7 August 2001

1. "Germany confirms arms sale to Turkey", the German government confirmed Monday it had authorised the sale of detonators to Turkey but denied that the decision marked an easing of arms export policy towards the country.

2. "Turkey's rough political waters", Turkey's political scene has experienced some upheaval in the last few weeks, with further complications expected throughout this summer.

3. "Ilisu Dam in Turkey may be under threat", Turkey's proposed Ilisu Dam- part of the $32bn Southeast Anatolian Development Project (GAP) project that will flood large numbers of villages and archaeological and historical sites- is under criticism from a scathing British government report published on July 3rd.

4. "National View Kurds wary of New Initiative", Majority of Kurds who notably supported National View movement allegedly not supportive of either Saadet Party or Erdogan's New Initiative.

5. "Towards strategical partnership", Defense Minister Binyamin Ben Eliezer of Israel came to Ankara on a one-day official visit in July. His contacts focused on the issue of putting into practice joint defense projects and further improving strategical relations between Turkey and Israel.

6. "Saddam Hussein's Call to the Kurds For Dialogue and the Difficult Kurdish Choice", the scene chosen by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to invite the Kurds to a dialogue is an example of surrealism in the Iraqi message.


1. - AFP - "Germany confirms arms sale to Turkey":

BERLIN

The German government confirmed Monday it had authorised the sale of detonators to Turkey but denied that the decision marked an easing of arms export policy towards the country.

The Frankfurter Allgemeine newspaper reported Sunday that the government had authorised the sale of detonators in a softening of its policy on weapons exports to the regime in Ankara. An economy ministry spokesman said the authorisation had been given on the basis of prevailing German policy, which requires the government to take into account the human rights situation of the country concerned. "In this case too, the human rights situation in Turkey was taken into account," he said. Such decisions are taken by the security council, a secretive government committee.

The newspaper said the decision had been taken at the behest of a Nuremberg arms manufacturer, Diehl, which had been seeking authorisation for a year to fulfil a contract to supply detonators. The present arms export policy was arrived at early last year after the Greens party of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer objected to the delivery of a prototype Leopard tank to Turkey which Ankara wanted to purchase in bulk.


2. - Oxford Businnes - "Turkey's rough political waters":

Turkey's political scene has experienced some upheaval in the last few weeks, with further complications expected throughout this summer. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decided on July 31st that human rights had not been infringed when the Welfare Party was banned in 1999, prompting outrage from Turkey's Islamists and nods of approval from most commentators. However, the Motherland Party (ANAP), one of the members of the ruling coalition, faced a potential deputy revolt against party head Mesut Yilmaz in its convention on August 4th. Although Yilmaz- as expected- retained his leadership, recent opinion polls indicate that all current parties would not clear the 10% threshold required to enter parliament. The grouping with the most support, but without a name is to be lead by the former mayor of Istanbul, Tayyip Erdogan, and has some 30% popular support. Meanwhile, the other wing of the disbanded Virtue Party (FP) has established a new party called the Felicity Party (SP).

In a surprise ruling by the ECHR in Strasbourg on July 31st, the court decided by four votes to three that Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights had not been infringed when the Welfare Party (RP) was banned in 1999. The previous members of the party had brought the case to the court in anticipation that the court would rule against Turkey, as does usually seem to be the case when human rights are involved. This time it was decided that the ban had not contravened Article 11, which the court pointed out covered freedom of assembly and association. The court also decided not to hear the other RP complaints against Turkey.

Naturally the reaction from the Islamists of the former RP was one of condemnation. The party chairman, Necmettin Erbekan, a former Turkish prime minister now banned from politics, called the decision "politically motivated" and has said that he will appeal. His followers have offered similar reactions, and some accused the Albanian judge of bias, claiming that as an Albanian he was grateful to Turkey for all the assistance and aid it had given his country. Most commentators were in full support of the decision, however. The chairman of Turkey's Constitutional Court, Mustafa Bumin, which oversaw the banning of the RP's successor party, the Virtue Party (FP) said that he was very pleased indeed. He commented that the ruling proved that the decision of the Constitutional Court was entirely in line with European human rights. Former Turkish president, Suleyman Demirel, was rather more blunt, and advised Erbekan to quit politics, as most of his political parties appear to have ended in clashes with the Turkish constitution. "He (Erbekan) should give up and stop wearying the nation" he said.

