It is observed that rather Turkey is trying to obstruct it…
We have pointed out it several times. Turkey can solve its structural problems and the Kurdish problem through democracy. But the existing regime has not accept it. On the contrary, especially after September 11, it is on the process to continue the same approach. It is of course dangerous. Turkey pursues a policy for annihilation and denial. Therefore it may reach an aggrement with Iraq. Iraq is already in a difficult state. It may accept such things from Turkey. Turkey seeks to secure a unity of the states which dominates in Kurdistan. In short, it is very likely that the powers that insist both on their autocratic structure and on their denial policy will support the status-quo.
-For example could we consider the visit of Iran Foreign Minister Harrazi to Ankara within this framework?
Of course it is striking that Kemal Harrazi has come to Ankara and he has been invited by Ankara. Iran has independent and peculiar policies. We cannot say anything today but we observe that Turkey is making interse efforts. It is trying to form a common policy. But it is not true to say it will be done very easily. Because there are conflicts between the forces. The all trouble of the Turkish state is that there will no any new development on the Kurdish problem, that Kurds have gain a statue neither in North nor in South. If the need be, it will be a pawn of America till the end. And this of cours is an approach which will cost Turkey dearly. But the existing regime is observed to insist on it. Supposedly Turkey would be a democratic model in the Middle East, it would encourage transformation and change. But it can be seen that it support status-quo not transformation and change. Therefore this approach will lead Turkey to destruction. It is clear that it will face grave situations both inside and outside. I mean, does it have the right to intervene? If the Southern Kurds gains a statue, why is the Turkish state against it?
-In Turkey and in some foreign circles annexation of Musul-Kerkuk is being debated…
Will it annex Musul-Kerkuk which is considered being within the limits of "national borders"? We do not think so. If it was, it would have a logic but it has not. It says that it will occupy the area temporarily in order to prevent a new development giving advantage to Kurds. I mean it is only political. It wishes his denial policies to prevail there and forces the world to accept it. But it is very difficult for the world to accept, furthermore it is impossible. Because Kurds are now a force. Yes, Kurds have not experienced anything serious since Lausanne but they have never stayed silent. They have been resisting all along.
The ideological revolutionary movement and revolutionary struggle which has been developed since 30 years by our Party has developed a level of becoming a nation, an enlightenment and democratization. And Kurds are now a power. It is difficult not to pretend they exist again. We do not witness 1920's. In this respect Turkey is only making trouble about the matter.
-Kurdish Democratic Party (KPD) has an approach against Turkey…
It is positive that KDP has stated it would insist and even resist against the approaches of the Turkish state. But it is necessary. And the fact that it has made such a statement shows the seriousness of the situation. If it did not feel that it was in a trap it would not make such a statement. Moreover, we think that it is related with the international forces. Such an intervention of the Turkish state will aim directly at Kurds and therefore KDP. And it will conflict with the Western world. Therefore it should not be seen as only a stake, it would be narrow approach. The problem is more comprehensive. But of cours all Kurdish national democratic forces should react against such occupations, interventions and denial policies.
The Southern forces may see their mistakes in the past properly. For the sake of simple interests and material values, Turkey has been made efficient and having initiative in South. But if they understand the real situation properly they should correct it as soon as possible. In this respect we can say that the stances of the Southern forces are positive.
-Which policy should the Kurds have for a democratic and political formation in all Kurdistan including South Kurdistan?
First of all we must say that the Kurdish problem will enter into the agenda of the world again. Not only the South but the Kurdish problem is being brought into the agenda. Yes, its beginning may be South. Therefore the key of the success will be to develop a correct political-tactical approach, to focus the Kurdish national democratic movement on a common strategy, having a principled and moderrn, honorful and strong-willed policy.
What is of important is first of all being principled and willed and supporting the unity. Kurds of course will support whoever approaches the problem correctly for their own national interests. What is important is that the national interests do not conflict with the interest of the peoples in the region. The preference should a local, regional solution. If the forces in the region do not accept it, then Kurds of course will support the policies having abilitiy to solve the problem.
