7 June 2001

1. Turkey's friendship comes at a cost", Turkey's support is crucial to the US and Nato, but its human rights record, aggressive foreign policy and alliance with Iraq make it hard to maintain, writes Simon Tisdall.

2. "EU mulls a new deal with Turkey", the European Union is considering a new deal with Turkey, a strategic military ally, that would clear the way for the creation of the EU's planned 60,000-man rapid reaction force.The EU hopes to field the force by 2003 for use in peacekeeping or humanitarian crises in which NATO does not want to get involved.

3. "Iraqi Kurds expected for talks in Ankara soon", the leaders of the two rival Kurdish factions in northern Iraq are expected here soon for talks with Turkish officials on the region, a Turkish diplomat said Wednesday.

4. "Turkey from politics to economics", should Turkey proceed on the path of restructuring? Turkish Perestroika from politics to economics.

5. "Russia's new M.E. alliance targets Israel, Turkey", amid flagging U.S. will, Russia has expanded its sphere of influence in the Middle East in a drive that threatens Israel and Turkey, a new report says.

6. "Turkey moves to balance ties with Israel and Syria", it was not long ago that Turkey's southern neighbor and former enemy Syria was among the major Arab countries criticizing Ankara's close military and security ties with Israel.


1. . - The Guardian - "Turkey's friendship comes at a cost":

Turkey's support is crucial to the US and Nato, but its human rights record, aggressive foreign policy and alliance with Iraq make it hard to maintain, writes Simon Tisdall

That the US defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, chose Turkey as one of his first foreign ports of call since taking up his Pentagon appointment should come as no surprise.

Mr Rumsfeld's purpose in visiting Turkey this week was primarily to inspect the Incirlik air base from which the US and Britain patrol the no-fly zone in northern Iraq.

Without Turkish permission enforcement of the zone, originally intended to create a sort of safe haven for Iraqi Kurds, would be impossible. So too, would be the broader policy of containment of Saddam Hussein's regime while maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity, which has been in operation since the 1991 Gulf War ended.

However, Turkey's importance to the US and the Nato alliance, of which it is a member, extends far beyond the problems posed by Iraq. Its strategic position, bordering Iran, for example, is of increasing interest to Washington, given what US officials portray as the growing threat posed by Tehran's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile capability.

Some unconfirmed reports suggested that Mr Rumsfeld's discussions with senior Turkish military officials in Ankara included talk of enhanced cooperation to counter "rogue state" Iran. The US has recently been complaining noisily about Iran's military and civilian nuclear cooperation with Russia, after Moscow ended an agreement with the Clinton administration that prevented the supply weapons to the Islamic regime.

This spat has also served to underline Turkey's importance to the US. There is no love lost between Ankara and Moscow, for historical and other reasons. Russia has repeatedly accused Turks (and neighbouring Georgians) of assisting Chechen resistance fighters in the Caucasus. There have even been dark hints of US covert assistance to the rebels via the same route.

Hardline Republican hawks in Washington, who fiercely condemn Russia's actions in Chechnya, believe such assistance would be justified - and would like Georgia, led by former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, to be invited to join Nato. All such ideas require Turkish support.

Turkey has closely backed other US projects, such as the expansion of Nato into eastern Europe that has already brought Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland into the fold. Enlargement is due to resume next year when the Baltic republics - Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia - may be invited to join, at least if western hardliners get their way.

It also backed the US earlier this year when a barely-contained row broke out over the EU's proposed rapid reaction force (RRF) - the so-called Euro army. People like Rumsfeld believe that the RRF may undermine and weaken Nato. The Turks hate the idea because they do not belong to the EU and are thus excluded from the RRF.

A British-engineered compromise was reportedly reached this week under which Turkey will have a say in the activities and management of the RRF, once it is deployed, in return for agreeing to its use of Nato assets.

Add to all these considerations the fact that, in recent years, Turkey has become, de facto, Israel's sole regional ally, undertaking joint military exercises and building up bilateral trade with the Jewish state. Furthermore, it is through Turkey (rather than Russia or Iran) that the US wants Caspian and central Asian oil and gas to be exported to the west. As a result, it is all too clear that, for the US and thus, Nato, Turkey is a vital partner.