One of the coalition partners, ANAP, the fourth largest political party in the Turkish parliament prior to the banning of the FP, held its convention on August 4th. There was an election for leader of the party and, although no-one expected that the current leader, Mesut Yilamz, would lose, he faced some opposition from his deputies. Media commentators have noted that the party will have to move towards a more liberal, technocratic structure in order to survive, and this call has been taken up by some of the more vocal members of the party. Yilmaz has claimed that even "the corpse" of the party could get into parliament, but has nontheless promised that following the convention the party will be rebranded. Already some ANAP deputies are threatening to move to the reformist wing of the disbanded FP, to be lead by Tayyip Erdogan, and the former ANAP interior minister, Sadettin Tantan, has indicated that he is considering establishing his own party.

Tantan was a very respected politician, known for his efforts to combat corruption in Turkey, but fell foul to in-party bickering and was demoted from minister of the interior, eventually resigning himself to back-bench activities as an independent. He is currently touring the country to try and establish whether there is scope for a new political party under his leadership, according to speech he made on August 1st.

Unfortunately, a recent poll by the monitoring agency ANAR indicates that not one of the current political parties would actually get into parliament, were an election to be held immediately, as none of them passed the 10% threshold required for seats in parliament. This represents no change since the last such poll in May, although overall public opinion for the economic reform programme appears to have waned. The new political grouping under the former mayor of Istanbul, Tayyip Erdogan, was the most successful, with 30% of respondents saying that they would vote for his party. It is highly unlikely that it would ever gain so much support in an election, but the poll is an indication of how unhappy the population is with the current political options. The movement is the reformist wing of the now-defunct FP, the other half of which has now grouped together as a new party, the Felicity Party (SP) under the guidance of Nemettin Erbekan. Some disgruntled members of the ANAP are reported to have moved to this party. The fundamental difficulty that politicians face lies in persuading the population to vote at all, as some 30% of those asked said that they would not vote for any of the existing parties or political movements.


3. - Oxford Businnes - "Ilisu Dam in Turkey may be under threat":

Turkey's proposed Ilisu Dam- part of the $32bn Southeast Anatolian Development Project (GAP) project that will flood large numbers of villages and archaeological and historical sites- is under criticism from a scathing British government report published on July 3rd. A British company, Balfour Beatty is to construct the dam, and has required that the British government's Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) underwrite the company's £200m contract. The government of Tony Blair promised in December 1999 that this underwriting would be provided, as long as certain environmental and human rights conditions were met in the planning stages. Last month's report suggests that none of the conditions have been met, implying that the British government should withdraw its vital support for the project. It also raises further issues over the water needs of Iraq and Syria and hence the UK's relations with all states concerned.

The $2bn Ilisu Dam- GAP's second largest project- is to create a reservoir for regional irrigation and hydroelectric power. However, it is rapidly becoming Turkey's equivalent of China's Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River, as opposition to the project grows in Turkey and abroad. The hydro-electric dam is to be constructed across the Tigris river just below the historic town of Hasankeyf near the Syrian border and should create a reservoir covering some 300 sq km. According to the report of July 3rd, commissioned by the British government in 1999, 28 200 people would be in a position to claim compensation for expropriated land or demand resettlement, of which 19 600 still live in the affected area. Overall, a total of 59 000 people living in 183 villages would be affected by the project. Furthermore, the report criticises the loss of local culture- including ancient archaeological ruins- and that fellow Tigris riparians Iraq and Syria, as well as the local Kurdish population, have not been consulted.

