8 May 2001

6. "The definition of terrorism", a new US government report illustrates that any classification of terrorist groups is fundamentally motivated by self-interest, writes Brian Whitaker.

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1. - BBC - "More deaths in Turkish prison fast":

So far 22 have died - many more are in critical condition

Two more prisoners have died in hunger strike protests against controversial prison reforms in Turkey.

The latest deaths bring to 22 the number of fatalities among prisoners and their supporters.

Cafer Tayyar Betas, 25, had been refusing solid food for 200 days, and 32-year-old Huseyin Kayaci for 148. They were both members of extreme left-wing groups.

Some 800 inmates and relatives are taking part in the strike which began last October. Doctors say many of them are in critical condition.

In an effort to end the protest, the Turkish parliament amended the country's anti-terrorism law, to allow prisoners at maximum security jails to take part in communal activities.
But protesters and human rights groups, such as Amnesty International say the changes are insufficient.

'Privilege, not right'

They say that in the new security prisons against which prisoners are protesting, access to common areas has been turned into a privilege for those who behave, but is not a basic right.
The hunger strikers began their protest over plans to transfer them to new detention centres - known as F-type prisons - with small cells, which they say leave them vulnerable to abuse from guards.

In December, Turkish officials stormed jails across the country in an attempt to end the hunger strikes. Some 30 inmates and two soldiers died in the operation.

Hundreds of prisoners have since been moved to the new jails.

'Riots and hostage-taking'

The inmates had been previously held in prisons with large communal areas which the authorities say made possible frequent hostage-taking and rioting.

Turkey has been facing growing calls from the European Union, which it hopes to join as a full member, to take decisive action to end the hunger strike.

The confinement of groups of prisoners in the F-type jails has also been condemned by the Council of Europe, the regional human rights watchdog. It has called for an immediate end to the practice.

But the BBC's Chris Morris in Istanbul says that although the Turkish Government is struggling to find a solution, it will not give in to what it regards as blackmail by the hunger strikers.

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2. -Anadolu Agency - "ECHR President Wilhaber visits Justice Minister Turk and Chairman of Supreme Court of appeals Selcuk":

ANKARA

Luzius Wildhaber, President of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) visited Justice Minister Hikmet Sami Turk and Chairman of the Supreme Court of Appeals Sami Selcuk on Monday.

Speaking to reporters after the meeting, Turk said that he gave information about the prisons' conditions in Turkey and death fast and hunger strikes in Turkey to the ECHR delegation.

Noting that he also explained the ECHR delegation about the amendment in Article 16 of Anti-Terrorism Act, Turk said that he also gave information about the bills that are on the agenda of the parliament and bills which are related to human rights.

Turk said he also informed the delegation about the bill that foresees amendment in civil code, adding that the meeting has been useful.

ECHR President said in his part that he hopes death fasts and hunger strikes in prisons to end as soon as possible, adding there are positive developments on the issue.

Later the delegation visited Selcuk.

Selcuk said after the meeting that although ECHR decisions are supranational, they are also part of the internal law.

Upon a question about the application of Welfare Party (RP) to ECHR, Rýza Turkmen, the Turkish judge who was also in the delegation said that no decision was taken about the application of RP yet.

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3. - AFP - "Iraqi Kurdish leader in Ankara for talks on cooperation":

ANKARA

The head of a leading northern Iraqi Kurdish faction arrived in Ankara Monday for talks with Turkish officials on cooperation between the two sides against Turkey's Kurdish rebels, Anatolia reported.

"I came here on the invitation of the Turkish government. We see it as necessary to hold consultations with Turkish officials from time to time," Massoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), was quoted as saying by the agency.

Barzani is expected to meet Tuesday with Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and officials from the Turkish foreign ministry. The KDP leader controls the stretch of land along Turkey's border in northern Iraq, which has been outside Baghdad's control since the 1991 Gulf War.His main rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani, meanwhile, controls the eastern part of the area bordering Iran. The two feuding groups recently agreed on a number of compromises in a bid to implement a long-delayed peace agreement, signed in 1998 under US auspices. The compromises included decreasing their military presence along the ceasefire line, relaxing restraints on freedom of movement and opening offices in each other's sectors by the end of April.

Barzani's KDP has been Ankara's main ally in its struggle against Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) rebels, who have waged a 15-year armed campaigning for Kurdish self-rule in southeastern Turkey. Turkey believes some 5,000 PKK militants have crossed into northern Iraq since 1999 when the group said it was laying down its arms and withdrawing from Turkey to seek a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish conflict.