There is a downside, though. Quite apart from ongoing concerns in Europe about Turkey's human rights record, its treatment of ethnic Kurds and Armenians, and its retention of the death penalty - all possible obstacles to its ambition to join the EU - three other issues have the potential to derail Turkey's relations with the US and its other allies.

One is ongoing tension with Greece, also a Nato member. The two countries continue to exhibit deep distrust, despite a brief outbreak of mutual assistance during recent earthquake disasters. They are engaged in territorial disputes in the Aegean. And Turkey, which continues to occupy northern Cyprus, fiercely opposes Greek Cyprus's application to join the EU. The Turkish foreign minister recently suggested Ankara would do all it could to block the republic of Cyprus's accession as an independent state.

Secondly, Turkey's economy is only just beginning to emerge from the state of collapse it suffered last winter and remains intrinsically weak. Its calls for structural and bank reforms, and privatisations notwithstanding, the US was obliged to back an $8bn IMF loan in April to Turkey on top of $11bn already made available. All this was in addition to existing US bilateral aid. In other words, Turkey's friendship does not come cheap.

The third issue that could upset relations is Turkey's unofficial collaboration with Iraq, despite its backing of the no-fly zones. It is the beneficiary of cheap oil brought by road from Iraq and in return has connived in the systematic flouting of UN sanctions. Part of the reason for this duplicity is economic. Part is Turkey's undeclared war on the Kurds and its not infrequent cross-border operations inside Iraq. In its hostility to Kurdish separatists, Turkey has a common cause with Saddam.

If Mr Rumsfeld did not realise it already, perhaps he now knows, as did the British during the time of the Ottomans, that while Turkey may be considered vital, it can also be infinitely vexatious.


2. - AP - "EU mulls a new deal with Turkey":

BRUSSELS

The European Union is considering a new deal with Turkey, a strategic military ally, that would clear the way for the creation of the EU's planned 60,000-man rapid reaction force.

The EU hopes to field the force by 2003 for use in peacekeeping or humanitarian crises in which NATO does not want to get involved.

To avoid duplication and expense, the EU also wants access to NATO's planning facilities and other assets such as intelligence, communications and transport. NATO is willing to do this, but Turkey seeks greater influence over how and when the assets are used.

Turkey is one of six European members of NATO who are not members of the EU; only 11 of the EU's 15 members belong to NATO. The United States and Canada round out the Atlantic alliance.

Turkey, which has one of the largest military forces in NATO, is adamant that it have a strong voice in any EU decision to mount a military operation using NATO assets, or an operation that would affect what Turkey considers its sphere of interest.

Negotiations have been underway since last year. Because NATO operates by consensus, Turkey has an effective veto over any decision on assets. After a final push by Britain and the United States, diplomats hammered out a compromise last week.

Turkey itself has been sending mixed signals about the tentative deal, which one NATO official called a "non-paper," because it carries neither name nor claim of ownership. Some diplomats say that is because Turkey's armed forces have not signed off on it yet.

Officials hope the compromise can be formally approved by the time President Bush attends a NATO summit next Wednesday.

The six-point proposal provides for consultation between the non-EU European NATO allies - Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary - and the EU on any decision affecting their security interests.

One of Turkey's main demands had been the right to participate in the initial decision-making phase of any EU operation, not just operational planning. While allowing the non-EU allies to consult during the decision-making phase, the proposal does not give them a veto. It only promises to consider their views.

EU foreign ministers meet Monday and Tuesday in Luxembourg and will have to decide if they can accept the proposed level of participation of nonmember states in EU business.

Diplomats are anxious to clear this hurdle, which is only one part of a larger agreement that will govern relations between NATO and the emerging military arm of the EU.


3. - AFP - "Iraqi Kurds expected for talks in Ankara soon":

ANKARA

The leaders of the two rival Kurdish factions in northern Iraq are expected here soon for talks with Turkish officials on the region, a Turkish diplomat said Wednesday. Massoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani, who heads the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), were to hold three-sided discussions with Turkish officials.