The GAP project as a whole was initiated in 1978 as a measure to alleviating poverty in southeastern Turkey. The dams will irrigate the region, increasing the area of arable land, and will eventually provide up to one quarter of Turkey's electricity. In the process some 4m jobs are to be created and officials estimate the individual incomes in the region will rise by 200%. Detractors of the GAP project claim that aside from damaging archaeological sites and consuming too much water from the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, it will drive 78 000 Kurds from their homes.

The British government, at the insistence of Prime Minister Tony Blair and against the advice of most of his cabinet colleagues, supported the dam project, but did commit to commissioning a report. The government decided to back the dam with £200m in the form of an export credit guarantee to provide an underwriting to the cost of Balfour Beatty's part of the project. The findings of this report make difficult for the British government to continue its support, as it concludes that Turkey has not fulfilled the four conditions set by then Trade and Industry Secretary Stephen Byers. His successor, Patricia Hewitt, stated that a decision will be made following a consultation period that ends on September 7th, and that the export credit guarantee will only be provided once she is satisfied that the environmental and social impacts are suitably covered. The ECGD is part of the Department of Trade and Industry.

The four conditions set by the British government state that the Turkish authorities establish a resettlement programme for the populations displaced by the dam, many of them Kurds. The report- which was compiled largely by Turks but with co-operation from Canadians, Belgians and Swiss- concluded that this programme has not yet been set up and that Kurds have not been fully informed of their rights or of the plans. The second condition called for provisions for upstream water treatment for the Tigris and the reservoir. Apparently not enough has been done yet, prompting fears of an algae bloom on the reservoir due to increased pollution. Within the third condition the flow of water to Iraq and Syria was to be regulated and agreed upon, but neither of the other countries have yet agreed to the flow, which has already been reduced by around 10% through irrigation in Turkey. Finally a plan was to be drawn up for the preservation of as much of the archaeological heritage of the area as possible, and a programme has been initiated to record the sites and excavate many of them.

The British government has not yet officially changed its policy, but select committees of MPs have all recommended that the government withdraw. This is likely to happen as international opposition has grown, and an international campaign has been set up. Especially in the face of such opposition, British support is crucial to the construction of the dam, largely because of the major involvement of Balfour Beatty. The controversy is likely to continue however, as another British company, Amec, is part of a consortium to construct a $1bn dam in north eastern Turkey to be called the Yusefeli dam, and has asked for a guarantee for £68m from the ECGD. Again minorities are threatened, as is the environment, as the commitment of the British government towards protecting human rights and the environment is once again analysed within the context of large-scale projects.


4. - Turkish Daily News - "National View Kurds wary of New Initiative":

Majority of Kurds who notably supported National View movement allegedly not supportive of either Saadet Party or Erdogan's New Initiative

It is being said that Kurdish voters who used to vote for parties in the National View movement (National Salvation, National Order, Welfare and Virtue - all defunct) are all wary of both the Virtue Party's successors Saadet (Happiness and Contentment) and Tayyip Erdogan's as yet unnamed New Initiative. This caution could reportedly be to the benefit of the Peoples Democracy Party (HADEP), which has a Kurdish voting base.

The defunct DEP did not take part in the 1994 elections, which saw important city municipalities like Diyarbakir, Batman, Urfa and Van won by the Welfare Party (RP). The voters that ensured these wins are reportedly cautious of both Saadet and the New Initiative movement.

The attitude taken by the FP to the Kurdish question and in regard to Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan imprisoned on Imrali Island, especially in calling for the file on his execution to be sent to Parliament, is still being criticized by Kurds of the National View persuasion.

Although this situation at first glance strengthens the opinion that Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his New Initiative will be supported, the preferences of the region's parliamentary deputies, the leanings of party provincial organizations and the attitude of the voters show that the Saadet Party is being supported. The Kurdish-origin National View supporters are reportedly wary of Erdogan and his new identity. However, as the Saadet Party's program shows no sign of supporting the Kurdish question, most of the party members are reportedly inclined to give up on the National View tradition.

According to news in the pro-PKK Ozgur Politika newspaper, the support of National View Kurdish-origin citizens is as follows:

Van...