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4. - Kurdish Observer - "The military must change":

Kalkan said that the developments in Turkey would no longer give the military the opportunity to carry out strategies in the classic way, such as on May 27, March 12, and September 12 [dates of military takeovers of the government], continuing to say, "For a force coming from the military to be influential after this, it must undergo a transformation appropriate to the realities of Turkey."

ISMET KEM

Duran Kalkan, a member of the Council of Leaders of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) spoke with OZGUR POLITIKA concerning the situation of the basic actors and forces in Turkey as it is on the threshold of a historical period from the aspects of democratic transformation and a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem. Kalkan made extensive comments concerning subjects that make up the current political agenda in Turkey, such as the place of the Turkish military in the aforementioned developments, the tension and repartee occurring between it and Mesut Yilmaz, the Kemal Dervis factor, various quests of TUSIAD, and the Democratic Conference comprised of nongovernmental organizations, unions, leftist parties and the like suggested by the PKK.

Q: Along with the Kurdish National Movement, the military is considered by a number of circles to be the most organized force in Turkey. Along with this, the military is also in the position of being one of the basic reasons for the current blockage and lack of solution. What can be said about its place and role in developments after this?

Kalkan: The military has no chance by itself. The military carried out May 27, March 12, and September 12 [interventions] and came this far. The developments in Turkey are no longer suitable for classic military methods. In order to go beyond this, it must undergo a deep-rooted renewal. There are views, indications that the military is renewing itself in the framework of developments. These were being called 'efforts to modernize.' It is being said that it is doing the same politically. But we cannot know exactly what level this is at. How much will this renewal suffice to meet the collapse of the system that Turkey has entered or, on this basis, process of transformation? It seems to be that it won't quite suffice. For a force coming from the military to be influential after this, it must see the realities of such a period a little better.

The military must undergo transformation appropriate to Turkey's realities. An important force within the military could make a contribution to the establishment of a democratic political system in Turkey. Let's not forget that the military made the '61 Constitution. The '61 Constitution was not a weak constitution. It was a constitution with quite a lot of democratic and participatory content. Undoubtedly, now such a constitution would not be a solution to the current realities in Turkey, it has been left behind. But Turkey is in a very progressive situation from the aspect of a process like 1961. Some circles in the military played a role in this, even if they began different trends after that.

Kemal Dervis said about the army that it was 'a thing that loved Turkey.' The officers are trained on the principle of taking Turkey as the basis. This produces this type of result: They are watching the situation in Turkey and following Turkey's interests. If they see that these interests have made a democratic initiative mandatory and that it will not be possible for different trends to save Turkey from crisis and collapse, they will be open to democratic developments. They won't reject change; it will be enough that it save Turkey. Mustafa Kemal said, 'If Communism is going to come to this country, it will still be us that brings it.' This is the line that the Turkish military takes as its basis. If they see that democracy is going to save Turkey and that no other road of salvation remains, a significant segment of the military could slide this way. The military has not yet reached this point. In this sense, it doesn't have an approach and program for a deep-rooted democratic transformation. They are experiencing a situation of being open to a number of directions.

Q: What can be said, in regard to understanding and institutionalization, concerning directions and paths for solution arising from political parties, in other words, civilian politics, in the continuation of support for the status quo for so long?

Kalkan: The system itself has a conservative structure. It cannot renew itself or produce. Change in parliament, politics, and government does not mean the same as political transformation. One needs to change the implementing cadres, people to change the same policy in this manner or that. Democracy in Turkey is very restricted. The oligarchy is acting under a democratic appearance for itself. It is exactly like the Soviet Union with its military and economic structure, statism, and political structure.

There is just one difference. The Republican Peoples Party (CHP) was divided into a few parties after 1950. Because of this, Turkey lived a little. It became a little more long-lived than the Soviet Union. But the essence and basic structure has not yet changed. As for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it carried those pieces in its guts, it gradually became unbearable and it collapsed. Basically, everyone protected this structure. The great majority of the existing cadres, all the bureaucracy, and the great majority of the political cadres are that way. Demirel, Ecevit, Erbakan, Turkes, Inonu, and Baykal are those who made this system live for 40, 50 years. These are the political cadres of the status quo. When it is looked at from this angle, there is more conservatism in civilian politics than in the military.