But the date of the meetings has not yet been fixed, Turkish foreign ministry spokesman Huseyin Dirioz told reporters. Long-time adversaries, the KDP and KYP have recently agreed to a number of confidence-building measures in a bid to implement a long-delayed peace agreement, signed in 1998 under the auspices of the United States. Developments in northern Iraq, which has been outside Baghdad's control and run by the Kurdish groups since the 1991 Gulf War, are of direct interest to Turkey, whose southeastern region borders it. The planned visit of Barzani and Talabani coincide with moves by Britain and the US to modify the 11-year sanction regime against Iraq. The proposals for so-called "smart" sanctions envisage the abolition of the embargo on civilian trade with Iraq, while tightening a weapons ban and controls on smuggling outside the UN-run oil-for-food deal.

Cross-border oil trade outside the confines of the program is a significant source of revenue not only for the regime of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, but also for Turkey's impoverished southeast and the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq, via which the trade goes. Turkey has also held regular contacts with the northern Iraqi leaders in order to ensure their support in Turkish cross-border operations in the area against Kurdish guerrillas fighting the Ankara government. Turkey says the rebels use the area as a jumping-off zone for attacks on its territory.


4. - Turkish Daily News - "Turkey from politics to economics":

Should Turkey proceed on the path of restructuring?

Turkish Perestroika from politics to economics

The economic crisis in Turkey gives the appearance of being rooted in the lack of political stability, or rather, of a political-economic crisis inherent in political crisis

Long-standing populist policies and the lack of future oriented policies of both government and opposition parties, their effort to only "save the day," are foremost among the causes of the political crisis in Turkey today

The Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD), nongovernmental associations and public institutions would like two laws to change in Turkey. The first is the electoral law, the second is the political parties law. The reigning idea is that with this change, the stunted authority and jurisdiction of the parliament as a result of the constitution of 1982 will be expanded, and pressure over its work will lift. Consequently either the numerical alignment or the qualifications of deputies will change

Politicians allocate cheap resources from public banks and public enterprises to their close circles under the wings of the paternalistic state. The system is also based on the allocation of cheap credits to peasants, farmers and merchants through subsidies. "Corruption" is not the sole problem. Not only the millions of dollars obtained through "corruption" but also the "illegal payments and tribute" distributed to some sections of society are the black holes of the budget

"A $17 billion rescue package was immediately prepared for Turkey. But on one condition: that this time Turkey get real. Because there would be no next time. Turkey's reckless and squabbling politicians had no choice but to look for someone outside the political system who knew Turkey, knew economics and was not corrupt" (Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times)

Demoted from the Interior Ministry to the State Ministry Responsible for Customs by ANAP leader Mesut Yilmaz, Sadettin Tantan yesterday resigned from government

There is an effort to get out of the vicious circle and realize the depolitization of the economy, as well as passing to a more widespread and productive real sector model through a smaller and more effective government-public sector model. Kemal Dervis is in Turkey to affect this change

ISTANBUL /by Gul Demir

The economic crisis in Turkey gives the appearance of emerging from the lack of political stability, or rather, of a political-economic crisis inherent in political crisis.

Long-standing populist policies and the lack of future oriented policies of both the government and the opposition parties, their effort to only "save the day," is foremost among the causes of the political crisis in Turkey today. The electoral system in Turkey is in fact far from reflecting the public will. The source of the current political-economic problems called "corruption" is the distortion in the electoral system. The political parties in Turkey are not mass parties in the conventional sense. Instead they represent small-scale mechanisms established by a limited number of party members to distribute public funds. Economic problems are allied with the fact that parties not only fail in representing the masses but serve as loci for patronage networks.

The election of ministers from among deputies who lack political education, only to hunt for votes, fails not only to establish the fair representation of citizens in the assembly but also to solve problems. Interest-based reckoning geared to giving away state land and plots cheaply, and the domination of majority groups consisting of members of religious or feudal orders (which can also be explained as hunting for votes) in political parties is deemed sufficient to access the lists prepared by the party leadership during electoral periods. Deputies who are chosen for the money and votes that they will bring rather than active party work and resourcefulness create a problem in Turkey's adoption of the rules of a changing world. Their inadequate educational level, culture, feudal structure and lack of sufficient knowledge with regard to draft laws under discussion in parliament project the image of an assembly of people unable to take initiatives and led by party chairmen.