It is being said that the New Initiative is seeing some interest because it contains Fethullah Erbas, who is known for his remarks concerning the Kurdish question. Former provincial chairman Ikram Dincer says he sides with Erdogan but adds only time will tell which way the voters will turn.

Urfa...

Once known as an FP fortress, Urfa's situation has not changed. Deputies Niyazi Yanmaz and Ahmet Karavar have remained faithful to the National View cause. When he spoke on behalf of all the FP mayors at the FP congress on Sept. 14, Mayor Ahmet Bahcivan said they would continue to back Kutan.

Diyarbakir...

The word 'balance' expresses the situation in Diyarbakir to a tee. According to former provincial chairman Fehmi Uyanik, who was removed from office for supporting the New Initiative, most of the voters are backing Erdogan. On the other side of the coin, deputies Omer Vehbi Hatipoglu and Sacit Gunbey, who have considerable influence over the voters, are firmly within the Saadet Party.

Batman...

A 'conservative' stronghold. Both the province's deputy Alaattin Sever Aydin and the provincial organization are backing Kutan. The prevailing view of the New Initiative is that they are mistaken.

Region's National View vote could go to HADEP

The split within the National View movement following the banning of the FP will reportedly increase the number of former FP voters switching to HADEP. The fact that the FP loss considerable ground at the last general and local elections in predominantly Kurdish constituencies makes this eventuality all the more likely. Urfa in particular saw HADEP votes increase by 50 percent in the 1999 elections while FP votes slumped.


5. - Anadolu Agency - "Towards strategical partnership":

Defense Minister Binyamin Ben Eliezer of Israel came to Ankara on a one-day official visit in July. His contacts focused on the issue of putting into practice joint defense projects and further improving strategical relations between Turkey and Israel.

The missile shield program which was planned to be formed against joint threats in the region, was also discussed during Eliezer's contacts in Ankara.

Eliezer stressed that fundamentalist circles' possessing nuclear weapons would pose a threat to whole region and the free world.

He tried to draw Ankara's attention to the nuclear weapons in Iran.

Recalling that regional countries were in the range of Iran's Sahab-3 missiles, Eliezer said that Iran could become a total nuclear power by 2005.

During Eliezer's contacts in Ankara, Arrow missile system, performing joint land maneouvres, modernization of Turkish tanks, sale of unmanned planes, Popeye-2 missiles, military satellites, ATAK assault helicopter project and delivery of anti-tank missiles were taken up.

Eliezer also gave messages about the Middle East peace process. He noted that peace negotiations were halted because of Arafat's attitude supporting terrorism and violence. He stressed that terrorist methods could not send Israel back to the negotiation table.


6. - Al Hayat - "Saddam Hussein's Call to the Kurds For Dialogue and the Difficult Kurdish Choice":

The scene chosen by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to invite the Kurds to a dialogue is an example of surrealism in the Iraqi message.

Though the contacts of Kurdish leaders, especially Mas'ud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, with Baghdad were never severed, particularly during the past few years, the Iraqi president insisted on personally announcing the invitation to the dialogue and chose as the stage for this scene his meeting with members of the Baghdad-based "Legislative Council of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region" that was established by the government.

If Saddam met the "Legislative Council" members as the Kurdish people's representatives, so what does his invitation to the leaders of Kurdistan to a dialogue mean? The safe haven in northern Iraq was imposed by an international resolution. Yet he says that he has kept "the special situation" in northern Iraq as it is so that the Kurdish citizen could "reach his genuine choice", as if the decision to control Kurdistan depends on his will.

The mastermind of the Al-Anfal operation, the displacements, and the repression claimed credit when he said: "The Kurdish leaders would have inflicted the worst punishment on their people were it not for their fear of Baghdad." He described Kurdistan as a "despised small" part and its condition "that of the prodigal son" who has "to back down and repent." He brandished the club of obedience when he said: "When we cannot do this, then we will tackle things in due course."

But there are bitter and very realistic facts behind this surrealist and absurd speech. Saddam believes that the situation in Kurdistan after10 years has changed in a way that allows him to act and impose his political will, if not his direct will.