For that reason, it is necessary for civilian politics to give a more serious struggle. There is a need for politics to be renewed in a serious fashion. Transformation and democratization must first of all happen in political parties. If the political parties and cadres enter a process of transformation, the conservatism and preservation of the status quo in bureaucracy cannot resist. What is needed is for them to see their responsibilities in a serious way and direct towards a democratic political line that exceeds this. This could be a liberal democratic or a right democratic line. We're not saying anything on this, but the forces in favor of democracy and transformation must unite along the lowest common denominators to form a new democratic system. These all require serious, deep-rooted democratic transformation. They need democratic initiative and mentality.

'Yilmaz must overcome the credibility problem'

Q: In this framework, there has been a debate between ANAP Chairman Mesut Yilmaz and military officials, especially in recent days, about the White Energy [investigation into irregularities in energy contracts] and Blue Stream [project for bringing natural gas from Russia to Turkey through a pipeline under the Black Sea] incidents on the agenda. How do you evaluate the developments on this subject?

ANAP had a right liberal line and policy from the Ozal period. But it could not show as much influence as Ozal in later periods. It used the private war in its own service for a specific period. Mesut Yilmaz served as prime minister three times during the dirtiest period of the war. Gangs, murders, 'perpetrator unknowns', prison massacres, robbing and pillaging were experienced the most during these periods. This dirt is now coming out into the open. ANAP and Mesut Yilmaz are one of those responsible for all this.

Some press-media organs are saying, 'He's showing this reaction because the tip is poking him now.' No one values a politician protecting himself, no matter what rhetoric he uses. We must see these truth once. If those carrying out the dirty war had said, 'We were up against such a thing in the past. The part we were responsible for was this, the part others were responsible for was that, we had to give such kind of struggle because it was that way. This much dirt and rot came from this, now we are trying to overcome it with this kind of policies; We changed policies and we are taking democratic reconciliation instead of war, and accepting the forces we fought, in other words, the Kurds, instead of denial as a basis. We will establish a new Turkey on this basis, we will be a force for solution,' then they would have been a little believable.

Despite this, the realities that ANAP and Mesut Yilmaz expressed, even if at the level of rhetoric and general truths, are important democracy utterances. This signifies a certain debate. ANAP is going towards a liberal, democratic line, even if it is not very consistent. It is inconsistent and hasn't quite been systematized. It is understood that certain circles are directing this situation. As a matter of fact, he is in conflict with forces tied to himself. ANAP is taking its strength from the collapse of the system. There is a serious democratic effect on Turkey from within and without. ANAP sees this and is taking strength from this. Those who do this must at the very least be consistent and credible. And for this, it is necessary to examine the past and not act like a knight today but do what is necessary. In other words, it is important to take practical steps. Being able to take practical steps will happen with developing democratic initiative. Then it is necessary to achieve alliance and solidarity with democracy forces and a program for a democratic renewal. It will be necessary for unity and alliance with the forces doing this.

We are watching and evaluating. We are following the criticism. We have our own evaluations also. We find the carrying out of a debate on this level in Turkey to be important, even if it is just at the level of rhetoric. These debates are necessary in order to bring the problems out into the open and solve them and for a self-examination to develop. We value it in this sense. It is an important, progressive development. But there are also deficiencies. It must be straightened out, developed, and perfected.

'TUSIAD must become practical'

Q:TUSIAD's [Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association] interference through various statements, reports, and recommendation packages is gradually increasing. What is TUSIAD's place in this process?

Kalkan: Industrial capital is capital related to production. The profiteering system is making things difficult for them also. That is why they desire stability. They have realized that stability will come with democracy. The existence of so much heavy pressure and exploitation and gaps is opening the path to struggles and fights. They saw that this resulted from the system and political environment, not from bad people. Then they also want the political environment to straighten out. And this means democratization because it will transform the existing system. They recommended solutions for Turkey's problems, for democratization and the Kurdish problem. The presented programs along this line in various periods, they published reports. This became a topic of debate. They made contributions in this framework. But they haven't become very practical yet. They are also carrying out a debate among themselves and don't have the strength to go beyond that. We found these positive and meaningful. But there is a limited, superficial situation. It is a situation limited by their own interests that must be overcome. A deep-rooted democratic system must become foreseeable. It is necessary to push the existing capital owners. It seems that the production capital in Turkey will lean towards this.

Solution: a unity and debate conference

Q: You mentioned that, as the PKK, you have cut out a determining role in Turkey's democratization. What can you say on the subject of the problems experienced by a democratic bloc comprised nongovernmental organizations, unions, leftist parties, the Kurdish national opposition, etc, and the way out?