The Kurds should display a stance guaranteeing the stable,
peaceful and democratic development of the region, of the peoples in
the region, not their narrow local approaches. It is all the more important
as far as new arrangements and interests of both the peoples in the
region and the Kurdish people. I mean political approaches become more
important. Therefore we say that the Kurdish policy should be for a
democratic solution, for democratic civilization. The project developed
by our party and leadership in clear-cut.
4. – AFP – “Two Kurdish party members injured in revenge attacks in Istanbul”:
ISTANBUL
Two members of Turkey's pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HADEP)
were injured Wednesday in attacks on party offices in Istanbul, a HADEP
official said. As the incidents took place in two HAPED offices within
a short space of time, police are considering whether the attacks were
carried out by the same person, the head of HADEP in Istanbul, Dogan
Erbas, told AFP.
In the first attack in Sisli district, the assailant burst into the building, holding a gun and shouting "My brother was killed in the southeast and I will take his revenge," Erbas said. The man then stabbed a party member in the leg with a knife. He fled leaving a plastic bag which he said was a bomb. Police subsequently said there were no explosives in the bag, Erbas said.
The second incident took place in another HADEP building nearby where an assailant shouted similar threats of revenge and fired a single shot at a party official, injuring him in the leg before running away, Erbas said. Kurdish rebels from the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party have waged a 15-year war for self-rule in Turkey's predominantly Kurdish southeast. The conflict has left some 36,500 people dead. Turkish authorities accuse HADEP of being linked to the PKK.
The party, which favors a peaceful solution to the Kurdish
question, denies the charges, but nonetheless faces a possible ban for
alleged association with the PKK in a pending case at the constitutional
court. Clashes in the southeast have scaled down since September 1999,
when the PKK said it was abandoning its armed campaign in favor of a
peaceful solution to the conflict following peace calls from its leader
Abdullah Ocalan, who is on death row for treason and separatism.
5. – Turkish Daily News – “EU report: Turkey must do more”:
The European Union welcomed Turkish steps towards expanding civil liberities on Tuesday, but said in its progress report on candidates that the reforms far from guarantee freedoms required for membership in the bloc.
The bloc, which made Turkey a candidate for membership in late 1999, said in its annual enlargement report that constitutional amendments passed in October were a "significant step towards strengthening guarantees in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms and limiting capital punishment."
But the changes to the national charter did not completely abolish the death penalty as defined in the European Convention on Human Rights, and Turkey still restricted fundamental freedoms, including linguistic and cultural rights for the country's 12 million ethnic Kurds, the report said. Some excerpts from the EU Progress Report are follows:
NPAA 
The Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA)
is a wide-ranging document, which addresses many of the priorities set
out in the Accession Partnership (AP). It presents a broad agenda of
political and economic reforms. It contains a useful inventory of measures,
which are to be taken. It is an impressive piece of work that was adopted
very soon after the adoption of the Accession Partnership by the European
Union.
With respect to the political criteria, some of the initiatives foreseen in the Turkish NPAA have already been overtaken by more recent developments, such as the adopted constitutional amendments. A revised NPAA will have to take these and other developm ents into account, for example with respect to newly adopted legislation that has been adopted.
The present NPAA makes it insufficiently clear how Turkey will address a number of priorities in the Accession Partnership such as those on cultural rights.
The NPAA falls considerably short of the Accession Partnership priority of guaranteeing cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of origin. Furthermore, the priority on the removal of all legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of the ir mother tongue in TV/radio broadcasting is to be included. With respect to the death penalty, a commitment in the NPAA to sign Protocol 6 of the ECHR is lacking. The document should specify how Turkey intends to guarantee freedom of religion, in partic ular with respect to minority religions not covered by the Lausanne Treaty (Muslim and non-Muslim communities).
Constitutioanl amendments
Constitutional reform was set in motion after the adoption of the NPAA,
building on the work of the Parliament's Conciliation Committee and
on the basis of a strong cross-party consensus. The package of thirty-four
amendments to the 1982 Constitution was adopted on 3 October 2001, introducing
new provisions on issues such as freedom of thought and expression,
the prevention of torture, the strengthening of civilian authority,
freedom of association, and gender equality. Several amendments are
related to the Copenhagen political criteria, the Accession Partnership
and the NPAA.