The international factor as represented by the United Nations is incapable of taking a decision to intervene in favor of the Kurds in view of the Russian veto and the Turkish refusal.

In the absence of a firm US decision to use force directly to bring down the regime, Washington has adopted "containment" as its policy. This has served Saddam more than any other factor. In the name of the fear from the(Shiite or Kurdish) alternative, the Iraqi president has become the least damaging factor.

In the absence of a possible resolution of the situation on the ground, the US air strikes have become a media tool that helps Baghdad's ruler gain regional and international sympathy. Saddam sought to defuse the Kurds as a force for political change in Iraq. He scored success in this endeavor, starting with the vacuum created by the decision to withdraw the central administration and its services from the Kurdish north, thus placing the burden of managing and feeding the region on others. With Baghdad's encouragement, the political vacuum also helped turn the political conflict between the Kurdish parties into internecine fighting that reached a climax in 1996 when one of the parties turned to the Iraqi regime for military aid.

All this happened in full view of Washington, which did not take any action and was content with observing the Iraqi forces' withdrawal from Irbil after putting an end to the military presence of the Iraqi opposition there. Washington thus launched a new stage in Kurdistan that the then US Secretary of State Madeline Albright consolidated when she told the Kurds: "Do not challenge Saddam and provoke him to attack in return for continuing the air protection."

With the central government absent, Iraq's Kurdistan was seen as a vacuum that both Iran and Turkey, and Syria to a lesser degree, sought to fill. This gave Baghdad the opportunity to join the balance of powers' game by backing one party against another. The Kurds' preoccupation with protecting themselves from Iran and/or Turkey compelled them to make concessions and live in constant anxiety.When the two main Kurdish parties overcame many of their differences, Baghdad turned to secondary parties to stoke up the conflicts. It helped the Kurdish Workers Party and other marginal groups and also resorted to terrorism and explosions (a Tunisian UN employee was recently arrested on the charge of transporting explosives in a UN truck).

The growing danger that the Kurdish Islamic parties posed to the two main Kurdish parties also served Baghdad. But the oil and financial card remained the most effective one in neutralizing the Kurds. The regime has again linked the region to an economic network whose main activity is oil and smuggling. The Kurdish economy today, especially in Irbil, relies on the trade and oil transport routes to Turkey through Kurdistan. This has created Kurdish sectors that are benefiting from this situation and it is difficult to compensate them for the Iraqi Government's supplies. Baghdad also succeeded in building bridges of cooperation with Turkey and hinted at opening a second crossing point that does not go through the Kurdish area.

With this background, Saddam's initiative becomes more of a threat than a dialogue. Yet the Kurds are not in a position to reject the invitation. The Kurdish predicament is represented by the fear of a confrontation with Saddam without a regional or international cover to protect them. Their response came in a very moderate statement. The two main Kurdish parties underlined in a joint statement dated 27 July their peaceful path and Iraq's national unity "which will be consolidated in as much as democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights, and the peaceful and fair solution of the Kurdish issue within the framework of a united and sovereign Iraq are achieved." Regarding the conditions for the dialogue, the statement merely referred to the "need to prepare the appropriate grounds and the requirements for the democratic and open dialogue and to establish confidence building measures." It specified these requirements as "ending the policy of deporting and displacing the indigenous population from their areas and disclosing the fate of detainees and missing persons. The sacrifices, aspirations, and will of the people of Kurdistan should also be taken into consideration in accordance with the resolution of the Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly of 4 October 1992 that says the legal relationship between the region of Kurdistan and the central government should be based on federalism and respect for the legitimate rights of all ethnic groups and religions."

The statement talks here about "taking into consideration" and not commitment to or the actual implementation of the Kurdish National Assembly's decisions while stressing "Iraq's unity and sovereignty." The reference to "respect for the legitimate rights of all ethnic groups and religions" was included to assure the Turkomen and Assyrians. On the other hand, the statement avoided linking the Kurdish issue to the Iraqi opposition or even to refer to the latter in any way. It also dropped the international factor by not demanding an international participation or supervision to guarantee the democratic transition process. The statement totally ignored all the UN resolutions, including Resolution 688 that deals with the Kurds' human rights.