Loss of confidence in parties

The structure of the government parties Democratic Left Party (DSP), Motherland Party (ANAP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) gives a clear picture of the realities of Turkey. Their constituencies condone intellectual and structural party differentiations in order to accede to power or to scramble for the allocation of cheap resources by power-holders. Each party can make concessions from its party program in order to cling to power for one more day, in disregard of the particular significance of this period for Turkey. The coalition parties find themselves in a position where they are expected to affect changes opposed to their structure. To await for instance from the MHP with its nationalist structure the solution of the Kurdish problem... To await legal amendments for the recognition of Kurdish as a language... Or cooperation in the annulment of capital punishment in Turkey...

The current position of the parties, and the not-too-different approach of past governments from the current one, has cast an air of inconfidence over the Turkish people. The electorate clearly indicates the erosion of trust paralleling the discrepancy of the pledges of candidates for power and action if they come to government. Data by a number of research companies in Turkey corroborate these facts. If the Turkish people go to the ballots today, not only will none of the political parties get the majority of votes but they will also have slid back from their former positions.

Consequently, Turkey's primary problem in the political arena is the need to make do with parties that have lost confidence. This circumstance is reflected in civil society associations, universities, the youth and business circles. Organizations like the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD) in particular that see Turkey's predicament conduct research for solutions to problems and convey their suggestions to the public. The parties in power reject all propositions, claiming that they do the best and currying favor with their constituencies, instead of benefitting from debate and seeking solutions.

If we were to list the main causes of the lack of political stability in Turkey, the first would be the low educational level of deputies; second, an electoral system based on money and the decisive role of party leaders; third, the listing of deputies at the level of the districts they represent with respect to promised votes. All this has pulled down in the last decade and a half the level of politics in Turkey. The lack of quality of the political staff brings on its heel policies of corruption, bribery and favoritism.

Change required for restructuring

TUSIAD, public institutions and nongovernmental associations would like two laws to change in Turkey. The first is the electoral law and the second is the political parties law. The reigning idea is that with this change, the stunted authority and jurisdiction of the parliament as a result of the constitution of 1982 will be expanded, and pressure over its work will lift. Consequently either the numerical alignment or the qualifications of deputies will change. For consecutive coups in Turkey have come with their own constitutions and laws.

A more significant issue is the obstruction of what needs to be done to bar corruption and correct the political structure, since the publication of these facts in the press disconcerts the forces (called the deep state) behind the parties. The problem emerges in the guise of a prohibitive political route spiralling in a vicious circle. The search for the rights and freedoms of individuals leads to heavy prison sentences. When the bright minds of Turkey present their ideas, they are faced with legal arrangements that constitute an element of threat. The power-holders in Turkey are comfortable with the method of determining by themselves the future of Turkey rather than consulting with intellectuals and opinion holders, whom they subject to threatening penalties.

When the European Union accession laws and regulations are on the agenda of the parliament, they are sometimes deleted from one place and with a showcased change (which takes the form of playing with words) are combined with another law. It is a widespread belief among citizens that the parties in particular do not pursue corruption cases in which they are incriminated, insist on laws such as the one regarding parliamentary immunity; and all the deputies (government and opposition parties) watch the interest of their relatives and friends rather than of Turkey. It is clearly seen that political parties seek legal arrangements that will shield their political authority and sometimes protect businessmen whom they see as their allies. The most recent Radio Television Higher Board (RTUK) bill and internet law reflect clearly what we have stated.

Law enacted without public debate and consultation with relevant public institutions and organizations and the route of "denting laws" are not accepted by the public. Which is why the state turns into an organism that supervises, punishes and oppresses citizens rather than protecting them and watching out for their interests...

Economic crisis and the search for solutions

Turkey's economy is still not independent from politics and the portrait of a Turkey drowning in crises is reflected in the economy. The ongoing struggle between old and new created a political sitution that becomes the cause of chronic economic instability. The defenders of the old Turkey call for a "protectionist social state." This is a system where politicians allocate resources from public banks and public enterprises cheaply to their close circles under the wings of the paternal state. The system is also based on the allocation of cheap credits to peasants, farmers and merchants through subsidies. "Corruption" is not the sole problem. Not only the millions of dollars obtained through "corruption" but also the "illegal payments and tribute" distributed to some sections of society are the black holes of the budget. This economic structure called statism represents the disproportional influence of the state in economic affairs.