At political level, the banning by the Constitutional Court of the Fazilet party in June, highlighted problems of freedom of expression and association, and led to changes in the party formations. Despite several Ministerial changes, the coalition government has held together and reached agreement on economic and political reforms.
Democracy and the rule of law
On 3 October 2001, the Turkish Parliament adopted a package of 34 constitutional
amendments, drawn up by its Conciliation Committee. Several of the amendments
are intended to prepare the ground to meet some of Turkey`s Accession
Partnership priorities and are evaluated under the appropriate headings
below. The Parliament worked swiftly and effectively, and there was
broad cross party support for most of the amendments. However, at the
end of the process, the rejection of a draft amendment limiting parliamentary
immunity was the subject of public criticism.
In all, 117 new laws were adopted between October 2000 and June 2001. During the same session, Parliament simplified its internal procedures and discussed the establishment of a Parliamentary Committee for EU integration.
The judicial system
There is continuing concern regarding the extent of the independence
of the judiciary in practice. Pressures were exerted on judges and prosecutors,
particularly in connection with prosecutions of state officials, for
instance in relation to corruption cases. The fact that the Supreme
Board of Judges and Prosecutors, in charge of appointments and postings,
is chaired by the Minister of Justice, puts into question the separation
of powers between judiciary and executive.
There is still a need to guarantee the independence of the judiciary from the executive, to further reform the system of state security and military courts and to introduce the possibility of reparations for violations of the European Convention of Human Rights.
Anti-corruption measures
President Sezer has stated that corruption is one of the most serious
problems affecting Turkey and has given his support to the fight against
corruption.
Several anti-corruption measures are included in the Turkish Government's economic programme of April 2001. Their aim is:
· to ensure transparency and accountability in
resource allocation in the public sector;
· to prevent politically motivated interventions in the management
of the economy;
· to strengthen good governance and the fight against corruption.
Initiatives are being taken to reinforce the independence of state owned banks, to bring public procurement rules into line with the acquis, and to ensure that the energy market is liberalised in transparent conditions. A number of high-level corruption investigations have started, notably in the energy, public works, housing, and banking sectors.
On 27 September 2001, Turkey signed the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime as well as the Council of Europe Civil Law and the Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption. Turkey is also participating in the monitoring of anti-corruption measures effected by the OECD Working Group on Bribery in international commercial transactions.
The National Security Council
As part of the constitutional reform package, the provision of Article
118 concerning the role and the composition of the National Security
Council has been amended. The number of civilian members of the NSC
has been increased from five to nine while the number of the military
representatives remains at five. In addition, the new text puts emphasis
on the advisory nature of this body, stressing that its role is limited
to recommendations. The Government is now required to "evaluate"
them instead of giving them "priority consideration". The
extent to which the constitutional amendment will enhance de facto civilian
control over the military will need to be monitored.
Since the last Regular Report, the National Security Council has given its opinion on a number of governmental issues and policies including the NPAA, the Cyprus issue, European Security and Defence Policy, measures to combat anti-secularism activism, the extension of the compulsory age limit in primary education, the state of emergency in various provinces, the privatisation of state companies (e.g. telecoms), recent socio-economic developments and on the constitutional reform package. The National Security Council also warned against the risk of "social unrest".
The Action plan for the Southeast, as devised by the National Security Council, has not been made public, but is under implementation by the civilian authorities.
The law revising the legal framework for TV and radio (the "RTUK" law), vetoed by President Sezer in June 2001, provided for a representative of the National Security Council to be appointed to the Audio-visual High Board. A revision of the law is now under preparation. It is important that a revised version of the law meet European standards.
Human rights and the protection of minorities
The recent constitutional amendments are a significant step towards
strengthening guarantees in the field of human rights and fundamental
freedoms and limiting capital punishment.
The freedom of expression, the freedom of the press, and the freedom of association and peaceful assembly are among the fundamental freedoms addressed by the constitutional amendments. In Articles 13 and 14, a number of restrictions have been deleted, thus narrowing the grounds for limiting fundamental rights and freedoms. The principle of proportionality has been introduced: any limitation of the rights protected must be proportionate.