It is quite noticeable that, according to informed sources, the first draft of the statement included several conditions, the most important of which were: "The Baghdad Government's acceptance of the federal system declared by the Kurdish Parliament in April 1992; the launch of a dialogue on the basis of establishing a democratic and pluralistic regime; and the holding of general elections under regional and international supervision to ensure the honesty of the electoral process." Another condition called on the government "to disclose the fate of the victims of the 1988 Al-Anfal operation when it arrested more than 150,000 Kurds and moved them from their areas in northern Iraq to unknown destinations." The moderation of the joint statement and its focus on what is possible within the limits of the common Iraqi will has left the ball in the central government's corner. If Saddam's call to a dialogue was merely a card for the consumption of the Arab and international media, then the moderation of the Kurdish response has rendered it useless. If the Baghdad ruler's aim from using the language of threat encased in the call to a dialogue was to ensure the Kurdish leaders' rejection or to provoke them so as to justify an invasion of Kurdistan, then the Kurdish moderation has also rendered this excuse useless.

The Iraqi president's need for a "Trojan horse" to re-impose his control on Kurdistan might have prompted him to propose a plan with which he had hoped to split the Kurds' ranks. But the issuance of the joint statement that left the door open for a dialogue has rendered this possibility useless too.

Saddam's initiative might however achieve with the Iraqi opposition what it has failed to achieve with the Kurds, especially when non-Kurdish Iraqi opposition elements attack the Kurds for "the dialogue" with the regime. This only increases the Iraqi opposition's divisions and reinforces the Kurds' conviction of its futility. The Kurds have gained some time but the problem of the Kurdish future remains. Kurdish leaders know that the current situation, which has continued for 10 years (and is the best for several decades), cannot remain like that forever and that the fate of Kurdistan will in the end be decided, either positively or negatively, in Baghdad.

The Kurdish leaders also realize at the same time that they are incapable of and not allowed to impose the change in Baghdad and that there is no effective Iraqi opposition that is acceptable at the regional and international levels on which it is possible to wager or forge an alliance with. Besides the Kurds, the Islamic number in the equation (specifically the Shiite one) remains the stronger one. But the problem is that this number is unacceptable at the regional and international levels and its policies on the Kurdish affair are not assuring to most Kurds.

Apart from Libya, there is not a single Arab country that is sympathetic to the Kurds' aspirations and hopes. The Arab street too sees only a secessionist movement in the Kurds. At the regional level, no neighboring country (Turkey, Iran, Syria) wishes to see a sophisticated Kurdish example established that would attract the Kurds in their countries. The Kurds fear being abandoned by the United States as much as they understand the importance of its protection of their existence. The events of 1975 are still vivid in the Kurdish leaders' memories, especially Barzani. The Kurds' fears are growing today as the US administration is reviewing its policy toward Iraq, particularly in connection with continuing the no fly zones as its planes are coming under more Iraqi challenge there. The most that the Pentagon promised at the last meeting held with the Kurds on 14 July was that Washington "will not allow Saddam to use Iraqi air space to attack the Kurds or threaten his neighbors."

Protection from Saddam's aircraft is not a substitute and not enough to protect the Kurds from a military invasion on the ground. Washington's failure to assure the Kurds about their future is not just a political defeat for US policy but also the end of the Kurdish democratic experiment and is, consequently, a victory for the dictatorship and for Saddam personally.

In return, Saddam is not willing to make any political concession, not even a temporary one, for the sake of democratic détente in Iraq, especially after having come out of "political healthcare unit" and the "cage" of US containment. Finally, no one knows Saddam's promises better than the Kurds. They have been bitten several times and they therefore need international guarantees. But Saddam does not accept this, arguing that it is a matter of "sovereignty." Nor the party that is most capable of providing the guarantees is willing to do so for fear that this would rehabilitate the regime.