The system is now stonewalled, with no guarantee that it will not do so again as long as this system is in place. The state is at the point where it cannot pay back the internal and foreign debts it incurred to sustain the system. Since production has come to a standstill, Turkey found itself in a tight spot. This system gnawed on the existing production system in the country because of the spiral of state's demand for high loans and rising interests. The system that contradicted the rules of a free market economy and diluted the international competitiveness of the private sector was unable to stand firm against inflation. The reform and stand-by agreeements suggested by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to end this system that were bolstered with domestic and foreign loans failed as a result of the resistance of Turkish politicians and the groups living on interest and rent.

Politicians, who have professedly drawn a lesson from the last economic crisis, the upshot of long-standing policies, still want to proceed as though unaware of Turkey's realities. Having failed to revise the government after the crisis, the government has now started to "entrench its position" under the name of revision.

Does Turkey see the truth?

"Quite simply, Turkey's economy is on the brink of disaster. In mid-February the Turkish currency was devalued by 25% in one day. It was the culmination of decades of mismanagement and corruption ... The Bush team, which came to office swearing it would never do bailouts, as President Clinton did, quietly arranged for a $17 billion rescue package for Turkey from the IMF and the World Bank. But on one condition: that this time Turkey get real. Because there would be no next time. Turkey's reckless and squabbling politicians had no choice but to look for someone outside the political system who knew Turkey, knew economics and was not corrupt." As Thomas L. Friedman wrote thus in the daily New York Times of the United States, he had not imagined that Turkey would enter another crisis. In fact he concluded his essay by responding to analyst Andrew Finkel's [most probably a victim of a memo by the Chief of Staff but, unlike others, off the record] statement that "Turkish politicians, who for decades have enjoyed power without responsibility, lining their pockets without worrying about the future, have now responsibility without power," by saying "On one hand they deserve it. On the other hand, they may not be up to it. Stay tuned. This is going to get interesting."

The day of Thomas L. Friedman's above quoted commentary in the New York Times witnessed hot developments in the Turkish capital of Ankara. Interior Minister Sadettin Tantan was removed from his position by Mesut Yilmaz, the leader of his Motherland Party (ANAP). Tantan, who demonstrated that he is not afraid to press on with the struggle against corruption, the mafia, gangs and terrorist organizations, is known by the public for his fearless attitude. Transferred from the Interior Ministry to the State Ministry Responsible for Customs by ANAP leader Mesut Yilmaz, Tantan resigned from government. The gendarmerie operation, code named White Energy, over improper tenders had drawn a wedge between him and Mesut Yilmaz. Alleged to also have been opposed to the most recent RTUK bill, Tantan's removal is seen as a "goal" by Mesut Yilmaz. The resignation of Sadettin Tantan after Yuksel Yalova has created confusion in ANAP. The ANAP organization in Istanbul's Fatih district and the Kocaeli Sapanci Organization also demonstrated their reaction by resigning. All these developments raise the question if a government crisis is impending in Turkey.

The most recent political developments are the sign of a new crisis for Turkey. As the dollar and the mark go up, the stock market has started falling. It is as though the last acts of an exciting play are staged in Turkey. On the stage stands a car and three drivers. They have brought the car to the edge of the abyss, driving it in a fool's paradise, ignorant of the worth of what they possess. The smallest imbalance or movement could have brought the car to abyss. The utter care exercised by the drivers in leaving the car, lest it tumble into the abyss, would have at least guaranteed their lives. The drivers lose their sang froid at this point; gripped by agitation and panic, they seem to have lost their capacity for responsible action. And this is where the drama starts.

Minister of State Responsible for the Economy Kemal Dervis emerges as a person who knows Turkey closely! It is only his distance from political games that is thought-provoking. Especially as the coalition partners enamored of soccer vie to "score goals," it seems unclear how long he will be able to catch the ball with his racket. But tennis still has a superiority to soccer, which requires a team spirit. Tennis is a solitary game that demands constant agility. In a way this explains why the Turkish people believe that Dervis will emerge victorious in this game by himself despite the moves of the team, and the public support for the minister. Kemal Dervis is at this point the only reliable politician for the Turkish people, or at least they hope so.