Kalkan: The civilian organizations in Turkey have been restricted and cropped over the past 30 years under the special war regime and brought to where they cannot struggle. They are just coming out of this. They have little organization, weak influence, and have not yet overcome their timidity. They have not achieve a depth of conscience of democratic transformation. For that reason, they remain weak, they need to become stronger. When it was necessary for the labor institutions to struggle much more with this business, they remained on an economist line. They didn't develop democracy programs, they need to be developed. The IHD (Human Rights Organization) is carrying out a particular struggle; this must be developed further. A number of associations, unions, and institutions must participate in the struggle for democracy and develop a democracy program. Again, it isn't happening all alone and with their own programs. Their current situation is out in the open. They still haven't come together, their forces are weak.

It is necessary to carry out works and efforts to strengthen them. We are calling to these forces again. The way out of problems, overcoming weaknesses and lack of power is a conference. They must come together and unite their strength at a conference. They can overcome their weaknesses if they show a little political flexibility and come together. Being democratic requires this. Democracy comes through being together with others, living together, and risking doing business together. It is necessary to live on this basis and become practical in order for them to accept democracy in essence.

There will be a democracy conference and if a bloc and democratic program develops from that, it will become a determining force in the democratic initiative process. We are continuing our work along this line, carrying out debates. Turkey's future depends on developments along this line, there is no other future.

'The Dervis line is limited to repair'

Q: There is the Kemal Dervis factor which has come onto the agenda to come out of the current status quo. What do they want to do here through Dervis, and is this enough by itself to overcome the status quo system?

Kalkan: What is wanted to do with Kemal Dervis, who gains his strength from the US and international capital institutions, is worth understanding well. On this point, the left - with liberal tendencies - because the environment in Turkey can only take this much - Kemal Dervis wants to create a Turkey which is in harmony with international institutions, is united with all of them.

This being the case, the matter called Kemal Dervis's search for transformation and restructuring means a repair, efforts to search for a solution to the crisis. And this, even if it includes a little lightening of the repressive, very heavy and exploitative side of the current oligarchic structure in comparison with the past, does not include a deep-rooted democratic transformation. If one notes the foreign support and internal situation, Kemal Dervis has a power that should not be belittled. But if one notes the depth, seriousness, and structural nature of the crisis in Turkey, it will be difficult to overcome crisis with the Kemal Dervis line.

It appears that Turkey will not achieve a solution right away, that it will experience a multi-sided struggle process for a solution. Tansu Ciller gave the Groom Ferit Pasha example the other day. If Kemal Dervis does not develop a deep-rooted economic, political restructuring with democratic measures, he will be like Groom Ferit. Groom Ferit's methods, which were not solutions, brought Turkey domestic conflict and action of the people. The Kemalist movement was born of these developments and he brought Turkey a liberation movement. If a solution is not found as the crisis deepens, this will open to much deeper development of the democratic liberation movement.

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5. - Middle East Defense - "Turkey":

Despite a fiscal crisis, Turkey has advanced a project to supply electronic warfare systems for the military's helicopter fleet.

Officials said the Defense Ministry has issued a request for proposal for EW systems for the entire fleet, reported at about 370 helicopters. These include attack and transport aircraft.

The program is said to be worth $500 million and will not be headed by a foreign contractor. Instead, the project calls for a Turkish prime contractor.

The EW system will include such components as a radar and laser warning receiver and radio frequency jammer for both active and passive protection.

Earlier this month, Turkey's military announced the suspension of 32 projects valued at $19.5 billion. Turkish military sources said the projects include a halt in plans to procure eight heavy-lift helicopters in an estimated $350 million deal.

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6. - The Guardian - "The definition of terrorism ":

A new US government report illustrates that any classification of terrorist groups is fundamentally motivated by self-interest, writes Brian Whitaker

Decide for yourself whether to believe this, but according to a new report there were only 16 cases of international terrorism in the Middle East last year.

That is the lowest number for any region in the world apart from North America (where there were none at all). Europe had 30 cases - almost twice as many as the Middle East - and Latin America came top with 193.

The figures come from the US state department's annual review of global terrorism, which has just been published on the internet. Worldwide, the report says confidently, "there were 423 international terrorist attacks in 2000, an increase of 8% from the 392 attacks recorded during 1999".

No doubt a lot of painstaking effort went into counting them, but the statistics are fundamentally meaningless because, as the report points out, "no one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance".

That is an understatement. While most people agree that terrorism exists, few can agree on what it is. A recent book discussing attempts by the UN and other international bodies to define terrorism runs to three volumes and 1,866 pages without reaching any firm conclusion.

Using the definition preferred by the state department, terrorism is: "Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant* targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." (The asterisk is important, as we shall see later.)