A number of restrictions on the exercise of fundamental freedoms have remained.
The extent to which individuals in Turkey will enjoy a real improvement in the exercise of fundamental freedoms in practice will depend on the details of implementing legislation, and the practical application of the law. It is encouraging that a general principle of proportionality has been introduced and that the stated general aim of the reform is effectively to bring to the forefront respect for human rights and the rule of law.
Proposals for legislative changes aimed at implementing a number of constitutional amendments, in particular with respect to freedom of expression and thoughts, are being finalised by the Government. They include proposals to change Articles 159 and 312 of the Penal Code and of Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti- Terrorist Law. As far as Turkey`s position with respect to various international conventions on human rights is concerned, on 18 April 2001, Turkey signed Protocol 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on the general prohibition of discrimination by public authorities.
Since the last Regular Report no progress has been made in acceding to a number of other major human rights instruments such as the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
As to Protocol 6 to the ECHR on the abolition of the death penalty, it remains to be seen whether, in the light of the constitutional amendment and the projected reform of the Penal Code it will be possible for Turkey to sign and ratify it. It can also be noted that Turkey has not signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.
Since the last Regular Report, the European Court of Human Rights found that Turkey had violated provisions of the ECHR in 127 cases (although 43 of these are not final, as an appeal to the Grand Chamber is possible). These cases relate to a wide range of violations to the Convention such as freedom of expression, ill treatment by the security forces and length of police custody. Turkey has resolved 53 of these cases through friendly settlements.
With respect to the enforcement of human rights, Turkey has established a number of bodies (law of 5 October 2000): the Human Rights Presidency, the High Human Rights Board, the Human Rights Consultation Boards and the Investigation Boards. The Human Rights Presidency is intended to monitor the implementation of legislation in the area of human rights.
The High Human Rights Board is an inter-ministerial committee responsible for making proposals intended to promote and to strengthen human rights protection in Turkey.
The Human Rights Consultation Board is designed to serve as a permanent forum of exchange of views between the Government and NGOs. The Investigation Boards will have the task to conduct on the spot investigations with respect to alleged human rights abuses.
Civil and political rights
Despite a number of constitutional, legislative and administrative changes,
the actual human rights situation as it affects individuals in Turkey
needs improvement.
The revised Article 38 of the Constitution limits the death penalty to cases of terrorist crimes and to times of war or imminent threat of war. The exception for terrorist crimes is not in line with Protocol 6 to the ECHR (which does not permit any reservations), whereas the exception in the case of war crimes is permitted under Protocol 6. Legislative changes to the Penal Code will be needed to put this revised Article into effect. This will permit an assessment of whether Turkey is in a position to sign and ratify Protocol NO 6 to the ECHR.
During the reporting period, death sentences have continued to be imposed by Courts on the basis of the Anti-Terrorist Law. In 2000, 17 people were sentenced to capital punishment, and 10 between January and August 2001. However, the de facto moratorium on carrying out the death penalty - which has applied since 1984 - has been maintained.
Regarding torture and mistreatment, the agreement of the Turkish Government to publish the report of the Committee on the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) of the Council of Europe on torture and mistreatment, in January 2001, is a welcome development.
Pre-trial detention provisions are to be brought further into line with ECHR standards on the basis of the amendment of Article 19 of the Constitution, which reduces to four days the period of police custody before bringing the person detained before a judge in cases of collective offences. This is a positive development from the point of view of the prevention of ill treatment of detainees and should be applied also for offences falling under the competence of the State Security courts and in state of emergency provinces.
There are also several other procedures to be brought in line with ECHR standards, notably automatic judicial review and medical examination as mentioned in the previous report.
In practice, the situation as regards torture and mistreatment has not improved since the last Regular Report and still gives serious grounds for concern. Incidents of torture and ill treatment continue to take place during police custody.
The number of prosecutions of officials suspected of acts of torture or ill treatment increased compared with earlier years. Though there are still concerns that sentences are too light or too frequently converted into fines or suspended. Moreover, the existing rule that an administrative authorisation is required in order to prosecute public servants has remained unchanged.
The Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights has become less effective in its investigation work on torture following the departure last year of Ms Sema Piskinsut, the chair of the Parliamentary Commission. In addition, Ms Piskinsut has declared herself willing to renounce to her parliamentary immunity in order to defend the non-disclosure of sources of information, which were received by the Commission during its investigations into the occurrence of torture. However, in a recent development, the new Chairman announced that members of the Commission would pay surprise visits to police stations and prisons to verify whether torture and / or ill-treatment is taking place in reality.
In autumn 2000, the Turkish Government decided to implement a reform of the prison system replacing large dormitories (up to 80 prisoners in one room) with a system of small cells shared by 1 to 3 inmates (F-type high security prisons). This led to violent demonstrations and hunger strikes, which related not merely to improvement of prison conditions but also to other demands. The vast majority of the prisoners involved in the strikes had been charged or convicted under the Anti-Terrorist law. A number of extremist groups were involved in the organisation of the hunger strikes.
Changes in legislation are needed to extend the scope of freedom of expression so as to give concrete content to the constitutional amendments, in particular to reflect the changes of the preamble and of Articles 13 and 14 and also of Articles 22, 26 and 28. These latter two articles remove the constitutional provision forbidding the use of languages prohibited by law. It is of particular importance, taking into account the aim of the reforms, that the new formulation of the restrictions in Articles 14 and 26 are translated into new legislation and practice in such a way as to provide an effective guarantee for freedom of expression, including the use of languages other than Turkish.
During the reporting period, there have been several serious problems in relation to the exercise of freedom of expression. Both the Penal Code (notably Articles 159 concerning insults to parliament, army, republic and judiciary and Article 312, concerning incitement to racial, ethnic or religious enmity) and Article 7 and 8 of the anti-terrorist law (disseminating separatist propaganda) continue to be widely used by public prosecutors and judges to restrict freedom of expression. Recent examples of such cases include those of the Radikal columnist Ms. Nese Duzel and the Turkish Daily News columnist Mr Burak Bekdil. Sixteen intellectuals, prosecuted for the re-publication of articles in a book on "Freedom of Thought 2000", have been acquitted by the Ankara Military Court, but continue to face the similar charges in other courts.
Since 1 January 2001, some 80 journalists have been imprisoned for political activities or for alleged infringements of various laws. Some are acquitted, such as Mr Mehmet Uzun, who had been detained on charges of "insulting the judiciary" and "insulting the Republic", and who was acquitted following international pressure. However, Dr. Fikret Baskaya, charged with dissemination of separatist propaganda, had to begin his sentence despite similar pressure. In a recent development, on 3 October 2001 Mr Uzun's book was confiscated, and there is a new risk of charges against him.
It has been recognised by some official sources that there are currently around 9,000 prisoners for crimes connected to freedom of expression. A significant number of journalists, intellectuals, writers and politicians have been detained for expressing views and opinions. Official data for 2000 show that 261 persons have been sentenced under Articles 159 and 312 of the Penal code and 324 under the Anti-Terrorist law. These figures in 1999 were 347 and 1,317 respectively.
As for freedom of the press, another amendment has been introduced. The provision that "publication shall not be made in any language prohibited by law" has been removed (Article 28). This amendment is encouraging but for it to become fully effective legislative changes are needed. The content of these legislative changes will be crucial for the enjoyment of this right. As the general restrictions of Article 26 also apply to the expression and dissemination of thought and opinions in writing and other media, it is important that the implementing legislation and practice ensure effective protection of the freedom of the press.
As for other aspects of freedom of the press, the Ministry of Interior published a list of terms prohibited in official documents and government owned media. A number of publishing companies had to suspend their activities and periodicals and books have been seized. A recent example is the decision to suspend the IDEA Politika Journal on 26 September 2001.
Cyprus
The Turkish government expressed support for the efforts of the United
Nations Secretary General to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the
Cyprus problem. But these expressions of support have not yet led to
advance the process. Indeed, the Government expressed understanding
and support for the decision of the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community
to withdraw from the proximity talks which were underway last year and
to refuse an invitation from the United Nations Secretary General to
participate in talks in New York in September 2001.