Toward restructuring

Turkey struggles to get out of the vicious circle and realize the depolitization of the economy, as well as passing to a more widespread and productive real sector model through a smaller and more effective government-public sector model. Kemal Dervis is in Turkey to affect this change. The circles of the U.S., the IMF and the World Bank, tired of squabbling with Ankara when none of the politicians in Turkey supported this kind of change, are thought to have imposed as the precondition of financial support for Turkey the appointment of Kemal Dervis as economy tsar, who they believed to be a trustworthy person who could change the system. Ecevit's coalition government reluctantly accepted this change, and it still reluctantly (and sometimes with resistance) follows the developments.

The debate as to why the West wanted this was brought to the spotlight by our politicians. The classical left has it that "they want to colonize Turkey and confiscate its resources." They believe that Turkey should start a "national struggle" against the West, the IMF and the U.S. Just as at the time of the War of Liberation... It is at this point that the views of the Turkish left converge with the defenders of the old order. They want the entrenchment of the bureaucracy and the politicians holding the reins of the political administration in Ankara, under the umbrella of a statist economy. The "Old Turkey" belonged to politicians like Suleyman Demiral and Tansu Ciller who received votes through populist methods, distributed the resources of the state cheaply to their "political families," most of whom are now standing trial. The defenders of the old order would like the wheel to turn forever. They want to be able to distribute ill-gained earning. Otherwise, they are not opposed to the statist economic model.

It is evidently not correct to expect Dervis to solve all problems on his own. He says whenever it is appropriate that he needs strong support even to solve economic problems. The struggle of new Turkey starts just at this point, with the demand for support for the new economic program. Will Turkey turn into a productive country with a strong real sector? How will the GNP go up from $3-4 thousand to about $15 thousand like in the U.S.? How will the Turkish public recover economically? With the aid of the state, or by increasing productivity? With foreign or local capital?

Turkey is only a regional market and point of transit for capital movements that are gradually integrated into the West and acquire international character. While its purchasing power is still small, it has a large consumption potential. In addition, it has a chance of engaging in border trade with countries in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East.

In other words, to modernize Turkey's economic structure resembles for the West to open a "plug" which deadlocks the gateway between Europe and Asia with its bizarre economic structure. Turkey turns into a black hole for economic assistance arriving from the West and with its current structure bars the flow of capital in a liberal system, which the West regards as crucial. To the West, Turkey appears as a rather large "bandits' town" between the Middle East and the Balkans. The robbed banks, narcotics trafficking, politicians mired in corruption, terrorist movements, the air of war with neighbors, torture, deaths and the wild traffic strengthen this impression.

The West, that is the U.S. and Europe, would like Turkey to become a country "of Western standards, part of the Western alliance, integrated to the West, modern and civilized." Turkey has noticed that the price of failure is to stay as part of the Middle East. The atmosphere of lack of confidence in the political system, and economic and other crises that we mentioned before created a political depression for the Turkish person.

In sum, economic stability in itself is insufficient to solve problems. First comes the establishment of political stability, the expansion of democracy, the lifting of bans, turning Turkey into a country that not only speaks but discusses, and the inclusion in the debate of the plurality of different cultures, languages and faiths... The expanded democratic structure will bring about economic stability, and will inaugurate the concept of free trade and liberal government leading to a developing country set free from the hegemony of politicians. As much as a state of law, economic transparency becomes important in a liberal economic system. Turkish pereostroika requires change in more than the economic sphere.


5 . - Middle East Newsline - "Russia's new M.E. alliance targets Israel, Turkey":

WASHINGTON

Amid flagging U.S. will, Russia has expanded its sphere of influence in the Middle East in a drive that threatens Israel and Turkey, a new report says.

The report says Moscow is achieving control of major sources of oil and natural gas and is reversing the gains made by the United States since the 1991 Gulf war. The report by the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies said Russia is also attempting to control the world price of oil.

The Russian policy focuses on relations with Iran and is meant to contain militant Islam in the nearby Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia has developed Iranian energy reserves and offered advanced weapons and technology in exchange for Teheran's agreement to serve as a route for any proposed energy pipeline from the Caspian.

"Perhaps more than any other issue," said the report, authored by strategist Ilan Berman, "Moscow's concerted quest for domination of the Caspian Basin, and its machinations to this end in the Persian Gulf, illustrate the degree of importance it attaches to the Middle East. Russia's Caspian policy is clear: to project its power over the oil-rich nations of the Caucusus to exclude any strategic presence there, and to impose its own security environment over the area."