"International" terrorism - the subject of the American report - is defined as "terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country".

The key point about terrorism, on which almost everyone agrees, is that it's politically motivated. This is what distinguishes it from, say, murder or football hooliganism. But this also causes a problem for those who compile statistics because the motive is not always clear - especially if no one has claimed responsibility.

So the American report states - correctly - that there were no confirmed terrorist incidents in Saudi Arabia last year. There were, nevertheless, three unexplained bombings and one shooting incident, all directed against foreigners.

Another essential ingredient (you might think) is that terrorism is calculated to terrorise the public or a particular section of it. The American definition does not mention spreading terror at all, because that would exclude attacks against property. It is, after all, impossible to frighten an inanimate object.

Among last year's attacks, 152 were directed against a pipeline in Colombia which is owned by multinational oil companies. Such attacks are of concern to the United States and so a definition is required which allows them to be counted.

For those who accept that terrorism is about terrorising people, other questions arise. Does it include threats, as well as actual violence? A few years ago, for example, the Islamic Army in Yemen warned foreigners to leave the country if they valued their lives but did not actually carry out its threat.

More recently, a group of Israeli peace activists were arrested for driving around in a loudspeaker van, announcing a curfew of the kind that is imposed on Palestinians. Terrifying for any Israelis who believed it, but was it terrorism?

Another characteristic of terrorism, according to some people, is that targets must be random - the intention being to make everyone fear they might be the next victim. Some of the Hamas suicide bombings appear to follow this principle but when attacks are aimed at predictable targets (such as the military) they are less likely to terrorise the public at large.

Definitions usually try to distinguish between terrorism and warfare. In general this means that attacks on soldiers are warfare and those against civilians are terrorism, but the dividing lines quickly become blurred.

The state department regards attacks against "noncombatant* targets" as terrorism. But follow the asterisk to the small print and you find that "noncombatants" includes both civilians and military personnel who are unarmed or off duty at the time. Several examples are given, such as the 1986 disco bombing in Berlin, which killed two servicemen.

The most lethal bombing in the Middle East last year was the suicide attack on USS Cole in Aden harbour which killed 17 American sailors and injured 39 more.

As the ship was armed and its crew on duty at the time, why is this classified as terrorism? Look again at the small print, which adds: "We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against US bases."

A similar question arises with Palestinian attacks on quasi-military targets such as Israeli settlements. Many settlers are armed (with weapons supplied by the army) and the settlements themselves - though they contain civilians - might be considered military targets because they are there to consolidate a military occupation.

If, under the state department rules, Palestinian mortar attacks on settlements count as terrorism, it would be reasonable to expect Israeli rocket attacks on Palestinian communities to be treated in the same way - but they are not. In the American definition, terrorism can never be inflicted by a state.

Israeli treatment of the Palestinians is classified as a human rights issue (for which the Israelis get a rap over the knuckles) in a separate state department report.

Denying that states can commit terrorism is generally useful, because it gets the US and its allies off the hook in a variety of situations. The disadvantage is that it might also get hostile states off the hook - which is why there has to be a list of states that are said to "sponsor" terrorism while not actually committing it themselves.

Interestingly, the American definition of terrorism is a reversal of the word's original meaning, given in the Oxford English Dictionary as "government by intimidation". Today it usually refers to intimidation of governments.

The first recorded use of "terrorism" and "terrorist" was in 1795, relating to the Reign of Terror instituted by the French government. Of course, the Jacobins, who led the government at the time, were also revolutionaries and gradually "terrorism" came to be applied to violent revolutionary activity in general. But the use of "terrorist" in an anti-government sense is not recorded until 1866 (referring to Ireland) and 1883 (referring to Russia).

In the absence of an agreed meaning, making laws against terrorism is especially difficult. The latest British anti-terrorism law gets round the problem by listing 21 international terrorist organisations by name. Membership of these is illegal in the UK.

There are six Islamic groups, four anti-Israel groups, eight separatist groups and three opposition groups. The list includes Hizbullah, which though armed, is a legal political party in Lebanon, with elected members of parliament.

Among the separatist groups, the Kurdistan Workers Party - active in Turkey - is banned, but not the KDP or PUK, which are Kurdish organisations active in Iraq. Among opposition groups, the Iranian People's Mujahedeen is banned, but not its Iraqi equivalent, the INC, which happens to be financed by the United States.

Issuing such a list does at least highlight the anomalies and inconsistencies behind anti-terrorism laws. It also points towards a simpler - and perhaps more honest - definition: terrorism is violence committed by those we disapprove of.