ESDP
Turkey`s involvement in decisions regarding the European Security and
Defence policy remained an unresolved issue. Currently, the EU is taking
further steps to make the ESDP operational. Various meetings took place
between the EU and 6 non-EU European NATO members (including Turkey),
as well as in the EU-NATO context, on questions concerning the nature
and functions of EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities.
Turkey should be more forthcoming in solving the issue of the modalities
for participating in decisions on EU-led operations.
Relations between Turkey and Greece have continued to
develop, with several meetings between representatives of the two countries
in which a number of joint initiatives were decided. Turkey lent full
support to the fight against terrorism following the attacks in the
United States of America of 11 September 2001 and the authorities have
agreed to make military capabilities available. It was among the first
candidate countries to endorse the conclusions of the Extraordinary
European Council of 21 September 2001.
6. – Turkish Daily News – “EU Progress Report”:
Opinion By Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik, Independent Deputy for Istanbul
The "Political Criteria" chapter of our National
program document, the final draft of which was approved of by the National
Security Council (MGK), carries special importance for Turkey but suffers
from gaps in willpower that not even the literary acrobats who penned
it could hide. Consequently, it has nothing to do with the rules we
have to stick to for EU membership and will not therefore be considered
acceptable by the EU. I had, you will recall, tried to draw attention
to these facts during the spring, when this document of ours, which
contains other inadequacies of secondary importance and slightly easier
to make up for, was being made official. However, I failed to make an
impression on the powers that be.
The EU Commission's Progress Report, which was published the other day - quite apart from the Cyprus issue, which by virtue of its distinctive characteristics has become a field of debate in its own right and has been listed in the EU "sins" box since 1990 - is a full-length mirror set before us in the light of EU norms and with as much diplomatic courtesy as possible. Mirrors do not talk. For example they don't say things like: "You can't fool all of the people all of the time", "are you taking and running?" or "Why are you holding up your people? I'm not your partner in crime." Mirrors do not expect favoritism. You can't get angry at a mirror. You will never find fault with them. You cannot argue with them. If it really is your intention, then the smart and sensible thing to do is use the mirror to make yourself presentable. Consequently, looking at the report in this light as an "opportunity" and acting with the will to use it as such will be of great benefit both for our national well being and our strategic interests.
Those who have still failed to grasp this should now understand that slyness and cheating are not how to climb the uphill slope to the EU. We should know well that this is the difference between the data we see in the mirror put before us and the norms of civilized society. Whatever happens to our relations with the EU, what we need to do is close this gap as quickly as possible by having self-confidence and by gladly accepting that we all have to pull together in the spirit of national unity. We have to act with resolve and determination. This is a matter of survival for our beloved nation Turkey.
Those among us who still fail to understand ought to understand that the question before Turkey is not, as some of us are still hung up on, whether our full membership will come about or not, even if objective conditions for that existed. Neither is the question one of what are we to do if we cannot become full EU members, as some of us are worried might be the case. The crucial question, over which we must be brutally honest and as visionary as possible, is the question of what will become of us if we fail to achieve in good time the EU standards in all fields that comprise the level of contemporary civilization Ataturk envisioned for us. I maintain it is extremely important for us to fully understand this point while we still have time.
In connection with this, there is a matter of great urgency that expects us to approach it in all seriousness, which is that it has now become abundantly clear we cannot reach these targets, which all public opinion polls prove is the aim of the majority of the people, with this government. It is in my opinion in the best interests of our nation to take into account the rapidly evolving global dynamics and the potential dangers around us and to realize without wasting any more time that continuing along this path with a government whose condition and record is well known will lead to adverse consequences that will become harder and harder to deal with both at home and abroad; we need to do what we democratically can.
This is the duty and responsibly of Parliament, which
faithfully reflects the will of the nation; which is responsible for
broadening this country's horizons with is legislative and supervisory
functions; which took its legitimacy on this basis and whose degree
of legitimacy, it must never be forgotten, is directly proportional
to the degree to which it fulfills its responsibilities.