The report said Moscow's exploitation of the Caspian could place Russia and its allies as the world's wealthiest oil exporters. Such control could allow Moscow to rival the power of Gulf Arab oil and natural gas producers and set world energy prices.


UN: Cyprus military situation remains calm

WASHINGTON

The United Nations has deemed that the military situation on the divided island of Cyprus remains calm.

A UN report submitted to the Security Council said that with the exception of several incidents the ceasefire line between the Greek-dominated Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the island is not in danger of exploding into violence. The report said the exceptions were several "small incidents, some potentially serious, caused by both the National Guard and Turkish forces."

"The military situation along the ceasefire lines remained calm," the report said.

UN secretary-general Kofi Annan has recommended the continuation of UN peacekeepers on Cyprus for another six months. The issue will be discussed in the council next week.


6. - Turkish Daily News - "Turkey moves to balance ties with Israel and Syria":

ANKARA

It was not long ago that Turkey's southern neighbor and former enemy Syria was among the major Arab countries criticizing Ankara's close military and security ties with Israel. Though Arab scepticism and criticism of Turkey's close military cooperation with Israel continues, there has been a decline in the level of the campaign against the ties between Ankara and Tel Aviv, as Turkey has begun to pursue a more balanced policy towards the Middle East.

Seeking to establish more balanced military ties with its Middle Eastern neighbors, who are interested in cooperating with the Turkish military, Ankara is currently hosting another Syrian military delegation headed by General Ahmed al-Ali from Syria's training department.

Also, starting on June 17, Turkey is to host the first ever tri-nation air exercises with participation by Israel and the United States and is scheduled to be staged in the central Anatolian town of Konya.

The Syrian military delegation, the second in less than six months, is holding talks with their Turkish counterparts at the Turkish General Staff headquarters.

Both militaries have discussed details of a draft military training scheme and a technical and scientific cooperation agreement that Lt Gen. Resat Turgut, head of the Plans and Principles Department of the Turkish General Staff gave to his Syrian counterpart, Gen. Mahmut Ammar, during a visit he paid to Ankara on Jan. 18.

Before this military agreement can be signed, a friendship and cooperation agreement should exist between the countries concerned. Thus a Declaration of Principles agreement developed between Turkey and Syria should be signed.

Turgut, taking questions from the press during a symposium on space held in Ankara in late May, described the Turkish-Syrian relations as improving. Turgut, who was in Damascus in late April last year, said that it was too early to talk about staging joint exercises as part of a planned establishment of confidence building measures (CBMs) between the two countries. CBMs could only be established in parallel with the further improvement of political ties between Ankara and Damascus.

After almost a decade of tension related to Damascus' continued support for the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Turkey has initiated military talks with its southern neighbor Syria.

Meanwhile, a Syrian delegation that was dealing with security issues held talks in Istanbul with their Turkish counterparts.

In reference to Turkey's advanced military ties with Israel, a senior Turkish general speaking to the Turkish Daily News stressed that it was natural for Turkey to look for alternatives to meet its security needs. "This, however, does not prevent us [Turkey] from furthering our relations with, for example, Syria and Russia," said the general.

Turkey has increasingly been questioning its weight within the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) due to fellow muslim countries' anti-Turkish policies on various issues including water. One senior diplomat recalls that while criticising Turkey over its military ties with Israel, Arabs could easily be using the Euphrates and Tigris river water issue -- of which Turkey controls the taps -- against Ankara.

Turkey to host first ever trilateral joint air exercises with United States and Israel

Turkish, Israeli and U.S. jets will stage trilateral air exercises code named "Anatolian Eagle" in Turkey's central Anatolian town of Konya. The 14-day exercise will further mark the irreversible course of the security and military ties that were established formally between Ankara and Tel Aviv back in 1996, when the two countries signed military training and defence industry agreements, said a Turkish diplomatic source.

While U.S. and Israeli sources in Ankara have confirmed the exercises, the Turkish Air Forces Command (HKK) has refrained from making any comment on the upcoming exercise due to the sensitivity of Turkish-Israeli relations in the minds of Arabs at a time when the Palestinian and the Israeli dispute has worsened.

Turkey and Israel have been staging joint air exercises in Turkish airspace which was followed by naval manoeuvres that were conducted by the two countries in late April at Turkey's Aksaz Naval Base in Southwestern Turkey.